Sūtra and *Abhidharma*: Taking in the Buddha's Words

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"A person's path is decided from the moment that
the crystallization of experience begins."
MORI Arimasa, *On Thinking and Experience*[1]

Not long after the early Buddhist scriptures were compiled, the *abhidharma* appeared. In this paper, I would like to ascertain the significance of this development from *sūtra*s to the *abhidharma* in terms of intellectual history. In doing so, adopting a perspective that considers how people took in the Buddha's words, I aim to depict one aspect of the history of ideas in Indian Buddhism.

1. Narratives of Experience that Precede Methodolatry

Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) criticizes excessive concern with establishing a proper methodology for academic work in his "The Essay as Form."

> For it is mere superstition on the part of a science that operates by processing raw materials to think that concepts as such are unspecified and become determinate only when defined. Science needs the notion of the concept as a *tabula rasa* to consolidate its claim to authority, its claim to be the sole power to occupy the head of the table. In actuality, all concepts are already implicitly concretized through the language in which they stand. ("The Essay as Form," *Notes to Literature* 1)[2]

[1] MORI 1976: 209.
[2] ADORNO 1991: 12.

The *raison d'être* of Buddhist *sūtra*s is in their form itself: narratives that are not excessively caught up in methodology.[3] In the *sūtra*s' narrative worlds, many suffering people are depicted. They begin walking the Buddhist path through the experience of reconsidering themselves in a fundamental way. The main characters of the *sūtra*s' narratives encounter the Buddha's words, and the Buddha's teachings are spun from their suffering. We who read *sūtra*s are also given the chance to encounter the Buddha's words at any time through these texts. The *raison d'être* of the *sūtra*s lies in both their providing opportunities to discover existential and religious issues through the characters' experiences that are presented in narrative form and in their unlimited opening of the Buddha's words to readers.[4] From the early *sūtra*s, we can find multiple narratives of experiences of people who came into contact with the Buddha's words and would come to encounter the Buddha. In such cases, the words the Buddha speaks are not always defined one by one, and explanations are not necessarily provided for how to understand related doctrines.

It appears that the intellectual desire to put in place norms regarding understanding the words of the Buddha in the *sūtra*s arose at an early stage in Buddhist history, though we cannot pinpoint the exact time. As is well known, the *abhidharma* project—in other words, the organization, categorization and analysis of doctrine—can already be seen in the early *sūtra*s (*āgama*).[5] Furthermore, one finds "Sarvastivata" (Sarvāstivāda 説一切有部) inscribed on a lion capital from Mathurā.[6] From this, it can be inferred that the *abhidharma* project had already begun. The *Nettipakaraṇa*—which is estimated to have come into existence in the Pāli tradition between the

[3] MINOURA 2015. In writing this paper, I have drawn considerably from WASHIDA 2007.

[4] Hermann Oldenberg, basing his understanding of the Buddha's doctrines on early scriptures, states that early Buddhism rejected both views that doubt the basis of morality as well as all theories that are for the sake of theory. See OLDENBERG 1915: 292. In the field of *abhidharma* research, SAKURABE 1969 provides a good overview of the development from the *āgama*s to the *abhidharma*. Based on recent research, SHIMODA Masahiro has made the interesting point that "there is a division of roles in which the *abhidharma* opens that which was closed off by *sūtra*s." See SHIMODA 1997: 34. All of these are excellent perspectives. However, they do not make clear the significance of the *sūtra*s in terms of intellectual history.

[5] Regarding the research on scriptural hermeneutics, see SAKAMOTO 1937. Though one finds the hallmark of the *abhidharma* exegesis (at a very early stage) in early *sūtras*, this does not diminish the significance of the emergence of the *abhidharma* texts in Buddhist history. See WILLEMEN et al. 1998: 177-181; AOHARA 2007.

[6] Regarding this inscription, see Mathurā 84 (Lion Capital, held by the British Museum), TSUKAMOTO 1996: 668ff.

beginning of the first century BCE and the first century CE—presents analytical norms for properly understanding scripture.

As Furuyama Ken'ichi has pointed out, it is inappropriate to see the *Nettipakaraṇa* as just instructions for interpreting scripture or a guide for those writing commentaries.[7] *Nettī-aṭṭhakathā*, a commentary on the *Nettipakaraṇa*, classifies doctrine (*sāsana*) under teachings (*pariyatti*), practice (*paṭipatti*) and realization (*paṭivedha*). Then, the *Nettī-aṭṭhakathā* says that teachings (*pariyatti*) are a means (*upāya*) for acquiring practice (*paṭipatti*) and realization (*paṭivedha*).[8] In light of the commentary in the *Nettī-aṭṭhakathā*, it is clear that the *Nettipakaraṇa* does not adopt an intellectual model that establishes a distinction between "theory" and "practice" and does not present itself as a strictly theoretical text in the sense that it has no relation to the act of practice and has only reference to theory itself. This is because the purpose of its analytical discussion of interpretive norms for acquiring a correct understanding of the teachings is to direct readers toward *nirvāṇa*. The objective of the *Nettipakaraṇa* cannot be discussed without including this point.

Even if we see the *Nettipakaraṇa* as not being a theoretical work that presents just interpretive norms, following Adorno, we must say that it is methodolatry in the sense that even empirical theories investigate some conditions of perception and aspire to systematization.[9] Therefore, it must be understood that a sort of methodolatry regarding the words of the Buddha was already behind the appearance of a work like *Nettipakaraṇa*. Furthermore,

[7] See MIZUNO 1997; FURUYAMA 1999. As is well known, there is a tradition that holds that the method of exploring doctrine called *netti* was taught by Mahākaccāyana. This tradition suggests the relation between *netti* and Mathurā and is very interesting. See FURUYAMA 2005.

[8] See *Netti-aṭṭhakathā*: [1] sutamayañāṇgocaro ca yo "pariyattisaddhammo" ti vuccati. [2] cintāmayañāṇagocaro ca yo ākāraparivitakkadiṭṭhinijjhānakkhantīhi gahetabbākāro vimuttāyatanaviseso "paṭipattisaddhammo" ti vuccati. [3] vipassanāñāṇādisahagato bhāvanāmayañāṇagocaro ca yo "paṭivedhasaddhammo" ti vuccati.
evaṃ tividhampi sāsanaṃ sāsanavaranti padena saṅgaṇhitvā tattha yaṃ paṭhamaṃ, taṃ itaresaṃ adhigamūpāyoti sabbasāsanamūlabhūtaṃ attano pakaraṇassa ca visayabhūtaṃ pariyattisāsanameva tāva saṅkhepato vibhajanto "dvādasa padānī" ti gāthamāha. (Myanmar Version, Buddhasāsana Society, 1960, p. 10).

[9] "In relation to scientific procedure and its philosophical grounding as method, the essay, in accordance with its idea, draws the fullest conclusions from the critique of system. Even empiricist theories, which give priority to experience that is open-ended and cannot be anticipated, as opposed to fixed conceptual ordering, remain systematic in that they deal with preconditions for knowledge that are conceived as more or less constant and develop them in as homogeneous a context as possible" (ADORNO 1991: 9).

the process of compilation of *sūtra*s also aimed at systematization in itself. It must be noted that *sūtra*s themselves have been passed on by the approach of methodolatry. However, in principle *sūtra*s are very narrative and the representation of events, which give us an opportunity to share experiences, that is, an opportunity to take in the Buddha's words. The traditional expression "teachings appropriate to the audience" (對機說法) to describe the Buddha's teachings has the significance of narrative, an encounter with others, and knowledge as dialogue in itself.

Regardless, what kind of attitude should one adopt when taking in the words of the Buddha? The Buddha's words are open in every way to people who encounter the *sūtra*s. Furthermore, such people themselves are rather unfixed: they can change their thoughts at any time. To what extent can a form endure that is a narrative of an always unstable and accidental experience when trying to pass on the words of the Buddha?

2. The Possibility of Sharing Experience

No matter how important experience is, why were the people who appear in the *sūtra*s able to change their path after encountering the Buddha? Furthermore, how can we share the experiences depicted in the *sūtra*s as narrative? In them, the Buddha frequently remarks how difficult it is to share the experience of suffering. Furthermore, this sense that it is difficult to hold a common understanding of a problem has been viewed by Buddhist thinkers as an intellectual issue that arose within Gotama's own life. Of course, in the context of the life of the Buddha, it has been seen as the difficulty of becoming aware that one is a suffering being. For example, as is well known, one finds the following narrative in the scene as depicted in the *Vinaya-piṭaka*'s "Mahāvagga" of Brahman's encouraging the Buddha to preach after reaching enlightenment:

> These people take delight in objects of sense-based pleasure, enjoy objects of sense-based pleasure, and rejoice in objects of sense-based pleasure. It is difficult for these people who take delight in objects of sense-based pleasure, enjoy objects of sense-based pleasure, and rejoice in objects of sense-based pleasure to understand this, that is, the law of dependent origination that based on this there is that. Furthermore, this—in other words, the subsiding of all life activities, the discarding of all attachment, the exhausting of all desire, the leaving behind of greed, the extinguishing of affliction, and seeing *nirvāṇa*—is very difficult. (*Mahāvagga*, *Vinaya-piṭakaṃ* vol. I, PTS, pp. 4-5)

Brahman asks the Buddha to teach. However, the Buddha is reluctant to do so because his teachings are hard to understand for those who enjoy pleasure. The *Saṃyutta-nikāya*'s *Brahma-saṃyutta* also says that it is hard for those who enjoy *ālaya* to understand the Buddha's teachings.[10] Regarding this part of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*'s *Brahma-saṃyutta*, Buddhaghosa says, "The very reason [these teachings] are hard to understand is that they are profound. They should be seen based on suffering, and cannot be seen based on pleasure."[11] We should note that he says that truth can be seen based on the experience of suffering. The **Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra* (Ch. *Fo benxingji jing* 佛本行集經), a considerably more developed biography of the Buddha that appears to be from a later period and includes various plots, inherits the same expressions: "Sentient beings are attached to *ālaya*, enjoy *ālaya*, and take delight in perceptual fields [*jakusho* 著處]," and "It is hard for those who take pleasure in desire and are attached to craving to personally know. This is because they are covered in the darkness of ignorance."[12] The same expressions about the reason that the Buddha's teachings are difficult to understand can be seen in many sources about Brahma's entreating the Buddha to preach after his enlightenment.[13]

[10] *Brahma-saṃyutta, Saṃyutta-nikāya* vol. VI, PTS, p. 136: ālayarāmā kho panāyaṃ pajā ālayaratā ālayasamuditā. ālayarāmāya kho pana pajāya ālayaratāya ālayasamuditāya duddasaṃ idaṃ ṭhānam.

[11] *Sārattha-ppakāsinī: Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Saṃyutta-nikāya* vol. I, PTS, p. 195.

[12] *Fo benxingji jing* 佛本行集經 (T 190.3: 805c18-19: 但衆生輩, 著阿羅耶〈隋言所著處〉, 樂阿羅耶, 住阿羅耶, 憙樂著處. 心多貪. 此處難見.)

[13] *Buddhacarita*, Peking nge 66b8-67a2, Derge ge 55a1-2:
lta ba dan pas chud zos 'bad la 'khrugs pa yi // 'gro ba rdul ni rgya chen dang ldan gzigs nas dang //
rnam thar chos ni mchog tu phra pa nyid gzigs nas // g-yo ba med pa nyid phyir thugs ni mdzad par gyur // (14.96)
Lalitavistara, VAIDYA ed., p. 290:
pratisrotagāmi mārgo gambhīro durdṛśo mama.
na taṃ drakṣyanti ragāndhā alaṃ tasmāt prakāśitum. (25.19)
Foshuo taizi ruiying benqi jing 佛説太子瑞應本起經 (T 185.3: 479c24-29): 至于三界欲色無色九神所止, 皆繫於識不得免苦. 昧昧然不自覺. 故謂之癡莫知要道. 夫得至妙虚寂無念, 不可以凡世間意知. 世間道術九十六種. 各信所事孰知其惑. 皆樂生求安, 貪欲嗜味, 好於聲色故不能樂佛道.
Foshuo puyao jing 仏説普曜經 (T 186.3: 527b5-10): 至于三界欲色無色九神所止, 皆係於識不得免苦. 昧昧暗冥然不自覺. 故謂之癡莫知要道. 夫道至妙虚寂無念, 不可以凡世間意知. 世間道術九十六種. 各信所事孰知其惑. 皆樂生求安, 貪欲嗜味, 好於聲色故不能樂佛道. Cf. 佛説太子瑞應本起.

The core of the episode about Brahman's encouragement is not the bestowal of authority on the Buddha *via* Brahman's appearance. While even if it actually functioned this way in India, this episode focuses on the importance of perceiving the reason that the Buddha's teachings are difficult to understand. Furthermore, even if the significance of the Buddha's beginning to teach thanks to Brahman's encouragement is the verbalization of truth or that truth was revealed by the specific individual Śākyamuni, it must be said that it is an intellectual problem that cannot be articulated if one leaves out the issue of the reason why truth is difficult to share.[14] In other words, this episode is rooted in the experiential issue of why some humans begin to walk the Buddhist path. It brings up the philosophical problem of whether or not one can find reality in the words of the Buddha and, for us reading these ancient scriptures, the problem of whether or not it is possible to have the same way of viewing ourselves and the world that ancient people had. Not only do early-period scriptures touch upon this problem here and there, but the same kind of question has from the beginning been embedded in the textual narratives of Gotama's four excursions out of the palace and the

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Fangguang da zhuangyan jing 方廣大莊嚴經 (T 187.3: 604a27-b1):

我證逆流道　甚深難可見
盲者莫能覩　故默而不説
世間諸衆生　著彼五塵境
不能解我法　是故今默然

Guoqu xianzai yinguo jing 過去現在因果經 (T 189.3: 642c12-14, 642c21-23): 一切衆生, 於五濁世, 爲貪欲瞋恚愚癡邪見憍慢諂曲之所覆障, 薄福鈍根, 無有智慧. 云何能解我所得法. . . .

衆生諸根鈍　著樂癡所盲
順於生死流　不能反其源
如斯之等類　云何而可度

[14] Nakamura Hajime understands Brahman's role to be the bestowal of authority on Śākyamuni's preaching. See NAKAMURA 1992: 449.

Shimoda Masahiro sees it as an issue of whether or not the "deep meditative experience acquired by the Buddha can be entrusted to words that are communicable to a third person," describing it as a shift from a "silent truth" to an "articulated truth." Furthermore, he says, "One special characteristic of Buddhism as a founded religion is that it lays total responsibility for that founding on the shoulders of a specific individual, Śākyamuni." See SHIMODA 1999. While I agree that the focus of this episode is the "reluctance and decision to preach the Dharma" (SHIMODA 1999: 72), surely it should be seen as being about why people begin or do not begin to walk the Buddhist path—which is almost without fail touched upon in stories of Brahman encouraged the Buddha to preach—rather than regarding the verbalization of truth.

Regarding the texts in which the "encouragement from Brahman" narrative appears, see SAKAMOTO 1992; and MORI 2000: 107-110.

This paper's stance regarding this episode is based on MIYASHITA 2011: 201-202.

encouragement from Brahman, which both pass down a view of the Buddha from a comparatively early period.[15]

It goes without saying that, regardless of how hard it is to share experiences, the narrative world of the *sutras* depicts people who encounter the Buddha and begin to walk the Buddhist path. There is a need for an adequately careful discussion of the structure of the thought regarding this change in people. Having recognized this, I would next like to consider the issue of sharing experiences from the perspective of the development from the *āgama*s to the *abhidharma*.

3. From the Sharing of Experience to the Sharing of Dharmas

As I have stated, while the importance of experience is emphasized, it is not easy to share the experience of understanding the meaning of suffering. To share experiences is rather difficult, very unstable and perilous. With this in mind, there is a need to consider the significance of the development from the *sūtra*s to the *abhidharma*.

The **Mahāvibhāṣā* discusses the relationship between *sūtra*s, the *vinaya* and the *abhidharma*[16] after stating, "All Buddhas have appeared in the world and preached the *tripiṭaka*."[17] It presents the understanding that there are distinctions among the three, as well as the understanding that there are not. The reason that one can say the former is clear is: first, it is because all three come from the same ocean of wisdom, the same pond of realization and are accepted equally by the Buddha's power and fearlessness. Second, it is because all discuss the path that is based on superior morality and superior insight. Then, in contrast, the reasons are explained why there are differences among the three. The differences can be summarized as follows:[18]

1. *Sūtra*s are discussions of the Way based on a superior mental state. The *vinaya* is a discussion of the Way based on superior morality. The *abhidharma* is a discussion of the Way based on superior insight.

[15] As Miyashita Seiki points out, the story of Upaka that appears in biographies of the Buddha has the same issue in the background. See MIYASHITA 2003: 220.

[16] Honjō Yoshifumi briefly touches upon this point, stating the text's explanation positions *sūtras*, the *vinaya*, and the *abhidharma* in order of increasing importance. See HONJŌ 2010: 111-112.

[17] *Da piposha lun* 大毘婆沙論 (T 1545.27: 1b25).

[18] See *Da piposha lun* (T 1545.27: 1b25-2a11). The corresponding old and alternate translations are, respectively, *Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 (T 1546.28: 1c25-24) and *Piposha lun* 鞞婆沙論 (T 1547.28: 416b24-c9).

2. *Sūtra*s show the situations in which Śākyamuni taught. The *vinaya* shows the circumstances surrounding Śākyamuni's establishment of the code of moral discipline. The *abhidharma* shows the essential nature and characteristics of truth.
3. *Sūtra*s are the result of outflow from [the Buddha's] power. The *vinaya* is the result of great compassion. The *abhidharma* is the result of fearlessness.
4. *Sūtra*s are various teachings. The *vinaya* discusses rules of moral discipline. The *abhidharma* analyzes both intrinsic and common characteristics (Skt. *sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*; Ch. *zixiang gongxiang* 自相共相).
5. *Sūtra*s make those who do not have the seeds of virtuous roots have the seeds of virtuous roots. The *vinaya* makes those with seeds of virtuous roots continually ripen these seeds. The *abhidharma* makes those with ripened seeds acquire true liberation.
6. *Sūtra*s are preached to those who have just begun engaging in Buddhist cultivation. The *vinaya* is preached to those who have already repeatedly engaged in Buddhist cultivation. The *abhidharma* is preached to those who have transcended the practice of contemplation.
7. *Sūtra*s make those who have not entered the true Dharma enter the true Dharma. The *vinaya* makes those who have entered the true Dharma uphold the code of moral discipline. The *abhidharma* makes those who have upheld the code of moral discipline penetrate the true characteristics of the dharmas.

The **Mahāvibhāṣā* positions the *sūtra*s as opportunities to realize and accept that existence is suffering and the *abhidharma* as something through which those who have already begun to walk the Buddhist path can penetrate the characteristics of truth. In other words, the significance of the *abhidharma* lies in its presentation through discourses regarding the dharmas of a place in which knowledge forms a basis upon which experience can be shared.

If a place for the formation of knowledge is opened, the knowledge obtained through experience can be clearly shared and confirmed again.[19] In response to the question, "Why was the *abhidharma* preached?," the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* states, "Besides proper analysis of the dharmas (*dharma-pravicaya*), there is no excellent method for quieting afflictions."[20]

[19] *Da piposha lun* 大毘婆沙論 (**Mahāvibhāṣā*) says the following regarding the title of *Fa chih lun* 發智論 (**Jñānaprasthāna*): "Various true wisdoms arise from here. Since they take this as the basis, it is 'the arising of wisdom.' This *abhidharma* is the 安足處 of wisdom. Various true wisdoms take this as the root, and theorize based on it. Therefore, it is the 安足處 of wisdom" (T 1545.27: 4c4-7). Emphasis added.

[20] AKBh EJIMA ed., 3.

The *abhidharma*, when pursuing the Buddhist path by sharing the narratives of experience that have been passed down as *sūtra*s, presents a basis upon which experience can be shared and overcomes suffering by analysis of the dharmas. Therefore, it tries to structurally break through the precariousness of sharing experience.

4. Aspiring to Identity: Making *Sutta*s the *Pamāṇa* (Standard)

At any rate, the *abhidharma* stands in contrast to the *sūtra*s as narrative that we have touched upon above: the *abdhidharma* adopts a very careful approach to the definition and systematization of dharmas.

In the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, a commentary on the *Dīgha-nikāya*, the following interesting passage appears:

> From showing (*sūcana*) the good, from having been well spoken (*suvutta*),
> from begetting (*savana*), and from giving out (*sūdana*),
> from being an excellent shelter (*suttāṇa*), and from being like thread (*sutta-sabhāga*),
> it is called "*sutta*."

> For it shows the good consisting of the good of self and others, and so on. And meaning has been well spoken in this respect through being spoken in conformity with the dispositions of those ready for the teaching. And it begets the good, like crops produce fruit, so it is said that it brings forth. And it gives it (the good) out, like a cow yields milk, so it is said that it flows out. And it excellently shelters and protects it (the good). And it is similar to thread, for as the carpenter's thread (*sutta*) is a standard (*pamāṇa*), so it (*sutta*) is too for the wise, and as flowers tied together with thread are not scattered nor damaged, so by it (*sutta*) good things are tied together. (*The Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī, Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Dīghanikāya*, Part I, PTS, pp. 17-18)[21]

Various people encountered the Buddha through their experiences and then embarked upon the Buddhist path. Thus, the teachings were "spoken in conformity with the dispositions of those ready" for them. This gave rise to the good. However, active discussions then came to be carried out regarding the

[21] See *The Expositor (Aṭṭhasālinī), Buddhagosa's Commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, vol. I, ed. Maung Tin and Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1920, p. 24; Dhivan Thomas JONES "The Meaning of the Pāli Word 'Sutta'" (https://dhivanthomasjones.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/the-meaning-of-the-pali-word-sutta/), last modified September 8, 2015.

promotion of analytical thought, giving rise to various interpretations that do not match the true intentions of the *sūtra*s. These can be found in the *abhidharma* literature. The well-known passage in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* about the term *sautrāntika* is as follows: "We are those who take the *sūtra*, not the *śāstra*, as the valid standard of authority." (AKBh Chapter 3: *Lokanirdeśa*: sūtrapramāṇakā vayaṃ na śāstrapramāṇakāḥ.)[22] Moreover, Yaśomitra states in the commentary on the first chapter *Dhātunirdeśa* of the *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: "What is the meaning of *Sautrāntika*? Those who take the *sūtra* as the valid standard of authority, not the *śāstra*, they are *Sautrāntika*s." (SA: kaḥ sautrāntikārthaḥ. ye sūtraprāmāṇikā na śāstraprāmāṇikāḥ te sautrāntikāḥ.)[23] Buddhaghosa's explanation cited above is evidence to affirm that in the background of the discussion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* about the so-called *Sautrāntika* theories regarding scripture, namely, the proper attitude to take regarding the Buddha's words, are at issue.[24] In other words, when various interpretations arose due to the analytical approach of the *abhidharma*, the need arose to again re-emphasize an approach that seeks to return to the Buddha's teachings. For this very reason, there was a need to reconfirm that the *sūtra*s are the valid "standard" of teachings, as Buddhaghosa states in a commentary on the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*.

People must have begun walking the Buddhist path and understanding Buddhism by taking in the Buddha's words. Despite this, a need emerged to confirm that the *sūtra*s are the standard for taking in the Buddha's teachings. If this is the case, it could be said that at the root of the assertion that the *sūtra*s are this standard, there is a desire to maintain unchanged the identity of those words over time. It was said that "flowers tied together with thread will not be scattered and damaged" in the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*. This kind of statement was rooted in a sense of crisis about the diffusion of the Buddha's words, that is, that the thought expressed by the Buddha's words had become vague and not the clear object of focus.

Above, I have discussed the contrast between the *sūtra*s' approach of "against methodolatry" and the *abhidharma*'s approach of "methodolatry." This is the significance in Buddhist intellectual history of the *sūtra*s as narrative, which precede the *abhidharma*. The knowledge base to share the experiences relayed in the *sūtra*s was prepared by the arising of the *abhidharma*. Both the *sūtra*s and the *abhidharma* can be said to have made possible the

[22] AKBh PRADHAN ed., 146.3-4.
[23] SA WOGIHARA ed., 11.29-30.
[24] See MINOURA 2007; HONJŌ 1992; HONJŌ 1993.

persistence of Siddhārtha Gotama's major questions—that is, fundamental issues surrounding aging, illness and death.

Abbreviations

AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*
Derge	Derge Edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka
Peking	Peking Edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka
PTS	The Pāli Text Society
SA	*Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*
T	大正新脩大蔵経 *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*

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