ARTICLES

# Religion and Philosophy: Miki Kiyoshi's Philosophy of Religion

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Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897–1945) was one of modern Japan's major philosophers. As a student, he would attend the sermons of Chikazumi Jōkan 近角常観 (1870–1941), a Jōdo Shinshū 浄土真宗 priest who played an important role in modern Japanese intellectual and religious history. Miki never forgot this experience of listening to Chikazumi preach. We can gain an overview of the basic characteristics of Miki's thought, which have not been adequately understood, by keeping in mind his relationship with Chikazumi. Miki worked to construct his own philosophy of religion, developing his ideas while being both directly and indirectly influenced by Chikazumi. The aim of this essay is to make clear the characteristics of Miki's philosophy of religion. By doing so, I hope to sketch for readers a picture of one of the many young intellectuals who listened to Chikazumi's Shin 真 Buddhist teachings, as well as present a new side of modern Japanese intellectual history that emerges when we situate Chikazumi in our field of vision.

## *Chikazumi Jōkan's Life and Its Historical Significance*

In the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century, Buddhists such as Chikazumi were engaging in innovative proselytization, similar to that of Christians such as Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 (1861–1930) and Ebina Danjō 海老名弾正 (1856–1937), who at the time influenced young Japanese through their Bible research groups and church sermons.

Chikazumi was born in what is today Nagahama 長浜 City's Kohokuchō 湖北町 (Shiga Prefecture). He was the oldest son of Chikazumi Jōzui 近角常随 (ca. 1838–1904), the twelfth-generation head priest of Saigenji 西源寺, a temple belonging to the

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Ōtani 大谷 school of Shin Buddhism. Expected from birth to become a Shin priest, Chikazumi received a thorough education in sect teachings and scripture-reading methods starting at a very young age. After studying at Kyōto-fu Jinjō Chūgakkō 京都府尋常中学校 (Kyoto Prefectural Ordinary Middle School), at the recommendation of Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903), he was sent by Higashi Honganji 東本願寺 to study in Tokyo. At the Daiichi Kōtō Gakkō 第一高等学校 (First Higher School) and Tokyo Imperial University, he trained in Western academic fields. In September 1897, while an undergraduate, he had a decisive conversion following a period of deep anguish. He would gradually come to discuss this experience at Bukkyō Seinen Kai 仏教青年会 (Buddhist Youth Association) lectures, in articles in the periodical *Seikyō jihō* 政教時報, and elsewhere. After graduating, at the order of Higashi Honganji he spent two years in the United States and Europe observing the religious situation there. While Chikazumi was abroad from 1900 to 1902, Kiyozawa Manshi moved into his vacant residence in Hongō Morikawa 本郷森川 in Tokyo and started the Kōkōdō 浩々洞 group. After coming back to Japan, Chikazumi established the student boarding facility Kyūdō Gakusha 求道学舎 at his former place of residence and passionately engaged in Shin proselytization activities. Chikazumi's sermons were based on his own experiences, which he referred to as *jikken* 実験, a term that also means "experiment." This emphasis on *jikken* was found in Chikazumi's thought and in that of many other religious figures of his time.

Partially due to the proximity of Tokyo Imperial University, a great number of young people gathered to hear Chikazumi's sermons in Hongō Morikawa. They were not only men; Chikazumi had many female followers, including students from Japan Women's University. Eventually, his audiences could no longer fit inside the Kyūdō Gakusha, and therefore in 1915 he established nearby the Kyūdō Kaikan 求道会館, a Western-style brick building for preaching. In 1931, Chikazumi had a cerebral hemorrhage. While his opportunities to preach and engage in other activities were reduced due to frequent hospitalizations, he continued to proselytize at the Kyūdō Kaikan until he died in 1941.

Let us turn to the people that listened to Chikazumi's sermons. In addition to Miki, Tanikawa Tetsuzō 谷川徹三 (1895–1989), Shirai Shigenobu 白井成允 (1888–1973), and Takeuchi Yoshinori 武内義範 (1913–2002) each had close connections with Chikazumi that they would never forget, and all would subsequently become famous as philosophers and/or scholars of philosophy. Iwanami Shigeo 岩波茂雄 (1881–1946), the founder of the famous publisher Iwanami Shoten, went to Chikazumi for help in resolving his psychospiritual troubles, and the novelist Kamura Isota 嘉村磯多 (1897–1933), a writer of "I-novels" (*shishōsetsu* 私小説), took Chikazumi as his teacher and depicted him in his works *Gōku* 業苦 (Karmic Suffering) and *Gake no shita* 崖の下 (Beneath the Cliffs). Also, the family of the famous writer Miyazawa Kenji 宮沢賢治 (1896–1933)

used to go to hear Chikazumi preach. While it is not clear whether or not Kenji himself did so, and the precise nature of his relationship with Chikazumi is also not certain, Kenji's father, Masajirō 政次郎 (1874–1957), did have close ties with Chikazumi. For example, he invited Chikazumi to the city of Hanamaki 花巻 (Iwate Prefecture). In the field of psychoanalysis, Kosawa Heisaku 古澤平作 (1897–1968), the first president of the Japan Psychoanalytical Association (Nihon Seishin Bunseki Gakkai 日本精神分析学会), was a fervent Chikazumi follower, and Chikazumi's sermons became a fountainhead for this field in Japan. Chikazumi's influence also extended to the thought of Kosawa's pupils Okonogi Keigo 小此木啓吾 (1930–2003) and Doi Takeo 土居健郎 (1920–2009).[1]

Following the Meiji 明治 Restoration in 1868, many Buddhists sought to modernize Buddhism in line with Japan's westernization efforts. Chikazumi was one of them. However, another predominant feature of Chikazumi's activities was the reconstitution of tradition: he took traditional Shin Buddhist doctrines and organizational forms that had existed even before the early modern period and adjusted them for modern Japan.

We can understand how he did so through the example of the *Tannishō* 歎異抄, a work synonymous with his proselytization. Even today, people sometimes say that the *Tannishō* became well-known thanks to Kiyozawa Manshi's discovery of it after four hundred years of obscurity following the work's banning by Rennyo 蓮如 (1415–1499). However, scholarship has made clear that this narrative includes misunderstandings; during the Edo 江戸 period (1603–1868), the *Tannishō* was published in many forms and was the subject of many academic studies, lectures, and sermons. This was true for both Higashi and Nishi Honganji 西本願寺. For Chikazumi, the *Tannishō* was a traditional Shin Buddhist religious work handed down to him by his father. However, Chikazumi read the *Tannishō* in quite a different way. In Kohoku, Jōzui had read it together with a small group of familiar faces. In contrast, Chikazumi lectured on the *Tannishō* in Hongō in front of large crowds, comprised of many people he did not personally know, and furthermore, he then published these lectures. Chikazumi's sermons and publications contributed significantly to the spread of this text from the Meiji period (1868–1912) onwards.

The architectural style of the Kyūdō Kaikan, Chikazumi's base for propagation, symbolizes his reconstitution of tradition. It was designed by Takeda Goichi 武田五一 (1872–1938), and on the outside it resembles a two-story Christian church. The first floor also imitates a church: it is wood-paneled and contains three-person wooden benches. During Chikazumi's time, the second-floor gallery was covered with tatami mats, on which audience members would sit. Inside, at the front of the building, is a

[1] Regarding the relationship between Chikazumi and Japanese psychoanalysis, see Iwata 2014a.

platform that contains a Buddhist altar. The altar includes a small hexagonal reliquary, made out of unadorned *hinoki* cypress in a Japanese style, that enshrines a standing statue of Amida Nyorai 阿弥陀如来. It was inside this building, a combination of Japanese and Western styles, that Chikazumi preached.

Young people who came to Tokyo from the provinces freely listened to Chikazumi's experience-based sermons with their school friends. Many people attended these sermons, which, like at a Christian church, were held on Sunday mornings. However, Chikazumi did not just preach *at* his audience. He often would organize events for discussing religious beliefs and answering questions from his followers. This was another way that he reconstituted the Shin tradition. From ages past, Shin Buddhist followers formed organizations called *kō* 講. In them, members were encouraged to talk with each other about their own religious beliefs. This practice was referred to as *shinjin no sata* 信心の沙汰. The events that Chikazumi organized reworked this tradition to construct a space in which followers from society at large could freely come together and discuss religion. They also satisfied the psychospiritual desires of young people who, having left their hometowns, tended to become isolated in Tokyo.

At the beginning of the Meiji period, approximately 30 percent of Japanese people were Shin Buddhists. However, as European and American culture permeated Japan following the Meiji Restoration, the number of people who could no longer accept Shin teachings had increased. This was particularly true of the young people that had left behind their local communities and temples to study at high schools and universities in the capital. They were compelled to reconsider their stance toward spiritual matters. Each taking stock of their own self-formation, they sought to encounter religion in a new way. A typical example of this was Miki Kiyoshi.

*Shinjin no sata* evoled into a new form in the pages of Chikazumi's periodical *Kyūdō* 求道. *Kyūdō* was published, generally monthly, from 1904 to 1922. Many religious confessions shared by anonymous followers were printed therein: in its letters column, they would discuss their own religious beliefs drawn from their day-to-day lives. This column helped form a loose network among not only Chikazumi and his followers, but also between the followers themselves. Such a column was a first for a Buddhist periodical. There was a similar one, though, in Uchimura Kanzō's *Seisho no kenkyū* 聖書之研究, yet another example of a characteristic that Chikazumi and the Christian Uchimura had in common.

While the abovementioned activities of Chikazumi had a great influence during his time, he has not received due attention. A major reason for this is that he took in traditional Shin teachings, as well as the religious ethos that supported Shin institutions, and then reconstituted them. Today, many Japanese people may feel that his teachings are not novel but, rather, conservative and obsolete. However, the psychospiritual world of Japanese modernity, as well as the reconstitution of its traditions, emerged

together with the country's encounter with the West, and we cannot adequately understand the characteristics of modern thought in Japan if we ignore this fact. Chikazumi was one prominent figure who reconstituted a tradition that, for many people, had become either vague or seemingly self-evident.

Young, modern intellectuals were unable to accept religions in their early modern forms. If we adopt a perspective that understands Japan's "traditions" as unchanging in substance and possessing a self-evident nature, we will not notice the importance of Chikazumi. His significance comes into relief when we reflect upon how Japan's traditions were reconstituted. Chikazumi's activities refashioned Shin Buddhism in a modern manner and allowed it to be comfortably assimilated by many young intellectuals. Unless we pay close attention, we will overlook this legacy of Chikazumi's activities. Reexamining this, and other such assimilations that took place, can help us deepen our understanding of the psychospiritual situation both in Japan's modern period and in Japan today, which, after all, has inherited the legacy of modernity.[2]

### *Miki's Philosophy as "Philosophy of Religion"*

Chikazumi had a close relationship with philosophy, which can be seen in a number of respects. In the first place, it was philosophy that Chikazumi himself primarily studied as an undergraduate at Tokyo Imperial University. He then went on to graduate school, wrote articles on the subject, and also taught philosophy of religion as a lecturer at the Tetsugakukan 哲学館 (Philosophy Academy). While he would subsequently leave behind research in philosophy to engage in proselytization, we find scattered throughout these activities teachings that were based on his previous studies of philosophy. For this reason, there are a considerable number of topics to be discussed regarding Chikazumi's relationship with philosophy. Here, I will focus upon one of these—his impact upon Miki Kiyoshi's philosophy of religion.

Some might be surprised that I am approaching Miki's philosophy as "philosophy of religion." It is certainly true that there is little research that examines Miki's thought from such a perspective. Those researching his thought have been primarily interested in its social philosophy and social theories. The strong impression left by his philosophical inquiries into Marxism, as well as his unfortunate death after his arrest under the Peace Preservation Laws (Chian Ijihō 治安維持法), also surely have played a role. At any rate, the majority of scholars with an interest in Miki's social philosophy have taken a lukewarm attitude towards religion. As a result, they have also been perplexed as to how to handle the ideas about religion that he left behind.

[2] I invite readers to view the following website, which contains materials related to Chikazumi, such as *Kyūdō* and other of his publications: Chikazumi Jōkan Kenkyū Shiryō Saito 近角常観研究資料サイト. http://chikazumi.cc.osaka-kyoiku.ac.jp.

After his tragic death, Miki's unfinished manuscript on Shinran, covering two hundred eighty-four pages each filled with two hundred characters, was discovered (below, "Shinran"). It appears that Miki was working on it right up until his arrest in March 1945. However, Miki scholars have found it difficult to understand why this manuscript exists. While this is partially due to it having been left unfinished, they also have held that there are discrepancies between it and his preceding philosophical ideas. Ever since its discovery, the popular opinion is that it deviates from his philosophical views. However, in recent years, some scholars have recognized that "religion" is at the foundation of Miki's philosophy.[3] However, even their research has not yet actively tried to evaluate the position of religion within Miki's overall phlosophy. Therefore, in this article I will make clear that Miki's philosophical work aimed to construct a unique philosophy of religion.

### *Miki's Life and "Religion"*

Religion lies at the basis of Miki Kiyoshi's thought. While he may not have finished it, he attempted to construct his own philosophy of religion. First, I want to provide a

[3] Karaki Junzō was the first person to carry out research on Miki's "Shinran." Karaki, who knew Miki when he was alive, wrote *Miki Kiyoshi* soon after his death, discussing Miki's thought in favorable terms. However, even Karaki had to raise a "doubt" that *Kōsōryoku no ronri* 構想力の論理 (The Logic of Imagination), Miki's major late-period work, has aspects that are incompatible with "Shinran." He held that there is a mismatch between the former, which is about the "philosophy of infinite self-transcendence," and the latter, which takes "complete reliance on a transcendent being" as its premise (Karaki 1966, pp. 184–85). Karaki's doubts regarding Miki's work would be repeatedly raised in subsequent research on Miki. Therein, we also find two tendencies: one to treat the problem carefully and another to avoid it. There was also research that attaches importance to the historical-social existential philosophy of human beings found in *Kōsōryoku no ronri* and does not take up the issue of Miki and religion head on. It was in this context that the work of Tsuda Masao, Tairako Tomonaga, and others appeared which holds that "religion" is at the foundation of Miki's philosophy and thinking. Tsuda wrote *Bunka to shūkyō* 文化と宗教 (1998), as well as *Jin'i to shizen: Miki Kiyoshi no shisōshiteki kenkyū* 人為と自然：三木清の思想史的研究 (2007). In these works, he discusses the transformation of Miki's philosophy, pointing out the importance of religion for Miki and recognizing the significance of this fact. However, Tsuda did so from a perspective *critical* of religion. Tairako also points out that the issue of religion was important for Miki, shifting the discussion from a perspective that critically examined Miki's position vis-a-vis religion to one that reconsidered it rather positively. First, in his 2002 article "Miki Kiyoshi no shisō no akuchuariti" 三木清の思想のアクチユアリティ, while bringing to light the important position of religion in Miki's philosophy, he critically argued that this led to its major shortcoming. However, he would then attempt to reconsider the location of religion in Miki's philosophy (Tairako 2010). With that said, while Tairako recognizes the importance of religion for Miki, using cautious phrasing he takes the position that Miki's philosophy is not philosophy of religion.

Nishizuka Shunta (2008) has tried to understand Miki's philosophy as a whole (up through "Shinran"). Also, Uchida Hiroshi has published a work in which he presents Miki as "a philosopher who explored a 'historical philosophy of the imagination of the individual' that is extremely similar to a philosophy of religion" (Uchida 2004, p. 9).

general overview of the position that religion occupied in Miki's life. In the section that follows I will consider a text in which Miki first discusses Taishō-period (1912–1926) *kyōyōshugi* 教養主義 (self-cultivation through education) and explain the intellectual situation that stimulated the formation of his thought. Then, I will turn to Miki's notes ("Shuki" 手記) to make clear the position of religion within his philosophical thought.

Miki was a young man during the time that *kyōyōshugi* was an important trend in Japanese philosophical culture, and he heard Chikazumi preach when he was a student at the First Higher School. In a list of the books he has read, Miki recalls the intellectual situation of this time, stating that it was an era in which "humanism" appeared in five forms,[4] namely, (1) self-cultivation, (2) religion, (3) the Shirakaba 白樺 literary coterie, (4) the Gakkyū-ha 学究派, an academic school that supported the ideal of "culture," and (5) the philosophy of life (*sei no tetsugaku* 生の哲学). Here we should note that Miki was not influenced by only one of these: "I have been influenced by all of these to some extent."[5] This was the context in which the ideas that Miki would subsequently develop began to form. When touching on (3) the Shirakaba literary coterie, he draws our attention to the fact that its interest "had shifted to societal problems."[6] Judging from Miki's own recollections, it appears that first as a young man he took an interest in societal problems in the wider context of humanism, and then came to tackle them head-on, enthusiastically discussing Marxism and engaging with problems related to the societal dimension. Miki holds that his primary position was that of the Gakkyū-ha. This term referred to philosophers with an interest in Neo-Kantian value theory. Regarding "philosophy of life," Miki states that while at the time he did not have much of an interest in Henri Bergson (1859–1941), a philosophy of life scholar, he is connected to it via his philosophy teacher Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), who was part of the field.

With regard to "religion," Miki says that while he was influenced by Nishida Tenkō 西田天香 (1872–1968) and Kurata Hyakuzō 倉田百三 (1891–1943), this was temporary. However, this explanation alone risks a misunderstanding; elsewhere in Miki's explanation of his reading history, he describes his involvement with Shin Buddhism from a very young age, as well as his thoughts and feelings as a First Higher School student regarding Chikazumi Jōkan. Miki's relationship with religion must be understood while keeping in mind the following:

> I was originally raised in a Shin household, and at some point ended up memorizing the *Shōshinge* 正信偈 and *Gobunshō* 御文章 that my grandfather

[4] Found in "Dokusho henreki" 読書遍歴, *Miki Kiyoshi zenshū* (hereafter MKZS) 1: 401–4.

[5] MKZS 1: 401.

[6] MKZS 1: 402.

> and grandmother, as well as my father and mother, would recite. Sometimes, doing as I was told, I would sit in front of our home altar and recite them as well. In our area, reading scripture was a part of basic education. Perhaps due to the influence of such a childhood, since I was a young man, Shin Buddhism caught my interest the most. This has not changed even today. . . . When I was in high school I read for the first time, and was particularly impressed by, the *Tannishō*. Chikazumi Jōkan-sensei's *Tannishō kōgi* 歎異鈔講義 [Lectures on the *Tannishō*] is also a book that I cannot forget. I have also heard him give lectures on the *Tannishō* at the Kyūdō Gakusha in Hongō Morikawa. It appears that Chikazumi-sensei had a great influence on some young people during this era.[7]

In other words, from when he was a young man to when he wrote the above, Miki was most attracted to Shin Buddhism, and Chikazumi was a representative Shin Buddhist figure when he was a young man.

Karaki Junzō's essay "Gendaishi e no kokoromi" 現代史への試み (Towards an Account of Modern History) gives us a good idea of the relationship between young intellectuals and Chikazumi during this era.[8] Karaki's article is a classic piece analyzing Taishō-period *kyōyōshugi*. Therein, Miki serves as the example of an intellectual living within this broader trend. Karaki says that there was a "model" for the generation that preceded Miki, members of which included Uchimura Kanzō, Mori Ōgai 森鴎外 (1862–1922), Natsume Sōseki 夏目漱石 (1867–1916), Nishida Kitarō, and Nagai Kafū 永井荷風 (1879–1959).[9] While Karaki does not list Chikazumi Jōkan, as is clear from Miki's relationship with him, Chikazumi occupied the same place as these figures. Karaki argues that this generation, which was born around the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868), lived through the contradictions and conflicts between Western modernity and Japan while having a "model" in mind that came from Confucianism and *bushidō* 武士道. In contrast, Miki's generation was a "model-less" one: its members did not have a pattern based on which to shape the self, says Karaki.[10] They thought that, rather than following only a specific teacher or classical text, it was important to learn freely from a variety of sources, and that this would cultivate their "individuality" (*kosei* 個性) and lead to the formation of their character. Having grown up in an area where Shin Buddhism flourished, Miki was familiar with its ethos, yet it still had a premodern hue. However, Chikazumi, who had reconstructed Shin Buddhism in a modern fashion, was proselytizing in Tokyo's Hongō area. For this reason, Miki and others

[7] MKZS 1: 383–84.
[8] In Karaki 1963.
[9] Karaki 1963, p. 35.
[10] Karaki 1963, p. 25.

were able to take in the familiar Shin Buddhism with fresh eyes as a valid choice, equal to philosophy and Christianity, which could contribute to the formation of their "individuality." While there is a need to separately examine whether Miki's generation was in fact completely unconnected to such models from the Edo period,[11] there is no doubt that Miki was a young adult during Taishō-period *kyōyōshugi* and learned a considerable amount from the generation that preceded him, and also that he then came to question the foundations of humanism. This issue relates to Miki's "Nietzschean task," which I will discuss later in this essay.

In this way, Miki took in the academic field of philosophy along with the mixture of various elements included under the heading of "humanism," and would spend his life as a philosopher. In the context of his chosen field, he would thoroughly investigate the various issues included in this humanism. In other words, when he first began to engage in research on philosophy, he encountered both philosophy as well as non-philosophical elements, and he would end up repeatedly examining these non-philosophical elements in his philosophical contemplations. Herein "religion" occupied a special position.

His personal notes ("Shuki") that he wrote in 1930 at Toyotama 豊多摩 Prison addressed to the prosecutors handling his case capture his basic approach to religion. These notes were written in particularly unusual circumstances: in detention after having been arrested based on the Peace Preservation Laws for providing financial assistance to the Communist Party. However, with that said, they have a similar orientation as the critique of religion he wrote immediately before his arrest, which was published in *Chūgai nippō* 中外日報.[12] It appears that they do not contradict the content of his writings or the development of his thought but rather clearly express his intellectual position.

In these notes, Miki says that he has lived his life as a scholar aiming to construct his own philosophy: "My path has been one of continually seeking my own philosophy."[13] He then lists "Nishida's philosophy," "Heidegger's philosophy," and "Marxism" as things he encountered while forming his own philosophy. While they may have captivated him temporarily, they were only part of what he encountered on his "philosophical journey." After presenting his standpoint in this way, he declares, "I

[11] Tsutsui Kiyotada, after pointing out that Karaki's outstanding article established the general outlines for research on Taishō-period *kyōyōshugi* that remain current today, raises doubts about the typological schema positing a shift from Meiji-period (1868–1912) *shūyōshugi* 修養主義 (moral cultivation) to Taishō-period *kyōyōshugi*, and proposes modifying Karaki's schema based on a more detailed analysis. However, he does recognize that Karaki's schema is convincing as a basic way of looking at the change from the "Meiji person" to the "Taishō person." See Tsutsui 1995, ch. 1.

[12] MKZS 13: 8.

[13] MKZS 18: 100.

am a human who inherently has a religious tendency,"[14] and asserts that this "religious feeling of mine is one of the things that ultimately makes it impossible for me to be a Marxist."[15] In other words, on the one hand, he asserts that while he encountered outstanding philosophical thought as he formed his own philosophy, since he was primarily concerned with this task, specific kinds of philosophical thought never became his own philosophy. On the other hand, he also confesses that he has a deep religious tendency, and that it is this tendency which made it impossible for him to be a Marxist.

Miki also describes an important religion-related perspective of his, namely, a focus on "societal elements" and "natural elements." He states the following:

> I think that while religion is clearly societal and therefore has class constraints, it is similarly deeply rooted in human nature itself. In order to find out about the depth of such "natural" roots of religion, one should just read books that are the confessions of the souls of great religionists: Augustine, Luther, Pascal. And Shinran.[16]

Miki then clearly states that religion has two kinds of directions or elements, that is, "societal elements" and "natural elements."[17]

In his article published slightly earlier in the newspaper *Chūgai nippō*, which focuses on religion, the strong interest in religion that Miki revealed in his notes to the prosecution is described from a perspective critical of religion. Miki states that when considering humans as a whole, religion always emerges as an issue: "Insofar as humans are not machines, the issue of religion is included in human existence itself."[18] At the foundation of human existence are "religious elements," and the issue of religion is "not something that will go away with the advent of an exploitation-free classless society."[19] However, this does not mean that he approved of religion as it existed at the time. He asserts that religion should be dialectically reaffirmed after having been rejected. Then, he says that if people arrive at "true religion" (*shin no shūkyō* 真の宗教) by delving deeper in the direction of pathos, they will be reborn as "creative spirits" (*sōzōteki seishin* 創造的精神) and prepare a new culture.

> If humans truly arrive at religion, then they must be reborn as creative spirits. If today the vast majority of people are in the process of becoming

[14] MKZS 18: 104.
[15] MKZS 18: 104.
[16] MKZS 18: 110.
[17] MKZS 18: 111.
[18] MKZS 13: 8.
[19] MKZS 13: 8.

> deeply engaged in pathos, then this is significant in that this is approaching the source of the rebirth of humans. The creative spirit is essentially not the same as the cultural spirit (productive spirit) and is a denial of culture. Yet, it also serves as the fountainhead of cultural creation. Today, based on this [creative spirit], old culture must be denied, and the path towards a new culture prepared.[20]

Before his arrest, Miki clearly stated that religion is indispensable to human existence, as well as that he expects it to play a major role in society. Religion had a weight in Miki's philosophical thought incomparable with its other non-philosophical elements.

### *Miki's Philosophy of Religion and Work on Pascal*

Miki's handwritten "Katararezaru tetsugaku" 語られざる哲学 (The Unspoken Philosophy) provides an excellent glimpse into his intellectual approach after he had begun to engage in the full-fledged study of philosophy under Nishida Kitarō at Kyoto Imperial University. After having identified the place of religion in Miki's philosophy based on this manuscript, I will consider his *Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenkyū* パスカルに於ける人間の研究 (Pascal's Research on Humanity; 1926) as the concrete materialization of this philosophy.

Miki completed "Katararezaru tetsugaku" in July of 1919, when he had finished his second year at Kyoto Imperial University (unlike today in Japan, the new academic year began in September). It spanned approximately one hundred fifty handwritten manuscript pages and is included in the eighteenth volume of his complete works.[21] It is not an academic article. Rather, Miki wrote down his own aspirations and resolutions as someone living as a philosopher. Its logical development is inadequate, there are many grand youthful locutions, and his expression of his intellectual position is unrefined. However, one can thus all the more glimpse the beginnings of his ideas. Above all, we find what would become the basic pattern for his ideas regarding the relationship between religion and philosophy.

Miki states that "unspoken philosophy" is at the basis of normal philosophy: "At the basis of spoken philosophy is unspoken philosophy."[22] Miki's aim in this paper was to render visible what was foundational and make clear his position as a philosopher.

What is "unspoken philosophy"? "Confession is unspoken philosophy."[23] He first states that the non-philosophical, religious element of "confession" is the fundamental

[20] MKZS 13: 30.
[21] MKZS 18: 1–93.
[22] MKZS 18: 35.
[23] MKZS 18: 3.

principle of philosophy and that philosophy comes into existence by making confession its foundation. Miki holds that in "unspoken philosophy" the "good life" and the problems of "form" and "content" (the necessary constraints of this good life) emerge as issues.[24] Miki then asks himself whether or not such issues have been examined in classical ethics. He answers that while classical ethics has been satisfied with logical consistency and indispensable knowledge regarding the good life, his own "unspoken philosophy" is different in that it emphasizes "ordinary life" more than knowledge.[25] Miki, quoting Tolstoy's *My Confession*, asserts that "unspoken philosophy" is based on "the belief that knowledge regarding truth can only be obtained by living."[26]

While it goes without saying that "confession" would become an important concept in the philosophy of Tanabe Hajime 田辺元 (1885–1962), here Miki is using it over twenty years earlier.[27] While Miki does not specify where he has gotten the word "confession" from, one of the books he did have in mind was Tolstoy's *My Confession*. However, that is not all. Judging from his statement, "It is precisely because we, with [our] tremendous transgressions and evil as well as [our] blazing delusions exist, that the extent of the Buddha's great compassion and great vow becomes more and more apparent,"[28] as well as his quotation from the thirteenth chapter of the *Tannishō*,[29] it appears that another source of his thought was Chikazumi's bestseller *Zangeroku* 懺悔録 (Confession Record).

In this manuscript the philosophical issues into which Miki would later deeply delve are presented in a rough form. One example is the issue that he would subsequently formulate as "the problem of the unification of *logos* and pathos." In this manuscript Miki discusses it with regard to the issue of humans as beings that exist between "reality and ideal" or "lightness and darkness." He rather hastily concludes that in order "to make the good life possible," the "existence of an absolute being" is necessary.[30] Importantly, this need for the "existence of an absolute being" is not a postulate based on rational inference but instead given irrationally or by religious belief.

> I am confident that the solution to the problem [of how it is possible to live the good life] is in the end given not rationally but irrationally, or not

[24] MKZS 18: 7.

[25] MKZS 18: 8.

[26] MKZS 18: 8.

[27] However, Miki was not the first to use "confession" as a key philosophical concept. Nozaki Hiroyoshi 野崎広義 (1889–1919), a pupil of Nishida Kitarō, had already written an essay entitled "Zange toshite no tetsugaku" 懺悔としての哲学 (Philosophy as Confession) in December 1916, and was preparing to publish it in *Tetsugaku kenkyū* 哲学研究 (Philosophy Research). Nozaki's article would later be included in his 1942 *Zange toshite no tetsugaku*, which featured an introduction by Nishida.

[28] MKZS 18: 59.

[29] MKZS 18: 72–73.

[30] MKZS 18: 63–64.

> by logic but religious belief, and that such lived religious belief is acquired not by simple conceptual thought but by actually living the good life.[31]

In this way, Miki's "unspoken philosophy" takes the position of philosophy that emphasizes ordinary life and searches therein for a point from which to be involved with religion.

If we consider that Miki was engaged in such a search, then the aim of his graduation thesis becomes clear. Miki finished an article entitled "Hihan tetsugaku to rekishi tetsugaku" 批判哲学と歴史哲学 (Critical Philosophy and Historical Philosophy) in March 1920. He then modified and published it in the journal *Tetsugaku kenkyū* 哲学研究 (Philosophy Research) in July of the same year. Unlike his manuscript "Katararezaru tetsugaku," it is a piece of research on the history of philosophy. It investigates the relationship between enlightenment thought and German Idealism within the framework of research on Kant. In short, he is trying from within Kantian philosophy to make clear the turning points from natural science to history and from the abstract universal to the concrete universal. In this article, in which his thought shows clear development, he philosophically investigates the meaning of "freedom" and "individuality," which he had not touched upon in "Katararezaru tetsugaku." Miki understands real-world freedom as having the potential for both good and evil, and argues that this freedom is historical freedom, namely, freedom that gives new things within history. He then states that religious belief lays the foundation for historical progress: "The ultimate meaning of historical activity is confirmed by pure religious belief. The final problem of the philosophy of history is the acquisition in philosophy of religion of the stability of a solution."[32] In this way, here Miki philosophically fleshes out the "good life" that he had discussed in "Katararezaru tetsugaku." Also, while he uses concepts from Kantian philosophy, he is philosophically working out the relationship between the good life and religious belief. Considering the philosophical interest of Miki during his younger days, it was actually quite natural for his first published book to have been research on Pascal. Let us now turn to his *Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenkyū*.

In 1922, Miki, with the support of Iwanami Shigeo, went to study in Europe. In Marburg, he attended a young Heidegger's seminar on Aristotle and was attracted to Heidegger's phenomenological method. Iwanami Shoten happened to have been planning to publish a series of critical biographies of philosophers (Tetsujin sōsho 哲人叢書), and Miki was asked to write one on Aristotle. While he planned to do so, in the end this did not happen. In April 1924, he moved to Paris where he wrote an article on Pascal. He became immersed in his Pascal research to the extent that he would write a letter stating, "Right now it is *impossible* for me to do anything but study

[31] MKZS 18: 36.
[32] MKZS 2: 48.

Pascal."[33] Until going to Paris, Miki had read Descartes and Bergson to an extent, and had planned to continue his research on them in Paris. Shortly after arriving, though, he wrote a letter to Iwanami Shigeo stating that he planned to study Maine de Biran (1766–1824).[34] However, after happening to pick up a copy of *Pensées*, it captured him.[35] Miki would then work to construct his own philosophy of religion through his research on Pascal.

Miki discussed *Pensées* from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. While recognizing, of course, that it is a religious work, he decides to discuss it in terms of its relationship to human beings.[36] To do so, he adopts the "interpretive" method of "making clear the basic experience of a given concept, and the concept of a given basic experience."[37]

Following Pascal, Miki discusses human beings in terms of the three "orders" of body, mind, and charity, to which correspond sense, reason/*esprit*, and heart/religion. In other words, in Miki's work on Pascal, he discusses how to understand "life" as a whole, which he would subsequently refer to in various ways (such as the "unification of *logos* and pathos"), in terms of the three "orders." He states the following:

> Religion does not go against sense and reason, in fact, it is an even higher, more flexible standpoint that subsumes and unites these things. Only within the order of religion is it possible to understand the *whole* of human existence without remainder. The way of understanding within this order is both contemplative and practice-oriented. A complete understanding of life is only possible from the perspective of a life in which "knowing" and "doing" are together and mutually inclusive.[38]

In this work Miki presents philosophical inquiry and religion as being very connected. Following Pascal, he asserts that philosophy is incomplete in and of itself and requires religion as a historically existing fact. Philosophers cannot replace religion with philosophy. This is because philosophy belongs to one of the human orders, and "is nothing other than the way of looking at life that is limited by the way of under-

[33] MKZS 19: 300. Emphasis in this and subsequent quotations is found in the original.

[34] Letter dated October 19, 1924 to Iwanami Shigeo in Iida 2003, pp. 275–76. However, we can see that he had an interest in Maine de Biran from an early stage; for example, Miki quotes him in "Yūjō: Kōryō seikatsu kaiko no issetsu" 友情：向陵生活回顧の一節 (Friendship: A Reflection on Life at the First Higher School), which he wrote right before graduating from the First Higher School (MKZS 19: 34).

[35] MKZS 1: 429.

[36] MKZS 1: 4.

[37] MKZS 1: 5.

[38] MKZS 1: 120–21.

standing unique to this order."[39] Philosophy is limited to showing the conditions in which God's revelation is realized and is only complete when it connects to religion that exists in history: "*Esprit* cannot complete the dialectic of the interpretation of life. This dialectic demands a *secondary* interpretation of life. This is provided by religion. . . . The dialectic is complete only when one arrives at the religious interpretation."[40]

Insofar as this passage is concerned, Miki's understanding of Pascal generally falls within the already existing research on Pascal, as well as the framework of philosophical research inspired by him in France at the time. It is difficult to identify anything particularly original. However, in Miki's understanding of Pascal we can indeed find some expression of his own philosophical position. I will make this point clear by comparing his understanding of Pascal with those of French philosophers.

When Miki took an interest in Pascal, research on Pascal in France was flourishing to the extent that a work would later be published entitled *The Revival of Pascal*.[41] Émile Boutroux (1845–1921), Léon Brunschvicg (1869–1944), Maurice Blondel (1861–1949), Jules Lachelier (1832–1918), and others successively published monographs on Pascal or philosophical works and articles that took Pascal as a source of inspiration.[42]

Ahead of his time, Maine de Biran presented from a philosophical standpoint a theory of human beings that would find its way into Pascal's thought. Biran's theory of human beings became one model for French philosophical anthropology. In *Nouveaux essais d'anthropologie*, Biran presents three modes of life in different dimensions: animal life, human life, and spiritual life.[43] Here we should note that Biran argues that religion is necessary for human beings, as well as that, even when discussing the human state, he does not take up the problem of the historicity of revelation or Jesus Christ.

The philosopher Lachelier wrote a research article on Pascal and philosophically refined Biran's philosophical anthropology. Miki himself referred to Lachelier's work.[44] However, Miki deals with issues that go beyond the scope of Lachelier's philosophy, and it is here we find Miki's uniqueness. According to Lachelier, Pascal's wager is not

[39] MKZS 1: 119.

[40] MKZS 1: 159–60.

[41] Eastwood 1936.

[42] For details regarding the philosophies of Biran, Lachelier, Blondel, and Bergson, see Iwata 2001.

[43] While there are editorial problems in *Nouveaux essais d'anthropologie*, here I am using the Naville version that was circulating in Paris at the time Miki stayed there. According to this work, the appearance of the ego distinguishes "animal life" and "human life." However, "human life" is given to humans for them to ennoble themselves to the "spiritual life." It is only here that human beings are liberated from the yoke of emotions and pathos, are filled with an inexplainable feeling, and are able to experience complete serenity and pleasant peace. While effort is indispensable in order to arrive at the "spiritual life," ultimately one can only reach it via grace. "Spiritual life" is the pure accepting state under the influence of something greater than human beings that follows active effort, and only Christianity has been able to reveal it.

[44] MKZS 1: 66.

an either/or situation in which one must choose or not choose God as a logical possibility. In this wager, the existence of God, eternal life, and the renunciation of self-love are inseparable. In other words, to wager that God exists is a practical affirmation: renouncing self-love and choosing a life suited for pure happiness as one's way of living. This is the wager presented to human beings; while freedom does not actually become a reality and remains ideal, humans must respond practically. However, according to Lachelier, when the mind (ideal freedom) acts on reality, there is no harmony between form and matter, and there is an inconsistency which we can describe as being practically a "contradiction." He then explains from a philosophical perspective the necessity of the wager.

Lachelier and Pascal are the same in that they look to religion when understanding human beings holistically. However, Miki takes a dimension not covered by Lachelier as the subject of his discussion, namely, the issue of Jesus Christ's death/resurrection and original sin. While these problems are normally covered in the academic field of theology, Miki discusses them from the perspective of the "interpretation of life" in philosophical anthropology. When doing so Miki focuses on the concept of the *figuratif/signe*. He declares, "The concept of the *figuratif/signe* is indispensable when religion interprets existence."[45] Miki explains the concept of *figuratif/signe* and asserts that that which is signified in religion relates to "truth." He then attempts to justify his own philosophical method.

Here we should note what it is that Miki is trying to elucidate using this method. From the perspective that the interpretation of religious signs is both practice-oriented as well as teleological, Miki first makes clear the significance of original sin and then of Jesus Christ. First, he asserts that from the truth of original sin, the reason for the confusing contradiction of "greatness and misery in human existence" is made clear.[46] Then, he states that from the truth of Jesus Christ, "the principle that integrates the contradiction of human existence" is made clear.[47] Here Miki says that Jesus Christ is "God, person," and "redeemer," as well as saying, "Only in his personhood is Christ's death on the cross integrated together with his resurrection based on death itself."[48] These normally fall within the scope of theology and are not topics discussed by philosophy. However, Miki engaged with these issues entirely as a philosopher. This does not mean that he did not differentiate between philosophy and theology: he does so not in terms of content but method. Since early modern times, philosophy and theology have often been distinguished in terms of their territory, but Miki tried to do so in terms of their method.

[45] MKZS 1: 171.
[46] MKZS 1: 182.
[47] MKZS 1: 187.
[48] MKZS 1: 184.

There was one French philosopher who tried to do the same before Miki: Maurice Blondel. Blondel's 1893 *L'action* is a major work of French philosophy of religion. It used Biran's ideas about human beings as a model and also tried to philosophically address Pascal's wager. *L'action* presents the transcendent as the only thing necessary for humans, and pushes readers to choose whether to accept it. It discusses the "completion of action" after having accepted this, and also covers doctrines, rules, and rituals that provide concrete norms for human action. Then, Blondel recognizes the significance of the tradition and the historical nature of the church that transmits these doctrines, rules, and rituals. While this work led to a major debate between theologians and philosophers, Blondel, as a philosopher, was himself attempting to explore the conditions that should obtain between human beings and God from the perspective of overcoming the imbalance of the will and from the perspective of the conditions for human action. Unlike theology, he does not start from the position that a supernatural "gift" (*don*) actually exists. He posits its existence merely as a hypothesis and attempts to focus entirely upon human action. While philosophy of religion is sometimes thought to be philosophy that takes the place of religion, this is not the case for Blondel's and Miki's philosophies.

Of course, Miki's "interpretation of life" and Blondel's "dialectic of the will" differ in terms of philosophical method. However, the philosophical personalities of the two thinkers are similar in that they tried to differentiate between philosophy and theology not in terms of content but methodology. With the same approach as that taken when researching Sanskrit instructional books or Mongolian customs (to use an expression from *L'action*),[49] Miki discussed as philosophical anthropology the Christian doctrines covered by Pascal. Like Blondel, Miki's philosophy of religion as expressed in his work on Pascal is essentially mediatory and is brought to completion by the existence of religion in history. In the concluding portion of Miki's work on Pascal, we find an important passage that clearly expresses this.

> Life naturally bears a nature that is not fully understood by purely immanent analysis. The understanding of life can only be complete when it is understood in relation to the transcendent. Herein lies the deepest mystery of life. While it goes without saying that this transcendent entity is at the same time immanent, it cannot be perceived by the *esprit* because it is supernatural as a whole. The limit of an immanent interpretation of life is, in the end, the limit of the philosophy of life itself. Philosophy, by its nature, can establish the transcendent. However, for life as a whole this is entirely abstract and it cannot become the concrete truth of life. It is reasonable for there to be limitations to philosophy. This is because philosophy is

[49] Blondel (1893) 1950, p. 391.

> nothing more than something that belongs to a single order of life as one mode of existence in life. Religion, which is located in an even higher order of life, fully interprets human existence. This is not by bending the facts of life but, rather, by making one understand their meaning and connections in keeping with the reality of life.[50]

Based on the methodology he learned under Heidegger, Miki engaged in research on Pascal, a popular subject at the time. Here we find Miki's ability to swiftly grasp current issues and develop them in the context of his own contemplations. However, he did not simply chase after trends. I want to emphasize that Miki found something in Pascal which resonated with his own philosophical interest and that his preexisting concerns took shape in his work on Pascal, in which he explored a philosophy of religion that could make possible a "good life" for all human beings.

### *Two Issues in* Kōsōryoku no ronri

After finishing his studies in Europe and returning to Japan, Miki would actively write on a variety of topics, and we no longer find works that are primarily on religion itself. However, we could also say that Miki, deepening his ideas regarding history and society, was expanding his focus in order to construct his own philosophy of religion. Miki deepened his thinking regarding at least two philosophical issues that he had not considered when working on Pascal. His essay "Shinran" can be seen as a work of philosophy of religion that was supposed to provide an answer to these issues. One of these was involvement with societal realities, and the other was what he referred to as the "Nietzschean task." Let us consider how he presented them when writing his major late-period work *Kōsōryoku no ronri* 構想力の論理 (The Logic of Imagination).

*Kōsōryoku no ronri* draws from Kant's "imagination" to solve the issue of the unification or integration of the *logos*-like and the pathos-like. However, constructing a logic for this was not easy. One difficultly grew out of Miki's increased focus on societal reality. In the first chapter of *Kōsōryoku no ronri* entitled "Shinwa" 神話 (Myth), Miki actively refers to contemporary Western research on myth theory. In this context, he presents the *Réflexions sur la violence* by Georges Sorel (1847–1922), a work which connects myth as a historical force to action. Following this French socialist, Miki says that while socialist revolutions and general strikes are contemporary myths, unlike a utopia that projects things of the past into the future, they have historical creativity.[51]

Sorel looks to Bergson's philosophy prior to *L'évolution créatrice* as one of the sources of his thought. However, Sorel's above reading is different from Bergson's position, at

[50] MKZS 1: 190–91.

[51] MKZS 8: 47–48. Miki is referring to Sorel 2007, vol. 1, p. 221.

least as found in *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*. Furthermore, while Miki incorporates Sorel's ideas regarding myth into his own logic, he does not actively do the same with those of Bergson. It appears that this was intentional; in *Tetsugakuteki ningengaku* 哲学的人間学 (Philosophical Anthropology), written immediately before *Kōsōryoku no ronri*, Miki criticizes the society presented in *Les deux sources* as "abstract" and not depicting "concrete human existence."[52] The analysis of static religion in *Les deux sources* and the analysis of myths in *Kōsōryoku no ronri* are very similar in how they connect issues, and they also both refer to and touch upon the same texts and scholars. However, Bergson saw imagination as a kind of necessary evil and discussed static religion. Then, not stopping there, Bergson turns to dynamic religion that takes Christian mystics as a model. He says that mystics return to the fundamental principle of life, encounter the creative effort that runs throughout the universe, and, having done so, then turn to act in the real world.

While Sorel recognizes the existence of historical creativity in myths, Bergson distinguishes between that which gives rise to myths and that which forms the core of creativity. Bergson sees "love" as forming the essence of creative effort, but calls our attention to the existence of two qualitatively different kinds of "love." He then links these two kinds of love to "open society" and "closed society." This distinction does not mesh with Sorel's position in *Réflexions sur la violence* that looks to "those myths in which all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party, or of a class are discovered."[53] Miki, probably aware of this, decided that he could use Sorel's theory of myths, but not that of Bergson, in his own work. This was probably because Miki had determind that the act of turning to the real world that Bergson emphasized in his writing on "dynamic religion" was in fact "abstract." Miki thought that one had to investigate forms of human life that would more concretely connect to societal reality. In his writing on Pascal, Miki presented a unified theory of human beings and discussed the relationship between human beings and religion. However, the life of a human found therein is an individual one, and Miki did not pay much attention to its relationship with actual society. It appears that Miki's deepened awareness of societal reality was one of the major background elements to his reconstruction of philosophy of religion, and also was one of the reasons that this reconstruction was difficult. This difficulty was further increased by his "Nietzschean task."

When Nietzsche interrogated the basis of Europe's value system, he had to confront the issue of Christianity; his nihilism inquired into the historical genealogy of these values. While Nietzsche interrogated Christianity, Miki would criticize "nature" (*shizen* 自然) which he saw as being at the basis of Japan's value system. Miki came

[52] MKZS 18: 380–81.
[53] Sorel 1908, p. 216.

to discuss the "Nietzschean task" from the perspective of "humanism's fundamental demand for the rebirth of human beings."[54] This "Nietzschean task" was, for Miki, a "critique of Oriental peoples."[55] It was in this way that Miki adopted Nietzsche's interrogation into the basis of the values of Western thought for his own project. In his 1936 article "Hyūmanizumu no gendaiteki igi" ヒューマニズムの現代的意義 (The Contemporary Meaning of Humanism), Miki states the following:

> Incidentally, the issue of tradition today appears particularly as the issue of cultivation through education. While cultivation through education is no doubt an issue that humanism should regard as important, at the same time one must fundamentally grasp it from the viewpoint of the issue of the rebirth of human beings. . . . One must be cautious with regard to cultivation through education becoming a new form of escape for the intellectual class.
>
> In this way, we encounter the issue of the critique of Oriental peoples, which is arrived at in the context of humanism's fundamental insistence on the rebirth of human beings. We can call this the "Nietzschean task." There is a need to critique Oriental peoples with the same enthusiasm as that of Nietzsche when he critiqued Western, Christian ones. Of course, it is impossible for the method and conclusion of this critique to be the same. However, we cannot lack the same humanistic spirit as him. Thoroughly carrying out this Nietzschean task is a necessary premise for the future development of our culture.[56]

Generally speaking, it appears that there are two parts to this "Nietzschean task": the interrogation of the basis of the Western value system and the interrogation of Japanese values. Miki does not take up the former but questions the basis of the Japanese value system. Miki recasts the Nietzschean task as a criticism of the Eastern ideology of naturalism.

> Our problem must be working on this issue in a self-aware fashion and intensely fighting Oriental "nature." Becoming aware of this problem is particularly important considering that there is always too much unconscious compromise with traditional naturalism. In the West, Nietzsche cried "God is dead!" Should we similarly cry "Nature is dead!" in the Orient?[57]

[54] I have found Tsuda 2007 helpful in understanding Miki's "Nietzschean task."

[55] MKZS 13: 284.

[56] MKZS 13: 283–84.

[57] MKZS 12: 229–30. However, in *Shin Nihon no shisō genri* 新日本の思想原理 (New Japan's Fundamental Principles of Thought; published under the name of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai 昭和研究会 in

For Miki, to present a critique of the East's traditional naturalism involved raising difficult issues; it was to critically interrogate his own footing. This "Nietzschean task" meant not simply that the humanism of Taishō-period *kyōyōshugi* that Miki took in during his younger days was insufficient, but that the very foundation of this humanism was not firm. His statement in "Ningen no jōken ni tsuite" 人間の条件について (On the Human Condition) that his "self" is floating on "nothingness" (*kyomu* 虚無) is an expression of this problem.[58] Considering that the foundation of his self was not firm, the issue emerged for Miki of how to produce a new humanism. Miki began working on *Kōsōryoku no ronri* in order to do so.

After completing his work, he reflects that his logic was in the end a "logic of form" (*katachi no ronri* 形の論理), writing the following in the introduction to its first volume (1939), which contained articles on the logic of imagination that he had previously published in the journal *Shisō* 思想 (Thought): "My thought regarding 'the logic of imagination'—a subjective expression, so to speak—has reached tentative stability by finding 'the logic of form'—an objective expression, so to speak."[59] Miki holds that this "form" arises out of "nothingness," and ends up expressing "life" (*seimei* 生命) as the "formative power from nothingness."[60] In other words, he understands human life as forming a set along with "nothingness." He states that the self is floating "on nothingness," and conversely, because nothingness comprises the human condition, he even states that self-formation is possible therein.

Miki explains his "logic of imagination" in relation to this kind of self-formation out of nothingness. The "logic of imagination" is characterized by a "coalescent dialectic."[61] This "coalescent dialectic" is an assembly of "indeterminate things" that are indistinct, and the basis of these "indeterminate things" is not solid and therefore can be described as "the being of nothingness." In this sense, all things exist within nothingness, and it is where they—each possessing its own unique nothingness—coalesce that "new forms" are born. Miki sees the biggest issue in this context as "how form can be created out of the formless."[62] He states that this problem is not solved from an immanent perspective and thus something "transcendent" is necessary.[63] This

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January 1939), Miki approvingly discusses "nature" as that which is the basis of Eastern humanism (MKZS 17: 514). While it is certain that the "Nietzschean task" was part of a major current in Miki's thought that would develop into his "Shinran," it is a fact that there are points still requiring elucidation in his later thought, such as his participation in the Shōwa Kenkyūkai and going to Manila as a member of the army's propaganda team.

[58] MKZS 1: 254.

[59] MKZS 8: 6.

[60] MKZS 1: 254.

[61] MKZS 1: 259–60.

[62] MKZS 1: 259.

[63] MKZS 1: 259.

is because he thought that the absence in modern times of a model to regulate human life arose due to the fact that individual, substantially existing entities had been dissolved into infinite interrelationality and lost their individual determinate nature. Miki's concern with this absence of "form" was probably in the background of his writing about the "non-observance of the precepts" (*mukai* 無戒) in "Shinran."

At any rate, *Kōsōryoku no ronri* was written after Miki turned to the issue of the foundation for values. Therefore, even though the unification of the *logos*-like and the pathos-like still needs to be addressed, the way in which they unify had become a much more difficult problem than when he wrote his work on Pascal. While taking the Nietzschean task as his own personal task, at the same time he emphasized its relationship to societal reality, and thought that he would be able to consider the important realities of human beings and society by reference to "religion." It was with this focus that he began working on "Shinran."

### *Miki's Reliance on Takeuchi Yoshinori's* Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku

"Shinran" is not a confession of religious belief. Just as Miki had considered the relationship between human beings and religion in *Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenkyū*, in "Shinran" he tried to philosophically consider the mode of human life grasped by Shinran. Miki spoke of its close relationship to his work on Pascal as follows:

> I went to Kyoto to study with Nishida Kitarō-sensei. During my years in high school I was most deeply influenced by his *Zen no kenkyū* 善の研究 (*An Inquiry into the Good*). I was wondering what to do, and this work made me decide to do philosophy. Another work was the *Tannishō*. Still today it is a bedside book of mine. Despite the recent popularity of Zen, in my case, this common person's Jōdo Shin Buddhism is what gives rise to religious feeling in me. I think that I will probably die based on this religious belief. Later, from around the time I wrote *Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenkyū* at my boarding house in Paris when I was twenty-nine, trying to write about Shinran's religion using the same kind of method never left my mind.[64]

While a limited number of scholars have discussed "Shinran," there is one fact that has been overlooked by them: its central content relies on Takeuchi Yoshinori's *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku* 教行信証の哲学 (The Philosophy of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*). In order to acquire this work by Takeuchi, who would subsequently become a professor of religious studies at Kyoto University, Miki went so far as to write a letter to someone in the publishing industry requesting it. In this letter, dated June 6, 1944 to Izawa Kōhei 伊澤幸平 (d.u.) of the publisher Sōgensha 創元社, Miki wrote the following:

[64] MKZS 1: 364.

> I am sorry about the other day. How have you been since then?
>
> There is a book about Shinran that came out, perhaps last year, from Kōbundō 弘文堂. Is there any way that you could get hold of it? If it is difficult to get, do you know anyone who has it? I would like to borrow it and give it a read. Just one week would be fine. If it is possible, could you take care of this? I have also been writing little by little about Shinran recently. I am not sure when I will finish, but I intend to research a lot [about him]. I hope that you can help me.[65]

While he does not explicitly mention Takeuchi's name, at least judging from the holdings of the National Diet Library, it appears that the only book published by Kōbundō during this time related to Shinran was that of Takeuchi. Thus, Miki was asking for Takeuchi's *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku*. The circumstances by which Miki found out about this work are unclear. Published in 1941, it is a collection of articles that originally appeared in the journal *Tetsugaku kenkyū*, so it is possible that Miki had already read them. It is unclear how Izawa responded to this letter. At any rate, in Miki's library at Hosei University, we find the second edition (1942) of this work.

Miki incorporated Takeuchi's ideas into his own thought, specifically the major parts of "Shinran." Therein, "Rekishi no jikaku" 歴史の自覚 (The Awareness of History) and "Sangan tennyū" 三願転入 (Turning through the Three Vows) were inspired by Takeuchi's writing. This does not mean that Miki adopted parts of Takeuchi's *Kyōgyōshinshō* interpretation in a piecemeal fashion. As I will make clear below, Miki's understanding of the logical structure of the entire *Kyōgyōshinshō* followed Takeuchi's interpretation. The fact that Miki does not cite Takeuchi's work was not his fault, but due to the fact that "Shinran" is a posthumous manuscript.

Miki's and Takeuchi's understandings of Shinran share the same sources; not only were they familiar with Shin Buddhism from a very young age, but they also were exposed to the teachings of Chikazumi Jōkan as young men. Furthermore, this was not temporary; both Miki and Takeuchi were cognizant throughout their lives of their indebtedness to Chikazumi and expressed this publicly. If this is the case, we could even say that it would actually be unnatural if there were no similarities between their understandings of Shinran.

I have already talked about the relationship between Miki and Chikazumi. Here I will write in some detail about the relationship between Takeuchi and Chikazumi. Takeuchi accompanied his friends to hear Chikazumi in Tokyo's Hongō, and in 1950 he would write down his memory of that time in his "Shinshū kyōke no mondai" 真宗教化の問題 (The Issue of Shin Buddhist Teaching): "I was able to receive the teachings of Chikazumi Jōkan-sensei due to the introduction of my

[65] MKZS 20: 291.

friend 'I' at Kyūdō Gakusha. It was in his later years, and I will probably never forget until I die how moved I was at the time. His voice still echoes in my ears, and the depth of his teachings truly gush forth like a spring from my chest as a truth that cannot be exhausted."[66] Takeuchi's sense of affinity to Chikazumi was stronger than that of Miki's, and he continued to revere him throughout his life. It was in this context that he wrote *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku*. At the beginning of this work, he states, "Fortunately, I have been able to encounter a teacher and a friend who both live in the religious belief of Shinran. The radiance and character of this teacher and this friend taught me the immeasurable loftiness of this religious belief. That *Kyōgyōshinshō* serves as indispensable food for my mind and my soul owes much to the influence of this teacher and this friend."[67] The teacher that Takeuchi is referring to is Chikazumi, and the friend was an old man named "Wasaburō" 和三郎. Wasaburō was a living example of the Shin Buddhist conversion from self power belief to other power belief as understood by Takeuchi. Takeuchi heard from Wasaburō about the actual experience of "turning through the three vows," a subject which he addressed head-on in *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku*. Takeuchi recalled his encounter with Wasaburō as follows:

> I came to know him when he was around seventy-five or [seventy-]six. At the time I was twenty-five, so we were over fifty years apart. As he said, I was "like a grandchild." However, leaving school and returning to my hometown temple, he welcomed me with a respect that stemmed from his unaffected heart. I first came to know of the depth of his religious belief one day when he told me about "turning through the three vows," which he had heard dozens of years ago in a sermon. Of course, he did not know about the Shin sectarian subject of "turning through the three vows." However, he accurately grasped the core of the issue based on his own experience and his excellent understanding of the sermon's content. Having just begun research on the *Kyōgyōshinshō* that took this same issue as a starting point, this was very beneficial guidance for me. We often would talk about the issue of religious belief.[68]

Sometime later Wasaburo would have a decisive conversion experience based on the words of Chikazumi that Takeuchi had shared with him.

> The hot red torch of [Chikazumi] Sensei's joy from entrusting (*shingyō* 信楽) [himself to Amida] appeared to fire up even my mind—a poor

[66] *Takeuchi Yoshinori chosakushū* (hereafter, TYCS) 1: 253.
[67] TYCS 1: 4.
[68] TYCS 1: 249–50.

> conductor—to the same high heat. It was amid this deep emotion that I discussed in detail with the old man Wasaburō what Chikazumi-sensei had taught me. When I told the old man that Chikazumi-sensei said, when parting ways with me for the last time, "Other power, you must not forget Other Power," Wasaburō said, "Oh, is that so, he said 'Other Power, you must not forget Other Power?'" Then, on a very rainy afternoon four or five days later, he came with his small granddaughter to my place. Upon taking his hand and showing him inside, [while kneeling] he all of a sudden [leaned forward and] placed his shaking hands on the ground, confessing, "While for a long time I was blessed with the opportunity to hear about it, I had forgotten about Other Power. It is such a waste. I am so sorry." From his closed eyes tears shed onto the tatami. I knew what was happening before my own eyes. Feeling a mix of, on the one hand, the urgent tension present when hearing serious news about a historical event on the radio that will probably determine one's fortune yet appears unrelated to oneself, and, on the other hand, blank vacancy, I listened to his confession. This old man's thirty years of effort had finally stepped over its last peak. Even so, just how kind, yet precipitous, is the path of the easy practice of Shin Buddhism? I was unable to raise my shameful face, confronted with my deep emotion and a perception of myself that appeared superficial upon reflection. It was shortly thereafter that old man Wasaburō would have a great rebirth that brought joy to everyone.[69]

Takeuchi wrote *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku* in the wake of these religious exchanges with Chikazumi and Wasaburō. Takeuchi's thought cannot simply be reduced to Chikazumi's sermons or Wasaburō's experience because he clearly developed his own world of philosophical contemplation. With that said, his philosophical thought took living religious people as models, and so it was only natural that it would be influenced by them. In the next section I will look into this influence in more detail.

### *From Chikazumi to Miki Kiyoshi and Takeuchi Yoshinori*

In order to identify the Shin Buddhist thought that Chikazumi passed on to Takeuchi and Miki, it will be useful to first compare him with his teacher Kiyozawa Manshi. Following Kiyozawa, Chikazumi engaged in research on the philosophy of religion when he was young. The philosophical essays that Chikazumi wrote after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University aimed to lay a philosophical foundation for Buddhist,

[69] TYCS 1: 253–54.

particularly Shin Buddhist, doctrine.[70] When doing so, he primarily referred to Hegelian philosophy, which was precisely how Kiyozawa tried to fulfill the same aim. However, while their orientation may have been the same, Kiyozawa and Chikazumi emphasized different points in their writing on the subject. Kiyozawa was primarily interested in fields like ontology, and he took in Hegelian logic and applied it to Buddhism.[71] In contrast, Chikazumi paid attention to how truth manifests in the historical world. A typical example of this is his focus on the relationship between the development of the *shinjin* 信心 (the entrusting mind) of the individual and the historical world. When Chikazumi gave a presentation in Paris, he discussed how Buddhist truth had manifested itself in Japanese history. With regard to Shinran, he touches upon the "turning through the three vows" as found in the *Kyōgyōshinshō* and discusses the order by which one "goes through the process of 'turning through the three vows' and arrives at belief in Shin Buddhist other power."[72] This is not discussed by Kiyozawa. Their difference in this respect is, to put it in terms of Hegelian philosophy, due to Kiyozawa taking logic as his model for philosophy, and Chikazumi focusing on the philosophy of history and the phenomenology of spirit. Chikazumi took as his main subjects aspects of Hegel's thought that Kiyozawa had not developed but needed to be addressed.

Both Kiyozawa and Chikazumi began by referring to such Hegelian philosophy and attempting to make the world of absolute other power philosophically clear. They clarified the meaning of renouncing philosophical inquiry and entrusting oneself to the power of Amida Buddha's vow amid the deepening of this religious belief. On this point they are the same. However, while Kiyozawa seeks the purity of a world of religious belief that is distinguished from the outside world, Chikazumi focuses on the concrete relationship between affliction-filled human beings and the absolute. He both emphasizes that foolish people (*bonbu* 凡夫) are drawn to the compassion of Amida Buddha and touches upon the ethical way of being in daily life after one has acquired other power belief. It is for this reason that he discusses homelife and life in society—those things which make religious life possible—as well as sometimes even discussing the relationship between religion and the state.

Miki's "Shinran" is difficult to understand and has been often misread largely because it is an incomplete set of notes. However, I believe that there are also two other

[70] Ōmi Toshihiro has already discussed in some detail the relationship between Chikazumi's own philosophy and religion. See Ōmi 2010, which is included in an expanded form in Ōmi 2014.

[71] Regarding the relationship between Kiyozawa Manshi and Hegelian philosophy, see Fukasawa 1991.

[72] Chikazumi 1896, p. 801. In the first half of this article we find Hegel listed as the first philosopher to advocate a "history of philosophy" that aimed to completely harmonize philosophical principles and history. However, Chikazumi does not attempt, for example, to compare "turning through the three vows" with Hegel's phenomenology of spirit. Takeuchi was the first person to truly elucidate the *Kyōgyōshinshō* from the perspective of Western philosophy.

factors that have led to misunderstandings. First, Miki understands Shinran's logic of "turning through the three vows" as something that runs throughout the *Kyōgyōshinshō* as a whole. Second, Miki expands this logic and ultimately goes so far as to discuss a "life in society" that is based on *shinjin*. For the former, Miki has inherited Takeuchi's framework for understanding Shinran.[73] However, Miki, without much explanation, uses that which has been carefully discussed by Takeuchi as if it is self-evident. Also, Miki greatly differs from Takeuchi with regard to the latter point. Takeuchi, rather faithfully to the structure of Shinran's writing, understands and investigates the logic of "turning through the three vows" as a logic of conversion from self power belief to other power belief. However, Miki's primary interest is life in society after this turn.

Both Takeuchi and Miki were close to Chikazumi, and his teachings greatly resonated with them. While their interests were therefore similar, their philosophies were not the same. Takeuchi was sympathetic to the way of being of concrete, historical people found in Chikazumi's sermons, yet was primarily interested in the logic of individual conversion. Miki, on the other hand, had a greater interest than Takeuchi in the construction of a life in society based on religion. To put it in rather rough terms, Chikazumi's religious activities had the two facets of internal religious belief and societal connection, and Takeuchi primarily took in the former, while Miki the latter. However, they were similar in that they both tried to find two philosophical aspects of Hegel—his phenomenology of spirit and his logic—in the *Kyōgyōshinshō*. They also both inherited Chikazumi's interest in the historical nature of Shin Buddhist belief, albeit while emphasizing different points.

Takeuchi, comparing the structure of the *Kyōgyōshinshō* to the relationship between Hegelian phenomenology of spirit and logic, offers the following explanation.[74] The phenomenology of spirit is the stage that preceeds logic. It is preparatory study. However, phenomenology of spirit and logic are like two sides of one coin, and only acquire a concrete meaning when they complement each other. The six chapters of the *Kyōgyōshinshō* can be divided into the first five ("Jōdo shinjitsu" 浄土真実 [The Pure Land Truth]) and the sixth ("Hōben keshindo" 方便化身土 [The Expedient Land of the Transformation Body]). The latter corresponds to the phenomenology of spirit, and the former to logic. In other words, the "Hōben keshindo" portion of the text, in which "turning through the three vows" is discussed, is an expedient means for reaching the truth of the Pure Land. It is a preparatory stage. The majority of religious thinkers and doctrinal scholars have placed more of an emphasis on the "Jōdo shinjitsu" portion in their understandings of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*. This was also the case for Kiyozawa

[73] Takeuchi's *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku* played a major role in the creation of Tanabe Hajime's *Zangedō toshite no tetsugaku* 懺悔道としての哲学 (*Philosophy as Metanoetics*; 1948). This means that the influence of Chikazumi's thought extended to Tanabe through Takeuchi. See Tanabe 1963, p. 6.

[74] TYCS 1: 9.

Manshi and other Shin modernists. Insofar as I am aware, Kiyozawa does not even discuss the "Hōben keshindo" portion of the text. However, Takeuchi held that the *Kyōgyōshinshō* is structured in such a way that its profound meaning only becomes apparent after these two sections come together and reflect each other; he also saw the "turning through the three vows" of the "Hōben keshindo" as being the logic that runs throughout the entirety of the text. For this reason, he understands "turning through the three vows" as an idea that forms the foundation of Shinran's ideas regarding rebirth in the Pure Land. Takeuchi, drawing from Hegel's phenomenology of spirit, holds that "turning through the three vows" (Shinran's logic of conversation) is closely connected to the historical world. Furthermore, he also states that the basis of Shinran's logic of conversation lies in his Buddhist view of history: "The true Dharma, semblance Dharma, and degenerate Dharma view of history is actually the transcendental basis of 'turning through the three vows,' and it is based on this transcendentally existing view of history that the temporality of the self-edification of this turn comes into existence."[75]

Shinran explains three of Amida Buddha's forty-eight vows by linking them to the logic of religious conversion. While many Shin Buddhist scholars have discussed "turning through the three vows," it was Takeuchi's idea to connect this to Buddhism's view of history and seek their basis therein. Of course, this Buddhist view of history refers to the three periods after Śākyamuni's death in which people receive his teachings in different ways. The period immediately after his death is referred to as that of the "true Dharma." During this time period, the teachings (*kyō* 教), the practice of implementing these teachings (*gyō* 行), as well as the result of doing so, or enlightenment (*shō* 証), all exist. However, during the age of the "semblance Dharma," while the first two exist, people cannot reach enlightenment. During the period of the "latter Dharma," only the teachings remain, and people are unable to engage in religious training and become enlightened. By seeking the basis for "turning through the three vows" in this Buddhist view of history, Takeuchi interprets Shinran's logic as one in which the logic of religious conversion is not reduced to the internal world of human beings but is understood in terms of its dynamic connection with the historical world. Miki's understanding of Shinran incorporated this perspective as is.[76] The section "Rekishi no jikaku" 歴史の自覚 in Miki's posthumous work is a comparatively organized discussion, and therein, based on Takeuchi's detailed logical development, Miki tries to understand Shinran's view of history that takes the subject as a starting point.

[75] TYCS 1: 14–15.

[76] "The fact that the Buddhist view of history of the three time periods is discussed immediately following the self-admonition of 'turning through the three vows' in the *Kyōgyōshinshō*'s 'Keshindo' chapter must be understood to indicate that an awakening based on this view of history is the foundation of 'turning through the three vows'" (MKZS 18: 456).

Using Takeuchi's logic, Miki tries to find the basis for Shinran's teaching of *akunin shōki* 悪人正機 (the salvation of evil persons) in the notion of the latter Dharma age. Takeuchi explains Shinran's ideas regarding the "non-observance of the precepts" in terms of the dynamic logic of conversion as follows. The realization of "non-observance of the precepts" must be accompanied by the reappearance of the true Dharma. Unlike "violating the precepts" (*hakai* 破戒), "non-observance of the precepts" is not something that directly rejects the good. It does not approach "the good" in this way. However, in "non"-observance, the non-existence of the precepts is shown, and something like their traces are evoked. In order to understand evil as evil today during the latter Dharma age, something needs to serve as a standard, and Shinran developed a logic in which this standard is summoned via traces while being accompanied by historical consciousness. It is here that Takeuchi found the profundity of Shinran's insight as a religious thinker.[77] Following Takeuchi's understanding of Shinran, Miki expresses it as follows:

> How does non-observance of the precepts become recognized? By awareness of the basis of non-observance of the precepts. This basis is nothing other than the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age view of history. The era of the latter Dharma age is the basis from which the state of non-observance of the precepts comes into existence. Awareness of the latter Dharma inevitably brings about awareness of the true Dharma age. Based on this, the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age view of history comes into existence. Recalling the latter Dharma age makes one more and more deeply aware of the sadness of belonging to the latter Dharma age. One becomes aware that the non-observance of the precepts is in the context of the violation of the precepts, that it is the extreme limit of violating the precepts.[78]

In this way he states that the teaching of *akunin shōki* holds that the "evil person" who awakens to "themself as the lowest class of foolish person" is the object of Amida Buddha's salvation.[79] Here we must note that salvation does not happen when sentient beings deepen their awareness of their own transgressions. The functioning of an absolute being occupies a decisive position in salvation. Therein a view of the history of the

[77] "In order to awaken to the hindrances of transgressions, it is necessary in the present to again bring back the three historical ages of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma in some form within the awareness of *Dasein* (*gensonzai* 現存在). If this history of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma ages can in this way be repeated within *Dasein*, and be remembered (*erinnern*) via this repeating, then the world itself that comes into existence by this history of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age itself is internalized (*er-innern*) within *Dasein* via this repeating. However, how is it possible to repeat the three ages of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma in the present? In order to repeat [them] we must reproduce the true Dharma age in some form" (TYCS 1: 32).

[78] MKZS 18: 454–55.

[79] MKZS 18: 458.

Pure Land teachings, which is the other side of the aforementioned Buddhist view of history, is necessary. The idea that these two views are two sides of one coin is Takeuchi's own understanding of Shinran's thought, and Miki adopts this as is.[80] Let us turn to Miki's explanation of the history of Pure Land teachings.[81]

According to Miki, in one way, the absolute nature of the teaching of Amida Buddha's original vow (*hongan* 本願) uniquely corresponds to the latter Dharma age. In another way, it has a true absoluteness in that it is universally applicable to all eras. The absoluteness that, without departing from history, runs throughout and in history, is found in its tradition. Shinran understood this tradition in terms of seven eminent monks: India's Nāgārjuna (Jp. Ryūju 龍樹; ca. 150–ca. 250) and Vasubandhu (Jp. Tenjin 天親; fl. ca. 4th or 5th c. CE), China's Tanluan 曇鸞 (Jp. Donran; ca. 476–542), Daochuo 道綽 (Jp. Dōshaku; 562–645), and Shandao 善導 (Jp. Zendō; 613–681), and Japan's Genshin 源信 (942–1017) and Hōnen 法然 (1133–1212). The teaching of Amida Buddha's original vow that was preached by Śākyamuni has been revealed by the seven eminent monks who span across great distances in time and place. A view of history that in this way shows the absoluteness of the original vow of Amida Buddha is the view of history of the Pure Land teachings. The historical nature of the teachings, while always connected to the absolute entity that is Amida Buddha's original vow, is found not as a philosophical concept but in the seven eminent monks, actual human beings. Miki quotes as an example of this a famous passage from the second chapter of the *Tannishō*: "As for me [Shinran], I simply accept and entrust myself to what my revered teacher [Hōnen] told me, 'Just say the *nenbutsu* and be saved by Amida'; nothing else is involved."[82] Here, says Miki, we do not simply find Shinran's "inner religious belief," but a view of the history of Pure Land teachings throughout which the "absolute," mediated by actual human beings, runs.

This assertion regarding the inseparable nature of these two views of history is not present in Chikazumi's thought. However, we do find traces of Chikazumi's influence on Miki's view of how religious truth appears dynamically in history. Miki's library includes Chikazumi's *Tannishō kōgi*, and therein Miki has underlined the terms "legalism" (*rippōshugi* 律法主義) and "absolute salvation" (*zettai kyūsai* 絶対救済). In the introduction to this work, Chikazumi explains religion in terms of the dynamic tension between an emphasis on the observance of rules (or legalism), an emphasis on salvation

[80] The correspondence between Takeuchi's and Miki's thought is clear from their two following statements: "We can find Shinran's view of the history of Pure Land teachings, which is the other side of the true, semblance, and latter Dharma age view of history, in the 'Shōshinge' 正信偈 in the 'Gyō' 行 (Practice) chapter and in the *Kōsō wasan* 高僧和讃" (TYCS 1: 127), and "In this way, we know that the true, latter, and semblance view of history, and the view of the history of Pure Land teachings, are two sides of the same coin" (MKZS 18: 467).

[81] MKZS 18: 458–70.

[82] MKZS 18: 465–66. Translation from Hirota et al. 1997, p. 662.

(*kyūsaishugi* 救済主義), and an emphasis on faith (*shinkōshugi* 信仰主義). Noting that Christianity's emphasis on salvation came into existence after destroying Jewish legalism, he says that Śākyamuni's Buddhism and the easy practice of the *nenbutsu* reflect the absolute emphasis on salvation through faith that came into existence after destroying legalism. We should note that Chikazumi points out the danger of reverting to legalism even after it has been left behind and an emphasis on salvation through faith has appeared. He says that after Shinran's death, his emphasis on salvation reverted to legalism among his followers, and then the *Tannishō* was written in response. Here we can see an orientation towards understanding religious conversion with historical reality, or the beginnings of an analysis in a philosophy of religion that attempts to understand religion within dynamic history. It is highly likely that Miki was influenced in some way by this passage. We could say that Miki philosophically refined Chikazumi's passionate preaching that did not fully engage in philosophical scrutiny, as well as the content Chikazumi expressed by the practice-oriented concept of *kyūdō* 求道 (seeking the way).

Miki might not have known that Takeuchi had become a follower of Chikazumi after him. At any rate, though, he found elements in Takeuchi's understanding of Shinran that he could use for his concerns. However, Miki did not passively accept Takeuchi's arguments but rather developed his own philosophical questions while using them as a guide. Next I will show how Miki's "Nietzschean task" and "societal reality" (both discussed above) are addressed in his posthumous manuscript "Shinran."

Miki highlights that Shinran does not discuss impermanence frequently.[83] He states that while we could say that generally Buddhism tries to deepen the natural sense that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent so that it becomes an ingrained understanding, Shinran was unable to limit himself to the notion of impermanence. This is because this notion, regardless of whether it is aesthetic or philosophical, leads to "contemplation" (*kansō* 観想) and is not practice-oriented. Since Shinran is practice-oriented and ethical, he focused on awareness of one's own transgressions: "In Shinran the sense of impermanence has turned into a sense of one's transgressions."[84] The "Nietzschean task" spoken of by Miki is a confrontation with traditional naturalism, and this led him to position Shinran, who did not ground his thought in a naturalistic sensibility, as a pioneering religious figure who was critical of it.[85] Miki, having sought

[83] MKZS 18: 427–29.

[84] MKZS 18: 429. Takeuchi describes the relationship between a sense of impermanence and a sense of one's transgressions as follows: "*This awakening to the hindrances of transgressions is a state in which the unease over death has been further deepened*" (TYCS 1: 88).

[85] Sometimes there is the somewhat mistaken assertion that Shinran celebrated Japanese-style naturalism with the *jinen hōni* 自然法爾 thought of his later years. Miki was preparing a response. In "Shinran," Miki states that there are three kinds of *jinen* 自然 while quoting the *Sutra of Immeasurable Life* (Jp. *Muryōju kyō* 無量寿経) and Shinran: *gōdō jinen* 業道自然, *mui jinen* 無為自然, and *ganriki jinen* 願力自然. He understood Shinran's *jinen hōni* as being that of *ganriki jinen* and was preparing

in Shinran a precedent for his critique of "nature," saw in Shinran's notion of "non-observance of the precepts" the potential for the creation of new forms. "Non-observance of the precepts" refers to not having the precepts' norms as an ethical foundation. To use Miki's words, human beings are an "existence of nothingness" lacking an ethical foundation; they are placed within a state of "nothingness." Furthermore, salvation that takes the "precepts" as its direct basis is impossible. However, from Miki's perspective, Shinran developed a new understanding of human existence as an "existence of nothingness" and proposed a new way of being for humans that involves a historical awakening. Miki problematized the absence of a "model" to regulate human life and explored how one could be produced. He also brought into relief the fact that nothingness is the basis for "indeterminate things." At that time in Japan it was difficult to straightforwardly take refuge in the gods and buddhas. Furthermore, one could no longer simply just praise nature just as it was. In the same way that Nietzsche was the first one in the West to confront God, when trying to face off with Japan's traditions with this kind of focus, Miki encountered Takeuchi's writing on Shinran that positively interpreted "non-reliance on the precepts," and incorporated it into his own thought. In "Shinran," Miki then extended Takeuchi's ideas to the "Jōdo shinjitsu" portion of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*, which Takeuchi had not discussed head-on, and tried to examine, in terms of historical reality, how to live this life in society.

Miki's interest was directed towards how "the notion of non-observance of the precepts" was related to life in society, and in this way covered an aspect not found in Takeuchi's work. The final part of "Shinran" discusses "societal life." Although "Shinran" was left incomplete, and its content not fully developed, the direction of Miki's interest therein is clear. He is trying to discuss how to live in society during the latter Dharma age of the non-observance of the precepts.[86] He states that the Buddhist teaching of the latter Dharma age is the *nenbutsu* and that it serves as the basis for a philosophy of fellowship on the Shin Buddhist path: "The philosophy of 'fellow companions and practitioners' has a transcendental basis in that the *nenbutsu* is Amida Buddha's transferring of merit."[87] Furthermore, he highlights that during an era of non-observance of the precepts, the laws of the world and society are important: "In the practicing of the Buddhist teaching without departing from life in the world lies the positive meaning

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to show the difference between the three (MKZS 18: 514–15). According to the *jinen* entry in the *Jōdo shinshū jiten* 浄土真宗辞典, *ganriki jinen* refers to other power, namely, the practitioner believing in, and entrusting themself to, the power of Amida Buddha's original vow, naturally being brought to rebirth in the Pure Land via the power of the vow without any calculation on their part. In contrast, *gōdō jinen* refers to results being produced based on good and evil acts in accordance with the law of cause and effect, and Shinran does not use *jinen* in this sense. *Mui jinen* refers to the world of enlightenment being an absolute state of infinity that transcends the distinction of being and non-being. See Jōdo Shinshū Honganjiha Sōgō Kenkyūjo 2013, p. 289.

[86] MKZS 18: 490–500.

[87] MKZS 18: 492.

of the non-observance of the precepts."[88] He also emphasizes doing away with superstition, attempting a kind of critique of religion. We must note that unlike Nietzsche, Miki does not focus on how the gods and buddhas came to "exist" in the first place. While he investigates the basis of value systems, focuses on the "non-observance of the precepts," and engages in a critique of actual society and religion, he does not inquire into whether the transcendental basis of this—or, to use his expressions in "Shinran," "Amida's transfer of merit," or, the "foundation of the doctrine"[89]—exists.

The social ethics that Miki discusses in "Shinran" are not terribly special in terms of their content. However, there are some points we should highlight with regard to his method as a philosopher. Miki aimed to reconstruct societal ethics for the historical situation of the latter Dharma age, and also tried to discuss as a philosopher the form that one's life assumes after acquiring *shinjin*. Discussing how a believing individual should live after covering the structure of the *shinjin* conversion experience is the same philosophical method as we found in his writing on Pascal. Miki's philosophy of religion is not limited to simply postulating the existence of the gods or buddhas or wagering on their existence; rather, it also includes within its scope a religious life that is found after having postulated their existence.

In the early period of his thought, Miki's idea to construct a philosophy of religion first came to fruition in the form of his work on Pascal. Around 1930, he clearly began describing the relationship between his own thought and religion, and during the last years of his foreshortened life, he wrote "Shinran." It is no exaggeration to state that his ideas therein comprise his life's aim to complete a philosophy of religion. However, this philosophy of religion was not a philosophy that replaced religion. His philosophy was an essentially incomplete one in that it has a mediatory nature which in itself does not reach completion.

Miki's life epitomizes that of intellectuals who lived through the era of *kyōyōshugi*. During his high school years, he met Chikazumi, and then later distinguished himself as a provider of *kyōyōshugi* thought. While Miki's spiritual activities were diverse, they had religion as their basis, and the foundation of this religion was the Shin Buddhism reorganized by Chikazumi. Despite Chikazumi himself having renounced philosophical inquiry, Miki, hearing Chikazumi preach, spent his life pursuing the meaning of this religion. Miki was not the only person to have done so. While limited in number, other scholars like Takeuchi attempted to do so as well. While Chikazumi's religious activities were complete in themselves, the generations that succeeded him would take on the task of inquiring into their philosophical significance.

(Translated by Dylan Luers Toda)

[88] MKZS 18: 493.
[89] MKZS 18: 452.

## ABBREVIATIONS

MKZS *Miki Kiyoshi zenshū* 三木清全集. 20 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966–1986.
TYCS *Takeuchi Yoshinori chosakushū* 武内義範著作集. 5 vols. Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1999.

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