

ARTICLES

FEATURE: COMMEMORATING THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PASSING OF SUZUKI DAISETSU

Reading D. T. Suzuki with a Focus on His Notion of “Person”

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I. DEVELOPMENTS IN D. T. SUZUKI RESEARCH

WITH THE year 2016 marking the fiftieth anniversary of his death, scholars have been turning a fresh eye to D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966). Their efforts are not limited to studies of Suzuki the individual; their importance extends to scholarship on modern Japanese thought and religion. First, I will provide a simple overview of the history of research on D. T. Suzuki.¹

In the past, scholarship on D. T. Suzuki was carried out by researchers who were taught or influenced by him, such as Furuta Shōkin, Kirita Kiyohide, Ueda Shizuteru, and Akizuki Ryōmin. They focused on uncovering and organizing materials related to Suzuki, as well as honoring and recognizing the man and his work. We can see this as the first period in the history of research on D. T. Suzuki.

However, starting around the 1980s, critical studies began to appear in a flurry in response to existing research with its slant towards praising Suzuki. This development, which began overseas, included Brian Victoria’s *Zen at*

¹ Being an overview, in this section I have omitted citations of individual texts. An examination of some of the research on Suzuki that follows can be found in Sueki 2010.

War (1997), as well as the work of Robert Sharf and Bernard Faure. They directed their criticisms towards Suzuki's war cooperation and nationalism. At its root, this was also a criticism of the European and US Buddhist world, which had absolutized him. It had been as if all of Suzuki's views were *the* correct understanding of Zen, with no need for modification or revision. This was the second period in the history of research on D. T. Suzuki.

In recent years, Suzuki's thought has begun to be reexamined in a new way, which takes into account such criticisms. This is the third, and still ongoing, period. Along with numerous efforts to uncover Suzuki-related materials, there have also been many publications and exhibitions relating to him. At the same time, scholarship by a new generation of researchers has been flourishing, pushing Suzuki scholarship forward.

Document surveys have resulted in the publication of his manuscripts held at Matsugaoka Bunko, and a clearer picture has emerged of his activities in the United States during his later years. Many of Suzuki's writings have been released in the pocket paperback format, which are more accessible than, for example, his complete works. These include the 2010 complete version (with chapter 5) of *Nihonteki reisei* 日本的靈性 (Japanese Spirituality, 1945) by Kadokawa Bunko, for which I wrote a commentary; Moriya Tomoe's new anthology of Suzuki's writings, *Zen ni ikiru* 禪に生きる (Living in Zen, 2012) also by Kadokawa Bunko; the publication in 2016 of Japanese-language translations of *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* and *The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk* as well as *Jōdokei shisōron* 浄土系思想論 (On Pure Land Thought, 1942) by Iwanami Bunko; and the publications by Kōdansha Gakugei Bunko in 2016 of both Suzuki's translation of Swedenborg's *Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell from Things Heard and Seen* (Jp. *Tenkai to jigoku* 天界と地獄) and his biographical *Suedenborugu* スエデンボルグ. These works, along with the commentaries contained therein, have provided us with new perspectives. In the United States, the four-volume *Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki* (University of California Press) is in the process of being published and has been receiving attention.

Commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Suzuki's death, the exhibition "Daisetz and Matsugaoka Bunko" was held at Tama Art University Museum from July 2 to September 11, 2016, featuring materials held by Matsugaoka Bunko. Important Suzuki-related items previously not shown to the public, such as early modern woodblock prints of Buddhist images, were on display. The international symposium held at the International Research Center for Japanese

Studies (Nichibunken) on December 5–6, 2016, covered a variety of new issues from an international perspective. Furthermore, the D. T. Suzuki Museum, which opened in Kanazawa in 2011, is becoming a new hub for Suzuki research.

Recent scholarship is led by a generation temporally removed from Suzuki, which can adopt a more objective perspective. They are from a variety of fields—not only Chan/Zen studies—and bring with them a variety of interests. In the United States, the center of Suzuki research has shifted to a new generation of scholars, such as Richard Jaffe. Similarly, in Japan, work on D. T. Suzuki by a new set of scholars is being published in rapid succession. This research is characterized by, first, a reexamination of Suzuki as a mystic, and individuals engaging in this research include Wakamatsu Eisuke, Andō Reiji, Yoshinaga Shin'ichi, and Nakajima Takahiro. Second, other critical research reconsiders his ideas about Buddhism from the perspective of contemporary Buddhist studies or Chan/Zen studies rather than focusing on his ideological and political positions. From the Buddhist studies side, we can point to Sasaki Shizuka, and from the world of Chan/Zen studies, Kinugawa Kenji. Ogawa Takashi, also from the latter field, adopts a more positive view of Suzuki's work. While research on Suzuki's thought typically gets caught up in Suzuki himself, Yamada Shōji has offered a new perspective by examining Suzuki objectively by focusing on his reception overseas and on the life of his son, Alan.

The first half of this paper will provide an overview of Suzuki's life and intellectual development, and the second half considers in detail the evolution of his thought regarding the notion of "Person" from *Nihonteki reisei* through to *Rinzai no kihon shisō* 臨濟の基本思想 (The Fundamental Thought of Linji, 1949).²

² Suzuki would attach Japanese emphasis marks (*bōten* 傍点) to the Sino-Japanese character for person (人) to differentiate it from its ordinary usage. He also indicates that it should be read as *nin*, not *hito* or *jin*, as it would normally (*Rinzai no kihon shisō* in SDZ, vol. 3, p. 350).

Translator's note: In this paper, following Norman Waddell's translation of *Nihonteki reisei* (Suzuki 1972), the translator has chosen to express this concept in English by writing "person" with a capital P ("Person"). In Suzuki's writings and the author's original Japanese version of this paper, phrases containing this term appear multiple times, sometimes with and sometimes without marks indicating that this character refers to "Person." I have used "Person" and "person" to distinguish these accordingly in such cases. The author of this paper indicates Suzuki's emphasis marks with angled brackets: ⟨*nin*⟩, ⟨人⟩. I have followed this convention when providing the original Japanese in the following.

II. LIFE AND WORKS: PERIODIZATION

Suzuki was born in 1870 in Kanazawa City, and passed away at the age of ninety-six at St. Luke's Hospital in Tokyo in 1966. Not including his time studying as a student and engaging in religious training during his younger days, he wrote and gave lectures as an active intellectual for seventy years, beginning with his translation of Paul Carus's *The Gospel of Buddha* (*Budda no fukuin* 仏陀の福音) into Japanese in 1895. For more than ten years between 1897 and 1908, he lived in the United States, devoting himself to research under Paul Carus. After returning to Japan via Europe in 1909, he taught English as a professor at Gakushuin University, and then in 1921 he became a professor at Otani University in Kyoto, which is affiliated with the Shin sect, where he worked until 1960. After World War II, while often returning to Japan, he based himself in the United States from 1950 to 1959, where he continued to give lectures at a variety of places, including Columbia University.

In this way, Suzuki's activities consisted of two long periods in the United States interspersed with periods in Japan. He was active in Japan before first leaving for the US, between these two periods, and after returning towards the end of his life. However, the times preceding his first and following his second American period were comparatively short. Thus, we can see 1909 to 1950 as the major period of his activity in Japan.

With that said, the situation is somewhat complicated. Even after returning to Japan, he published important works in English during the 1920s and 1930s, which were very well received in Europe and the United States. If we focus on his writings, we can divide his life into the four periods below.

(1) *Early works. From the 1890s to the 1910s, before he went to the United States, his time residing there, and his professorship at Gakushuin after returning to Japan.*

While also writing about Zen, he adopted a wider perspective, focusing primarily on Buddhism in general and Swedenborg. During this time he published a Japanese translation of *The Gospel of Buddha*, *Shin shūkyō ron* 新宗教論 (A New Theory of Religion, 1896), his English translation of *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (Ch. *Dasheng qixinlun* 大乘起信論; Jp. *Daijō kishinron*; 1900), his own monograph *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (1907), as well as a Japanese translation in 1910 of Swedenborg's *Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell from Things Heard and Seen*.

(2) *English-language writings. The 1920s and 1930s, after he moved to Otani University.*

While he was in Japan, he wrote his major works in English. This was probably done with the help of his wife Beatrice. In addition to books that became popular in the United States and Europe like *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (1927, 1933, 1934) and *Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture* (1938), he also produced an English translation and study of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sutra* (1932), which would become his doctoral dissertation.

(3) *Japanese-language writings. From the end of the 1930s until he began to base his activities out of the United States after World War II.*

During this period he wrote his major Japanese works, such as *Mushin to iu koto* 無心と言ふこと (What is No-Mind?; 1939), *Jōdokei shisōron*, *Nihonteki reisei*, *Myōkōnin* 妙好人 (Wondrously Happy People, 1948), and *Rinzai no kihon shisō*. The timing of these works is due perhaps to Beatrice having passed away in 1939, and to the difficulty of writing for an overseas audience as the war approached. Many of his works during this period were academic in nature. He brought them together in volumes 1 (1943) and 2 (1951) of his *Zen shisōshi kenkyū* 禅思想史研究 (Research on Chan/Zen Intellectual History).

(4) *Lectures in the United States. Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist (1957), Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (1960), and so on.*

His lectures in the United States have been reconstructed from the drafts held at Matsugaoka Bunko, and were recently published in translation as *Zen hakkō* 禅八講 (Eight Lectures on Zen), and *Suzuki Daisetsu Koronbia Daigaku seminā kōgi* 鈴木大拙コロンビア大学セミナー講義 (D. T. Suzuki's Columbia University Seminar Lectures). In the last few years of his life he also worked to translate into English canonical works such as Shinran's *Kyōgyōshinshō* 教行信証 (Teaching, Practice, Faith, and Realization) and the *Biyan lu* 碧巖錄 (Jp. *Hekiganroku*; Blue Cliff Record).

In this chapter I focus on Suzuki's Japanese writings from the third period of his life. We need to locate this period within an overall image of Suzuki, and it is to this that I will first turn.

III. DIVERSITY AND UNITY IN SUZUKI

Suzuki wrote many works over his long life. For this reason, evaluations of him vary considerably depending on which aspect in those works is the focus of attention. His way of writing was not always the same: not only did it change over time, he also had diverse readers in mind depending on the language in which he was writing. This, in turn, led to differences in the way he was received. In Europe and the United States, where Zen itself was not known, he was enthusiastically greeted as an evangelist of this completely new culture. In contrast, in Japan, there was traditional Buddhism, of which Zen was a part. However, in the midst of modernization, it became necessary to reinterpret this traditional Buddhism. Suzuki played a major role in this project, but his position therein was somewhat ambiguous.

In his youth Suzuki had withdrawn as a student from Tokyo Imperial University. He did not have academic qualifications from Japan, and he did not receive a formal education in the United States. He taught for many years at the Buddhist Otani University after returning to Japan, but this was an institution affiliated with the Ōtani branch of Shin Buddhism and not with one of the Zen schools. He later received a PhD from the university for his research on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Subsequently, despite carrying out cutting-edge academic research (such as his studies of early Chan Dunhuang texts), he was not necessarily part of the mainstream of modern Buddhist studies. Always placing himself in ambiguous positions—researcher and popular educator; Zen and Pure Land; Japan, Europe, and the United States—his identity was not fixed, and we cannot unequivocally place him. This contrasts with Suzuki's close friend Nishida Kitarō, who had a clear position as a philosopher in the academic space that was Kyoto Imperial University. This ambiguity of Suzuki's has made research difficult.

Do the multitudes that comprise this diverse Suzuki ever become integrated? David L. McMahan sees Suzuki as a representative figure of “Buddhist modernism”:

Suzuki wrote that Zen in its essence was an *experience* that transcended the particularities of any religion. Not only was the liberating experience of *satori* the essence of Zen, it was the essence of all religion, though found in its purest form in Zen. Suzuki therefore de-emphasized not only Zen's intimate connection to the history of Buddhism but presented everything except the “Zen experience” as peripheral. This emphasis on the authority of personal intuitive experience over tradition, ritual, and social life

would become a prominent feature of some versions of Buddhist modernism.³

The above passage accurately captures the essence of modern Buddhism. As the term "funerary Buddhism" indicates, even in modern times, the essence of the social role of Japanese Buddhism has been funerary rites and grave management. This is what has created its economic foundation. However, on this foundation there was built an elite-level discourse that trumpeted pure belief and Zen experience as Buddhism's superior aspects. Suzuki was a layperson for his whole life; he never joined a temple as a priest. This enhanced his purist emphasis on experience. He transplanted this elite Buddhism overseas. If we call this "Buddhist modernism," then we can certainly see Suzuki as one of its representatives.

A reverse perspective is possible. The Christianity introduced to Japan had its European-American historical and societal background removed, and in Protestantism, in particular, it brought its modernity to the fore by emphasizing only pure faith. This purification was rendered thoroughgoing by the non-Church movement (*mukyōkaishugi* 無教会主義), which had not existed in Europe or the United States. Buddhism in Europe and the United States and Christianity in Japan were in the same position.

McMahan writes the following regarding the trope employed by the Buddhist modernism that Suzuki spread: "Suzuki also promoted one of the common—if overly simplistic—tropes of Buddhist modernism: that the 'East' was intuitive, aesthetic, and spiritual, while the 'West' was technological, rational, and material."⁴ This "East versus West" schema has lived on to today while variously changing its form. Such a discourse can be found not only in Europe and the United States but also in Japan. We should take note of the relationship between the "East" and "Japan" therein. Often times Japan is understood to represent the "East," and it becomes an expression of Japanese cultural nationalism. This is similar to how "Greater East Asia" in the phrase "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (*Daitōa kyōeiken* 大東亜共榮圈) really meant "Japan," and to how the word "Japanese" in the title of Suzuki's work *Japanese Spirituality* is vague.

If we assume Suzuki is basically a "Buddhist modernist," what does this actually mean? McMahan pointed to Suzuki's emphasis on the "Zen" religious experience. How did this appear in Suzuki's thought? In recent

³ McMahan 2012, pp. 164–66.

⁴ McMahan 2012, p. 166.

years Suzuki's early writings, such as *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* and his research on Swedenborg, have been attracting attention. It may be that through them we can reach an understanding of the fundamental ideas that run through from his early to his later periods. It is from this perspective that Andō Reiji, for example, has examined Suzuki's early-period thought.⁵ This enables us to consider that which runs consistently throughout the established multi-dimensional image of Suzuki.

His 1907 *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* was the final work from his time spent under Paul Carus. Sasaki Shizuka, in his translator's afterward to the Japanese-language edition, has critically examined its content in detail.⁶ This work is known for the harsh critique levelled at it by Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, an authority in Buddhist studies at the time.⁷ Sasaki, agreeing with de La Vallée-Poussin's critique, lists several more issues and then points out, "Almost all of the concepts comprising this book, which Suzuki presents as fundamental elements, are mistaken."⁸

However, as Sasaki also states, "A person with even a little interest in the doctrines of Japanese Buddhism will probably affirm many of the ways of thinking introduced by Suzuki in this book as being Mahayana Buddhist thought."⁹ In other words, while his arguments might not constitute a proper understanding of the Mahayana Buddhist thought that originally appeared in India, they are not necessarily inadequate as a traditional Japanese understanding of Mahayana Buddhism. Suzuki's ideas about Mahayana Buddhism took as their basis the *Dasheng qixinlun*, which he translated into English as *Aśvaghōṣa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, and which emphasized concepts like suchness (Ch. *zhenru* 真如; Jp. *shinnyo*), *tathāgata-garbha* (womb of the *tathāgata*; Ch. *rulai zang* 如来藏; Jp. *nyoraizō*), and the dharma body (Ch. *fashen* 法身; Jp. *hosshin*). However, Suzuki's stance goes beyond the scope of Japan's Mahayana Buddhism in certain respects:

Individual existences have no selfhood or self-essence or reality.
 . . . The world of particulars is the work of Ignorance. . . .
 When this veil of Māya [*sic*] is uplifted, the universal light of
 Dharmakāya shines in all its magnificence. Individual existences

⁵ Andō 2016a.

⁶ Sasaki 2016.

⁷ de La Vallée-Poussin 1908.

⁸ Sasaki 2016, p. 484.

⁹ Sasaki 2016, p. 485.

then as such lose their significance and become sublimated and ennobled in the oneness of Dharmakāya.¹⁰

Here we can see that Suzuki's understanding of Mahayana Buddhism included Vedic elements, such as the notions of "self-essence" (*atman*) and illusion (*māyā*). Regarding this point, Sasaki states, "The Japanese Buddhism itself on which Suzuki based his thought was different from original Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Rather than Buddhism, it was close to Vedanta and other Hindu philosophy."¹¹ Certainly, in a sense, *tathāgata-garbha* thought is the foundation of Japanese Buddhism as a whole. This position has been criticized by the critical Buddhism (*hihan Bukkyō* 批判仏教) movement.

However, one does not find expressions like "the universal light of Dharmakāya shines in all its magnificence" in a traditional Japanese Buddhist context. Rather, as Andō Reiji has pointed out, this matches the "'spiritual world' that Suzuki saw through his Swedenborg experience."¹² Andō believes this "spiritual world" (*reikai* 靈界) eventually led to Suzuki's idea of *reisei* 靈性 (spirituality) as found in the title of *Nihonteki reisei*.¹³ This is certainly plausible. If true, we can see the consistent thread that Suzuki pursued throughout his life as the intellectualization or systematic articulation of religious experience. While his friend Nishida Kitarō would shift his thought from the idea of pure religious experience to the ontological notion of "place" (*basho* 場所), Suzuki for his whole life continued to focus on things related to religious experience.

In his English-language writings, Suzuki wrapped this "spiritual" religious experience in the keyword "Zen," to which he connected "Japan." However, as McMahan points out, to do so he "articulated some of the difficult themes of Zen in the vocabulary of Idealist, Romantic, and Transcendentalist thinkers of the nineteenth century,"¹⁴ which led Europe and the United States to read the underside of their own modernity into Zen. We could see this as a typical example of Orientalism. We might suggest that Suzuki ended up glorifying "Japan" and "Zen" so as to satisfy this European and American tendency.

¹⁰ Suzuki 1907, p. 179.

¹¹ Sasaki 2016, p. 485.

¹² Andō 2016b, p. 556.

¹³ Andō 2016b, p. 558.

¹⁴ McMahan 2012, p. 166.

IV. THE NOTION OF “PERSON” IN *NIHONTEKI REISEI*(1) *Japanese-language Writings and Nihonteki reisei*

From around 1939, when Beatrice passed away, Suzuki started writing his major works in the Japanese language. Due to the war’s intensification, it was becoming increasingly difficult to reach a European and American audience. It is notable that these Japanese works include textual research and excavations of new materials; here we find Suzuki the academic researcher at his best.

These studies gradually grew in number starting in the 1930s. In 1932 he wrote his study of the *Lankāvatāra Sutra*, and in 1935 he published the “Rufajie pin” 入法界品 (Jp. “Nyūhokkai bon”; Entry into the Dharma Realm Chapter) of the *Huayan ji* 華嚴經 (Jp. *Kegonkyō*; Flower Ornament Sutra) as the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sutra* in English. However, his publications of critical editions of Chan texts (including Dunhuang manuscripts) were his major accomplishments. These included *Rokuso dankyō* 六祖壇經 (Platform Sutra of the Fifth Patriarch, 1936), *Jinne goroku* 神會語錄 (Record of Shenhui’s Sayings, 1934), *Shōshitsu issho* 少室逸書 (Lost Works of Bodhidharma; 1936), and *Bukka hekigan hakan gekisetsu* 仏果碧巖破關擊節 ([Yuanwu’s] Keeping the Beat to Smash the Barriers at the Blue Cliff, 1942). His treatment of Dunhuang manuscripts led to a debate with Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962). Importantly, it was around this time that he discovered Bankei 盤珪 (1622–93), Suzuki Shōzan 鈴木正三 (1579–1655), and the *myōkōnin*.

In this academic research Suzuki consistently adopted a perspective on religious experience, which led from the idea of a “spiritual world” to “spirituality.” Suzuki discovered and produced research on experience-oriented Buddhists who had been overlooked in previous academic studies. At the same time, while “Zen” was at the forefront of his English-language works, and he published many critical textual studies on its history, he often also paid attention to Pure Land Buddhism in his many Japanese-language works. Redefining *Sukhāvātī* and *sahā* (“*Sukhāvātī* is the world of spirituality, and *sahā* is the world of sensation and the intellect”),¹⁵ he included Pure Land thought within discussions of spiritual experience. By doing so, he eliminated the idea of a “spiritual world” that had a Swedeborgian feel to it and was able to discuss Chan/Zen and Pure Land Buddhism as issues belonging to the same sphere. Furthermore, while focusing on these two

¹⁵ Suzuki (1942) 2016, p. 7.

Buddhist schools, his discussions of spiritual issues transcended the framework of Buddhism, covering the structure of religion as a whole.

Nihonteki reisei served as the apex of these Japanese-language works, synthesizing them together. However, Suzuki did not spend adequate time planning his monographs and polishing his writing, so sometimes their core arguments were unclear. There are more than a few cases in which it is hard to understand how one work relates to the others that preceded and followed it. For example, consider the term *reisei* or "spirituality." It appeared suddenly in *Nihonteki reisei*, and again after World War II in his 1946 *Reiseiteki Nihon no kensetsu* 霊性的日本の建設 (The Creation of a Spiritual Japan). In *Nihonteki reisei*, the idea was that "Japanese spirituality" had already been actualized in the past in Japan. In contrast, in his later work, Japan's "spiritualization" is presented as a task yet to be embarked upon. There is slippage here. In other books, he did not attach any significance to *reisei*. Therefore, while it is less than certain that we can really place *Nihonteki reisei* at the center of his Japanese-language corpus, it is certain at the very least that it constitutes the culmination of the various intellectual elements he had developed in these writings.

Furthermore, Suzuki did not necessarily pay particular attention to a book's structure. For example, he later removed without explanation the fifth chapter of *Nihonteki reisei* entitled "Kongōkyō no zen" 金剛経の禅 (Diamond Sutra Chan/Zen). His complete works and Iwanami Bunko follow his lead in this regard.¹⁶ We can speculate that he might have wanted to decrease its length. However, he might also have been concerned that the chapter on Chan thought was inappropriate for a book about "Japanese" spirituality. Suzuki presents in this chapter the very important "logic of *sokuhi*" (*sokuhi no ronri* 即非の論理), sometimes translated into English as the "logic of contradictory self-identity" or "the logic of 'is and is not.'" By excluding this discussion, *Nihonteki reisei* becomes a book only about Pure Land thought, not Zen; the logical aspect of "spirituality" is lost, as it is approached only from its emotional side. Depending on whether or not this fifth chapter is included, our understanding of Suzuki's ideas on spirituality changes considerably. Believing that this chapter was indispensable, I included it in the 2010 complete version of this work that I compiled for Kadokawa Bunko. The analysis that follows draws on the Kadokawa edition of *Nihonteki reisei*.

¹⁶ "Kongōkyō no zen" is in the fifth volume of Suzuki's complete works, separate from *Nihonteki reisei*.

(2) *The Notion of “Person” in Chapter 2 of Nihonteki reisei*

Ideas regarding the notion of “Person” serve as an important part of *Nihonteki reisei*. Since they are carried over into *Rinzai no kihon shisō*, let us first examine them here. Chapter 2, which is about “spirituality,” discusses the issue of “the supra-individual Person” (*chōko no* 〈*nin*〉 超個の〈人〉) and the “one individual person” (*hitori* 一人). While Suzuki’s explanations are sometimes hard to understand, he uses the expression “the supra-individual Person that lies at the basic ground of the individual self,” contrasting it with a self that does not “encounter spirituality itself.” He also states, “The supra-individual Person is the genuine individual.”¹⁷ We could say that it is the individual that has awoken to the universality that is spirituality. “Spirituality” as religious experience can, in Buddhist terms, be described as acquiring a dharma body. In the past—as we saw in the portion of *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* quoted above—Suzuki had said that individual existences are absorbed into the singularity of the dharma body; the individual dissolves. However, here spirituality is not a simple negation of the self; the subject again rises. The “supra-individual Person” is a subject that has, in this way, reengaged with the world as an individual.

Here we should note that this “supra-individual Person” can be considered from both a Zen and a Pure Land perspective.

Different tendencies or directions in the movement of Japanese spirituality are noticeable between Shin (and the other Pure Land sects) and Zen. The former always sees the supra-individual Person in the direction of the individual self, while the latter sees the individual self in the direction of the supra-individual Person.¹⁸

While Suzuki does not provide a detailed explanation here, he points to the phrase, “this one individual person, Shinran” (Jp. *Shinran ichinin* 親鸞一人) as an example of the Pure Land “Person,” and Linji’s “true person of no rank” (Ch. *yi wuwei zhenren* 一無位真人; Jp. *ichi mui shinnin*) as an example of the Zen Person. We could say that in the case of Shinran, the “supra-individual Person” is expressed in the context of the individual who is an ordinary being (or *bonbu* 凡夫 in Japanese), and in the case of Linji that the “genuine individual” is expressed in living in the “supra-individual,” having gone beyond the self. The former is emotional, the latter intellectual.

¹⁷ Suzuki 1972, pp. 76–77; Suzuki 2010, p. 109.

¹⁸ Suzuki 1972, pp. 76–77; Suzuki 2010, p. 109.

Had Suzuki pursued to their conclusion these two directions, a truly interesting unfolding of thought would have been possible. However, insisting he had no wish to "be trapped between two different directions of thought,"¹⁹ he pursued this no further. He then turned the discussion to Japaneseness, stating that the above realization "was experienced only by means of Japanese spirituality."²⁰ While his argument in this section contains many jumps and is hard to follow, he points out that "Japanese spirituality possesses something that works within the emotional nature of the individual self," and focuses on the phrase, "this one individual person, Shinran" as a typical example.²¹

Suzuki draws this phrase from Shinran's statement in the *Tannishō* 歎異抄 (Passages Lamenting Deviations of Faith): "When I reflect deeply on Amida's Original Vow which issues from his meditation for five long kalpas, I realize that it was solely for the sake of this one individual person, Shinran."²² It was typical of Suzuki to identify an exceptional religious state in this statement. However, the phrase "this individual person, Shinran" is premised upon a response to "Amida's Original Vow which issues from his meditation for five long kalpas." The Other (Amida Buddha) is required for it to be meaningful. Therefore, his argument linking it directly to the "supra-individual Person" is something of a shortcut.

(3) *The Notion of "Person" in Chapter 5 of Nihonteki reisei*

Suzuki also discusses the notion of "Person" in chapter 5 of *Nihonteki reisei*. Here we find a more thorough explanation that fills in the gaps of chapter 2. To explain the *Diamond Sutra's* statement, "in accordance with non-abiding yet giving rise to the mind" (Ch. *yingwusuoazhu ershengqi* 心無所住而生其意; Jp. *ōmushojū jishōgoi*), he quotes and discusses the meaning of "person" in the statement of Panshan Baoji 盤山寶積 (Jp. Banzan Hōshaku; n.d.), "All buddhas are persons; there is no difference between buddhas and persons" (Ch. *quanfojiren renfowuyi* 全仏即人人仏無異; Jp. *zenbutsu sokunin ninbutsu mui*) from *Jingde chuandeng lu* 景德伝灯録 (Jp. *Keitoku dentōroku*; Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Published in the Jingde Era).²³ Suzuki states, "From the standpoint of religious or spiritual life,

¹⁹ Suzuki 1972, p. 78; Suzuki 2010, p. 109.

²⁰ Suzuki 1972, p. 78 (modified); Suzuki 2010, p. 110.

²¹ Suzuki 1972, p. 78; Suzuki 2010, p. 111.

²² Suzuki 1972, p. 77 (modified).

²³ Suzuki 2010, p. 355; T no. 2076, 51: 253b.

one must no matter what extinguish all such discriminations, and function in absolute nothingness, in other words, non-abiding.”²⁴ The “Person” is the subject’s functioning that comes into existence when the individual has entirely dissolved, after entrenchment as an individual is eliminated.

Suzuki then quotes the enlightenment song of the Zen master Shidō Munan 至道無難 (1603–76)—“While living, be a dead man, thoroughly dead; Whatever you do, then, as you will, is always good,”²⁵ which Nishida Kitarō also liked to quote—as well as Linji’s “true person of no rank.” Here we can clearly see a connection to Suzuki’s later *Rinzai no kihon shisō*. At the same time, he also presents the idea of *jinen hōni* 自然法爾, or “naturalness,” and Shinran’s statement “no working is true working” (*mugi o gi to su 無義を義とす*), understanding “Person” as the “discrimination of non-discrimination” (*mufunbetsu no funbetsu 無分別の分別*).²⁶ More than a few aspects of this are difficult to accept as they are; for example, considerable use of original terms familiar to the Kyoto school of philosophy such as the latter phrase and the phrase “absolute nothingness” (*zettai mu 絶対無*). Here, anyway, I limit myself to making clear that “Person” refers to a subject that begins to function after the individual has been temporarily dissolved.

We should also note that following his discussion of “Person,” Suzuki turns to the issue of “passivity” (*judōsei 受動性*). He begins doing so from the standpoint of Shinran’s Other Power (*tariki 他力*) of “no calculations (*hakarai no nai はからいのない*).” He states, “The final position of religion is the acquisition of passivity,”²⁷ thereby turning to passivity as a fundamental problem of religion. He finds this passivity in the metaphor from Buddhist scriptures of a mirror that reflects all phenomena and in “likening the mind of religious belief to trees and rocks.”²⁸ This is, in other words, the idea of “while living, be a dead man.” Thus, he finds passivity in both Zen and Pure Land teachings. His incorporation of this constitutive moment of passivity introduces the Otherness that was lacking in his aforementioned discussion of “this one individual person, Shinran.” The “Person” comes into existence only after taking in an outside stimulus. While Suzuki had already examined passivity head-on in his 1930 article for *The Eastern*

²⁴ Suzuki 2010, p. 356.

²⁵ Translation from Suzuki 1972, p. 124.

²⁶ Translation from Hirota et al. 1997, p. 666.

²⁷ Suzuki 2010, p. 360.

²⁸ Suzuki 2010, p. 361.

Buddhist "Passivity in the Buddhist Life," by making it an important constitutive moment for the "Person" in *Nihonteki reisei*, his ideas regarding spirituality acquired the potential to develop considerably.

Suzuki points out that this passivity is not simply passivity, for "the active is within the passive";²⁹ after one has thoroughly become a dead man while living, one acts as one wills. The Person takes on contradictions (that is, the logic of *sokuhi*), such as "the discrimination of non-discrimination, the non-discrimination of discrimination," and "passive being active, active being passive."³⁰ This, Suzuki says, is *jinen hōni*, or naturalness.

As we have seen, in *Nihonteki reisei*, the constitutive moment of passivity is very important for the "Person." In Suzuki's later *Rinzai no kihon shisō*, however, this aspect is again ignored. In the end, the notion of passivity was not put to full use in his thought regarding the notion of "Person."

V. THE NOTION OF "PERSON" IN *RINZAI NO KIHON SHISŌ*

(1) *Thought, Hermeneutics, and Intellectual History*

Rinzai no kihon shisō was Suzuki's last full-fledged Japanese-language monograph. We could call it a tour de force but it is certainly not easy to understand. Ogawa Takashi states, "While taking this idea of 'Person' as a self-evident premise, he just presents as examples Tang-period Chan practitioners' words and actions one after another."³¹ Kinugawa Kenji remarked that "This is a work very hard to understand," before examining each quotation from the *Linjilu* 臨濟錄 (Jp. *Rinzairoku*; Record of Linji), and pointing out errors in Suzuki's interpretations.³²

While it is difficult to read and problematic, it deserves attention because Suzuki applies his notion of "Person" that he had matured since *Nihonteki reisei* to his interpretations of the *Linjilu*, and he also attempts to construct Chan intellectual history as the process of the establishment of Linji's notion of "Person." In other words, using "Person" as a keyword, Suzuki aims for an integration of thought, hermeneutics, and intellectual history. This work is hard to read because Suzuki does not discuss these three elements individually; they are indistinct. Furthermore, he does not always cover them in a systematic fashion. Nonetheless, Suzuki's interpretation

²⁹ Suzuki 2010, p. 361.

³⁰ Suzuki 2010, p. 362.

³¹ Ogawa 2011, p. 428.

³² Kinugawa 2016, p. 93.

of the *Linjilu* is central to all of these. He fleshes out his understanding of “Person” based on this interpretation, and, having done so, reads this into the history of pre-Linji Chan thought.

We first note that at the beginning of chapter 1 of *Rinzai no kihon shisō*, Suzuki makes an important methodological statement regarding his interpretation of the *Linjilu*: “The task of today is pointing to the fact of religious experience. The approach of contemporary research is to look at the *Linjilu* overall and trace the development of his [Linji’s] *thought*.”³³ Here Suzuki presents “the fact of religious experience” and “thought” (*shisō* 思想) as two central concepts. As we have seen, the former is the core of Suzuki’s own thought. However, we must ask whether Chan/Zen can ever be seen as “thought.” Chan/Zen is thought’s rejection in that it does not accept teachings that are systematized thought. To say that Chan/Zen itself has thought is a contradiction. Despite this, Suzuki tries to read thought into it. This is the basis upon which modern scholarship on the topic comes into existence. Suzuki wants to extract Chan/Zen thought out of the tension that exists between the two elements of “experience” and “thought” that he has established.

Before *Nihonteki reisei*, Suzuki had already published two works on Chan/Zen “thought” in 1943: *Zen no shisō* 禅の思想 (Chan/Zen Thought) and the first volume of *Zen shisōshi kenkyū*. We could say that *Rinzai no kihon shisō* considers Chan/Zen thought anew by discussing it as inherent within the *Linjilu*.

(2) *The Notion of “Person”*

Suzuki identified the “Person” as comprising the fundamental thought of the *Linjilu*. Previously in *Nihonteki reisei*, along with “this one individual person, Shinran,” Suzuki had pointed to Linji’s “true person of no rank” as an example of thought regarding the “Person.” It appears that Suzuki forms his notion of “Person” out of a generalization of these two models. Suzuki directly addressed Linji’s thought in *Rinzai no kihon shisō*.

It is certainly true that, as Ogawa Takashi states, Suzuki does not really explain the notion of “Person” per se. This is because he was taking as a premise his ample discussion of it in earlier works such as *Nihonteki reisei*. While he does not provide a detailed explanation, in places such as the following he does present formularized expressions regarding the “Person,” as well as his “Person”-based understanding of the *Linjilu*, in a straightforward fashion:

³³ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 343; SDS, vol. 15, p. 3.

In Linji's words, spirituality is the "Person." . . . It is the "true 'Person' of no rank," or the "'Person' on the path who relies on nothing" (*mue no dō* 〈*nin*〉 無依の道 〈人〉). The *Linjilu* is presented on the basis of this "Person," and is a record of the functioning of this "Person." By understanding this "Person," one grasps that which runs throughout this text. . . . This "Person" is the supra-individual as well as a single individual. In other words, Linji is Linji as well as that which is not Linji. . . . The "Person" is one who lives the logic of *sokuhi*.³⁴

Suzuki's basic definition of "Person" can be found in his statement, "This 'Person' is the supra-individual as well as a single individual." In *Rinzai no kihon shisō*, Suzuki attempts to read the entirety of the *Linjilu* as illustrating the spiritual functioning that comprises this "Person." He frequently states that this "Person" finds its most direct expression in the section about the "true 'Person' of no rank" in the chapter on "Ascending the Hall" in the *Linjilu*. Suzuki had already pointed this out in *Nihonteki reisei* where he quoted the original as follows:

"On your lump of red flesh is a true person without rank who is always going in and out of the face of every one of you. Those who have not yet confirmed this, look, look!" Then a monk came forward and asked, "What about the true person of no rank?" The master got down from his seat, seized the monk, and cried, "Speak, speak!" The monk faltered. Shoving him away, the master said, "The true person of no rank—what kind of dried piece of shit is he!" Then he returned to his quarters.³⁵

Chan scholars in recent years do not see this passage as an expression of the fundamental thought of Linji. I will return to that point below, but here, let us examine how Suzuki understands this "Person" by going through its characteristics. Compared to *Nihonteki reisei*, in *Rinzai no kihon shisō* Suzuki explains the "Person" making more use of concrete texts. While his explanation is therefore somewhat involved, it is not indecipherable.

First, the "Person" is not static but functions dynamically. As Suzuki states, in the *Linjilu* one finds the "Person" in phrases like "the person of

³⁴ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 350; SDS, vol. 15, pp. 12–13.

³⁵ Quoted in SDZ, vol. 3, p. 352; SDS, vol. 15, p. 15. Translation based on Sasaki 2009, pp. 4–5. Japanese translation found in Iriya 1991, p. 20.

the way who depends upon nothing,”³⁶ and “you, the persons who are listening to my discourse right now before my very eyes” (Ch. *ni jijin muqian tingfade ren* 你即今目前聽法底人; Jp. *nanji sokkon mokuzen chōhōtei no nin*).³⁷ As he points out, “Linji frequently uses that [phrase] ‘*tingfa de*’ (聽法底) —‘who are listening to my discourse.’”³⁸ This refers to the “you” (Ch. *ni* 你; Jp. *chi*)—in other words, the monks in training listening to Linji’s dharma talk. Suzuki sees this *tingfa de* as “the core of the notion of ‘Person’” because “[the phrase] ‘*muqian xianjin*’ 目前現今, or, ‘now before my eyes,’ on its own evokes a mere philosophical or intellectual existence, and no actual *functioning* emerges from it. . . . We must recognize that the uniqueness of [*tingfa de*] lies in its expressing the *functioning* [of the Person; that is, “listening”].”³⁹

Second, Suzuki admonishes against a pantheistic interpretation, which would hold that during religious experience the individual is dissolved in a dharma body-like totality. Putting aside the appropriateness of this definition, in *Nihonteki reisei* it at least seemed like we would be able to understand spiritual experience in this way: the establishment of the subject after having dismantled the individual. However, when it comes to the “Person” in Linji’s thought, the individual is not abandoned: “Linji’s ‘Person’ is not waiting behind the multitude of individuals (*kota* 個多).” He explains: “The multitude of individuals are themselves ‘Persons.’”⁴⁰ An individual fully exists as an individual, and the three bodies of the Buddha (the Dharma, reward, and response bodies) are also “not outside of the mind” (Ch. *xinwai wufa* 心外無法; Jp. *shinge muhō*).⁴¹ They are realized in the functioning of the individual. In this way, Suzuki thoroughly eliminates that which transcends the individual. However, how can there then be a “supra-individual individual”?

Third, the issue arises of how this “supra-individual” comes into existence. In this regard, Suzuki speaks of intellectual discrimination and spiritual awakening, which he had covered before writing *Rinzai no kihon shisō*. He understands the supra-individual Person to be attained by spiritual experience: “When the intellect itself dies (Jp. *sōshin shitsumyō* 喪身失命; Ch. *sangshen shiming*), there is a spiritual awakening.”⁴² The supra-individual “Person” comes into existence when the intellect’s dualism vanishes:

³⁶ Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 197. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 59.

³⁷ Translation based on Sasaki 2009, p. 160. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 36.

³⁸ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 386; SDS, vol. 15, p. 58.

³⁹ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 386; SDS, vol. 15, p. 58.

⁴⁰ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 385; SDS, vol. 15, p. 57.

⁴¹ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 367; SDS, vol. 15, p. 33.

⁴² SDZ, vol. 3, p. 507; SDS, vol. 15, p. 205.

"Between spiritual awakening and intellectual abstraction there is an insurmountable trench."⁴³

However, does this not again lead to a dualism between intellectual discriminative thinking and spiritual awakening? According to Suzuki, this is not the case: "The experiential fact of intellectual discrimination penetrating its own non-discriminatory root—or its own root non-discrimination—is spiritual awakening."⁴⁴ Therein the "discrimination of non-discrimination" comes into existence. This is a very important point for understanding the spiritual "Person." One must overcome a gap in going from the intellectual to the spiritual. Therefore, "when reaching that which is a spiritual awakening, one becomes the 'Person' (〈*nin*〉 *o taitoku suru* 〈人〉を体得する)."⁴⁵ However, the individual that is discrimination does not disappear after this trench has been surmounted. The supra-individual that is non-discrimination is not separate from the individual that is discrimination; they cannot be divided. The supra-individual cannot come into existence outside of the individual. The "Person" that is the supra-individual individual is established where this contradiction exists *as is*.

The above can be illustrated as follows:

Intellectual discrimination ⇒ Spiritual awakening
Individual ⇒ "Person" (= individual + supra-individual)

This is Zen enlightenment put in modern terms.

Fourth, this "Person" is complete in itself, lacking nothing: "What is lacking?" (Ch. *qianshao shenme* 欠少什麼; Jp. *kesshō jūmo*).⁴⁶ This is the state frequently described in the *Linjilu* as "doing nothing" (Ch. *wushi* 無事; Jp. *buji*) or, in the words of Mazu 馬祖 (Jp. Baso; 709–88), of "the ordinary mind being the path" (Ch. *pingchangxin shi dao* 平常心是道; Jp. *byōjōshin kore dō*). Suzuki also uses the phrase *kannagara no michi* 神ながらの道, or the "way of the gods."⁴⁷ He explains this as follows.

One returning (*gensō ekō shite* 還相廻向して) from [the state in which] "mountains are not mountains and water is not water" again to [the state in which] "mountains are mountains and water

⁴³ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 490; SDS, vol. 15, p. 184.

⁴⁴ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 507; SDS, vol. 15, p. 205.

⁴⁵ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 487; SDS, vol. 15, p. 180.

⁴⁶ Quoted in SDZ, vol. 3, p. 379; SDS, vol. 15, p. 49. Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 208. Japanese: Iriya 1991, p. 34.

⁴⁷ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 380; SDS, vol. 15, p. 50.

is water” is very different from the one who first said “mountains are mountains and water is water.” However, if we only look at what is apparent, in terms of that which makes the person of the path who relies on nothing be the person of the path who relies on nothing, there is neither gain nor loss whatsoever in the present, past, there, or here.⁴⁸

This is also the example Suzuki gives when discussing the “logic of *sokui*” in the fifth chapter of *Nihonteki reisei*. Ogawa Takashi explains this in an easy-to-understand way as turning from zero degrees to one hundred eighty degrees, and then to three hundred sixty degrees.⁴⁹ If one rotates three hundred sixty degrees, then one is back at zero degrees. While it looks the same, it is “very different.” In appearance, the “Person” that is a “supra-individual individual” is no different than just an individual. Just by looking one cannot differentiate between the state of “doing nothing” in which someone has not engaged in any religious training (zero degrees) and the state of “doing nothing” in which, after religious training, someone has become enlightened (three hundred sixty degrees). However, here the problem of “do-nothing Zen”—which holds that it is fine not to engage in religious training or anything else—emerges.

Linji calls out to those who are listening to his dharma talk—“You, the persons who are listening to my discourse right now before my very eyes”—but have these persons truly rotated three hundred sixty degrees and arrived at a spiritual awakening? Probably not. Since they tend to be satisfied in a zero-degree state, Linji exhausts his words in his preaching, encouraging them to awaken. Thus, to the extent that they have not attained to the state of “true person of no rank” or to the state of “you, who are the persons listening to my discourse right now before my very eyes,” they are unable to manifest the functioning of a “Person.”

Above we considered four characteristics of the notion of “Person” that Suzuki identified in the *Linjilu*. While Suzuki discusses various other issues as well, his major points regarding the notion of “Person” can be found above.

Now, let us slightly change our perspective and turn to a fifth point, namely, that Suzuki does not only focus on Linji’s notion of “Person”; he also goes back into Chan history to identify Linji’s position therein. Suzuki points out, using concrete examples, that here and there one finds the notion of “Person” in Chan figures predating Linji. Here I would like to point to

⁴⁸ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 380; SDS, vol. 15, p. 50.

⁴⁹ Ogawa 2011, p. 260.

the fact that Suzuki summarizes Chan intellectual history at the end of this work in the following way:

The “mind of no-mind” (Ch. *xin wuxin* 心無心; Jp. *shin mushin*) transmitted by Bodhidharma became “seeing [buddha] nature” (Ch. *jianxing* 見性; Jp. *kenshō*) in Huineng 慧能 [Jp. Enō; 638–713]. This clearly marked a turning point in Chan/Zen intellectual history. Shenhui 神会 [Jp. Jinne; 668–760], saying that “the single character for knowing (Ch. *zhi* 知; Jp. *chi*) is the gate of myriad wonders,” changed Huineng’s “seeing” into “knowing,” losing the outstanding nature of this idea. Mazu then advanced “functioning” (Ch. *yong* 用; Jp. *yū*). Mazu’s Chan was one of “great capacity and great functioning” (Ch. *daji dayong* 大機大用; Jp. *daiji daiyū*). Linji changed this again. He synthesized seeing, knowing, and functioning as the “Person.” His “Person” is a very instructive concept. While considerable developments in Chan/Zen thought could have been expected from this [idea], in both China and Japan it was not carried on.⁵⁰

Here Suzuki presents the development from the “mind” to “seeing,” “knowing,” “functioning,” and, finally, “Person.” We should note that all of the terms preceding “Person” are terms used in Buddhist doctrinal studies. The first three had been used since the time of Indian Buddhism. In other words, “they were always within the traditional vocabulary.”⁵¹ We could perhaps see “functioning” as a term imbued with the characteristics of Chinese thought. It is also an abstract philosophical one. Suzuki holds that Linji brought together these terms, expressing them not with traditional philosophical terminology but with the non-philosophical and concrete everyday term of “Person.” In order for Chan/Zen to exist as “thought,” it must be thought that lives with concrete reality as concrete reality, and not drawn back to abstract doctrinal studies. Such was one of the conclusions Suzuki reached after *Nihonteki reisei* when examining the *Linjilu*’s notion of “Person” in his final major Japanese-language work.

(3) A Critical Examination of the Notion of “Person”

As touched upon above, recent research on the *Linjilu* is skeptical of interpretations that emphasize the “true person of no rank,” as Suzuki did.

⁵⁰ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 521; SDS, vol. 15, p. 224.

⁵¹ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 441; SDS, vol. 15, p. 124.

According to Ogawa Takashi, who has offered a new view of Chan history, there were two major currents in Tang dynasty Chan: Mazu Chan and Shitou 石頭 (Jp. Sekitō; 710–90) Chan.⁵² The former is characterized by ideas such as “this mind is Buddha” (Ch. *shixin shifo* 是心是仏; Jp. *zeshin zebutsu*), “functioning is [buddha] nature” (Ch. *zuoyong jixing* 作用即性; Jp. *sayū sokushō*), and “ordinary doing nothing” (Ch. *pingchang wushi* 平常無事; Jp. *byōjō buji*). In other words, it asserts that everydayness is, as it is, the Buddha’s enlightenment. “Functioning is [buddha] nature” means that the functions of the senses and consciousness are, as they are, a manifestation of buddha-nature. This exact four-character compound, however, was not used by Mazu himself. We can see it as a view that embraces one as one is. Linji and others express it as “doing nothing.” If understood in an extreme fashion, it can be taken to mean that since one is a buddha as one is in everyday life, there is no need to engage in religious training.

Shitou, on the other hand, criticized this Mazu Chan. He thought that everyday functioning is not the true self, and that, to use Ogawa’s phrasing, one must find in the depths of the “self of *energeia*”/“self of actuality” (*genjitsutai no jiko* 現実態の自己) the “self of *Eigentlichkeit*”/“self of authenticity” (*honraisei no jiko* 本来性の自己). Ogawa sees the characteristics of this Shitou Chan as best expressed in the phrase of his disciple Yueshan 藥山 (Jp. Yakusan; 745–828): “He is not similar to me, and I am not similar to him.”⁵³ Here, “he/him” is expressed by the third person pronoun *qu* 渠 (Jp. *kare*). As Ogawa notes, it is “used to abstractly express the original person or master of the self, described here as the ‘self of authenticity.’”⁵⁴ Therefore, Yueshan’s words mean that, not being satisfied with the self that appears in everyday life, one must arrive at the original self that lies in its depths. This directly confronted the issue of religious training that was lacking in Mazu Chan. However, a new problem appeared: this can invite the misunderstanding that this *qu* is something that actually exists separately from “me.” In this way both Mazu and Shitou Chan become problematic.

Similarly, Suzuki states, “It appears that a large proportion of those under Qingyuan like Shitou, Yueshan, Daowu, Yunyan, and Dongshan discussed things that would lead to the notion of ‘Person’.”⁵⁵ In the section “A Person”

⁵² Ogawa 2011, ch. 1.

⁵³ Ogawa 2011, p. 112; Sun 2007, p. 224.

⁵⁴ Ogawa 2011, p. 113.

⁵⁵ SDZ, vol. 3, p. 459; SDS, vol. 15, p. 145.

(*hitori* 一人) in *Zen no shisō*, he refers to a discussion between Yunyan and Daowu—both in the Shitou lineage—that shows this in an easy-to-understand fashion. Yunyan was boiling tea, and his fellow monk Daowu came, and asked,

“Who are you boiling that for?”

Yunyan answered, “There is a person who said he wants it.”

“Shouldn't you get him to do it himself?”

Yunyan answered, “Well, I am here and so . . .”⁵⁶

Here, it appears that there is “a person” separate from “I” (Yunyan). However, this would be strange. There is no possibility that a supra-individual person and an individual “I” would be different.

Linji belonged to Mazu's lineage. In fact, Linji frequently spoke of “doing nothing” and “ordinariness.” For example, he said, “As to the Buddhadharma, no effort is necessary. You have only to be ordinary, with nothing to do—defecating, urinating, wearing clothes, eating food, and lying down when tired,” asserting that there is no Buddhadharma outside of everyday life.⁵⁷ However, if one focuses on the “true person of no rank,” then one might think that there is an original self like the one asserted in Shitou Chan. Therefore, Ogawa and Kinugawa both are critical of focusing on the “true person of no rank” phrase, and see the dharma talk in which it appears as having been a failure based on the fact that Linji gives up and returns to his quarters (Ch. *fangzhang* 方丈; Jp. *hōjō*).⁵⁸

While I will not embark here on a discussion of the status of the phrase “true person of no rank,” there is room to consider whether Linji's position in the *Linjilu* is really an exact replica of the Mazu Chan “functioning is buddha-nature” doctrine. It is certainly true that Linji frequently quotes Mazu and attaches importance to this lineage. When read literally, the aforementioned phrase “you, who are the persons listening to my discourse before my very eyes right now” that Suzuki emphasizes does refer to the functioning of perception/consciousness (listening). Therefore, one can understand it as referring to the Mazu Chan “functioning as buddha nature” doctrine.

However, Linji is not advocating doing nothing. As Suzuki points out, Linji changes Mazu's “functioning” into “Person” and draws considerable

⁵⁶ SDZ, vol. 13, p. 160; SDS, vol. 2, p. 193; *Jingde chuandeng lu* (Jp. *Keitoku dentōroku*; Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Published in the Jingde Era), T no. 2076, 51: 315a.

⁵⁷ Translation based on Sasaki 2009, p. 185. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 50.

⁵⁸ Ogawa 2008, p. 181; Kinugawa 2016, p. 100.

attention to the active nature of the “Person.” Linji states that the “Person” who is “right now before my very eyes” engages in the activity of traversing “the ten directions” and “freely” being “himself in all three realms.” The “Person” also has the ability to preach to the buddhas: “On meeting a buddha, he teaches the buddha.”⁵⁹ Linji also expresses this functioning as “bright and vigorous” (Ch. *huo bobode* 活撥撥地; Jp. *kappatsupacchi*).⁶⁰ In other words, he is seeking not a zero-degree “doing nothing,” but a three hundred sixty degree “doing nothing,” which leads him to issue his famous harsh reprimand in the form of a shout (Ch. *he* 喝; Jp. *katsu*). With Mazu Chan giving rise to a tendency for satisfaction with a zero-degree state, Linji wanted practitioners to arrive at the three hundred sixty degree state of “doing nothing” through intense religious training.

With the above in mind, it appears that Suzuki’s reading of the *Linjilu* that places at its core the notion of “Person” is not necessarily wrong. Chan, while trying to part ways from the study of doctrine, had only been able to articulate “thought” in doctrinal studies terms. Suzuki saw Linji, in contrast, as having established Chan thought in his idea of “Person” who is entirely enmeshed in the concrete. This understanding of Suzuki’s certainly merits our consideration.

We should also note that Suzuki, in investigating the relationship in Chan/Zen between the supra-individual and the individual, changed his view from that in writings such as *Nihonteki reisei*. In *Nihonteki reisei*, Suzuki considered the supra-individual as a dharma body-like entity that dissolved the individual, and held that the “Person” was established when the individual arose after this dissolution. However, in *Rinzai no kihon shisō*, he rejects the idea that the individual is dissolved by anything like a dharma body. He holds that the “Person” is established when the discrimination of the intellect changes to a spiritual realization, and that the supra-individual is the authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) that makes this “Person” be a “Person.” The “Person” comes into existence out of *sokuhi*-like contradictions: the “supra-individual individual” and the “discrimination of non-discrimination.” This is another one of Suzuki’s views worth considering.

However, as I mentioned when discussing *Nihonteki reisei*, in Suzuki’s understanding of “Person,” there is no constitutive moment of the Other. In *Nihonteki reisei*, Suzuki did not fully develop his ideas regarding examples

⁵⁹ Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 192. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 54.

⁶⁰ Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 198. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 61.

of passivity; it disappears. In *Rinzai no kihon shisō*, while he covers the issue of "belief" as found in the *Linjilu*, he does so primarily as belief in oneself, and Suzuki does not discuss the Other. One could look for the constitutive moment of the Other in Chan/Zen by turning to the teacher-disciple relationship in the "mind-to-mind transmission" of the teachings (Ch. *yixin chuanxin* 以心伝心; Jp. *ishin denshin*). Only when a teacher and disciple come into contact with one another does "mind-to-mind transmission" arise. Likewise, many Chan/Zen question-and-answer format exchanges also vividly show that Chan/Zen does not come into existence outside of the coexistence with others. However, both Suzuki and other modern interpreters of Chan/Zen in general close off the self from the outside world by limiting it to the "investigation of the self" (Jp. *koji kyūmei* 己事究明), thus losing sight of an important issue.

(Translated by Dylan Luers Toda)

ABBREVIATIONS

- SDS *Suzuki Daisetsu senshū* 鈴木大拙選集. 26 vols. Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1961.
 SDZ *Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū* 鈴木大拙全集. 40 vols. Ed. Furuta Shōkin 古田紹欽, Hisamatsu Shin'ichi 久松真一, and Yamaguchi Susumu 山口益. New, enlarged ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999–2003.
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