

Parallel Ideas in *Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya* and *Pātañjala-Yoga-Bhāṣya*

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1. A paper on “Sarvāstivāda” was published by me in 1960 from Nalanda in which I discussed the four Vaibhāṣika doctrines of change, as explained in the *AKBh*, and compared them with the three doctrines of *pariṇāma* as defined in the *PYBh*. At that time I had no idea of the many more parallel passages in the two treatises, which I discovered later on while engaged in the detailed study of the *AKBh* in connection with my English translation of the sixth chapter of the treatise. In the present paper a humble attempt is being made to bring together some of the parallel passages in order to assess the basic onto-psychological agreements and disagreements between the Vaibhāṣika and the Yoga schools of thought.

I shall start with the doctrines of change (*pariṇāma*) by quoting the parallel passages from the two treatises and then quote the other parallel passages on different topics, with notes where necessary. The function of the *kleśas* and *anusāyas* is the central theme of the quotations.

2. The antiquity of the four theories of change evaluated in the *AKBh* (V. 25–26) goes to the *Mahāvibhāṣā* of the Sarvāstivādins, that is considered to have been completed in 2nd or 3rd century A.D.

2(a). Of these four theories, the first, *bhāvānyathātva* of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, has its counterpart in the *dharmapariṇāma* of *PYBh* (III, 13). The *bhāvānyathātva* is defined and illustrated in the *AKBh* as follows:

AKBh, pp. 805–6: *dharmasyādhuvasu pravartamānasya bhāvānyathātvaṃ bhavati na dravyānyathātvaṃ, yathā suvarṇabhājanasya bhittvā'nyathā kriyamānasya samsthānānyathātvaṃ bhavati na varṇānyathātvaṃ, yathā ca kṣīraṃ dadhitvena pariṇamad rasavīryavipākān parityajati na varṇam, evaṃ dharmo'py anāgatād adhvanah pratyutpannam adhvanam āgacchann anāgatabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvam, evaṃ pratyutpannād atītam adhvanam*

gacchan pratyutpannabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvaṃ iti.

The nature of *dharmā-pariṇāma* is defined and illustrated in the *PYBh* as follows:

PYBh pp.110–5: *tatra vyutthānanirodhayor dharmayor abhibhavaprādurbhāvau dharmiṇi dharmāpariṇāmaḥ* (p.110) *paramārthatas tv eka eva pariṇāmaḥ, dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmo dharmivikriyavaiśā dharmadvārā prapañcyata iti, tatra dharmasya dharmiṇi vartamānasyaivādhrvasv atītānāgatavartamāneṣu bhāvānyathātvam bhavati na tu dravyānyathātvam, yathā suvarṇabhājanasya bhittvānyathā kriyamāṇasya bhāvānyathātvam bhavati na suvarṇānyathātvam iti,* (pp.111–2) *mṛddharmī piṇḍākārād dharmād dharmāntaram upasaṃpadyamāno dharmataḥ pariṇāmate ghaṭākāra iti.* (p.115).

Vasubandhu has identified the *bhāvānyathātvā* of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta with the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

AKBh p.807: *eṣāṃ tu prathamāḥ pariṇāma-vāditvāt sāmkhyaapakṣe nikṣep-tavyaḥ*

The *pariṇāma* mentioned here is *dharmā-pariṇāma* according to the Chinese tradition.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the *PYBh* quotes the view of a Buddhist philosopher who refuted the existence of any entity called *dharmīn* apart from the *dharmā*, arguing that the postulation of a persisting substance would entail the transmutation of an eternal unchanging entity, on account of its continuing through the prior and posterior states, while not superseding the pristine existence. The *PYBh*, in its own defence, asserts that it did not accept any entity that was absolutely static or absolutely changing:

PYBh p.112: *āpara āha — dharmānabhyadhiko dharmī. pūrvatattvānatikramāt pūrvoaparāvasthābhedaṃ anupatitaḥ kauṭasthyenaiiva parivarteta yady anvayī syād iti, ayam adosaḥ, kasmāt, ekāntānabhyupagamāt, tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti, kasmāt, nityatvapraṭiṣedhāt, apetaṃ apy asti, vināśa-praṭiṣedhāt.*

2(b). The second theory of change, *lakṣaṇānyathātvā*, ascribed to Bhadanta Ghōṣaka, is defined and illustrated in *AKBh* (p.806) in the following way:

dharmo dhvasu pravartamāno tīto tītalakṣaṇayuktaḥ, anāgatapratyutpannābhyām aviyuktaḥ, evaṃ pratyutpanno py atītānāgatābhyām aviyuktaḥ, tadyathā puruṣa ekasyāṃ striyāṃ raktaḥ śeṣāsv avirakta iti.

In the *PYBh* (p.113), the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* is defined and illustrated in the following manner:

*lakṣaṇa-pariṇāmo dharmo'dhvasu vartamāno'tīto 'tītalakṣaṇayukto 'nāgatavar-
tamānābhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyāṃ aviyuktaḥ, tathānāgato 'nāgatalakṣaṇayukto var-
tamānātītābhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyāṃ aviyuktaḥ, tathā vartamāno vartamāna-
lakṣaṇayukto 'tītanāgatabhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyāṃ aviyukta iti, yathā puruṣa
ekasyāṃ striyāṃ rakto na śeṣāsu virakto bhavatīti*

Vasubandhu finds fault with the theory of *lakṣaṇānyathātva* by pointing out that it entails the commingling or confusion of the temporal tracks. There is, moreover, no similarity between the theory and the illustration given, according to him. The lust actually arises in respect of some woman, while the lust is simply potential in respect of other woman, and therefore it cannot be said that the person is lustful in respect of a particular woman and 'not un lustful' in respect of others:

*AKBh p.807: dvitīyasya (= lakṣaṇānyathikasya) adhvasaṅkaraḥ prāpnoti sar-
vasya sarvalakṣaṇayogāt, puruṣasya tu kasyāñcit striyāṃ rāgaḥ samudācarati
kasyāñcit kevalaṃ samanvāgama iti kim atra sāmīyam.*

The *PYBh* (pp.113–4) raises the same problem of commingling of temporal tracks, but attempts at explaining it with reference to its own ontological position. The *dharmas* are possessed of their general aspect of *dharmatva* that continues to exist through the three periods of time, viz. past, present and future. Since the persistence of *dharmatva* is accepted, it cannot be said that the *dharmatva* is confined to the present period alone. Thus the mind cannot be possessed of lust, when there is the actual rise of anger, because the lust cannot rise at that moment. Moreover, the three periods of time cannot exist simultaneously in a single state of the mind, but they can exist in succession according as there is the manifestation of their respective indicators. There is mutual contradiction between the different discrete manifestations of the *rūpas* (= *bhāvas* like merit, demerit, etc.) and also between those of the *vṛttis* (mental states like pleasure, pain, etc.) but there is no contradiction in the coexistence of the generalities with the different manifestations of *rūpas* and *vṛttis*. There is therefore no commingling of temporal tracks. For example, because there is actual manifestation of lust alone at some time, it does not follow that there is no lust elsewhere. But the latter as associated with the generality exists there at that moment. The relevant passage of the *PYBh* (pp.113–4) runs as follows:

atra lakṣaṇa-pariṇāme sarvasya sarvalakṣaṇayogād adhvasaṅkaraḥ prāpnotīti

parair doṣas codyata iti. tasya parihāraḥ — dharmāṇaṃ dharmatvam aprasādhyam, sati ca dharmatve lakṣaṇabhedo'pi vācyo, na vartamānasamaya evāśya dharmatvam, evaṃ hi na cittam rāgadharmakaṃ syāt krodhakāle rāgasyāsamudācārād iti.

kiñca tryāṇāṃ lakṣaṇāṇāṃ yugapad ekasyāṃ vṛttau nāsti sambhavaḥ, krameṇa tu svavyañjakāñjanasya bhāvo bhaved iti. uktaṃ ca, rūpātisāyā vṛttyātisāyās ca paraspareṇa vīrudhyante, sāmānyāni tv atisāyāiḥ saha pravartante, tasmād asaṃkaraḥ, yathā rāgasyaiva kvacit # samudācāra iti na tadānīm anyatrābhāvaḥ, kiṃ tu kevalaṃ sāmānyena samanvāgata ity asti tadā tatra tasya bhāvaḥ, tathā lakṣaṇasyeti.

2(c). The third theory of change, *avasthānyathātva*, ascribed to Bhadanta Vasumitra, is defined and illustrated in *AKBh* (p.806) in the following way:

dharmo'dhvasu pravartamāno'vasthām avasthām prāpyānyo 'nyo nirdiśyate avasthāntarataḥ na dravyāntarataḥ, yathaikā gulikā ekānke niḥṣiptā ekam ity ucyate śatānke śataṃ sahasrānke sahasram iti.

In the *PYBh* (p.114), the *avsthā-pariṇāma* is defined and illustrated in the following manner:

na dharmī tryadhvā, dharmās tu tryadhvānaḥ. te lakṣitā alakṣitās ca tāṃ tām avasthām prāpnuvanto 'nyatvena pratiniḍiśyante 'vasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ, yathaikā rekhā śatasthāne śataṃ daśasthāne daśaikā caikasthāne, yathā caikatve 'pi strī mātā cocyate duhitā ca svasā ceti

The theory of *avasthānyathātva* is the most excellent one, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, because the three temporal tracks are established in this theory through the causal efficiency. When the *dharma* does not exercise its causal efficiency, it is future; when it does, it is present; when it had exercised the causal efficiency and become extinct, it is past:

AKBh, p.808:

*ata eṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ
tr̥tīyaḥ śobhanaḥ
yo 'yam avasthā 'nyathikaḥ, tasya kila
adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ || (26)
yadā sa dharmāḥ kāritraṃ na karoti tadānāgataḥ, yadā karoti tadā pratyutpannaḥ, yadā kṛtvā niruddhas tadā atīta iti.*

Vasubandhu discusses in detail the theory of *avasthānyathātva* and points out

the difficulties in it. If the past as well as the future are substantially existent, why are they called 'past' or 'present' (although they are as good as 'present' in regard to their existence)? Moreover, how should one account for the eye-facsimile being called present when it is not exercising its causal efficiency of seeing in the states of slumber and the like? If *phalaprati-graha* of *phaladāna* were considered as the causal efficiency, and the criterion of its being called present, then the 'past' *sabhāgahetu*, *sarvatragahetu* and *vipākahetu* will pass as present — a contingency which entails confusion or commingling of the temporal tracks of the past and the present in the *dharma*. The relevant passage of the *AKBh* (p.808) runs as follows:

yady atītam apy dravyato 'sty anāgatam apīti (reading emended) kasmāt tad atītam ity ucyate anāgatam iti vā. nanu cōktam adhvānaḥ kārित्रेṇa vyavasthitā iti. yady evam pratyutpannasya tat - sabhāgasya cakṣuṣaḥ kiṃ kārित्रam. phaladāna-prati-grahaḥ. atītānām api tarhi sabhāgahetvādīnām phaladānāt kārित्रa-prasaṅgo 'rdhakārित्रasya veti lakṣaṇasamkaraḥ.

Vasubandhu, moreover, raises the problem as to whether the causal efficiency itself has another causal efficiency. If the causal efficiency were neither past nor future nor present, but even then 'existent', it would be *asaṃskṛta* and so eternal. Consequently it should not be asserted that when the *dharma* does not exercise causal efficiency, it is 'future' (because, causal efficiency being eternal, there cannot be any *dharma* that does not exercise causal efficiency). The relevant passage of *AKBh* (p.809) is as follows:

kiṃ kārित्रasyāpy anyad asti kārित्रam atha tannaiivātītam nāpy anāgatam na pratyutpannam asti ca, tenāsaṃskṛtatvān nityam astīti prāptam, ato na vaktavyam yadā kārित्रam na karoti dharmas tadānāgata iti.

In the *PYBh* also we find mention of the fault of eternalness levelled against the doctrine of *avasthā-pariṇāma* by some philosophers. The passage under reference runs as follows (*PYBh*, pp.114–5):

avasthāpariṇāme kauṭasthya-prasaṅga-doṣaḥ kaiścid uktaḥ, katham, advhano vyāpāreṇa vyavasthitatvāt (reading emended) yadā dharmāḥ svavyāpāram na karoti tadānāgato yadā karoti tadā vartamāno yadā kṛtvā nivṛttas tadātīta ity evaṃ dharmadharminor lakṣaṇānām avasthānām ca kauṭasthyam prāpnotīti parair doṣa ucyate.

This fault is however dismissed in the *PYBh* (p.115) by the following argument that is based on the ontological position of the Yoga philosophy:

nāsau doṣaḥ, kasmāt, guṇinīyatve 'pi guṇānām vimardavaicitryāt.

2(d). The fourth theory of change, *anyathānyathātva*, ascribed to Bhadanta Buddhadeva, is defined and illustrated in the following way in the *AKBh* (p.807):

*dharmo 'dhavasu pravartamānaḥ pūrvāparam apeksyāno 'nya ucyate avas-
thāntarataḥ na dravyāntarataḥ, yathikā strī strī mātā cocyate duhitā ceti*

In the *PYBh* (p.114), we find the same illustration in connection with *avasthā-pariṇāma*:

yathā caikatve 'pi strī mātā cocyate duhitā ca svasā ceti.

Vasubandhu has levelled the change of commingling or confusion of the three temporal tracks against this theory in the following passage (*AKBh*, p.807):

*caturthasya (= anyathānyathikasya) apy ekasmin evādhvani trayo 'dhavānaḥ
prāpnuvanti, atīte 'dhvani pūrvapaścimau kṣaṇāvātītānāgatau, madhyamaḥ
kṣaṇaḥ pratyutpanna iti, evam anāgate 'pi.*

In this connection, it should be noted that the Yoga philosopher accepts the existence of 'past' and 'future' on a par with the 'present' (*PYBh*, p.165):

*bhaviṣyadvyaktikam anāgatam anubhūtavvyaktikam atītam, svavyāpāropārū-
dham vartamānam, trayam caitad # vastu jñānasya jñeyam, yadi caitat sva-
rūpato nābhaviṣyan nedam nirviṣayam jñānam # udayatsyata. tasmād atītā-
nāgatam svarūpato 'stīti.*

The affinities as regards language and ideas between Sarvāstivāda doctrine of change and the Yoga doctrine of *pariṇāma* have been shown by us through quotations from the *AKBh* and *PYBh*. We should, however, like to explain here the ontological positions of the two systems in order to bring home to the reader the basic differences in the solution of the problems raised by the opponents on certain basic problems of change and causation.

The Sarvāstivāda philosopher believes in the permanent existence of causally related moments arising in succession, without any common thread running through them. The present moment is the flash point of the series, that explains the change of *bhāva* and also other changes. But the *bhāva* has no continuity like the continuity of the *svabhāva* (= *dravya*, *dharmā*) that exists always. The *bhāva* is not *nitya*, although it is accepted as not different from the *svabhāva* that is *nitya*. Vasubandhu severely condemns such ontology as a blatant self-contradiction (*AKBh*, p.811) through the following quotation:

*svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti, bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate/ na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo,
vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam//*

The Yoga ontology believes in a common thread (*dharmīn* which is not divided into three temporal tracks, *na dharmī tryadhvā*, *PYBh*, p.134) running

through the changes (*dharmas* which are divided into three temporal tracks, *dharmās tu tryadhvānaḥ*, *ibid.*) which are like flashes emerging from and merging in the same continuum (= *dharmin*, *dravya*). The contradiction between the contrary states — like *jñāna* and *ajñāna*, *rāga* and *krodha* — are explained with reference to their *atiśayas* and *sāmānyas* (*PYBh*, p.69):

calaṃ ca guṇavṛttam iti. kṣīpraparīṇāmi cittam uktam, rūpātiśayā vṛtṭiyatiśayās ca paraspareṇa virudhyante sāmānyāni tv atiśayaiḥ saha pravartante.

The Sautrāntika philosopher does not believe in the permanent existence of causally related moments. But each moment, according to him, is the integrated existence of the entire past, there being no ‘past’ and ‘future’ apart from such moment. Such Sautrāntika ontology is evident from the following statement of Vasubandhu (*AKBh*, p.817) in connection with the exposition of the operation of *karma*:

naiva hi sautrāntikā atītāt karmaṇaḥ phalotpattiṃ varṇayanti, kiṃ tarhi tatpūrvakāt santānaviśeṣād.

3. There is a fundamental agreement between the four *viparyāsas* explained in the *AKBh* (VI.15): *śuci-sukha-nityātma-viparyāsānām caturṇām pratipakṣeṇa catvāri smṛtyupasthānāny uktāni yathākramam*, and the *PYBh* (II.5) definition of *avidyā*: *anityā-śuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā*.

4. The *PYBh* (I.1) considers *samādhi* as a *sārvabhauma dharma*, that is, a *dharma* common to all the five *bhūmis*, viz. *kṣīpta*, *mūḍha*, *vikṣīpta*, *ekāgra* and *niruddha*: *yogaḥ samādhiḥ. sa ca sārvabhaumaś cittasya dharmah*. This is similar to the *AKBh*, II.24, view that *samādhi* is one of the *mahābhūmika sarvacitta-sādhāraṇa dharmas*.

5. The following two passages of the *AKBh* and *PYBh* have very close relationship.

AKBh, II.25: *śraddhā cetasaḥ prasādaḥ; AKBh*, VI.69: *śraddadhāno hi phalārthaṃ vīryam ārabhate, ārabdhavīryasya smṛtir upatiṣṭhate, upasthitasmṛter avikṣepāc cittam samādhīyate, samāhita-citto yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti.*

PYBh, I.20: *śraddhā cetasaḥ samprasādaḥ. sā hi janantva kalyāṇī yoginaṃ pāti, tasya hi śraddadhānasya vivekārthino vīryam upajāyate. samupajāta-vīryasya smṛtir upatiṣṭhate. smṛtyupasthāne ca cittam anakulaṃ samādhīyate. samāhita-cittasya prajñāviveka upāvartate, yena yathārthaṃ vastu jānāti.*

6. The following passages on the *āsaṃjñika-samāpatti* from *AKBh*, and the *bhavaṃpratyaya-asampraññāta-samādhi* from *PYBh*, bear very close resemblance.

AKBh, II.41: *asaṃjñīsattvoṣu deveṣṭupapannānāṃ yaś citta-caittānāṃ nirodhas tad āsaṃjñikam nāma dravyam, yena citta-caittā anāgate 'dhvani kālāntaram sannirudhyante, notpattum labhante nadītoyasannirodhavat.* The noble personalities do not attain this *samāpatti*, because they understand it to be a place of downfall. (*AKBh*, II.42: *na hy āryā asaṃjñi-samāpattiṃ samāpad-yante, vinipāta-sthānam ivaitāṃ paśyantaḥ.*)

PYBh, I.19–20: (*Sūtra*): *bhavaṃpratyayo videha-prakṛtilayānāṃ (Bhāṣya): videhānāṃ devānāṃ bhavaṃpratyayaḥ. . . . tathā prakṛtilayāḥ sādḥikāre cetasi prakṛtilīne kaivalyaṃpadam ivānubhavanti, yāvan na punarāvartate 'dhikāra-vaśāc cittam iti.*

7. There is a very close affinity between the following two passages from the two treatises:

AKBh, VIII.9: *vitarka-vicāra-kṣobhavirahāt praśāntavāhitā santater adhyātmaprasādaḥ.*

PYBh, I.47: *nirvicāra-vaiśāradye 'dhyātmaprasādaḥ.*

8. The following two passages on the functions of the *kleśas* exhibit a very fundamental resemblance.

AKBh, V.1: *kleśo hi pravartamāno daśa kṛtyāni karoti — mūlaṃ dr̥ḍhīkaroti, santatim avasthāpayati, kṣetram āpādayati, niḥṣyandaṃ nirvartayati, karmabhavam abhinirharati, svasambhāraṃ parigrhṇāti, ālambne saṃmohayati, vijñānasroto namayati, kuśalapakṣād vyutkrāmayati, bandhanārthaṃ ca spharati, dhātvanatikramayogeneti.*

PYBh, II.3: *te (=kleśāḥ) spandamānā guṇādhikāraṃ draḍḍhayanti, pariṇāmam avasthāpayanti, kāryakāraṇasrota unnamayanti, parasparānugrahatan-tribhūtṅvā karmavipākam cābhinirharantīti.*

9. The following two passages on the order of the elimination of the *kleśas* show a basic agreement between them.

AKBh, VI.33: *audāriko hi malaś celāt pūrvaṃ nirdhūyate, paścāt sūkṣmaḥ. audārikam ca tamaḥ sūkṣmeṇālokena hanyate, sūkṣmam cādhimātreṇety eṣa dr̥ṣṭāntayogaḥ.*

PYBh, II.11: *kleśānāṃ yā vṛttayaḥ sthūlās tāḥ kriyāyogena tanūkṛtāḥ satyaḥ*

*prasamkhyānena dhyānena hātavyā yāvat sūkṣmikṛtā yāvad dagdhabijakalpā
iti. yathā vastrāṇām sthūlo malaḥ pūrvam nirdhūyate paścāt sūkṣmo yatneno-
pāyena vāpanīyate tathā svalpapratipakṣāḥ sthūlā vṛttayah kleśanām sūkṣmās
tu mahāpratipakṣā iti.*

10. The threefold sufferings defined in *AKBh*, VI.3, have their counterparts in *PYBh*, II.15 unlike the threefold sufferings mentioned in the *Samkhyakārikā*. In this connection, the affinity between the two passages quoted below deserves careful attention.

The following verse is quoted in *AKBh*, VI.3:

*ūrṇā-pakṣma yathaiṅva hi karatalasamstham na vedyate pumbhiḥ, akṣigataṃ tu
tathaiṅva hi janayaty aratiṃ ca pīḍāṃ ca/ karatala-sadrśo bālo na vetti saṃs-
kāra-duḥkhatā-pakṣma, akṣisadrśas tu vidvāṃs tenaivodvejyate gādham//
PYBh, II.15: evam idam anādi duḥkha-sroto viprasṛtaṃ yoginam eva pratikū-
lātmakatvād udvejayati. kasmāt? akṣipātra-kalpo hi vidvān iti. yathornātantur
akṣipātre nyastah sparśena duḥkhayati nānyeṣu gātrāvayaveṣu. evam etāni duḥ-
khāny akṣipātrakalpaṃ yoginam eva kliśnanti netaram pratipattāram.*

11. The *AKBh*, VI.10–1, mentions the designations *ādikarmikā kṛtaparijaya*, *atīkrāntamanaskāra*, etc., that can be compared with the *prathamakalpika*, *madhubhūmika*, *prajñājyotiḥ* and *atīkrānta-bhāvanīya* described in *PYBh*, III.51.

12. The *AKBh*, VII.53, mentions five kinds of *ṛddhis*, viz. *bhāvanā-phalā*, *upapattika-lābhikā*, *mantrajā*, *ausadhajā* and *karmajā* which can be considered as identical respectively with the *siddhis* due to *samādhi*, *janma*, *mantra*, *auśadhi* and *tapas* mentioned in *PYBh*, IV.1.

13. In the *AKBh*, VI.27, we find the nature of *darśanābhisamaya*, which is explained as: *duḥkhe hi drśyamāne tasya trividho'bhisamayaḥ samudayādīnām kāryābhisamayaḥ prahāṇa-sākṣāt-karaṇa-bhāvanāt duḥkham eva pariḷānan samudayaṃ prajāhāti nirodhaṃ sākṣātkaroti, mārgaṃ bhāvayati, ata evābhisamaya iti.* In addition to this *kāryābhisamaya*, we find in the *AKBh*, VI.76, the description of *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti*.

The above-mentioned ideas may be compared with the ideas contained in the following passage of the *PYBh*, II.27:

1) *parijñātaṃ heyam nāsyā puṇaḥ pariññeyam asti.* 2) *kṣīṇā heyahetavo na*

punar eteṣāṃ kṣetavyam asti. 3) sāksāt kṛtaṃ nirodhasamādhinā hānam. 4) bhāvito viveka-khyāti-rūpo hānopāya iti. eṣā catuṣṭayī kāryā vimuktiḥ prajñāyāḥ. cetovimuktis tu trayī: 5) caritādhikārā buddhiḥ. 6) guṇā giriśikhara-kūṭa-cyutā iva grāvāṇo niravasthānāḥ svakāraṇe pralayābhimukhāḥ saha tenāstaṃ gacchanti, na caiṣāṃ pravilīnānāṃ punar astyutpādaḥ prayojanābhāvād iti. 7) etasyāṃ avasthāyaṃ guṇasambandhātītaḥ svarūpamātrajyotir amalāḥ kevalī puruṣa iti. etāṃ saptavidhāṃ prāntabhūmiprajñāṃ anuṣāśyan puruṣaḥ kuśala ity ākhyāyate.

14. The four varieties of questions, viz. *ekāṃśa-vyākaraṇīya*, *vibhajya-vyākaraṇīya*, *paripṛcchya-vyākaraṇīya* and *sthāpanīya* in *AKBh*, V.22, may be compared with the three varieties in *PYBh*, IV.33, viz. *ekānta-vacanīya*, *vibhajya-vacanīya* and *avacanīya*.

15. The four *brahmavihāras* in the *AKBh*, VIII.29, viz. *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekṣā* can be compared with the *maitrī-bhāvanā*, *karuṇā-bhāvanā*, *muditā-bhāvanā* and *upekṣā-bhāvanā* in the *PYBh*, I.33.

16. The three *prajñas* in *AKBh*, VI.5, viz. *śrutamayī cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī*, may be compared with *śruta*, *anumāna* and *samādhiprajñāna* in *PYBh*, I.49. This reminds us of the famous statement of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II.4.5: *ātmā va are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*.

17. The above-mentioned parallel passages, and there are many such others, show a close relationship between the ideas of the two treatises. It is not always possible to determine their relative priority. But if we take into account the mention of the *kṣaṇikavādin* in *PYBh*, IV.20, *vijñānavāda* in *PYBh*, IV.16, and *śūnyatāvāda* in *PYBh*, IV.21, it would appear that the Buddhist philosophy in its different branches was quite well known to the author of the *PYBh*. It should not therefore be considered improper to assert that the author of the *PYBh* exercised his mind to develop his own philosophy in the light of the Buddhist ideas that he found acceptable to Yoga philosophy. There was, of course, the old *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* philosophy before the Buddhist thinkers, which the latter accepted without hesitation. In fact, Śākyamuni Buddha himself was indebted to the teachers of the ancient Yoga system of meditation on the foundation of which he developed his own novel system. There must therefore have been a common

source of inspiration, which was a sort of proto-Samkhya-Yoga, for both the Buddhist and the Yoga thinkers in the development of their respective philosophies, specially the doctrines concerning meditation as a means to emancipation through the elimination of *kleśas* and *anuśayas*.

ABBREVIATIONS

AKBh: Abhidharmakośam Svopajñabhāṣya-sahitam, Varanasi, 1972.

PYBh: Pātañjala-Yogadarśanam Vyāsabhāṣya-sametam, Varanasi – Ed. Śrī Rāmshankara Bhattacharya.