Some Reflections on the Personality of the Buddha\textsuperscript{(1)}

Paul Harrison
(University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand)

1. Preamble

During the autumn of 1994 I had the honour to be invited to present a graduate seminar at Ōtani University during which we read a Buddhist scripture known as the \textit{Lokānuvartanā-sūtra} (LAn). The LAn is part of a small corpus of Mahāyāna texts translated into Chinese by Lokakṣema in the late 2nd cent. C.E. This corpus has for many years been the focus of my research into Mahāyāna Buddhism, not only because of its unique historical status but also on account of the intrinsic significance and interest of many of the \textit{sūtras} in it.\textsuperscript{(2)} The LAn is a case in point: previous work on the text by Japanese scholars and by myself\textsuperscript{(3)} has demonstrated its importance for our understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology.\textsuperscript{(4)} In specific terms the LAn is a classic statement of the well-known \textit{lokottaravāda} doctrine, which held that many facets of the Buddha’s life and personality were simply a show for the sake of suffering humanity (it is thus often compared to the docetic heresy in Christianity). This is regarded as a characteristic teaching of the Mahāsāṅghika school in general, and especially of its sub-school the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādins. As I have already shown in my earlier article, the famous docetic passages in the \textit{Mahāvastu} which constitute the \textit{locus classicus} for this doctrine have extensive and close parallels in the LAn, indicating that one text is based on the other, or that the two are derived from a common source, it being more likely in my opinion that the \textit{Mahāvastu} passage is drawn from the LAn (or, of course, its forerunner). In the same article I also showed (ibid. 225–227) how in three of his works Candrakīrti cites a total of 8 different verses—three of them more than once—from the LAn, naming it
as the Lokānuvartanā-sūtra, referring to it as āgama, and ascribing it to the Pūrvaśailas (another subsect of the Mahāsāṅghikas). There are also distinct echoes of the LAn in Nāgārjuna’s Niraupamya-stava (ibid.224). These citations indicate that the LAn, or the tradition it represents, enjoyed a certain currency in Buddhist India, at least in scholarly circles, and therefore we may legitimately regard it as representative of at least one strand of Indian buddhology. In this paper I propose to introduce this text in some detail, to discuss certain aspects of its buddhology, and then move on to some general reflections on the personality of the Buddha and the historical development of the Buddhist religion.

2. The Lokānuvartanā-sūtra

There are only two complete versions of the LAn in existence, the Chinese translation by Lokakṣema, Fo-shuo nei-zang bai-bao jing, T.(=Taishō shinshū daizōkyō)807, and the Tibetan from around the beginning of the 9th century, ’Phags pa ’jig rtšen gyi rjes su ’thun pa r ’jug pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo.⁵ It is a rather unusual text, in that the Tibetan version is entirely in verse form, even down to the opening and closing passages; altogether it contains 113 verses; reference to it will therefore be by verse numbers. The Chinese translation is in prose, but almost certainly Lokakṣema’s original was also in verse, since he regularly translated verse into prose. We can divide his text into over a hundred sections corresponding to the putative original verses (reference in this paper will be by section, marked with a §), although division is somewhat arbitrary at the beginning and end of the work, where there is no recurrent formula to mark the breaks. While not common, such versified sūtras are not altogether unknown either, other examples being the Ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā (Rgs)⁶ and the Śālistamba-kārikās (SK) attributed to Nāgārjuna.⁷ Scholars will be well aware that the status of the Rgs has generated a fair amount of scholarly debate, as to whether it is a kind of verse summary of the Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra (AsPP) or the original text of which the AsPP is the prose amplification. Whatever the answer to this question, it is the second text (SK) which resembles the LAn more closely, in that it is a versification (in 70 stanzas) of the entire Śāli-stamba-sūtra, including the narrative
frame that encloses the doctrinal statements. Its status as a commentary, however, seems to be in no doubt—the first verse even includes a salutation and a declaration of intent (Tib. mchod brjod and rtsom pa dam bca’i) before the second begins the narrative—although its attribution to Nāgārjuna by the Tibetan and the later Indian tradition is a matter for discussion. As Schoening notes (pp. 64–65), such versifications are rare, and are almost always commentarial in nature, i.e., they are secondary productions based on prose or mixed prose and verse texts. In the case of the LAn, however, even more so than with the Rgs, there is no evidence that it falls into this class: it appears to be a stand-alone text. If there was ever a prose work corresponding to it, it has been lost.

What makes the LAn a Mahāyāna text? The title of the Tibetan version states explicitly that it is a Mahāyāna sūtra, and Lokakṣema is indeed famous as the first Mahāyāna translator in China, but what internal evidence is there for this identification? Well, we find that the Buddha is called upon to preach by Mañjuśrī (called a bodhisattva in Chinese, but referred to simply as mkhas pa Jam dbyangs or Mañjughoṣa the Wise in the Tibetan), and preaches to an audience consisting of śrāvakas and bodhisattvas, so the frame narrative has the look of a Mahāyāna sūtra. In both versions, however, the bulk of the text contains few references to specifically Mahāyāna doctrines. Although many of the verses appear to relate to a standpoint typical of the Prajñāpāramitā literature (see, e.g., vv. 63, 71), such a standpoint is not always necessarily inconsistent with Mainstream Buddhism. Specific Mahāyānist touches are slightly more evident in the Chinese version, e.g., Mañjuśrī asks the Buddha to explain the operation of upāya-kauśalya (transliterated by Lokakṣema), so that the bodhisattvas assembled can know by what means they are to distinguish between inner and outer things, i.e., between reality and appearance. The term upāya-kauśalya does not occur at all in the Tibetan text, which is intriguing, as we shall see later. Both versions, however, make reference to the concept of anutpatika-dharma-kṣānti (v. 86, §82). With so little Mahāyāna colouration, then, could the LAn be one of the oldest texts translated by Lokakṣema? Do we have in it an example of a work from the period when the Mahāyāna movement was taking shape out of
the matrix of various Mainstream nikāyas, a transitional scripture which may have gone on being acceptable to some Mainstream Buddhists who did not share the beliefs and orientation of their Mahāyāna co-religionists? I think it is quite likely that it is such a work—after all, even in the 6th or early 7th century Candrakīrti does not seem to regard it as a Mahāyāna sūtra, but as an Āgama text connected with the Pūrvasaīlas—but in this area it is inadvisable to jump to hasty conclusions.

What then is the content of this work? The verses of the LAn fall into two broad categories. In the first (and most but not all of these are in the first half of the text), aspects of the Buddha’s life and person are dealt with, while in the second category (usually found in the latter half of the text), various teachings of the Buddha are discussed. In both parts the basic format is the same: the Buddha does X or teaches X to be the case but the Buddha or the real nature of things is in fact Y, which contrast is generally followed by the words (from the Sanskrit parallels):  

 Gayendra,  the world. Let us leave aside for the moment the “doctrinal” verses, as interesting as they are, and concentrate on the more strictly “buddhological” part of the text. We take the Tibetan version as our initial vantage-point, adding references to the Chinese. After some introductory verses which establish the agenda of the text—that only Buddhas can really fathom Buddhas, that they are supra-mundane (lokottara) in all respects and therefore completely uninvolved with the world, but that they must appear in it somehow to express their compassion and make themselves known—the LAn gets down to business in v. 15. I include here a synopsis of the relevant portions of the text:

The Buddhas make a show of having a father and a mother, but their bodies are not produced through sexual intercourse:  v. 15, cf. §14.

They make a show of (the foolishness of) childhood but have been associated with the perfection of insight for aeons:  v. 16, cf. §17.

They manifest a limited halo or nimbus, but their radiance is immeasurable:  v. 17, cf. §15.

They make a show of leaving footprints, but their feet never touch the
They make a show of fathering a son, etc., but have risen above the mud of desire: v. 19, cf. §18?
They appear to call Rāhula (i.e., in the case of Gautama) "son," but are free of lust: v. 20, cf. §18?
They appear to search for the Dharma, i.e., by studying under other teachers, despite their proclamation of universal supremacy at birth: v. 21, cf. §19.
They make a show of six years of austerities, despite their proven mastery of dhyaṇa as children: v. 22, cf. §20.
They make a show of taming Māra at the bodhi-maṇḍa, but are unrivalled and presumably unassailable: v. 23, cf. §21.
They make a show of an initial disinclination to teach after awakening, despite being teachers almost by definition: v. 24, cf. §22.
They make a show of waiting to be asked to teach the Dharma, but came here to teach out of compassion: v. 25, cf. §23.
They make a show of mindfulness or smṛti, although their cognitive powers are unchanging: v. 26, cf. §24.
They make a show of coming and going, but there is no coming of going for them: v. 27, cf. §25.
They make a show of getting up and by extension lying down, but they do not rest anywhere: v. 28, cf. §26.
They make a show of washing their feet, but their feet are as pure as lotus-petals: v. 29, cf. §27.
They make a show of washing their bodies, but their bodies are spotless and gold in colour: v. 30, cf. §28.
They make a show of cleaning their teeth, but their teeth are pearly white and their breath is fresh: v. 31, cf. §29.
They make a show of eating, but they are not subject to hunger: v. 32, cf. §30.
They make a show of answering the calls of nature, but their bodies are as hard and incorruptible as vajra: v. 33, cf. §31.
They make a show of taking medicine, but they are free of illness: v. 34, cf. §33.
They make a show of old age, but their bodies are not subject to change: v. 35, cf. §32.
They make a show of physical weakness, but could move the entire cosmos with their big toes: v. 36, cf. §34.
They make a show of corruptible bodies, but the Dharma (or the dharmas) is their true body: v. 37, cf. §36.
(One doctrinal verse intervenes here.)
They make a show of the four modes of deportment, but are constantly composed or concentrated: v. 39, cf. §38.
They make a show of susceptibility to cold, heat, sun and shade, but they are impervious to these forces: v. 40, cf. §39.
They make a show of accepting clothes, but are always clad like Brahmā: v. 41, cf. §40.
They make a show of having their heads shaved, although the crown of their heads cannot be overlooked: v. 42, cf. §41.
They make a show of the performance of dhyāna, although they have already mastered the supernormal powers which it generates: v. 43, cf. §42.
They make a show of eating inferior things (food), although they have earned the best of tastes: v. 44, cf. §43.
They make a show of not obtaining things, but their merit is inexhaustible: v. 45, cf. §44.
They make a show of continually eating food, but could last for aeons on the food of bliss: v. 46, cf. §?
They make a show of wearing rag-robés, but their merit entitles them to divine garments: v. 47, cf. §45.
They make a show of dwelling in straw huts, but could dwell in the palaces of the gods: v. 48, cf. §46.
They make a show of using umbrellas, even though they could dry up the ocean with their breath: v. 49, cf. §47.
They make a show of being obstructed by Māra, but could subdue countless
Māras with a single thought: v. 50, cf. §48.
(One verse of a doctrinal nature intervenes.)
They make a show of having to ask questions, but are not subject to ignorance: v. 52, cf. §49.
They make a show of withdrawal into seclusion, but are in this world for the benefit of others: v. 53, cf. §50?
They make a show of numerous phantom bodies, but are without various bodies: v. 54, cf. §51.
They make a show of frequenting quiet spots, but no noise can really disturb them: v. 55, cf. §52.

After this come verses dealing with primarily doctrinal matters, except for the following (note that the distinction is sometimes hard to draw):
They make a show of (teaching about?) saṅgha-bhedā, but the Sangha could not be split even by countless Māras: v. 68, cf. §65.
They make a show of guarding the senses, but they are always concentrated: v. 75, cf. §72.
They make a show of sickness and of having to ask a bhikṣu to preach in their place, but their adamantine bodies are not subject to illness: v. 76, cf. §74.
They make a show of the continuing effects of (bad) karma, i.e. karma-ploti or karma-pluti, but they have eliminated all evil, and possess all merits: v. 77, cf. §73.
They make a show of turning the wheel of the dharma, but know the dharma to be eternal: v. 91, cf. §?
They make a show of their radiance and bodies being measurable or finite, but these are infinite: v. 92, cf. §86.
They appear to need attendants, although their powers are incalculable and their strength unfailing: v. 99, cf. §93.
They make a show of being satisfied, but mundane things like gain and honour do not affect them: v. 103, cf. §97.

As we can see from this brief review, the LAṣ presupposes—among other
things—a fairly well-developed biographical tradition. If we set aside those verses that deal with the recurrent activities and constant frailties of the human condition, we can see that the implicit biography of the Buddha underlying the text includes: the birth from human parents (with accompanying proclamation of supremacy), the miracle of the unmovable shadow, childhood, marriage, the birth of Rāhula, study under other teachers, the six years of austerities, the trial by Māra at the bodhi-manḍapā, the initial disinclination to teach after the awakening, the request from the gods to teach, and the turning of the wheel of dharma. There is no explicit reference to the Buddha’s death (mahā-parinirvāṇa), although logically this is not impossible, since the talk is so often of plural Buddhas. Other specific events alluded to (although the verses are so terse that it is often difficult to see this) are the occasions when the Buddha and his followers had to subsist on horse-feed for several months in the town of Vairamśhyena or Vairāṇjā (Pāli: Verāṇjā)(v. 44, §43), when he entered the village of Śalā (Pañcasāla in the Pāli sources) to beg for alms but returned with an empty bowl (v. 45, §44), when he was sick and accepted a special medicine from the physician Jivaka (v. 34, §33) and when he was so indisposed with back-ache that he had to ask one of his monks to preach in his stead (v. 76, §74). These four incidents have a special significance. We may perhaps find it instructive if we pause to attend to the theme which underlies them while at the same time considering textual traditions which are related to the LAn.

3. Related Texts and the Problem of the Buddha’s Bad Karma

Since the verses of the LAn are so concise, the details of the incidents it alludes to obviously had to be supplied by its readers or hearers on the basis of their knowledge of other texts. (The word “text” is used here in the broadest possible sense, denoting not only written sources, but also oral traditions and plastic arts, but for our present purposes the former are more readily accessible.) We can find these details in various places, one important Mahāyāna source being the Sarva-buddha-mahā-rahasya-upāya-kauśalya-jñānottara-bodhi-sattva-paripṛcchā-parivarta-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra, Text No. 38 in the Ratnakūṭa collection. This sūtra survives in three Chinese versions, which are, in
chronological order, T. 345 (translated by Dharmarakṣa, 285 C.E.), T. 310.38 (translated by Nandi, 420 C.E., and included in Bodhiruci’s edition of the Ratnakūṭa, compiled 713 C.E.) and T. 346 (by Dānapāla, 1005 C.E.). There are also two Tibetan versions, the first being a translation from Chinese by ’Gos Chos grub (Chin. Wu Facheng), based on Dharmarakṣa’s rendition; this appears independently in the Kanjur under the title Upāya-kauṣalya-sūtra. The second was translated from the Sanskrit by Dānakīla, Karmanvarman and Ye shes sde, bears the full title as given above and is embedded in the Tibetan version of the Ratnakūṭa. The first of these—the Wu Facheng version—has now been translated into English by Mark Tatz as The Skill in Means (Upāyakauṣalya) Sūtra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), with a rendition of the second added in small type where it differs. Tatz’s justification for making a translation of a translation of a translation is that it affords us access to an earlier stratum of the textual tradition, since the Ratnakūṭa version, in both its Chinese and Tibetan forms, is more developed; but an English rendition of Dharmarakṣa’s version (which Tatz did not study) would no doubt have served this purpose better. As for the later stratum, an English translation (with some omissions) of the Chinese from T. 310.38 may be found in Garma C.C. Chang, ed., A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras: Selections from the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra (University Park, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 427–468. The relevant section for us is on pp. 442–465. For convenience we shall refer to this text simply as the Upāya-kauṣalya-sūtra (abbreviation: UpK).

As the title suggests, this text is devoted to an exposition of upāya-kauṣalya. Thematically it falls into two parts, Part II being dedicated to showing how various events in the Buddha’s life were not as they seemed, but were expressions of his skilful use of stratagems, or creativity, as we might translate upāya-kauṣalya. It is thus rather similar in this respect to the LAN (the Chinese version of which also makes explicit use of upāya-kauṣalya as an overall explanatory concept), although vastly more developed, in part because the relevant sections are in prose. For example, it tells us that from the time of the conception up until taking up his seat under the bodhi-tree, the bodhisattva really re-
mained in dhyāna in the Tuṣita Heaven, and only appeared to enter his mother’s womb, be born, enjoy the pleasures of the householder’s life, go forth into the religious life, and practise austerities (see Chang, pp. 443–444; Tatz, pp. 52–53). Not content with this, it then proceeds to explain in detail why even the appearance of these activities is not to be accounted for in the usual way. For example, the six years of austerities are not the result of bad karma, the lengthy avadāna of Jyotipāla and his insulting of the Buddha Kāśyapa being explained as a creative act engaged in in order to convert five companions (Chang, pp. 449–452; Tatz, pp. 62–67). As the text later explains, even the ten setbacks that befell the Buddha after his awakening were not the result of bad karma, the Buddha being totally free of karmic hindrances through never having committed a crime. He simply pretended to have these hindrances, so as to ensure that sentient beings avoid evil acts. In the final section of the text, however, as with the Jyotipāla episode, the evil deeds traditionally cited as the cause of the ten disasters are, if they are recounted at all, themselves explained as salvific acts motivated by compassion. Such avadānas or fragments of them are, however, provided only in a couple of cases, the main concern of the author of the text being apparently to justify the relevant events in the last life of the Buddha in terms of their beneficial consequences for the witnesses to them, seen or unseen.

The links and correspondences between the UpK, the LAn and various Mainstream works which deal in particular with the issue of the Buddha’s bad karma remain to be worked out. The latter are rich but as yet relatively unexplored by Western scholars. In the Theravāda tradition the most important source is the Pubba-kamma-piloti apadāna (which lists 12 misdeeds and their results) within the Apadāna collection, recently made the object of study by Sally Mellick-Cutler of the University of Oxford, to whom I am indebted for drawing this entire complex of texts to my attention. In her doctoral dissertation Mellick-Cutler notes the anomalous status of this text within the Apadāna collection, where instead of being put with the Buddhāpadāna, where it surely belongs, it is located among the apadānas of the Theras (Therāpadāna). Other
Mainstream sources relevant to this issue are a Sāṃmatiya list of 16 incidents transmitted by Daśabalaśrīmitra in his Saṃskṛtasaṃskṛta-viniścayā,25 a possibly Dhammarucika list in a Sinhalese work of the 14th century or earlier called Detis Karmaya, which allegedly describes 32 such incidents,26 and the Mūlasarvāstivādin list of 11 (prose) or 10 (verse) in the Anavatapta-gāthā section of the Bhaisajya-vastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya.27 One could also cite the Daśa-karma-plutyavadāna (Chap. 50) of Kṣemendra’s Bodhisattvāvadāna-kalpalatā, and various passages in the Milinda-pañha; and this is by no means a comprehensive inventory of the relevant sources. The LAn itself, as we have seen, contains allusions to at least five events often included in the lists—six year’s austerity (v. 22, §20), the taking of medicine (v. 34, §33), subsistence on horse-feed (v. 44, §43), the unsuccessful begging-round (v. 45, §44), and affliction with back-ache (v. 76, §74)—while the verse referring to saṅgha-bheda (v. 68, §65) may also be relevant, as a veiled reference to the machinations of Devadatta. Also relevant in this regard is v. 77:

Even though they have eliminated all evils
And are elevated by all merits,
They make a show of the continuity of karma:
This is conformity with the way of the world.

“Continuity of karma,” Tib. las kyi rgyud, stands here doubtless for Skt. karma-ploti or karma-pluti. Lokakṣema’s rather loose Chinese translation (§73) “unpacks” the term and indicates that it generally refers to bad karma:

All the Buddha’s evils have been eliminated, and he is endowed with nothing but merits. The Buddha shows others that his evils have not yet been eliminated. It is through conforming to the ways of the world that he makes such a show.

The same is true of the verse (v. 20) in Nāgārjuna’s Niraupamya-stava which echoes this:
In no way are you subject to the defect of karmic hindrance, o faultless one,
But out of compassion for the world you display the continuity [continuing
effects] of karma. 

The precise meaning of ṇłoṭi or pluti in this context is a matter of some dis-
cussion, but it seems to refer, as the Tibetan translation suggests (las kyi rgyud,
continuity of karma), to a continuing strand or thread of karma, a trailing thread
which has not been trimmed off, a tie not yet cut. As the LAn points out, the
Buddha is in reality free of any such trailing threads or ties, but still displays
them, the obvious inference (as worked out in great detail by the UpK) being
that he does so out of compassion for the world to teach it the law of karma.
Indeed, this is supposed to be one of the essential ten acts to be performed by
a Buddha, according to the Mūlasarvāstivādins.

Despite their differences in total and order, the Pubba-kamma-piloti apadāna
and related texts reveal a common tradition about unfortunate incidents in the
life of the Buddha that must go back to very old sources. It is unlikely that a re-
ligious tradition will go so far as to invent stories that put its founder in a bad
light, even to drive home the inescapability of karmic retribution. After all, that
point can always be made with reference to lesser figures, sparing the great
master any blots on his record. It is more likely that a memory of real accidents
and setbacks in the founder’s life was preserved, in a kind of “warts-and-all”
biography, and that, as the cult of the Buddha developed, these separate inci-
dents were seen by certain Buddhists as demanding some kind of common ex-
planation or treatment, and were grouped together to facilitate this. In one
sense the differences in the various sources are irrelevant: what is important is
that in them all the bad bits were gathered together: no longer “warts and all,”
but “all the warts.” This suggests that while the Buddhist tradition as a whole
problematised them—or capitalized on them, in a way which perhaps only the
Buddhist tradition could—this process unfolded independently in the separate schools, each of them following its own ordering and hermeneutical principles. One response of the Pāli Theravāda tradition, as we see it in the Apadāna, is to accept the events as historical facts and to use them to prove a point: that karma is no respecter of persons. The object of the exercise is thus not to glorify the Buddha, but to underline the law of karma, which, good or bad, must inevitably ripen and bear its fruit, both sweet and bitter. In this sense the Apadāna collection as a whole is to be seen, as Mellick Cutler observes (1993, p. 12), as a meditation on karma, not simply as a series of eulogies of great saints. The LAn represents a far more radical kind of approach: it mixes the bad with the good and disposes of the lot: it is not interested in demonstrating the inescapability of karmic punishment but the fact that the Buddha is now so pure and exalted as to be entirely above it; subjection to the law of karma is not treated separately but as one limitation of the human condition among many. The UpK attempts a third type of operation, which in a sense combines the Mainstream approach (isolating the bad bits) with the LAn’s lokottaravādin emphasis on upāya-kaushalya.

This brief digression has, I hope, conveyed some idea of the richness and complexity of the biographical traditions and the hermeneutical strategies lying behind the apparently simple verses of the LAn. We look forward to seeing further work by Sally Mellick-Cutler and others on the Pubba-kamma-piloti apadāna and related sources. In passing we might also add that bad karma or supramundanity are not the only kinds of explanation pressed into service to explain away unfortunate incidents in the Buddha’s life. One might recall the episode recorded in the Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta where the favoured disciple Upavāna is ordered off by the dying Gautama. The monks are aghast at this rough treatment, until told that Upavāna is getting in the way of the supernatural beings flocking to see the dying Tathāgata. This strikes me as a rather feeble attempt to cover up for a perfectly understandable moment of grouchesness on the part of a sick old man who didn’t want to be fusssed over or mobbed. It is one of those rare moments in a sacred biography when the veil of piety is
twitched aside and we catch a fleeting glimpse of a real human being. That human reality, however, is totally and systematically denied by the \textit{LAn}.

4. Bodies of the Buddha

Not so systematically, however, that we can detect in the \textit{LAn} (or any other Lokakṣema text for that matter) a formalised theory of different bodies of the Buddha. Naturally in reading this work we are inclined to look for some foreshadowings of the developed Mahāyāna buddhology which is represented by the Trikāya doctrine and its later refinements. Can we see the beginings of this development, or at least the raw material for these different ideas, subsequently systematized by Asaṅga and other Buddhist thinkers?

In an article devoted to the subject\textsuperscript{89} I have already dealt with the notion of \textit{dharma-kāya} in the \textit{sūtras} of the Lokakṣema corpus, and hope to have shown fairly conclusively that the term \textit{dharma-kāya} is used solely in what we might call a non-substantivist way entirely consistent with Mainstream Buddhist teachings. That is, it is used either as a \textit{bahuvihi} adjective, to assert that the Buddha is “dharma-bodied,” i.e., that he is truly embodied in the dharma (the teaching or the truth), or as a noun to denote the body or collection of the scriptures, teachings, truths or qualities mastered or possessed by a Buddha. It does not denote some kind of absolute or cosmic reality, underlying all other manifestations of Buddhahood, as is commonly understood. Therefore, although it is certainly relevant to any buddhology, is indeed crucial to it, it cannot be plugged into a schema of actual bodies of the Buddha without qualification. I do not propose to rehearse the arguments for this here, merely restate the conclusion: the \textit{dharma-kāya} is not a body in the usual sense of the word.

What then of the other two parts of the trinity, the \textit{sambhoga-kāya} and the \textit{nirmāṇa-kāya}? What support for them do we find in these texts? Even if there isn’t a system there, can we detect some coherent principle underlying the text of the \textit{LAn}? Well, the \textit{LAn} does seem to posit more than one body. The most obvious is the ordinary human body, the body that is born of sexual union
through the womb, eats, sleeps, engages in movement and sexual activity, answers the calls of nature, is susceptible to heat and cold, sensitive to noise, succumbs to illness, ageing and presumably death. The ultimate reality of this body, for which the term pūti-kāya or corruptible body is used, is denied, it is nothing but an appearance, a manifestation, a show. That is to say, the Buddhas do not really have a body like that, or at least they are not bound by its limitations. This ordinary human body seems to correspond most closely to the later nirmāṇa-kāya, and indeed the term is found in our text, although its precise range is unclear (see below).

At the next level up, as it were, a kind of body is posited which is not like the ordinary human body, with which indeed it is contrasted, but appears to have physical characteristics (i.e., it is perceptible to the senses). This body has a golden colour, is immaculate, has similarly immaculate lotus-like feet which never touch the ground, has spotless pearl-like teeth, is incredibly strong (being able to move countless world-systems with its big toe), is always clothed like a god, has a crown of the head which cannot be looked down upon, and is impervious to sickness. To this body the term vajra-kāya is sometimes applied (see esp. v. 76, where it may be used as a bahuvrihi; cf. §74). This body is usually contrasted with the first, and seems to correspond to the splendid vision later known as the sambhoga-kāya (a term not used in the LAn or anywhere else in the Lokakṣema corpus, as far as I am aware). However, at least one well-known aspect of this is also denied: that the Buddhas have a nimbus one vyāma in extent is also a show, since their radiance is immeasurable and lights up the whole cosmos (v. 17, §15). See also v. 92 (cf. §86), which states that the Buddhas’ light and bodies are immeasurable, but they manifest them as having a certain extent.

Verse 54 introduces a fresh note of complexity:

Even though they are without various bodies,
In accordance with the inclinations of beings
They produce phantom bodies:
This is conformity with the way of the world.

What precisely are the phantom bodies (presumably nirmāṇa-kāyas) here? Are they the same as the pūṇi-kāya, or do they include the more glorious bodies as well? Does the verse mean that all Buddhas have ultimately only one “body,” that being the dharma itself? This solution is certainly suggested by v. 79 (cf. §76):

Since the Realised Ones (tathāgatas) are embodied in the dharma,
As one is, so are they all;
Nevertheless, they make a show of multiplicity:
This is conformity with the world.

The same theme is returned to in vv. 88–89 (cf. §§83–84):

Even though for the non-produced
There is neither one nor many,
They make a show of a varied succession:
This is conformity with the way of the world.

Even though they lack various bodies,
They conjure up [Skt. nir-mā?] bodies
In countless Buddha-fields:
This is conformity with the way of the world.

That is to say, plurality over time and through space is ultimately fictitious. One might also cite v. 111:

Even though the Fully Awakened Ones are one,
For the sake of bringing beings to maturity
Their appearances are inconceivable:
This is conformity with the way of the world.

This suggests that whatever physical form they assume, mundane or magnificent, is provisional and ultimately unreal, because of an identification with dharma which is itself unitary and beyond physical limitation. In a sense the project of contrasting the feeble and corruptible human body (the pūtī-kāya) with the magnificent wonder-body (vajra-kāya?) is over taken by a more philosophical stance informed by ideas very reminiscent of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Even a rarified form of physicality requires some kind of spatial limitation, requires the existence of an entity, and thus is denied ultimate reality. This said, it is still difficult to be sure what is going on here; no doubt further reflection is needed. For the time being, however, we can advance the provisional conclusion that the $LAn$ implies two kinds of physical bodies or bodies susceptible to sensory experience—an ordinary human one and a more magnificent superhuman one—and then subordinates both of them to an identification of the Buddha with the dharma, cancelling them, as it were, with the logic of non-dualism. Therefore we can say that although they are not systematically expounded, the raw materials for the Trikāya theory are indeed to be found in the $LAn$, a text which was in existence by the late 2nd century C.E.

5. Lokottaravādin Buddhology and the Mahāyāna

Moving away from the particular stance of the $LAn$ to more general issues, one question which does arise is this: to what extent, if any, is there a link between the development of a lokottaravādin buddhology of the type that the $LAn$ represents and the emergence of the Mahāyāna as a whole? Is there any essential connection between these two processes, as Paul Williams, for example, suggests.\footnote{We shall set aside here the familiar problem of the role of the Mahāsāṃghika nikāya in the development of the Mahāyāna, noting only the well-established connection which the lokottaravādin position and the Lokānuvartanā textual tradition share with the Mahāsāṃghikas and their subsects, a connection so well-entrenched that even Candrakīrti writing circa 6th century could still refer to the $LAn$ as the gāthās of the Pūrvaśailas. That is a}
historical question with a number of ramifications which go well beyond the scope of this paper. What I wish to address here is the general plausibility of a link between a developing cult of the Buddha, particularly one expressed in a lokottaravādin mode, and the emergence of the Mahāyāna, specifically of its central and defining doctrine, the ideal of the bodhisattva. There is abroad a notion that Mahāyāna Buddhism was a more devotional type of the religion, a kind of Buddhist response to the bhakti trend in Indian religion generally.\textsuperscript{60} Prof. Hirakawa Akira’s theory concerning the role of stūpa worship in the development of the Mahāyāna is perhaps also relevant here. Some aspects of this theory, particularly the social and organisational ones, strike me as unconvincing, but one might easily accept a somewhat looser connection between the two phenomena, i.e., that the flourishing of the cult of the Buddha in any form (with the inevitable emphasis on his supremacy and magnificence) might well have fostered a movement devoted to his emulation.\textsuperscript{61} However, this linkage is perhaps rather too loose to be compelling. Can a tighter one be found?

One plausible connection lies in the idea that the cult of the Buddha developed gradually over time, so that during the centuries after his death, as memories of him faded, he slowly drew away from the human level, becoming more and more an inaccessible object of adoration and devotion. As he did so, the bodhisattvas emerged as symbolic substitutes, nearer to ordinary mortals, for whom they took the place of an increasingly deified Buddha. They moved into the space vacated by him, were devised almost to order, as it were, to satisfy human aspirations for worship and company. However, there are definite problems with this model of progressive deification and substitution. First, it presupposes some kind of historical development for which there is insufficient evidence. In the absence of such evidence, why should we assume that Gautama became progressively deified with time?\textsuperscript{64} Could he have been like certain contemporary Indian spiritual masters, who become virtual gods even during their own lifetimes ascribed with miraculous powers and superhuman status by their adoring devotees? I for one find the following generated by Gautama difficult to account for in any other way, although I realise that some
scholars believe that the radical nature and the sheer persuasiveness of his message provide a sufficient explanation. In my view, however, intellectual persuasiveness could hardly have been enough—the man must have had enormous charisma as well, a charisma which the manifold hopes and dreams and prejudices of his followers both fed and fed upon.\textsuperscript{29}

In short, I believe that the hypothesis sketched above fails to convince, because it rests on the assumption of radical difference between the Buddha and the bodhisattvas, the former increasingly godlike, remote and ethereal, the latter more human, accessible and ready to reach out a helping hand. Yet if one focuses on the similarities between these two types of figure, one could posit a close, indeed an essential connection between the cult of the Buddha and the emergence of the bodhisattva ideal, which goes beyond the relatively banal observation that any variety of Buddhism that emphasises the cult of the Buddha is more likely to stress the imitation of the Buddha. In this analysis the lokottaravādin position is more germane. The view of the Buddha represented by lokottaravādin buddhology emphasises above all the transcendence of all limitations, especially the limitations of human existence. A similar theme is common to all major religions, which share a concern with transcending the stock problems of human existence, notably pain and death. We find exactly the same impulse in the bodhisattva ideal, as expressed in the texts of Lokakṣema, and in other Mahāyāna sūtras. This is something which I intend to address at length elsewhere, but to be brief I believe that one way of reading the bodhisattva ideal elaborated in these texts is as a kind of power fantasy, in which the Buddhist practitioner aspires not simply to the bare liberation or release of arhatship, but to the cosmic sovereignty and power represented by complete Buddhahood—not the destruction of ego, but its apotheosis. On this reading we can indeed postulate a strong connection, not simply because of the centrality of the Buddha or the awakened person as such, since this is found in all varieties of the religion, even Mainstream Buddhism. Here the actual nature of the fully awakened person (and of what it is that constitutes anuttara-samyak-saṃbodhi) is critical, since that nature is fundamentally transcendent and all-powerful. It is
precisely this theme of transcendence which is celebrated triumphally in sūtra after sūtra. Therefore I believe one can posit an essential link between lokottaravādin buddhology and the emergence of the bodhisattva ideal which is the foundation-stone of the Mahāyāna.

6. The Cult of the Buddha: Practical Implications

Such an approach is consistent with the overall tenor of the buddhology of Mahāyāna sūtras, or at least with that of the texts translated by Lokakṣema. While the LAn appears to lead us in a totally non-substantialist direction, in which the Buddha as a person disappears altogether, this is not in fact the principal thrust of the Lokakṣema corpus, which tends as a whole to stress the more magnificent aspects of the Buddha’s personality, including its physical side. The Buddha of these texts is a figure of cosmic stature, endowed with all sorts of marvellous powers and abilities, capable of making the entire universe resonate in response to himself, of illuminating it with the radiant smiles that herald predictions, and so on. Physically speaking, he is endowed with the well-known 32 marks and the 80 minor characteristics of the mahā-puruṣa or “Great Man.” These marks are frequently referred to in Lokakṣema’s texts, especially in verses of praise, so the tradition concerning them was obviously well-established by his time. The Buddha’s power and the splendour of his person exceed the glory of the gods. Despite the non-dualist Śūnyatāvāda stance of the LAn, then, the Buddha’s physical person is far from irrelevant or unimportant. Indeed, it is the object of specific ritual practice, which usually falls under the general rubric of buddhānusmṛti, on which I have written several articles, with specific reference to the pratyutpanna-buddha-saṅmukhāvasthitasa-mādhi. The visualisation required in this practice is detailed and concrete. Using the schema of the 32 marks and 80 secondary characteristics, the practitioner builds up a picture of the Buddha with which he or she is then supposed to identify. As this Buddha is, so shall I also become. I have suggested that the self-referential nature of this practice has been under-emphasised: it is not simply the worship of the Buddha as other, but the evocation of the Buddha in oneself, or of oneself as the Buddha: the point of the exercise is self-transformation. This, I
maintain, is the explicit message of the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sammukhāvasthita-samādhisūtra. Such an analysis reinforces the plausibility of a special link between the lokottaravāda (Buddhist docetism) and the Mahāyāna: the ideal or dream or fantasy of becoming superhuman, of triumphing over all limitations of time and space—an ideal whose realisation calls for extraordinary asceticism—requires as its supreme symbol a figure who does not suffer from any of the disadvantages of being a human being, or indeed a sentient being of any type, who is thus more than godlike. As with the bodhisattva, so too with the Buddha, what is more important here is the ideal of aspiration, rather than the ideal of inspiration. Thus the figure later known as the saṁbhoga-kāya would seem to me to be absolutely necessary for the ideal to capture the imagination, since the nirmāṇa-kāya, the ordinary human body, is something we already possess, and the dharma-kāya is a formless abstraction. The saṁbhoga-kāya, for which various English translations have been advanced, represents the visible fruition of the meritorious action—or religious practice—of the practitioner, and holds out the promise of the enjoyment of the magnificence and power which are its reward. It is the body in which the consumption and consummation of the merit accumulated in the quest for full awakening is made manifest. If we wish to know the secret of the appeal of the Buddha and of Buddhahood, surely it lies in this transcendent physicality.

However, this glorious vision is then deconstructed in terms of emptiness (śūnyatā), non-duality (advaya) and truth—or the way things are—(dharma, dharmatā), giving this aspect of the Mahāyāna considerable ritual and iconographical density and philosophical subtlety at the same time. Thus one is, in effect, called upon to follow in the footsteps of a person whose feet never touched the ground, indeed, of a person who in reality had no feet and was not a person at all. By any account, this is no easy task.

7. Concluding Observations

In conclusion, I have attempted in this paper to site the LAN in terms of a developing buddhology, to sketch its contents, to show how it contains the raw
materials for the later Trikāya theory, and to postulate a link between its teachings and the emergence of the Mahāyāna. Much more work remains to be done, before we can clarify all aspects of these issues. Indeed, we should not be surprised if the buddhology of the LĀn cannot be resolved into a single coherent system. The author (or authors) of this text was primarily concerned with the exaltation of the Buddha, with lifting him above the mundane level, with representing him as beyond all human limitations, or indeed, to be more accurate, as beyond the limitations of all the realms of sentient existence (lokas), even those of the gods. Basically he was attempting to eliminate the contradictions that existed between the many traditions relating to Gautama as an historical humanbeing, on record as having said certain things, and a more exalted view of Buddhahood, coupled with a developed notion of what truth was from a Buddhist perspective. If this led him into further contradictions he may perhaps not have found them especially troublesome. The resolution of these secondary contradictions fell to the lot of later Buddhist scholars, who, using materials already to hand, worked out a systematic buddhology to explain them away. This is a question of a specific historical development, which future research ought to illuminate. However, there is a general problem relevant to this situation, and that is the problem of symbolic vagueness.

Religions are symbolic systems, they function by elaborating and manipulating symbols or complexes of symbols. However one defines the term "symbol"—and I prefer a definition which draws attention to the fact that symbols stand for and point to realities beyond themselves in which they somehow participate—one important aspect of their functioning is that they are inherently vague or fuzzy. In this I follow the lead of Abner Cohen, who argues that if symbols had precise referents then they would lose their power to stir people's emotional as well as cognitive responses and move them to action. It is vital, in this view, that they be vague, fuzzy, ambiguous, multivalent. The Buddha is undoubtedly the central symbol of Buddhism, so it is only to be expected that, to borrow the words of St Paul, he is "all things to all people." This is not to say that he is a totally blank slate, on which anybody can write anything: the per-
sonhood of the Buddha still has a certain shape, onto which, within certain limits, his followers can project their own meanings and load their own feelings. For example, one person responds to the compassionate engagement, another to the dispassionate serenity, even though both of these qualities may be found inscribed in the smile that plays across the face of the Buddha-image. Each person will therefore appropriate this symbol in his or her own way, and we should expect to find evidence of this vagueness and ambiguity in literary sources as well as in the contemporary situation.

Clearly there is a potential tension between this and the scholarly enterprise, i.e., our attempts to understand and represent Buddhism. It would be commonplace to point out that there are as many different Buddhas and Buddhism as there are Buddhists, but continually we try to encapsulate our understanding of this religion in neat theories, crisp propositions, precise statements of probability and fact. How else could we study it? But it will not fit the procrustean bed we devise for it, we can never pin it down with absolute certainty as being this or that. To a certain degree, then, our attempts to understand and represent Buddhism are doomed to failure, but therein, I suspect, lies our salvation. If we reached any hard-and-fast conclusion, we would find ourselves in a reductionistic dead-end, a cul-de-sac devoid of any challenge or interest. Neat theories are all very well, but we could hardly expect them to capture the mystery of Buddhism or lay bare its appeal to individual human beings. This is especially the case with the person of the Buddha, which has been the subject of this paper. Buddhists have acknowledged this and represented it explicitly in various ways, some of which are echoed in the text under review. For example, the Buddha speaks with one voice, or he utters one word, or he says nothing at all, but he is heard in countless different ways delivering countless different messages, as many as there are hearers (like the well-known parable of the elephant and the blind men). His bodily image is also seen reflected in countless images across Asia, and now the whole world, all different, but all recognisably the Buddha. Whenever I come to Kyoto I make it a point to visit the Sanjūsangendō, for me one of the most eloquent expressions of the central mystery of Buddhism. There, as
one enters the hall, the images of the bodhisattvas (representing awakened consciousness) appear to stretch to infinity, all basically one and the same image, yet at the same time different. One is many, and the many are one. The effect is particularly potent, reducing the visitor to admiration and silence. The same dynamic holds true for the Buddhas, as the Laṅkā tells us.

Ultimately the explanations of scholars cannot exhaust the meaning of the principal symbol of Buddhism, although I would be the last to suggest that we should ever stop trying to explain it.

Note

(1) This is a lightly edited version of a public lecture delivered at Ōtani University on Friday 11 November 1994.


(4) Here I use buddhology with a small “b” to refer to theories about the nature and personality of the Buddha (cf. Christology), reserving Buddhology with a capital “b” for use as an alternative designation for Buddhist Studies.


862–1062. Schoening discusses at length the status and contents of the Śālistamba-kārikās on pp. 64–107 (see also pp. 34–38 for his comments on versifications).

See ibid., pp. 66–69.

If we accept that the overall purpose of the Ān is to resolve contradictions, then all the doctrinal verses can be construed as addressing the following single contradiction: X is the teaching of Buddhism, but the Buddha said Y, or, in other words, the Omniscient One appears to have made mistakes. This renders this section of the Ān especially interesting to students of the history of Buddhist doctrine, since it contrasts later developments in the teaching with what the Āgamas or Nikāyas depict the Buddha as actually saying. While some of the items are commonplace and pan-Buddhist (e.g. Gautama’s use of the words “I,” “me” and “mine”), others may provide valuable leads.

Or the Buddha. The Tibetan text appears to alternate between singular and plural, with a slight preference for the plural (even more evident in the Sanskrit fragments), but in this paper for ease of reading I adopt the plural throughout.

Section numbers for the Chinese text are provisional; some changes may be required in the light of further study.

This is thought by some to be a later addition to the biography of the Buddha.


This incident is recounted in the Piṇḍa-sūtra and in other sources. See Lamotte, Traité I, p. 457, n. 3, for references.


The incident is described, e.g., in the Sekha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M i 353–359), where the stand-in preacher is Ānanda. In a related text in the Sānьяutta-nikāya (S iv 182–188), Maudgalyāyana takes over. For further references, see Lamotte, Traité I, p. 244, n. 1, p. 507, n. 1, and Traité III (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1970), p. 1649, n. 3. Cf. also Tatz, op. cit., p. 84 (where Kāśyapa is the preacher).

The English translation from the Chinese is not entirely without problems, but reference to the Tibetan version resolves most of the difficulties.
(18) For a bibliographical survey see Tatz op. cit., pp. 16–18. Apart from citations in Śāntideva’s Śīkṣā-samuccaya, the Sanskrit version is lost.

(19) The standard translations “skill in means,” or worse, “skilful means” are rather good examples of that unnatural dialect which Paul Griffiths has styled “Buddhist Hybrid English” (see Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 4, 2 (1981), pp. 17–32) and deserve to be consigned to the translator’s dust-bin. I suggest “stratagem” or “creative stratagem” for upāya, and “skill in the use of creative stratagems” or simply “creativity” for upāya-kauśalya. “Creative” here is used in the sense of being good at thinking up ways of doing things or getting around problems, if necessary by bending the rules, as in the contemporary expression “creative accounting.”

(20) The ten are (1) the Buddha’s being pierced in the foot with a khādira thorn, despite having an adamantine body, apparently through killing a man with a spear, even though this act was to save the lives of 500 others and rescue the victim from the effects of his own bad karma; (2) taking medicine provided by the physician Jivaka, even though he was not ill, in order to convince 500 bhikṣus that it was not against the Vinaya to take such medicine; (3) coming back from the begging-round in the city with an empty bowl, so that people could see how the Buddha was unmoved by gain or loss, etc.; (4) suffering a bogus paternity suit from Ciṅcā-Maṇḍavikā; (5) being accused of the murder of Sūndari, both (4) and (5) being so that followers of the Buddha who might be slandered should not feel so bad, since it happened to the Tathāgata as well; (6) eating horse-feed, in reality a ruse to enable the horses to earn merit so as to be reborn as gods in Tuṣita (a prediction is given them), although various other rationalisations are also advanced; (7) having a back-ache and therefore asking Kāśyapa to expound the seven bodhyaṅgas, because there were gods listening who were likely to be converted only by Kāśyapa, and to increase people’s faith in the curative properties of such sermons; (8) having a headache during the massacre of the Śākyas, in order to convince gods and human beings of the results of karma; (9) being abused by the brāhmaṇa Bharadvāja, so as to display the virtue of patient acceptance; (10) suffering assassination attempts on the part of Devadatta using an elephant and pushing a boulder down on him (presumably all the Devadatta incidents count as one item). In the Tibetan text these are referred to several times as las kyi rgyud bcu po, i.e. Skt. daśa-karma-ploti/pluti (not [daśa-] karma-samrtati, as Tatz suggests, p. 71, n. 144). It should be noted that the order in which these incidents are presented in the UpK does not match that of other related texts (see below), and that the general lack of correspondence between any of them indicates a complex situation mirroring further study.

(21) One would also have to study the other Mahāyāna sūtras which deal with upāya-kauśalya, on which see Tatz, p. 17.


See, e.g., Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), s. v. *pluti* (piece of cloth, cord, connecting link, etc.).


A fair distillation of the conventional wisdom may be found, e. g., in the latest version (1992 reprint) of *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, edited by David Crystal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), s. v. Buddhism: “Theravada Buddhism adheres to the strict and narrow teachings of the early Buddhist writings: salvation is possible for only the few who accept the severe discipline and effort necessary to achieve it. Mahayana Buddhism Buddhism is more liberal, and makes concessions to
popular piety: it teaches that salvation is possible for everyone, and introduced the
doctrine of the bodhisattva (or personal saviour).”

Cf. Hirakawa Akira, A History of Indian Buddhism From Śākyamuni to Early
274.

This is not to deny the presence of change, demonstrable in the case of the
development of the stūpa cult and the use of the Buddha-image, less easily quantifiable
in the case of influence from emergent Indian deity cults. I am concerned here chie-
fly with possible attitudes to the personhood of the Buddha.

I take it that charisma is a feature of certain relationships between persons, rather
than being an inherent quality possessed by individuals. We see one aspect of this
question in the role of magic and magical powers in the canonical literature of Main-
stream Buddhism, the importance of which has so far been rather neglected by
Western scholarship.

In this regard, incidentally, I do not see the Mahāyāna as constituting a kind of de-
votional “soft option” for the masses. On the contrary, I prefer to see it as a hard-
core ascetic revival movement—but I reserve that discussion for another occasion.

See Paul Harrison, “Buddhānusmṛti in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthi-
ta-samādhī-sūtra,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 6 (1978), pp. 35–57, and “Com-
memoration and Identification in Buddhānusmṛti,” in Janet Gyatso, ed., In the Mir-
ror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan
Buddhism (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 215–238. For references to some
of the extensive Japanese literature on this topic, see the bibliography in my The
Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present: An Annotated English
Translation of the Tibetan Version of the Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saṃmukhāvasthitasamādhi-Sūtra with Several Appendices relating to the History of the Text (Studia Philo-
ologica Buddhica, Monograph Series, V) (Tokyo: The International Institute for

See especially my “Commemoration and Identification in Buddhānusmṛti.”

See Abner Cohen, Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power
and Symbolism in Complex Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974),
especially pp. 23–34, 36–37.

This problem is less serious with sāstra literature, of course, since it deals with a
different type of discourse, but it is especially acute in the case of Mahāyāna sūtra
literature, which is often unsystematic and polyphonic, even if it is not incoherent.

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