A COMPARISON OF THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA WITH FREUD'S AND JUNG'S THEORIES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

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> Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in; and the entire mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges that constitue our empirical self streches continously beyond it. So vaguely drawn are the outlines between what is actual and is only potential at any one moment of our conscious life, that it is always hard to say of certain mental elements whether we are conscious of them or not.
>
> William James
> *Varieties of Religious Experience*

SCOPE AND AIM OF THE STUDY

The *ālayavijñāna* has been the subject of many studies and much scholarly research in Japan and the West[1] and has frequently been described as a type of subliminal or unconscious level of mental functioning, but until now there has been very little systematic comparison with Western notions of the unconscious. The following is but an initial attempt towards that objective. I will not attempt a comprehensive comparison between the roles of the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious within their respective traditions, but will focus instead upon a "structural" analysis, that is, an analysis of the relationship between the *ālayavijñāna*/unconscious and sensory, waking consciousness, what Freud called a "topographical" analysis. This seems a fruitful place to start such a comparison.

I will concentrate upon the "classical" period of Yogācāra thought, about A. D. 4 – 5 th C., primarily the works of Asaṅga who has transmitted to us the intial systematic conception of the *ālayavijñāna*. Specifically, I shall draw upon the two short texts concerning the so–called "proofs of the *ālayavijñāna*", the first of

which is preserved in its original Sanskrit in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*[2] (ASBh), while the second, a section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* entitled *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, is available in its Tibetan and Chinese canonical translations.[3] I will also refer to the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (MSg) of Asaṅga and its two commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva.[4] For Abhidharma doctrine, especially as related to the theory of seeds *(bīja)*, I will refer to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*[5] (AKBh).

For modern depth psychology, I will focus exclusively on the works of Freud and Jung, as the most prominent spokesmen of the "psychology of the unconscious." For Freud in particular I will concentrate on the "Metapsychological Papers", a series of essays in 1914–15, in which he most systematically presented his conception of the unconscious.[6] I will draw from Jung's *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, where he too gives his most systematic treatment of the unconscious, but also from other essays found throughout the *Collected Works*.

I have not attempted any comprehensive criticism of the theories of mind of the two traditions that we are examining, nor have I attempted any new theory of my own. Rather I have tried to remain as close as possible to the language and ideas as they are used by the authors themselves.

What I have attemped to do, in short, is to arrange the materials topic by topic so as to make their congruity most apparent, sacrificing in the process, I am aware, conceptual conciseness in order to remain more faithful to the original texts, specifically, the structure of the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*.

I have further attempted through relevant illustrations and examples to demonstrate how the conception of the *ālayavijñāna* is a plausible model of mental functioning to be taken seriously in its own right. It is time that we take this concept, along with the rest of Buddhist psychology, out of the confines of classical research and examine its modern relevance as another of man's attempts to understand himself and his place in the world.

THE PROBLEMATICS

First why should we even attempt to compare the unconscious and the *ālayavijñāna*? The *ālayavijñāna* is a concept that the Yogācāra school of Indian Buddhism promulgated around the 4–5th centuries A. D. and it played a key role in the soteriogy of Buddhist practice, attempting to explain why beings remain caught in the vicious cycle of karma the Buddhists call *saṃsāra* and thereby indicate a way toward freedom from that cycle. The unconscious, on the other

hand, was a product of late 19th, early 20th century psychiatry attempting, at least at first, no more than to help explain the etiology of nervous disorders and thereby aid in their treatment.[7] On the face of it they would seem unlikely bedfellows.

However, as with most comparative studies of different systems of thought, we gain in perspective if we lose in context. If the traditions are at all concerned with the same problems then we may be able to see them in a fresh new light and to ask certain questions that might otherwise be overlooked; this is a common goal of most comparative studies.

In our case, it is clear after a little examination that the concepts of the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious encompass much of the same ground. They are both concerned with giving a coherent account of the continuity of individual 'mental streams', as the Buddhists so euphemistically refer to persons, and of the results of past actions and their continuing influence upon present lives. They are both concerned, moreover, with the extent to which these take place outside of immediate awareness. The descriptions as to how all this take place and the dynamics that "drive" them, so to speak, differ greatly in detail. As I am presently concerned more with the "structural" similarities I will only briefly discuss these latter questions. I will then offer a few tentative ideas concerning what problematics may have led to the concepts of the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious within their respective historical and philosophical milieus. But perhaps a few clarifications are in order here.

As just mentioned, the *ālayavijñāna*, the "store-consciousness", and the unconscious are concerned with mental functions or processes that take place outside of immediate awareness. Now why should these be of such great concern? Aren't we intelligent, rational beings, performing constant conscious, deliberate acts in our lives and in the world around us? In key respects, it seems, not as much as we would like to think.

To the extent that consciousness is defined as constituted by the presence of immediate awareness of or attention to sense-objects or ideas,[8] it is clearly inadequate for explaining the continuity of such pedestrian facts as memories, objective knowledge, dispositions and character traits. These pop in and out of conscious awareness, show themselves for a moment and then disappear as our feelings or attention change or turn elsewhere. No one imagines that such disappearance entails their complete destruction, for they are liable to reappear at any moment. Moreover, "consciousness" as defined by "immediate awareness" is

also unable to account for any causal relationship between past actions and present results and present actions and future effects as psychological processes. We are simply not always "immediately aware" of the results or reaction patterns that certain experiences, such as touching a hot burner or being rejected in a love relationship, might create, unless or until such circumstances repeat themselves or we re-experience or remember them, often in a painful or pleasant way. Again, these are pedestrian facts. "Stored" knowledge based upon past experience is a basic faculty of animate life - flatworms in the laboratory respond to and learn to avoid electric shocks - but it is not one of the functions of "consciousness" to be always immediately aware of such knowlege. How could consciousness possibly function if it were?

It was, in my opinion, the inadequacies of the conception of consciousness as "constituted by immediate awareness" to account for these basic facts that led both the early depth psychologists and the Yogācārin Buddhists to search for a continuous, uninterrupted level of mental functioning outside of immediate, intentional awareness.[9] This was the aim of their research and the content of their argumentation. And on these points they have much in common.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS

LATENCY

The first point in common concerns the intermittent nature and limited range of waking consciousness. The discontinuity of the objects of awareness is probably the most oft-repeated justification for the existence of unconscious processes. Freud says that inferring such processes

> . . . is necessary because the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them . . . All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if insist upon claiming that every mental act that occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand they fall into demonstrable connection if we interpolate between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred.[10]

We should emphasize what Freud means by unconsciousness: "We call a process unconscious if we are obliged to assume that it is being activated *at the moment,* though *at the moment* we know nothing about it."[11] This adjectival use of the term "unconscious" Freud calls a "descriptive definition" Jung also infers the existence of continuous unconscious processes outside of immediate awareness:

> Everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious, but have not forgotton; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want to do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness; all this is the content of the unconscious.[12]

In sum, Jung defines the unconscious as "the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness."[13] The tautological nature of these remarks serve to illustrate the dichotomy of "conscious" and "unconscious" all the more clearly.

Now how are we to describe these processes and ideas that are "unconscious"? Where, how, can they be said to exist? Freud replies that these processes are "for considerable lengths of time in a state of latency."[14] Freud suggests of such latent conceptions that "if we have any reason to suppose that they exist in the mind - as we had in the case of memory - let them be them denoted by the term 'unconscious'"[15]. Here, "latency" simply refers to that which has momentarily passed from conscious awareness but is capable of becoming conscious again, a merely "descriptive" use of the word.

William James, however, took great exception to the idea that mental contents could exist somewhere, somehow, outside of immediate consciousness, and offered a somatic explanation of memory. Knowledge

> . . . leaves behind it a modification of the brain, which makes it impossible for the latter to react upon things just as it did before; and the result . . . may be a tendency to act, though with no idea, much as we should *if* we were consciously thinking about the subject . . . But such a presupposition is no "unconscious idea"; it is only a particular collocation of the molecules in certain tracts of the brain.[16]

Freud, of course, dismisses this objection on the grounds that latent memories are in fact "psychological", that they possess psychic content, and futhermore, that denying psychological status to any mental contents which are outside of immediate awareness presupposes that all mental contents are conscious, the very concept that he calls into question. He calls this an

> . . . abuse of the word 'conscious.' We have no right to extend the meaning of this word so far as to make it include a consciousness of which its owner himself is not aware.[17]

We see again that the crux of the argument falls upon the Cartesian definition of consciouness as constituted by immediate awareness. Freud and Jung agree that that conception of consciousness cannot account for the facts of memory and the continuity of psychic processes and that an idea of "latency" is called for. Moreover, Freud and Jung consistently reject a purely physiological explanation of that "latency", On these two points we will find similarities in the Buddhist tradition to which we now turn.

In the Buddhist tradition consciousness or cognition (*vijñāna*) arises depending on the simultaneous presence of a sense-organ, a sense object, and attention. The ASBh repeats this, stressing that these exist concommitantly with present conditions.[18] But, the text says, of the traditional analysis of consciousness into six types based upon cognitions of the five sense-faculties and the mind, no single one of them can be considered to be strictly continuous and thus capable of accounting for the obvious continuity in psychological life, because "sometimes it arises and sometimes it does not arise."[19] This is clearly a variation of the argument we heard earlier on the "gaps" of waking consciousness. Memory and knowledge based on past experience cannot be contained in a strictly intentional amd momentary sense-cognition.

The solution that the Yogācāra school and the closely related Sautrāntika school posited to this problem of discontinuity was the metaphor of a seed (*bīja*). The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, conveying the Sautrāntika position, identifies the seed with a state of latency or sombulance, here in reference to the mental afflictions (*kleśa*):

> That which is named *anuśaya* (latent tendency) is just the mental affliction (*kleśa*) in a state of sombulance . . . . The dormant mental affliction (*kleśa*) is a non-manifest mental affliction (*kleśa*) in a seed-state (*bījabhāva*).[20]

But neither the *bīja*, nor the *vāsanā*, the suffusions or memory impressions that lead to this seed-state, can be dependent on the transitory sense-cognitions, because, as MSg. I. 30 argues:

> When the visual-cognition perishes and is interrupted by another cognition . . . the support of this *vāsānā* is no longer obtained.[21]

The Yogācārins created a new conception, a new level, of mentality, the *ālayavijñāna* or "store-consciousness,"[22] as that which possesses the seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ-vijñānam*), the dormant potentialities, uninterruptedly, and so it became the locus of psychic continuity. The *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇisays* that though the objects

of the *ālayavijñāna* are undiscerned (*aparicchina*) it "always cognizes the continuity of the world uninterruptedly," its object "always exists" and "it functions continuously in a stream of instants"[23]. The *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* also teaches that the *ālayavijñāna* proceeds like a current possessed with all the seeds."[24]

Similarly, the attainment of *nirodha-samāpatti*, a meditation wherein all sense-cognitions come to a standstill, becomes problematic for any theory of consciousness that requires both the presence of a sense-object and attention and the continuity of karmic retribution within such a stream of consciousness. It is the *ālayavijñāna* that is able to endure during this state. The ASBh and MSg. I. 50 cite a Sūtra where the Buddha had said that "for one in the *nirodha-samāpatti*, consciousness does not leave the body". The MSg. then explicitly identifies this as the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*), another synonym of the *ālayavijñāna*.[25]

There was also considerable debate amongst the Abhidharma schools as to whether that which continued during the *nirodha-samāpatti* could be considered associated with mind or not. The Sarvāstivādins objected to the seed metaphor and insisted that *prāpti*, a factor of existence belonging to the category of "non-associated with mind" (*citta-viprayukta-dharma*) could account for this continuity.[26] This too resembles the objection of William James to the very notion of the unconscious and his theory of somatic memory in its stead. The Yogācārins rejected this option in favor of the seed theory which is allied with the new level of mentality, the *ālayavijñāna*.[27]

Thus far we have seen a similarity in the initial arguments for the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious: they both argue that waking consciousness, dependent as it is on the presence of both a sense-object and attention, cannot account for the continuity of mental processes and that some idea of mental functioning below or outside of immediate awareness must therefore be posited. We have also noticed that both the Buddhist tradition and the depth psychologists attempt to describe this *terra incognitio* through the metaphors of dormancy, latency, dwelling and depth. This "latency", moreover, cannot be simply divorced from all mentality.

LATENT CAUSAL EFFICACY

However, the idea of latency entails more than simply that which is not present or represented to the mind. It implies a causality, a theory that unconscious ideas have "causal efficacy in relation to conscious ideas."[28] This is as true for the

depth psychologists as it is for the Yogācārin Buddhists.

When Freud began his study of neurophysiology he was greatly impressed with current experiments being done in hypnosis. A subject who was under hypnosis could be ordered to perform an act after coming out of hypnosis, whereupon he would carry it out without any conscious idea as to why he was doing it. Freud says that "this is the kind of occurence we have in mind when we speak of the existence of unconscious mental processes."[29] That is, there is a close causal relationship, quite unknown to the subject himself, which produces or instigates certain actions. The unconscious idea "became translated into action," Freud would say.[30]

Freud's entire theory of mental illness is based upon his idea of the way in which certain past events continue to affect an individual's present life. Basically, whenever a traumatic experience occurs "lasting disturbances must result" in the mind of the individual, disturbances for which "a fixation to the moment of the traumatic occurence lies at their root."[31] Thereafter, whenever certain conditions or objects arise related to that traumatic experience the memory of it becomes aroused, so to speak, and affects the individual's present consciousness. It is only with the exhaustion, or the expenditure, of the entire emotional "energy" surrounding the content of these memories that one is freed from their influence. As Freud declared early in his career:

> Each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect.[32]

Jung also views the unconscious as the effective cause of later conscious experience. In his most celebrated concept, the collective unconscious, Jung states that there are unconscious "patterns of behavior" lying dormant, awaiting, as it were, the proper conditions to occur in which they could come forth embodied in action. He calls the collective unconscious a "treasure-house . . . of accumulated experiences"[33], and its contents, the archetypes, "deposits of the constantly repeated experiences" of mankind.[34] They lie dormant as "*forms without content*, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated."[35]

The personal unconscious brings about conscious ideas and feelings through being "the seeds of future conscious contents"[36], and Jung says that all

conscious ideas "existed once as unconscious ideas."[37]

So the type of mental latency that both Fueud and Jung envision is something resulting from past actions and experiences which remain latent but possess potential causal efficacy until conditions are conducive to their becoming conscious. This is very similar to the basic ideas of *bīja* theory as presented in the Yogācāra texts.

For the Yogācārins the *bīja* themselves represent the latent potential for producing more *Dharmas*, mental factors. As defined in the AKBh, seeds are the "name-and-form capable of producing a fruit, either immediately or mediately, by means of a specific transformation of the mental continuum."[38] These seeds are deposited in the *ālayavijñāna* though the process of *vāsanā*, suffusion, where they remain dormant until the conditions conducive to their maturation come about.

The MSg. I. 21 says that "in brief, the chracteristic of the *ālayavijñāna* is to be a resultant consciousness furnished with all the seeds (*sarvabījaka vipākavijñāna*)."[39] As the commentaries elaborate, all these seeds are continuously being placed in the *ālayavijñāna* through the various intentional actions of living beings.[40] Subsequently, as the means whereby the results of such karmic action may come about, the *ālayavijñāna* "is furnished a special power (*śaktiviśeṣa*) capable of engendering defiled *Dharmas* (mental factors)"[41] So, we understand, the actual result, "the fruit of retribution, is projected (*akṣipta*) by the suffusion (*vāsanā*)" from those actions.[42]

The nature of the seeds is further described in MSg. I. 22 as being "momentary, simultaneous, proceeding continuously, determinant, dependent on conditions, and completed by their own fruit."[43] The first three qualities pertain to the purely passive, storing function described as latent continuity. The last three describe aspects of the causal function of producing certain results. Vasubadhu elaborates, saying that the seeds are "individually determined", that seeds only come to maturation "when in a given time and place the seeds encounter their proper conditions," and that each "fruit is only born from a seed that is proper to it".[44]

The Yogācārins consider the seeds to be the potential that the mind contains for certain experiences to occur later. These are based upon the past actions of the individual, his karma, and they lay in a dormant state until circumstances, "proper conditions", arise which are conducive to their manifesting. This occurs "by means of specific transformation of the mental stream" which thereafter creates "a special power" capable of producing new conscious experiences.

This is very close to the dynamic character of the unconscious as conceived by Freud and Jung, as we saw above, in which "lasting disturbances" remain in the mind in a latent state with the potential of instigating new conscious ideas and actions whenever the appropriate conditions present themselves.

In plain English, both these traditions are attempting to explain how it is that memories and dispositions, etc., which result from past experiences, are able to remain for long periods outside of awareness, but when the circumstances arise are quite capable of manifesting and even of instigating fresh actions. This is a common phenomenon whenever we remember something or react to something that we have experienced before. For example, when walking by a bakery we remember the pleasant experience of eating there once and so might enter in again; or if we have had a particularly unpleasant experience with a certain person, the next time we see him we may feel a very strong aversion towards him. But certainly we are not constantly aware of the memory of that bakery or this unpleasant person; more likely we seldom think about them at all. But when we come across these same circumstances the memories and the feelings associated with them reappear. In this way we may say that, though latent or dormant, i. e. existing outside of immediate awareness, these memories or feelings have the potential of reappearing and thus influencing present actions.

SIMULTANEITY AND RECIPROCAL CONDITIONALITY

Both the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious are a level of mental functioning which possess ideas, memories, etc., that are dormant, or unmanifest, but which have the potential not only to come to consciousness but to influence conscious activity in certain definite ways. But we must ask how this latent or unconscious potential, the *bīja*, become that way in the first place and how they then affect or interact with waking consciousness. We shall see that here, too, there is common ground between the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious. Following the outline in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* we will examine the way in which the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious interact simultaneously with and are reciprocally conditioned by waking consciousness. We shall begin again with the depth pyschologists.

Freud did not only conceive of the unconscious as a hermetically sealed vault full of seething latencies waiting to escape. Rather he saw the unconscious as dynamic, receptive and constantly intertwined with waking consciousness. He says that the unconscious is always "accessible to the impressions of life"[45] and is "affected by experiences originating from external perception."[46]

He further descibes conscious cognitive activity as arising from either of two sources: the unconscious or conscious perception:

> It is a general truth that our mental activity moves in two opposite directions: either it starts from the instincts and passes though the system Ucs. to conscious thought-activity; or, beginning with an instigation from outside, it passes through the system Cs. and Pcs. till it reaches the Ucs.[47]

Thus external perception, along with the ubiquitous instincts (whose direct psychological expressions, however, remain forever unconscious), play a key role in providing the unconscious with "contents."

Jung also portrays a constant and close relationship between waking consciousness and the unconscious. Consciousness is "an island surrounded by the sea" of the unconscious.[48] Moreover:

> The unconscious processes stand in compensatory relation to the conscious mind . . . . because conscious and unconscious are not necessarily in opposition to one another, but complement one another to from a totality.[49]

Though neither Freud nor Jung envision a complete symmetry between the unconscious and consciousness, in that not all contents of the unconscious can come into consciousness, nevertheless it is clear that they both function constantly and in an interdependent manner.

The *ālayavijñāna* and the sense-cognitions also simultaneously function and reciprocally condition each other. The section in the Viniścaya entitled "determining the arising [of the *ālayavijñāna*] by reciprocal conditionality" (* *anyonya-pratyayatā-pravṛtti-vyavasthāna*) states that "the *ālayavijñāna* functions as the condition of the arising-cognitions through being a seed and by creating a basis."[50] "Being a seed" means that the arising-cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*),[51] that is, the sense cognitions, arise accompanied by the *ālayavijñāna* as their seed.[52] In other words, what has already been known and experienced in the past unavoidably influences new perceptions and experiences.[53]

The arising-cognitions in turn "function as the condition of the *ālayavijñāna* by fostering (*paripuṣṭi*) seeds in this life".[54] Not only do they condition each other, but they do so simultaneously:

> Just as the virtuous, non-virtuous and indeterminate arising-cognitions arise, based upon the *ālayavijñāna*, so in the same way latent impressions (*vāsanā*) are infused by the [arising-cognitions'] arising and ceasing

. . . . simultaneously with them.[55]

In the next section of the Viniścaya entitled "determining the arising [of the *ālayavijñāna*] by simultaneous arising (* *sahabhāvapravṛtti-vyavasthāna*)", this is brought out more clearly: "the *ālayavijñāna* arises simultaneously with up to five of the sense-consciousnesses."[56]

Each cognition, every perception, is conditioned by the seeds, the latent potential for that perception to arise in the way that it does. At the same time each act of waking consciousness infuses further seeds into the *ālayavijñāna*, potentials for further experience that will remain outside of immediate consciousness most of the time. These two processes, the seeds of past actions conditioning present perceptions and present perceptions creating new seeds, occur simultaneously. They are completely interactive even though one of the processes, that of the *ālayavijñāna*, arises "through cognitions of the external world whose aspects are undiscerned."[57]

The easiest way to make sense of this rather technical terminology, in my opinion, is to look briefly at what physiologists have to tell us about the processes of perception. We know that perception is not a simple straightforward process but involves lightning-fast inferential processes based on a small amount of actual perceptual data. We all perceive and "re-cognize" familiar everyday objects almost automatically while hardly looking at them, as any artist with a trained eye will be happy to tell you.

Helmholtz, the nineteenth century founder of perceptual physiology, put forward the hypothesis that perceptions are actually unconscious inductive inferences based upon repeated experiences, and that "the elements in sense-perceptions that are derived from experience are just as powerful as those that are derived from present sensations" Perception for Helmholtz, then, is not mere passive reception of sense-data by a content-less blank slate, but an active projection of meaning based upon previous knowledge and understanding. In other words, perception is the interaction of present sense-data with the constant but unconscious feedback of previously stored knowledge and experience. It is a creative process.[58]

This is clearest in situations with poor lighting, etc., where one can almost sense this happening. Because of the divergence between the visual image in the retina and the object as understood and acted upon, we know that "there must be a great deal going on in the brain in order to produce perceptions from sensory signals: that our perceptions are created in us." If I am not mistaken, this is ex-[59]

actly what the Yogācārin concept of *ālayavijñāna* is trying to get across here. The simultaneous and mutual interaction between the *ālayavijñāna* and the waking, sense-consciousnesses in regard to a sense-object constitutes every act of perception.[60]

Returning to our discussion, the *ālayavijñāna*, though itself aways of neutral feeling-tone, arises without contradicting either the feeling of pleasure (*sukha*) or pain (*duḥkha*) of the sense-consciousnesses. Though the *ālayavijñāna*, as a resultant state (*vipāka*) and therefore without karmically determinate intention, is always indeterminate (*avyākrta*), it arises without contradicting the wholesome or unwholesome nature of either the arising-cognitions or their accompanying mental factors (*caitta*). This is because, while the *ālayavijñāna* arises simultaneously with the arising-cognitions, it is not directly associated with them because the two levels arise cognizing a different *Dharma*, a different object.[61] The *ālayavijñāna* then is a simultaneous, parallel stream with its own aspects and objects as Vasubandhu has explicitly stated elsewhere.[62]

> The MSg. I. 17 sums up these two functions:
>
> The *ālayavijñāna* and the defiled *Dharmas* (mental acts) are simultaneously reciprocal causes . . . . The *ālayavijñāna* is the cause of the defiled *Dharmas* and similarly the defiled *Dharmas* are the cause of the *ālayavijñāna*.[63]

In MSg. I. 27 it is stated that "the *ālayavijñāna* and the six arising-cognitions are reciprocal conditions," while Vasubandhu's commentary thereof states that "the *ālayavijñāna* and all the *Dharmas* are at all times and reciprocally cause and fruit; they are born the one from the other."[64]

This dual functioning of the *ālayavijñāna* as both cause and fruit is summed up at the very beginning of the MSg., in I. 3, in reply to a question as to why the term "store" is used:

> It is a 'store-consciousness' (*ālayavijñāna*) because all the defiled *Dharmas* of beings dwell (* *ālīnāḥ*)[65] in it as fruit, and because it too dwells in these *Dharmas* as cause.

Here, too, we find a fundmental parity between the Yogācārin exposition of the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious as described by Freud and Jung. They both function simultaneously with waking consciousness and condition conscious activities, while at the same time they are conditioned by just those conscious acts; it is essentially a feedback process. In this way, along with the concept of potential causal efficacy, both of these psychological systems attempt to account

for the continuing influence of past actions, memories, knowledge, dispositions, etc., on present perceptions and conscious experiences; the *ālayavijñāna*, is a resultant consciousness, the fruit of past acts (*phalabhāva*); at the same time it is a cause (*hetubhāva*) capable of engendering later conscious perceptions.[66] However, both these functions are still outside the realm of immediate consciousness, as they are with the unconscious of Freud and Jung.

COGNITVE PROCESSES

Now that we have examined the *ālayavijñāna* and unconscious in their relations with waking sense consciousness, we may ask what are the processes or functions that the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious possess as a level of mentality, as type of *vijñāna*?

Though the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious have many processes in common with waking consciousness, first, one major difference is that the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious may contain latent potential contents or ideas that are in contradiction with each other or with the contents of conscious waking states.

Contents in the unconscious, according to Freud, are "exempt from contradiction"[67]; the co-existence of contradictory ideas are never in conflict with one another.

We have seen above that the *ālayavijñāna*, too, is not in contradiction with the feeling tone or wholesome or unwholesome nature of the sense-cognitions. Neither are contradictory seeds prevented from existing simultaneously within the same *ālayavijñāna*. It is stated that the *śrutavāsanā*, the impressions from the teachings of the Buddha, "reside provisionally in the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*), united with it, functioning with it, like water and milk." But, these pure *vāsanā* are never the same as the *ālayavijñāna*.[68] The *ālayavijñāna* serves as the basis of the pure Dharmas, mental factors, but not as its cause.[69] It is always neutral and indeterminate, as it would have to be for the *ālayavijñāna* to serve as the basis of the seeds for all types of feeling and moral-toned fruits or results.

But as a subliminal level of consciousness, a type of *vijñāna*, both the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious carry out many of the same processes as waking sense consciousness. Freud says of unconscious processes that "all categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so on, can be applied to them"[70]. Jung claims that unconscious acts have "perception, thinking, feeling, volition, and intention, just as though a

subject were present."[71] Indeed, he says, "to my mind there is no doubt that all the activities ordinarily taking place in consciousness can also proceed in the unconscious."[72] This is not to say that *all* unconscious processes have these functions, but that they can not be a sole criterion for distinguishing what is conscious from what is unconscious.

The *ālayavijñāna*, too, performs many of the functions of waking consciousness. According to the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*:

> The *ālayavijñāna* is associated (*saṃrprayukta*) with the five omni-present factors connected with mind (*citta-saṃprayukta-sarvatraga*):attention (*manaskāra*), contact (*sparśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*samjñā*), and intention (*cetanā*).[73]

The text then describes these processes within the *ālayavijñāna* as very subtle and "difficult to comprehend even for the wise," and that they "always function in the same manner regarding a single object."[74] These processes are specifically the mental factors which nesessarily accompany every moment of mind (*citta*) in the Buddhist tradition. And we have already seen that the *ālayavijñāna* cognizes the external world in such a way that its "aspects are undiscerned."[75] As a type of mind then the *ālayavijñāna* has cognitive processes and cognitive objects, but in a fashion which are hard to perceive.

In other words, though the processes and objects of the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious are outside of immediate consciousness and are thus difficult to discern, they nevertheless function in a manner fairly similar to conscious functioning. Simply put, not all mental processes are conscious, even those most closely associated with waking consciousness.

This, too, has its parallels in modern experimental psychology in the notion of subliminal perception. In brief, subliminal perception is the capacity of the brain to accept, transmit, analyze, and react to sense-data outside of immediate awareness when such sensory input is below perceptible levels. One hypothesis for this phenomena is that:

> Since the span of consciousness is severely restricted, selective processes evolved whereby only a limited proportion of available sensory information could be admitted to consciousness. Subliminal stimuli constitute some part of the remainder - stimuli which . . . . may nevertheless be received, monitored and reacted to.[76]

MATRIX OF ALL CONSCIOUS ACTS

The next point that the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious share is that they are considered the 'root' or the 'matrix' of all conscious acts. What this means is that conscious acts are based on or originate in the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious. This conception departs from a strictly resultant, storing, or passive function and posits a central creative, active role for the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious.

Freud has stated that "every conscious act begins as an unconscious one"[77], but it is Jung who elaborates this aspect of the unconscious most thoroughly. He declares that "the unconscious is not just a receptacle but is the matrix" of conscious contents.[78] In fact, "everything that the human mind has ever created sprang from contents which . . . . existed once as unconscious seeds."[79] The unconscious is "a self-contained world", which never rests. "The unconscious processes are constantly supplying us with contents"[80], and consequently a "complete emptying of the unconscious is out of the question."[81]

The *ālayavijñāna* also is said to be the matrix of all conscious states. MSg. I. 8 states that "this mind (*citta*) furnished with all the seeds gives birth to the ego (*manas*) and the [sense-] cognitions."[82] Inasmuch as it contains all the seeds the *ālayavijñāna* is also the support and collection of all the existences within *Saṃsāra*, the cycle of life and death.[83] Because those seeds may produce new perceptions the *ālayavijñāna* is the "cause of the cognition which appears as the inanimate world" as well as the cause of the individual bases of the sense-cognitions.[84] And of course the famous verse which appears at the very beginning of the MSg. refers, according to the Yogācārins, to the *ālayavijñāna:*

> It is the beginningless realm, the common support of all the *Dharmas.*
> As it exists, all the destinies and realization of *Nirvāṇa*[85] also [exist].

The MSgU explains that while the *ālayavijñāna* is the support of all the *Dharmas*, or mental factors, pure and defiled alike, it is the cause of only the defiled *Dharmas*.[86] For Asaṅga and the MSg. this is an important distinction. The *ālayavijñāna* as the collection of and basis for the seeds of defiled *Dharmas* exists only so long as the seeds, the potentialities, for those *Dharmas* exist. At this point the *ālayavijñāna* and the Western notions of the unconscious begin to diverge.

We saw above Jung's statement about the impossibility of emptying the unconscious: to be fully conscious, without any part unconscious,

> . . . would necessitate an unimaginable totality of consciousness, and that in turn would presuppose an equally unimaginable wholeness and perfection of the human mind.[87]

But for the Buddhists, at least for Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's Yogācāra, this is exactly what they have in mind: the emptying of the *ālayavijñāna* of the seeds that are the cause of the defiled *Dharmas* is only possible for those who have achieved the state of *Arhat*, *Pratyekabuddha*, *Bodhisattva*, or a *Tathāgata* and who no longer possess an *ālayavijñāna* at all.[88] They have eliminated all the seeds. There is no longer any residue, any karmic fruit to come to maturation. Their present perceptions and conscious processes perceive everything in the word just as it is, free of any false discrimination or affective attachment created by past experience.

CONCLUSION

Let us summarize what we have covered so far, the characteristics which the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious of modern depth psychology seem to have in common. First of all, both argue the necessity of some enduring psychic stream that can account for the obvious continuity of certain mental phenomena based on past actions and experience - memory, knowledge, dispositions, etc. – in the face of the completely transient nature of immediate waking consciousness. We also noticed a common point of dispute within their respective traditions as to the ontological status of these imputed "latent"contents, as to whether or how they could be considered to exist, with both Yogācārins and the depth psychologists rejecting a purely non-mental explanation.[89]

Underlying this conception of latency is the idea that these dormant mental processes possess some kind of causal efficacy, that they are able to bring about new conscious states and perceptions. The term *bīja* is defined as the "capacity for afflictions (*kleśa*) . . . [and] memory to arise"[90], while Freud's and Jung's theories of the etiology of nervous disease also presuppose the continuing causal influence of previous experiences.

Moreover, both the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious are seen to be simultaneous with, and reciprocally conditioned by, waking sense-consciousness. In this way they are seen to function as fully active levels of mentality, albeit ones that are not accessible to immediate awareness. Both are capable of certain cognitive processes: thought, feeling, intention, sensation, etc. The *ālayavijñāna* is still a *vijñāna*, and the unconscious is still somewhat conscious (in a non-

immediate sense of the word). There is no absolute disjunction between them. Moreover, both the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious are considered to be the root, the matrix, of all conscious experience; they contain all the seeds, the causal conditions, of future consciousness.

In short, it is difficult to even conceive of meaningful conscious experience totally divorced from all past knowledge and experience.[91] The store of knowledge that we always possess and the affective attitudes that we consistently express are pre-existent in every conscious act and constitute the very preconditions for any act to be meaningful.[92] In this sense, every conscious perception must be interpreted by and assimilated into our sum of previous knowledge and experience. Most of this, fortunately, goes on automatically and beyond our immediate awareness; we would be too overloaded with sense-date otherwise. Altogether it is a process of continuous interaction with the world in which meaning is created more by what is unseen yet understood. In an important way perceptions are "created in us". This is what makes it all so intractable: it is the previously conditioned presuppositions, culturally agreed upon interpretations of "reality" embodied in some "common sense view of the world, that are most taken for granted, least seen and so least understood.[93] As these are the very processes that tend to keep beings trapped in their endless cycles of ignorance and greed and suffering, they are what Buddhist practice endeavors to understand and to eradicate. It seems quite appropriate that such a level of unconscious construction of meaning and reality would come into view and become a major focus in the history of Buddhist doctrine in India.

DIVERGENCES

Agreement, however, between the depth psychologists and the Yogācārin Buddhists about the dominant role in all mental life played by processes outside of immediate awareness does not necessarily entail agreement in all details. There are several areas of divergence and it is to these that we now must look.

While it is clear now that there are great areas of similarity in the "structural" relations between waking consciousness and the *ālayavijñāna*/ unconscious, "structures" are nesessarily defined, at least in part, by the functions they are presumed to perform. Often they are either a dynamic process that has ossified into a "stucture", or they are simply a different perspective, another way of looking at the same phenomenon, like the well-known distinction in nuclear physics between a wave and a particle. Thus, though I have aimed to limit the discus-

sion to the "structural" aspects of these concepts, it is worthwhile to look briefly at the "dynamics" involved, for it is here that the greatest light will be shed on the differences between them.

REPRESSION

Perhaps the most striking difference is the concept of repression (which is accepted by Jung, also, though his interpretation differs greatly.[94]) Freud has said that "the theory of repression is the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests."[95] At its simplest, Freud declares, *"the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious."*[96] Certain unconscious contents are prevented from coming to consciousness because they are incompatible, from a moral or ethical point of view, with conscious values. Denying the existence of these contents keeps them in a state of unconsciousness. It is, in effect, a *systematic* barrier between unconsciousness and consciousness.

But, Freud warns:

> The process of repression is not to be regarded as something which takes place *once* . . . . the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious . . . the maintenance of repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of force.[97]

Thus repression, and the barrier that it creates between the unconscious and the conscious, is an on-going process. For Freud, in the period of the Metapsychological Papers upon which we have been drawing, it was the presence or absence of repression that distinguished the unconscious from the conscious. That which could not come to consciousness because of repression was considered part of the "system *Ucs.*", as he put it. And that which was temporarily unconscious but could easily become conscious, such as certain memories, abstract knowledge, etc., was considered part of the "system *Pcs.*", which is thus *descriptively* unconscious, but *systematically* conscious. With this change in terminology we can discern a development from the concept of a "function", the function of latent causal efficacy, to that of a "structure", a defined "region in the mental apparatus"[98], what Ricouer called a "shift from a merely descriptive concept of latency to a systematic concept of a topographical system."[99]

Freud's conception of the unconscious which we have examined above involves both these senses of the word "unconscious". Though in the Metapsychological Papers Freud was careful to keep these uses apart through the nomencla-

ture of *Ucs.*, *Pcs.*, and *Cs.* (unconscious, preconscious, and conscious), he was to change his conceptions again, and revert back to the purely *descriptive* meaning of the word "unconscious", especially in *The Ego and the Id.*[100]

Repression then has everything to do with Freud's systematic "topographical" conception of the unconscious which we have been examining. In part, this dynamic functioning of unconscious helps to define its boundaries. To my knowledge nothing like repression exists in the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition, though one of the most fundamental of Buddhist tenets is that beings are constantly ignoring or denying the true selfless and impermanent nature of reality and always fabricating a fictitious, permanent "self" in its stead. In the Yogācāra tradition it is the *ālayavijñāna* that is taken to be such a self.[101] It is the tension or contradition then between grasping to such an unreal sense of self and the true nature of reality that "drives" the *ālayavijñāna* through *samsara*, as it were, rather than the tension involved in repression as it is for Freud.

REBIRTH

Another more obvious point of contrast is the doctrine of rebirth. Along with the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), the continuity of the individual, or rather, of the mass of *karma* through various lifetimes, was one of the major reasons for positing the *ālayavijñāna*, Needless to say, Freud and Jung, working within the metaphysical framework of modern scientific psychology did not investigate this as an area of scientific research, though both of them had a strong interest in the field of parapsychology.

ENERGETICS

The next area I would like to examine goes to the very heart of both Freud's and Jung's ideas on the functioning of the unconscious. It involves the relations of the unconscious to objects (both the mental representations of objects within the mind and external objects), the energy invested in and surrounding these objects, and the fate of these "invested" objects as they interact with other objects.[102]

This is a vast and intricate area in Jung's and Freud's systems of thought and therapy[103] but there are, I believe, two points of direct relevance to the *bīja* theory of the Yogācārins which are not often explicitly addressed.[104] These are, as I have just mentioned, the concept of energy, that is mental energy that is attached to, or "invested" in, specific objects or ideas as a quantity of emotional

charge, and the interpretation of the relations that these "invested" contents have with other such objects. The first question we shall call the theory of "energetics", and the second that of "hermeneutics". We shall examine energetics first.

The concept of energy, in psychological usage, is primarily phenomenological. Jung has said that, as objective events, "the perceptible changes effected by the psyche cannot possibly be understood except as a phenomena of energy."[105] This psychic energy is experienced "as motion and force when actual, and as a state or condition when potential."[106] In this state it amounts to a "reservoir of potential energy"[107] for mental phenomena to arise and take form.

Freud also uses the metaphors of energy and force. He defines a trauma as any experience in which a person's psyche is simply overloaded with stimulation beyond its capacity to assimilate it, "so that lasting disturbances must result in the distribution of the available energy in the mind."[108] In fact, he says that "the term *traumatic* has actually no other meaning but this *economic* one"[109]. So much energy becomes "fixated to the moment of the traumatic occurrence," that the individual is thereafter influenced by it until this stored, or rather, obstructed energy can be freed. This energy, originating in past experiences and stored up unconsciously, maintains a constant pressure on consciousness and so constantly affects conscious states.

When this energy cannot be released in conjunction with the particular objects in which it has been "invested", it searches for other suitable avenues of release (using the hydrodynamic metaphors again of which both Freud and Jung were so fond). Jung says that "energy clings with specific force to its object", but when blocked or inhibited "an analogous object is 'invested' and takes the place of the [other] one"[110]. Freud called this process "displacement" or "substitutive formation", which is simply the "withdrawal of the investment of energy from one object to another."[111]

Jung, however, strongly warns against hypostatizing the concept of psychic energy. He emphasizes that it expresses only "relations between" pyschological facts and is "never a substance or thing" in itself.[112]

To recapitulate, the theory of "energetics" in depth pyschology is characterized by these two main points: it manifests in "lasting disturbances" or "perceptual changes" in the psyche due to the fact that "energy clings with specific force to its object", and being "abstracted from relations", it expresses certain "relations between" mental phenomena.[113] The motility of this energy seems to bring together and embody both of these concepts.

How does this apply to the notion of *bīja* in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions? Vasubandhu defines *bīja* as that which has the special power to produce a fruit through a transformation in the mental continuum.[114] The term 'power' (*śakti*) is used widely in the works of Vasubandhu; his commentator has interpreted *śakti* as synonymous with *bīja* and *vāsanā*.[115] We have also seen that the AKBh distinguishes between the afflictions (*kleśa*) which are in a dormant or potential state and those which are active or manifest and that potential afflictions were called *bīja*. So the *bīja* are defined as the potential to produce results through transformations of the mind which are in a dormant or latent state.

But in what sense is a latent potential a "something"? According to the Sautrāntika school *bīja* are not actual existents, or things (*dravya*), but signify a causal relationship between factors, and as such are "mere designations" (*prajñaptimātra*).[116]

It seems clear then that the notion of *bīja* comes quite close to that of "energy" as used by depth pyschologists. But there is a problem with interpreting the *bīja* theory as a type of "energetics" along the depth psychologists' lines. One of the characteristics of the *bīja*, as mentioned above in MSg. I. 22, is that they are "determinate", meaning that each resultant state is "only born from a seed that is proper to it."[117] This follows the Abhidharmic principle that "a specific effect arises from a specific cause."[118] While we may, perhaps, understand *bīja* as some type of stored energetic potential, the *bīja* certainly can not jump around looking for some "analogous object". The AKBh states that "for a certain person an *anuśaya*, a dormant tendency, is attached to a certain object; this person is bound to that object by that *anuśaya*."[119] While this too is certainly close to the psychoanalytic conception of "invested" objects, there seem to be further complications.

We have seen that the *bīja* are determinant, producing only fruit that is proper to them, are bound to specific objects, and come to fruition when "the seeds encounter their proper conditions."[120] But what are proper conditions for their maturation? And what are the relations to these objects to which the *anuśaya* are bound? What is the status of these objects, and how do they effect the awakening of the dormant tendencies? What had this to do with the maturation of seeds? These questions all concern the relations between latent or dormant potential and their corresponding objects and ought to have been of great concern to Buddhist soteriology in overcoming the accumulative effects of *karma*.

HERMENEUTICS

Tangential to the concept of energetics and directly related to the entire *bīja* theory, then, is that of hermeneutics. Though to my knowledge this has not been directly discussed by the Yogācārins, it has played a very large part in psychoanalytic theory right from the beginning with the *Interpretation of Dreams* down to the more current reception of Freud, at the hands of Lacan, Ricoeur and others, as a hermeneutic theory par excellence.[121]

In the treatment of hysteric neurosis, as we mentioned above, Freud and his mentor, Breur, found that they could uncover the 'meaning' of the patient's symptoms, even though this 'meaning' was not known to the patient herself. They inferred that there were unconscious causal connections being made between those unconscious contents that were 'invested' with energy and the actual manifest symptoms. As Freud put it, "it is possible to find meaning in neurotic symptoms by means of analytic interpretation".[122] The interpretations consisted of explicating the hidden relations between these repressed and unconscious ideas and manifest conscious ones. At first Freud applied his interpretive theory to hysteria, then to dreams and everyday behavior, and then more widely to history, religion and culture. It is because psychoanalysis claims to be able to discover hidden relations between unconscious ideas and all of these phenomena through their interpretive methods that psychoanalytic theory is itself considered a hermeneutics, a theory of interpretation. In fact, the validity of its theories rests largely upon the interpretations of the causal relations between these hidden unconscious contents and the external situations in which they are expressed.[123]

Whatever we may think of the specifics of these interpretations, it is important to emphasize that Freud and Jung placed great emphasis upon understanding the context and the actual, specific conditions in which these specific potentialities, or latent energies, could come to consciousness. Certain situations, certain images or thoughts which are related *in content* to those images or thoughts which are repressed or simply unconscious will trigger them so that they are able, directly or indirectly, to come to conscious expression. Following this line of inquiry, the depth pyschologists exhaustively explored the relations between external conditions and the content of repressed or unconscious ideas.

We find this emphasis implicit in Yogācāra theory; it is stated everywhere, axiomatically, and as if it is self-evident, that:

> These seeds demand proper conditions in order to produce their fruit.

> They are not born whenever, but when in a given time and place the seeds encounter their proper conditions, at just that time and place their fruit takes birth.[124]

To my knowledge, beyond stating this general principle the texts do not "specify" when and how the seeds come to fruition. There is little detail about the specific seeds that come to maturation in relation to specific conditions. Perhaps these are discussed and described more generally in the many meditation manuals specifying different practices for different dispositions, different character types and specific types of delusions. This is, on the face of it, such an important subject for Buddhist practice that we would expect to find a wealth of materials related to it.

In conclusion, from the point of view of "dynamics", there seems to be no simple correspondence between the systems. The depth psychologists use the metaphors of energy, force, repression, investment, etc., to impart a sense of the dynamics, the tensions, that underlie mental functioning. We would do well to remember that both Freud and Jung had medical backgrounds in clinical psychiatry and were constantly exposed to and worked intimately with neurotic, psychotic and hysteric patients. Their concern with tension, pressure, conflict and reconcilliation dominated their metaphors and directed their therapies. Also, it cannot be overemphasized that for both Freud and Jung the unconscious is the locus and origin of the instincts and desires, etc., and thus played a very prominent role in their theories of motivation. All of this, along with the general mechanistic, scientific milieu in which they worked, led them to speak in terms of quantites of energy, force, etc., in order to convey the dynamics of human inner conflict.

The Yogācārins, on the other hand, were primarily interested in the continuity of personal *karma* within a soteriological context in which the practice of meditation wherein all cognitive acts came to a halt and the doctrine of rebirth both played a prominent role. Thus, they adhered closely to the ideas of latency, dormancy, dwelling and storage, sticking close to their central metaphor of the seeds (*bīja*). This led them to underemphasize, in my opinion, some of the major implications of the entire *bīja* theory, especially that of articulating the exact relationships between the maturation of karmically created seeds and the context or complex of conditions that would bring that maturation about: in short, the very kernal of karmic theory. *Karma* for Vasubandhu seems to be nothing more or less than a "special power to produce a transformation in the mental con-

tinuum". It is an article of faith for which the seeds are a graphic metaphor more than an explanation.

Moreover, the *ālayavijñāna* does not seem directly involved with the dynamics of motivation, as the unconscious is for the depth psychologists. Altogether, the relationship between the *bīja* or *ālayavijñāna* and motivation seems rather ill-defined. For all Buddhist schools the concept of *saṃskāra* plays a key role in karmic activity because *saṃskāras* are the volitional, intentional actions with which one reacts to a thing in a wholesome or unwholesome manner and thereby accrues the potential for karmic retribution or fruit. So it is the *saṃskāras* that create the seeds, and the *ālayavijñāna* itself, as the consciousness which "stores" the seeds, is a product of past *saṃskāras*. These volitions are also important because for any perceptual act "it is quite clear that their volitional content (fear, hate, greed, etc.) greatly outweighs the sensorial, and that sense-perception is not only embedded in a volitional attitude, but smothered by it."[125]

The accumulation of karma then is incurred by these intentional processes. The theory of latent seeds describes the continuity of that accumulation. However, this accumulation of seeds also creates the preconditions for further, specific intentional actions which keep the whole process going. These volitional predispositions are present during the apperceptual process and give rise to certain and specific intentional acts (*saṃskāra*). They remain, latent perhaps, but efficacious enough to continually create further intentional actions, which in turn create more kamic seeds.[126] While these are certainly involved in the theory of the *ālayavijñāna* as the "store–house" consciousness, it is clear that this cannot simply be a passive collection of dispositions, but must take an active and re-active role in all perceptual processes. The seeds of *saṃskāras* continually arise so that the habitual intentional responses can be just that: habitual. Otherwise there would be no continuity at all in the dispositional makeup of any individual. Thus unconscious, that is, latent, processes are as necessary to explain the *motivational* aspects of karmic theory as they are to explain the retributive aspects.

There are two factors involved in this, the *anuśaya*, the dormant afflictions, and the *klista-manas*, the "afflicted ego". We have seen above that the *anuśaya*, one of the types of seeds, are "attached to a certain object, this person is bound to that object by that *anuśaya*."[127] Also, the *anuśaya* are closely related to *saṃskāras:* when the *anuśaya* are aroused (*paryavasthāna*) they lead to anger, pride and craving for existence or sensual pleasure, all karmically inducing *saṃskāras*.[128] Presumably, in the presence of such objects to which they are attached, these *anuśaya*

are aroused, and the seeds, the potential, for new *saṃskāras* produce their effect as those *saṃskāras* arise.

Moreover, the *kliṣṭa-manas*, the afflicted ego, which was mentioned earlier, is involved here also. Briefly, it is the seat of ignorance and attachment to the self, which in the traditional *pratītya-samutpāda* doctrine of dependent origination are key factors in conditioning the arising of *saṃskāras*. Like the *ālayavijñāna*, the *kliṣṭa-manas* too is not directly associated with the six sense-consciousnesses and for much the same reasons: there needs to be a continually abiding potential of karmically afflicted and ignorant dispositions in order to explain the continuous potential for karmically unwholesome activities despite the presence of temporarily wholesome mental actions.[129]

Thus, though the dynamics of motivation is obviously involed in the *bīja/ālayavijñāna* theory it does not seem to have the central role here that it does for the depth psychologists in the guise of the instincts and the repressed unconscious. The *bīja* and the *saṃskāras* are conceptualized quite separately, though their functions overlap somewhat. Motivation and the unconscious do not seem so inseparable for the Buddhists as they often do for the depth psychologists.

With this I end the point-by-point comparison of *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious. We have seen a large degree of agreement in the conceptions of the unconscious and the *ālayavijñāna* concerning the relationship between waking consciousness and mentality outside of such a consciousness. They are both a level of mental activity interacting with and influencing present conscious actions in a constant feedback process. This idea of unconscious activity does not seem particularly controversial.[130] However, when it comes to actually describing the dynamics of such processes, the fundamental agreement over their structural relations breaks down and the psychoanalysts, at any rate, rely on the concept of the dynamically repressed. No such concept appears in the Buddhist accounts. Moreover, depth psychologists place great emphasis on articulating the dynamic interactions between specific conditions and the latent unconscious contents, something that the Yogācārins state in principle but gloss over in practice (at least in direct relation with the *bīja/ālayavijñāna* theories.) We need a better understanding of precise inter-relations between *bīja* and *saṃskāras*.

THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS, ANUŚAYA, & DRIVES

Now I would like to discuss a few questions raised by this study. They are general and tentative remarks rather than definitive conclusions.

A possible relationship between the *ālayavijñāna* and Jung's idea of the collective unconscious has been mentioned by numerous scholars[131] but only in passing. It certainly calls for more systematic comparison than has yet been attempted, but I can only offer a few comments at this time.

The collective unconscious, according to Jung, contains "unconscious qualities that are not individually acquired but are inherited."[132] These are inherited as "inborn tendencies" to behave in certain ways. Jung calls these tendencies, these inherited behavioral patterns, "archetypes". They are *collective* because as inherited patterns they are "universal and regular occurring phenomena"[133], and have nothing to do with individual experience. They are *unconscious* because they are outside of immediate consciouseness.

The collective unconscious is just "the totality of all archetypes"[134], which, being inherited, are "born anew in the brain structure of every individual."[135] This is the major justification for positing the collective unconscious: "The universal similarity of human brains leads to the universal possibility of a uniform mental functioning."[136] Thus it is called the collective psyche, because such mental functioning belongs to all the individuals of the same species simply because they share the same brain structure.

Translated from Jung's psychological terminology into the more familiar terms of biology, these ideas lose much of their mysterious allusiveness: the brains and nervous systems of a particular species have similar structures and neural functions which give rise to similar mental processes and behavior. Any cat anywhere has the same potential and propensity for typical cat-like cognition and behavior.[137] The typical patterns of this species-specific behaviour for human beings are called "archetypes" by Jung.

Relying on this physiological base, one would expect these archetypes to be closely related to the idea of drives[138], and they are. The collective unconscious is "the source of the instincts", and the "archetypes", Jung explains, "are simply the forms which the instincts assume"[139]. They are the psychic counterparts or expression of the drives. Thus, the drives cannot even be discussed "psychologically without considering the archetypes, because at bottom they determine one another."[140] This is why he says that "the instincts and the archetypes together form the 'collective unconscious'"[141].

While it is commonly thought that Freud and Jung completely disagree on this point[142], Freud also has said that:

> If inherited mental formations exist in the human being something ana-

logous to instinct in animals - these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs.[143]

This is close to what Jung calls the archetypes. Freud also agrees with Jung that what we perceive is never the actual drive, or instinct, but its representative in psychological form. "An instinct can never become an object of consciousness", he says, but"only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious."[144] The archetypes of Jung are also psychical representations of the drives, which form the nucleus of the unconscious and are common to all human beings.

But to what extent is the *ālayavijñāna* also considered the origin, or locus, of drives which are common to all human beings? The MSg. I. 60 states that the *ālayavijñāna*, inasmuch as it is common, is the seed of the inanimate world.[145] Asvabhāva, in commenting on this passage, says that the *ālayavijñāna*

> . . . is the cause of the cognition (*vijñapti*) which appears as the inanimate world. It is common in the sense that by the predominant force (*adhipatibala*) assuring a maturation of similar acts, this cognition appears under an identical form to all who experience it.[146]

Those who have performed similar deeds, similar *karma*, possess the seeds to experience a similar world with a similar appearance. So the *ālayavijñāna* which possesses all the seeds, which are themselves the potential for the maturation of previous *karma*, would produce the appearances of a similar world for those beings, to the extent that they do share a similar "force for maturation." Beings who are born in the same species then, in Buddhist theory, necessarily have common, similar karmic seeds.

But what about the drives? Are beings, for Buddhists, born with anything like drives in the Western sense? While this is another deep and involved subject, there is an interesting passage in the Mahā-Māluṅkyasutta from the Pali Canon concerning the *anuśaya*,[147] or dormant tendencies, which we have mentioned already (and which Vasubandu in the AKBh later equates with *bīja*).[148] The passage concerns whether or not a baby boy has views towards self-existence, has doubt, attachment to rules and rituals, desire for sense pleasure, or aggressiveness. The Buddha answers that the dormant tendency (*anuśaya*) towards these lie latent (*anuseti*) in him.[149] These derive, presumably, from his past karma which has specifically brought about his human birth endowed with all of its attendant physical drives and pyschological faculties.

Let us remember that for Jung the archetypes are closely related to brain structure and are always acquired at birth, not through individual experience:

"The child," Jung says, "has a highly developed brain which . . . . is the deposit of the psychic functioning" of these universally shared archetypes.[150] The child, for the Buddhists as well as for Jung, receives at birth many dormant or unconscious tendencies which are closely related to the instincts or drives.

To sum up, Jung posited the "collective unconscious" based upon this type of phylogenetic argument - that the evolution of species has created for all human beings a similar brain structure and therefore similar congnitve and behavioral patterns amongst which are those related to the instincts and drives and which are expressed *psychologically* in the archetypes.

For the Buddhists, individuals born into such a world and such a species necessarily share enough similar *karma* for them to experience that world in a similar fashion. Part of this similar *karma* are the *anuśaya*, which seem to be very close to the drives or instincts - the *anuśaya* for sensual pleasure relates closely to the concept of libido; for existence, eros; for agression, thanatos (to use Freud's terminology).[151] These are common to all members of the human species, *collective* in Jung's sense. Moreover, they are dormant proclivities, dispositions to act in certain ways; sometimes they manifest and sometimes they are sleeping - just like all the other contents of the unconscious and the seeds of *karma* with which they are compared.

On these three key points then - *collective* because shared by the human species; *unconscious* because dormant but potential; and related to the *instincts* or drives - the *ālayavijñāna* and the collective unconscious come very close to each other indeed.

But the *ālayavijñāna* is also concerned with the effects of past lives in determining the circumstances of this life, including the very birth as a human being, a concern not shared by Jung to my knowledge. In the MSg. I. 60, quoted just above, we saw that the *ālayavijñāna* as *common* was the cause of the collective cognition of the world; as *uncommon*, that is, individual, it is the cause of an individual's mind and body and the mass of *karma* which can be removed through Buddhist practice.[152] In a sense, then, the *ālayavijñāna* is personal as well as collective, as should be clear by the constant emphasis on specific acts creating specific seeds, etc. In any comparison with the collective unconscious this needs to be taken into account. Is the *ālayavijñāna* then the personal unconscious as well as the collective unconscious, the two levels of the unconscious that Jung delineates? I will leave that to the reader to decide.

DID A COMMON PROBLEMATIC LEAD TO THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA AND THE UNCONSCIOUS?

There are points of comparison also, I believe, in the respective religious and philosophical traditions out of which the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious arose, in the problematics that led both traditions to search for an area of psychic continuity behind the changing facade of waking consciousness. The conceptions of consciousness and the paradigms of knowledge, of epistemology, within which they were operating led both of them along a similar path.

First of all, both conceived of knoweledge in terms of a knowing subject and a known object. This theory of knowledge is based on the model of a sense-consciousness knowing a sense-object. The standard Buddhist theory of knowledge is the concommitance of sense-organ, sense-object and attention.[153] In a similar manner mental objects (*dharmas*) or "inner states" are known when they present themselves to the mental-organ (*mana-indriya*) and attention is present. The mental-organ also "perceives" that the sense-organs are cognizing something, for the mental-cognition has awareness that it knows:

> The visual-cognition knows blue, but it does not know "it is blue"; the mental-cognition knows blue and knows that "it is blue",[154]

The basic Cartesian model of cognition entails a similar relational theory of knowledge. Russell summed it up neatly, saying that:

> There is on the one hand the thing of which we are aware . . . and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act of apprehending the thing.[155]

Freud also considered attention a key factor in conscious awareness. He said that "the act of becoming conscious is dependent on the attention".[156] And we saw above that the presence or absence of attention and awareness played a very large part in both Jung's and Freud's conception of the unconscious. Indeed, Jung took great exception to "certain views which would restrict everything psychic to consciousness."[157] He recognized that "we connect consciousness, by analogy, with the sense functions," so that we come to think that "phenomena cannot be represented without an experiencing subject."[158]

In this sense, "subjectivity", that there is an experiencing subject in contra-distinction to a concommitant object, however otherwise anathema to the Buddhists who consistently disavow such a subject, is partially built into the epistemological model itself. Gudmunsen has noted that as long as vision is the model of

knowing,

> . . . as long as the Abhidharmists took their experiential *dharmas* as data that could be got into view . . . they could never wholly avoid reifying consciousness as that which gets dharmas into view.[159]

Now, if the prevailing theories of knowledge within both the Cartesian and the Buddhist traditions required attention or awareness of an object, even for 'inner states', as a constitutive condition of consciousness, then it is clear that not all mental phenomena could be considered 'conscious'. Simply put, "awareness cannot be taken as the criterion of mentality"[160]. It is when "an attempt has been made . . . . to choose awareness as the defining characteristic of an independent mode of being called mind"[161] that it becomes necessary to conceive of mentality outside of these strict confines. In response to this 'new' definition of mind the unconscious too (as with the *ālayavijñāna*) supposedly possesses awareness, but its objects are "undiscerned" and outside of immediate conscious awareness. It conforms to the letter of the law while evading its spirit; it may even, thereby, be closer to the facts.

If the idea of the unconscious only arose when'consciousness' came to be defined such a way, then what about the Buddhists? To what extent was is it unnecessary for the early pre-Abhidharma Buddhists to conceive of a mental substratum capable of carrying the karmic load outside of immediate consciousness? To what extent did the Abhidharmists define consciousness in such a way as to require the conception of something like the *ālayavijñāna* in order to account for karmic continuity outside of immediate cognition in a manner similar to the Cartesian "correction"?

In early Buddhist doctrine *vijñāna* designated both a medium of karmic continuity, throughout one's existence and through rebirth in the *pratītya-samutpāda* series, as well as the immediate cognitive processes themselves.[162] In the Abhidharmic tradition, however, this latter function came to dominate the concept of *vijñāna* as it became more narrowly identified with cognitive processes entailing immediate awareness. The abiding, accumulating aspect of *vijñāna* could no longer by equated with the *vijñāna* analyzed into the six sense-cognitions with their immediate objects, and another term, or more precisely another aspect, of *vijñāna* needed to resuscitated and re-emphasized, one not directly identified with the functions the six sense-cognitions.[163] This is one reason why the Yogācārins constantly referred back to the *vijñāna* of the *pratītya-samutpāda* series when justifying their "new" conception of the old, multi-valent term

"*vijñāna*". What we see in the *ālayavijñāna*, along with the six sense-cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), is the reunion of these two basic processes, now conceptualized separately but still functioning in a complementary manner—one part constantly arising, as "*pravṛtti*", the other always "dwelling", as "*ālaya*."

However, it also seems that the concept of *ālayavijñāna* is symptomatic of the conceptual dead end at which the Abhidharma tradition of mental analysis arrived. They developed meditative reflection and systematic introspective analysis to such a high art that they came to realize the existence of mental functioning beyond direct access to immediate consciousness, to areas that resisted their probing analysis. The very concept of such areas in the mind is *itself* an expression of the extent to which self-reflective understanding had come: to the limits of conscious and self-conscious awareness. This, in part, accounts for the problematic nature of such a concept and why *all* the various solutions offered seemed so unsatisfactory. Who wants to admit that they have reached their limits, the end of dead certainty and the beginning of tenuous inferences about regions and processes unseen?

In this sense, perhaps both the *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious can be seen as necessary compensations to a reified conception of consciousness, that is, of consciousness as constituted only and always by immediate awareness.[164] But mightn't it well be that such a counterpart to a reified sense of consciousness is itself merely an equally reified sense of unconsciousness, as if "the unconscious", too, were just another "experiencing subject"[165]? While it certainly appears that the *ālayavijñāna* exhibits that same "shift from a merely descriptive concept of latency to a systematic concept of a topographical system"[166], to a structure which is a separate stream of consciousness and a respository of all the seeds, we must ask if the model has really changed or is it, as many have claimed, merely an *ad hoc* solution, literally a "stop-gap" measure to fill the holes in Abhidharma theory, a solution, we might add, to an inadequate conception of consciousness as indelibly intentional in the first place?

Be that as it may, we must remember what the *ālayavijñāna* is intented to explicate: the abiding locus of affective attachment and cognitive delusions, especially those that linger irrevocably beyond immediate awareness. Particularly, the *ālayavijñāna* is that which is taken to be the self, unconscious attachment which keeps persons trapped in the vicious cycle of *saṃsāra*. As such its very basis is discrimination based upon attachment, and so it remains for as long as beings are stuck in the circle of fabricating and projecting their own realities

and remain inescapably enchanted with just those projections.

Thus, as a provisional model of the deluded mind that needs to be transformed and transcended, we can appreciate how such a notion may have been of benefit for what both the Buddhists and the depth psychologists have always considered to be of highest importance: the overcoming of ignorance and the uprooting of the hidden and nearly intractable malevolent tendencies lurking in the heart of man. "Neurosis," Freud once remarked, is "the result of a kind of ignorance, a not-knowing of mental processes which should be known."[167] Cure comes about with a genuine "inner change in the patient", when that which should be known is made known. For the Yogācārins, when the attachment and illusion of an absolute dichotomy between an experiencing subject and an experienced object has been completely eradicated, that is, when the basis which is the *ālayavijñāna* has been completely transformed and "turned around" (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), all that afflicts a human being is thereby eliminated and the pure life of freedom is attained[168], and this has always been the *summum bonum* of Buddhist life and practice.

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NOTES

[1] Of basic Yogācāra texts that directly pertain to the *ālayavijñāna* the following have been translated into Western languages: *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang.* trans. by La Vallee Poussin. Libraire Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner. Paris: 1928. *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.* trans. by E. Lamotte. Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques. V. 4. 1935–6. *Lankavatara Sutra.* trans. by D. T. Suzuki. London, 1932. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu.* trans. by Stefan Anacker. Motilal Banarsidass,

New Delhi: 1984. *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth Century China.* by Diana Paul. Stanford University Press, Stanford: 1984. These last two works also contain much useful explanatory material. Finally, an exhaustive scholarly study on the *ālayavijñāna* has just been completed by Lambert Schmithausen, (*Ālayavijñāna.* The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo: 1987) which contains the most complete bibliography on the *ālayavijñāna*, including Japanese works.

[2] N. Tatia, *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya,* Patna: 1976. TSWS, no. 17. Abbrev. ASBh. The Chinese translation of Hsuan-tsang (Xuan Zang): T. 31. # 1606. 701b4-702a5. The Tibetan Peking edition: # 5554. Si. 12a2-13b5. Derge edition: # 4053. Li. 9b7-11a5. Referred to in Hakamaya, *Araya-shiki sonzai no hachi-ronshō ni kansuru shobunken.* Kamazawa Daigaku Bukkyō-gakubu Kenkyū-kiyō, No. 16, 1978. Abbrev.: Hakamaya, 1978.

[3] Hsuan-Tsang's Chinese: T. 30. # 1579. 579c23-582a28. Tibetan Peking ed. # 5539. Zi. 4a5-11a8. Derge ed. # 4038. Shi. 3b4-9b3. Referred to in Hakamaya, *Viniścaya-samgrahaṇī ni okeru araya-shiki no kitei.* Tōyō Bunka Kenkyū-kiyō, No. 79, 1979. Abbrev.: Hakamaya, 1979.

[4] These too are available only in Tibetan and Chinese canonical translations, but there are modern translations into French and Japanese to which I have referred respectively in Lamotte, *La Somme du Grande Véhicle d'Asanga.* Univ. de Louvain-la-Neuve: 1973; and in Nagao, *Shōdaijōron.* Kodansha, Tokyo: 1982. (Hsuan-Tsang's trans.: T. 31. # 1594; D. ed. # 4048. P. ed # 5549.) Abbrev.: MSg. A major part of the commentary of Vasubandhu, the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya,* is found in Lamotte. (T. 31. # 1597. P. ed. # 5551. D. ed. # 4050.) Abbrev.: MSgBh. Likewise for the commentary by Asvabhāva, the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-upanibandhana* (T. 31. # 1598. P. ed. # 5552. D. ed. # 4051.) Abbrev.: MSgU.

[5] *Abhidharmakośa-bhāsya.* ed. P. Pradhan. K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna: 1967. Abbrev.: AKBh. The French translation by La Vallee Poussin (Paris-Louvain: 1932–31) has also been referred to.

[6] Though he changed many of his ideas concerning the "dynamic" character of the unconscious in his later works, these papers are representative of his basic conception of the relations between the unconscious and waking consciousness.

[7] These then impose two more limitations on the scope of this paper. First, I am treating the *ālayavijñāna* as it describes psychological processes in a systematic fashion and will not touch upon related or later developments more closely allied with notions such as the *tathāgata-garbha,* Buddha-nature, etc. Second, I am treating the unconscious as it appears in medical psychiatry and not as a conception of the "ground of being", etc., favored by the Romantic authors of the 19th century. (See L. L. Whyte, *The Unconsious Before Freud.* cited below.) There are many interesting parallels between these different contexts, also, but they must await another study.

[8] Locke declared an idea as "every immediate object of the mind in thinking" (as quoted in Rorty, R., *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.,* Princeton Univ. Press: Princeton, 1980. p. 48). Because of such conceptions, according to Rorty, "immediacy as the mark of the mental . . . became an unquestioned presupposition in

philosophy."

[9] "Intentionality" is used in the philosophical sense: "There is no such object without an act by which we attain it, and, conversely, no such act without the compresence of some such object." Casey, Edward. *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study.* Indiana University Press. 1987. p. 64.

[10] Freud, S. *The Unconscious.* From Pelican Freud Library, Vol. 11, *On Metapsychology.* p. 168.

[11] Freud, *New Intro. Lectures to Psychoanalysis.* W. W. Norton & Co.: New York, 1965. p. 70.

[12] Jung, *Collected Works,* Vol. 8. para. 382.

[13] Jung, *Instinct and the Unc. Portable Jung,* Penguin Books, New York: 1976. p. 52.

[14] Freud, *The Unconscious.* in *On Metapsychology.* op. cit. p. 168.

[15] Freud, *A Note on the Unconscious.* ibid. p. 50.

[16] James, William. *Principles of Psychology.* Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1983. p. 170

[17] Freud, *A Note on the Unconscious.* op. cit. p. 53.

[18] *cakṣur-ādi-pravṛttivijñānaṃ vartamāna-pratyaya-hetukam . . . . indriyaviṣaya-manaskāravaśād vijñānānāṃ pravṛttir bhavati iti.* Tatia: p. 12. 2–3; T. 31. 701b12-13; p. 12a6-7; D. 10a3. Hakamaya, 1978. p. 8.

[19] *ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate.* Tatia: p. 12. 11; T. 31. 701b20. P. 12a6-7; D. 10a3. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 8.

[20] *prasuptas hi kleśo anuśaya ucayate . . . . ka ca tasya prasuptiḥ? asaṃmukhībhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhah.* AKBh. V. 1d-2a. Pradhan. p. 278.

[21] MSg. I. 30. Lamotte, p. 50. Nagao, p. 180. It is interesting that the word *vāsanā* itselfe derives from the metaphorical use of a word meaning "to perfume, scent, or infuse." Monier-Williams. Sanskrit-English Dict., p. 947, defines *vāsanā* as "the impression of anything remaining unconsciously in the mind, the present consciousness of past perceptions, knowledge derived from memory."

[22] "*Ālaya*" of *ālayavijñāna* is also a telling term. "*Ālaya*", from a compound verb meaning "to settle down" means "dwelling, abode, store, receptacle", as in "*Himālaya*", the "abode of snow". Monier-Williams, SED, op. cit., p. 154. In early Buddist texts, "*ālaya*" also has the meaning of "hanging on, attachment." *Pali-English Dictionary,* Pali Text Society. p. 109.

[23] T. 31. 580a9, a15-18; D. 4a2, a4-5. Hakamaya. 1979. p. 26.

[24] Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra.* Louvain, 1935. p. 86.

[25] *vijñānaṃ câsya kāyād anapakrānatam bhavati iti.* Tatia: p. 13. 14; T. 31. 701c24-5. D. 11a4. P. 13b5. Hakamaya, 1978. p. 14. MSg. I. 50. Lamotte, p. 71; Nagao, p. 231.

[26] AK II. 35–39. Jaini says that "the theory of *bīja* was employed primarily . . . to replace *prāpti* in explaining the phenomena of immediate succession between two *cittas* of heterogeneous nature, and secondarily to reconcile the abiding nature of *santati* with the momentary flashes of *dharma.*" Jaini, P. *The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja.* BSOAS, vol. 22, 1959. p. 244–5. See Anacker, Stefan. *Vasubandhu's Karma-*

siddhiprakaraṇa and problem of the highest meditations. Philosophy East-West. Vol. 22. No. 3. July 1972. pp. 247–258, for a succinct discussion of this problem.

[27] The Sautrāntikas argued that "the *anuśaya* is neither associated nor non-associated with the mind, because it is not an existent." (*na ca anuśayaḥ samprayukto na viprayuktaḥ, tasya adravyāntaratvāt.*) AKBh. V. 1.d-2.a. Pradhan, p. 278. We shall remember that they have already closely related *anuśaya* with *bīja.*

[28] Archard, D. *Consciousness and Unconsciousness.* Hutchinson & Co,: London, 1984. p. 22.

[29] Freud, *Gen. Intro. to Psychoanalysis.* p. 288. Lec. 18. Washington Square Press, New York: 1963.

[30] Freud, *A Note on the Unconscious.* p. 51.

[31] Freud, *A Gen. Intro.* p. 286, Lec. 18.

[32] S. E. 1893. 2: 6. Cited in Grunbaum, *Foundations of Psychoanalysis,* p. 178, cited below.

[33] Jung, *On the Nature of the Psyche.* para. 352. C. W. v. 8.

[34] Jung, *On the Psychology of Unconscious.* p. 69 C. W. 7.

[35] Jung, *The Concept of the Collective Unconscious.* para. 99.CW. 9.

[36] Jung, *The Structure of the Unconscious.* para. 445. CW. 7.

[37] Jnug, *Analytic Psychology and 'Weltanschauung'.* CW. 8. para. 702.

[38] AKBh. II 35–6. *kim punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāmeti? Yan nāmarūpam phalotpattau samartham sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā santatipariṇāma viśeṣāt.* Jaini, op. cit., p. 243. A similar definition is found in the Yogacara text *Karmasiddhiprakarṇa* of Vasubandhu. Lamotte, Mélanges Chinois et Boudhhiques. V. 4. 1935–6. Sections # 20, 32, pp. 232, 246. Also in Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu.,* op. cit., p. 105, 112.

[39] Lamotte, p. 38; Nagao, p. 155.

[40] Lamotte, p. 44. MSgU. T. 31. 390a14-b7. P. 253b5-254a6.

[41] MSgBh. T. 31. 328a19-b7. P. 153b4-154a4. Re: MSg I. 16. Lamotte, p. 34; Nagao, p. 138-140.

[42] Lamotte, p. 50. MSgU T. 31. 391b7-c5. P. 225a6-256a8.

[43] Lamotte. p. 40. Nagao, p. 56–60.

[44] MSgBh. T. 31. 329b19-c12. bh. 155a7-155b8. Lamotte. 40.

[45] Freud, *The Unconscious.* p. 194.

[46] Freud, ibid, p. 198.

[47] "Ucs.", "Cs.", and "Pcs.", refer to unconscious, conscious, and preconscious, respectively. Freud, *The Unconscious.* p. 209,

[48] Jung, *The Psychology of the Transference.* CW 16. para. 366

[49] Jung, *The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious.* CW. 7 para. 274.

[50] T. 31. 580b10–11; D. 4b7. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 30.

[51] "*Pravṛtti*", from the root verb "*pravṛ*", means to come forth, proceed, arise, etc.; as a term for the active, functioning sense-cognitions it contrasts with the placid "*ālaya*", which "dwells" or "settles down", emphasizing the differences between them. Monier-Williams, SED, p. 693.

[52] T. 31. 580b11-12; D. 4b7-5a1. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 31.

[53] This has been demonstrated through experimentation with optical illusions wherein expectations based on past experience take precedence over direct visual evidence of unfamiliar objects. See Gregory, ed., *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1987. p. 608–610.

[54] T. 31. 580b18-19; D. 5a3. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 32.

[55] T. 31. 580b20-22; D. 5a4-5. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 32.

[56] T. 31. 580c8-9; D. 5b4. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 33.

[57] **aparicchinnâkāra-bhājana-vijñapti*. T. 31. 580a4; D. 3b7. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 26.

[58] Gregory, ed., *Oxford Companion to the Mind*, op. cit.: p. 608–10.

[59] ibid.

[60] Whether or not this is the most felicitous theory of perception is not the point here so much as its heuristic use in understanding the often obtuse techical vocabulary of the Yogācārin Buddhists.

[61] T. 31. 580c26-581a2; D. 6a4-6. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 35.

[62] *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. # 38. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 253; Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, op. cit., p. 115.

[63] Lamotte. p. 35; Nagao, p. 141–44.

[64] T. 31. 330b11–14; P. 157a3-6. Lamotte, p. 46; Nagao, p. 172–4.

[65] Lamotte p. 13. Nagao p. 81 f. Sanskrit reconstruction by Prof. Aramaki in Nagao p. 10;

[66] MSg. l. 3. Lamotte, p. 13; Nagao, p. 81–3.

[67] Freud, *The Unconscious*. p. 191.

[68] MSg. l. 46. Lamotte, p. 67; Nagao p. 222–24.

[69] MSg. l. 1. MSgU. T. 31. 383a4–15. u 238b8–239a6. Lamotte, p. 12.

[70] Freud, *The Unconscious*. p. 169–70.

[71] Jung, *On the Nature of the Psyche*. CW 8. para. 383.

[72] Jung, *The Structure of the Psyche*. par. 299.

[73] T. 31. 580a29-b1; D.4b2-3. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 29.

[74] T. 31. 580b2-3; D. 4b3-4. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 29. *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, # 36. Lamotte, op. cit,., p. 250; Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*. p. 114.

[75] **aparicchinnâkāra-bhājana-vijñapti*. T. 31. 580a4; D. 3b7. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 26.

[76] *Oxford Companion to the Mind*. op. cit., p. 754. One neurophysiological discovery made through open-brain research is that while sensory information is processed by the cortex, *awareness* of such information is dependent on the reticular activating system. If the latter is prevented from communicating with the former "the arrival of sensory information at the cortex still occurs but the owner of the cortex remains oblivious of the fact." p. 753.

[77] Freud, *A Note on the Unconscious*. p. 55.

[78] Jung, *Analytic Psychology and 'Weltanshauung'*. CW 8, par. 702.

[79] ibid.

[80] Jung, *The Relations Between the Ego and Unconscious*. CW 7. para. 291–2.

[81] Jung, *The Psychology of the Transference*. AW 16. par. 366.

[82] MSg. I. 8. Lamotte, p. 23; Nagao, p. 106–110. See also Hakamaya, "*Mahāyāna-*

saṃgraha ni okeru shinishiki-setsu." *Tōyōbunka Kenkyū-kiyō,* vol. 76. 1973. pp. 197–309.

[83] MSg. I. 21, Lamotte. p. 38; Nagao, p. 155–56. The *ālayavijñāna* is equated with the rebirth *vijñana* of the *pratītya-samutpāda* series, which is conditioned by *saṃskāras,* karmic formations, and in turn conditions the arising of a sentient body furnished with sense organs, the bases for experiencing the inner and outer worlds.

[84] MSgU T. 31. 397c12-398a18; P. 267a8-268a8. MSg. I. 60. Lamotte, p. 82. Also see Viniścaya, T. 31. 581a26-29; D. 7a2-3. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 38.

[85] MSg I. 1. Lamotte, 12; Nagao, p. 75–79.

[86] MSgU. T. 31. 383a4-15; p. 238b8-239a6. Lamotte, p. 12.

[87] Jung, *On the Nature of the Psyche.* CW 8. par. 385

[88] T. 31. 582a8-12; D. 9a1-2. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 44. See also MSg. I. 61, Lamotte, p. 86, Nagao, p. 261–69.

[89] We might also note that modern Western neurophysiology and neuropsychology still has no clear-cut answer to this question, epecially as pertaining to memory. See *The Oxford Companion to the Mind.* op. cit., pp. 455–58.

[90] AKBh V 1b-2a. Pradhan p. 278; *kleśotpadānnaśaktiḥ . . . . smṛtyutpādanna-śaktiḥ.*

[91] Luria. A. R., *The Man with the Shattered World.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1972, relates a tragic story of one man's near complete inability to function in life due to a brain injury which destroyed his long-term memory and the higher cortex functions that automatically synthesize and analyze discrete perceptual information into meaningful, coherent contexts. While this man's visual field and sensory functions were barely impaired, the complex, creative processes in normal perception were completly destroyed. This demonstrates clearly how even simple perception is an on-going constructive process.

[92] See Derrida, Jacques, *Speech and Phenomena,* Northwestern University Press: 1973, esp. pp. 70–104, for a discussion of the problem of "pure perception" in modern philosophy.

[93] *The Social Construction of Reality* (Anchor Books, Garden City, N. Y.: 1967) is a theoretical treatment of just this topic.

[94] See Frey-Rohn, *From Freud to Jung.* New Books. New York: 1974. pp. 48–66 for a Jungian perspective on the differences between their respective theories of repression.

[95] Freud, *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.* S. E. 1914. 14. 16. Cited in Grunbaum, Adolf. *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophic Critique.* University of California Press, Berkeley: 1984. For a trenchant critique of the hypothesis of repression in regard to the etiology of nervous disorders see especially pp. 177–266.

[96] Freud, *Repression,* in *On Psychology,* op. cit. p. 147. Italics in original. It is worth noting that this is the basic meaning of repression. The German, "verdrangung", means 'to displace', or 'push aside'; Bruno Bettleheim in *Freud and Man's Soul* , Viking Books: NewYork, 1982. p. 93., offers 'repulse' or 'repulsion' as a more appropriate translation.

[97] Freud, *Repression.* p. 150–51.

[98] Freud, *The Unconscious.* p. 176.

[99] Ricouer, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation.* p. 21.

[100] An interesting point in this regard is that now the Ego, no longer defined in the systematic sense of being conscious, can equally be unconscious, as large parts of it are according to Freud. To the extent that Freud's conception of Ego has anything in common with the Yogācāra concept of the "afflicted ego" (*kliṣṭa-manas*) we expect that the *kliṣṭa-manas* also continues during states free from waking consciousness, which we find to be the case. T. 31. 580c3-4; D. 5b1-2. Hakamaya, 1979, p. 32–3. "The *ālayavijñāna* arises simultaneously . . . . with the *manas* . . . . even in mindless states (*acittaka*)." See also Hakamaya, *Nirodhasamāpatti.* Indogaku-bukkyōgaku-kenkyū, 23, # 2, (1975). pp. 33–43.

[101] T. 31. 580c4-5; D. 5 b2. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 33. The "afflicted ego" (*kliṣṭa - manas*) always "apprehends the *ālayavijñāna*, thinking 'I am' and 'I', and is prideful."

[102] On "invest" as a more appropriate translation than the Latin neologism of "cathetic" for Freud's German term "besetzen", see Bruno Bettleheim's *Freud and Man's Soul,* op. cit., p. 89–90.

[103] See Frey-Rohn, op. cit., pp. 158–183, for a Jungian perspective.

[104] Guenther, H., *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma.* Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, pp. 19–20, discusses "energy" as the maturation process of *karma*: "in its potential state energy is 'heaped up' (*upacita*), while in its kinetic state it develops (*vipacyate*) toward a certain effect." p. 20. He refers to "*vipāka*" (which we have translated "maturation") as "an energetic process."

[105] Jung, *On the Nature of the Psyche.* CW 8, par. 441.

[106] Jung, *On Psychic Energy.* CW 8, para. 26.

[107] Jung, ibid., para. 72.

[108] Freud, *A General Intro. to Psychoanalysis.* p. 286. Lec. 18.

[109] ibid.

[110] Jung, *Symbols of Transformation.* CW 5, para. 226.

[111] Freud, *Repression.* p. 154–55.

[112] Jung, *On Psychic Energy.* op. cit., para. 3, 51.

[113] ibid. para. 3.

[114] *santati pariṇāma viśeṣāt.* AKBh II. 35–6. Jaini, p. 243.

[115] *Śaktir bījam vāsanety eko 'yam arthaḥ.* Sakva. p. 147–8. Jaini, p. 244.

[116] AKBh. II. 35–6. Jaini, p. 243.

[117] MSg. I. 22. MSgBh. T. 31. 329b19-c12. bh 155a7-155b8. Lamotte, p. 40.

[118] Jaini, p. *The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja.* BSOAS, vol. 22, 2., 1959, pp. 236–249. (kāraṇa-viśeṣa).

[119] *yasya pudgalasya ya anuśaya yasmin ālambane anuśete, sa tena tasmin samprayuktaḥ.* AKBh, V. 22. Pradhan. p. 295.

[120] MSg. I. 22. MSgBh. T. 31. 329b19-c12. Lamotte, p. 40.

[121] See Grunbaum, *Foundations,* op. cit., pp. 1–94, for a critique of the hermeneutic reading of psychoanalysis.

[122] Freud, *A General Intro. to Psychoanalysis.* p. 290. Lec. 18.

[123] These relations also rest upon equally debatable theories of semantic, linguistic and symbolic reference and meaning which, though fascinating, are well beyond the scope of this paper.

[124] MSgBh. T. 31. 329b19-c12. P. 155a7-155b8. Lamotte, p. 40–1.

[125] Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India.* Ann Arbor Paperbacks, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p. 190–91

[126] ibid., p. 143. Padmasiri de Silva in *An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology,* Macmillan Press, London: p. 76, says that the *saṃskāra* comprise the "dynamic unconscious" in early Buddhist pyschology, as does Bruce Mattews in *Craving and Salvation.* Wilfred Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario: 1983. p. 65.

[127] AKBh, V. 22. Pradhan. p. 295.

[128] AKBh, V. 1d-2a. See below.

[129] MSg. I. 6–7. Lamotte. pp. 15–22.

[130] For example see Gazzaniga, M. S., *The Social Brain,* Basic Books, New York: 1985. pp. 177–135. Gazzaniga translates into modern mechanistic terms the phenomena of unconscious perception, whereby he recognizes the existence of "an unconscious process [which] . . . normally occurs during the awake conscious state." (p. 118.) His single reservation is with the term "unconscious." Such a level of mentality, he stresses, is "very conscious, very capable of effecting action." It simply "cannot internally communicate with the dominant hemisphere's language and cognitive system."(p. 117.)

[131] For example, Ninian Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy.*, p. 58; Padmasiri de Silva, *Buddhist and Freudian Psychology.* p. 65.; David Kaluphana, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology.* p. 137–143. The first two acknowledge a resemblance between the *ālayavijñāna* and the collective unconscious; de Silva, p. 61, says that the term "unconscious" best descrides the *anusaya.* Kaluphana strongly rejects any notion of the unconscious as "mysterious" and "metaphysical", preferring to identify the *ālayavijñāna* instead with William James' "stream of consciousness", similar perhaps to the *viññāṇsota* and the *bhavānga* concepts of Theravāda Abhidharma.

[132] Jung, *Instinct and the Unconscious.* pp. 52, *The Portable Jung.*

[133] ibid.

[134] Jung, *The Structure of the Psyche.* p. 44. In *The Portable Jung.* p. 44.

[135] Jung, ibid. p. 45.

[136] Jung, *The Structure of the Unconscious.* CW 7. par. 756.

[137] See *Oxford Companion to the Mind,* op. cit., "Brain Science: Sperry's Contribution", pp. 114–116. Genetically determined brain structures "give the organism categories of experience as well as intricately coordinated forms of action."

[138] Bettelheim, op. cit., p. 103–108, discusses at length the "particularly regrettable" translation of Freud's German term "Trieb" as "instinct". Frey-Rohn, op. cit., uses 'drive' seemingly interchangably with 'instinct'. As I do not have access to the German originals, I have refrained from altering the standard English translations.

Though the concept of "instinct" is itself controversial in modern Western psychology (cf. *Oxford Companion to the Mind*, op. cit., p. 374) I have throughout this paper attempted to follow Freud and Jung's usage.

[139] Jung, *The Structure of the Psyche*. p. 44. in *The Portable Jung*.

[140] Jung, *Instincts and the Unconscious*. p. 52. *The Portable Jung*.

[141] ibid.

[142] For an analysis of the similarities and differences from a Jungian perspective, see Frey-Rohn, op. cit., pp. 126–132.

[143] Freud, *The Unconscious*. p. 200.

[144] Freud, *The Unconscious*. p. 179.

[145] MSg. I. 60. MSgU T. 31. 397c12-398a18; P. 267a8-268a8. Lamotte, p. 82. Also Viniścaya, T. 31. 581a26-29; D. 7a2-3. Hakamaya, 1979. p. 38.

[146] MSgU T. 31. 397c12-398a18. P. 267a8-268a8. Hakamaya,1979. p. 38.

[147] S V 60 mentions seven types of *anusaya*: the latent tendency to sensual pleasure, to anger, to speculation, to doubt, to pride, to crave existence, and to ignorance *(kāmarāgānusaya, paṭighānusaya, diṭṭhānusaya, vicikicchānusaya, mānānusaya, bhavarāgānusaya, avijjānusaya.)*.

[148] AKBh. V. 1d-2a. This chapter of the AKBh, devoted to the *anuśaya*, repeats the same seven kinds of *anuśaya* as the Pali text just quoted: *kāmarāga-, pratigha-, bhavarāga-, māna-, avidyā-, dṛṣṭi-, vicikitsānuśaya.*

[149] M I 433–4. *sakkāya-diṭṭhānusaya, vicikicchānusaya, sīlabbataparāmāsānusaya, kāmarāgānusaya, byāpādānusaya.*

[150] Jung, *Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious*. CW 9. p. 589.

[151] See Padmasiri de Silva, *Buddhism and Freudian Psychology*. op. cit. Silva also cites a Pali text which mentions craving for sensual pleasure, for existence and for annihilation *(kāma-taṇhā, bhava-taṇhā, vibhava-taṇhā)*, suggestively similar to the Freudian concepts.

[152] MSg. I. 60. Lamotte, p. 82.

[153] ASBh: *indriyaviṣayamanaskāravaśād vijñānānāṃ pravṛttir bhavati iti*. Tatia: p. 12. 2–3; T. 31. 701b12-13;P. 12a6-7; D. 10a3. Hakamaya, 1978. p. 8.

[154] *cakṣurvijñāne nīlam vijānāti, na tu nīlam; manovijñāne nīlam vijānāti, nīlam iti ca vijānāti*. AKBh. III, 30cd. LVP. III, p. 99. In contrast, the object of cognition of the *ālayavijñāna* is called "undiscerned" or "unperceived" because "it is not known by a specific perception that "that is this here". (*so 'sminn idam tad iti pratisaṃvedanākāreṇa asaṃvidita*). *Trimśikābhāṣyam*, ed. by Levi. p. 19.

[155] Russell,*The Problems of Philosophy*. p. 65, as quoted in Gudmunsen, *Wittgenstein and Buddhism*., p. 89. Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, op. cit., is devoted to detailing the history of this "new" paradigm of knowledge within the Western philosophic tradition and its many implications.

[156] Freud, *The Unconscious*. p. 196.

[157] Jung, *The Structure of the Psyche*. p. 27. *The Portable Jung*.. Remember that Freud too considered that an "abuse" of the word 'conscious'. Freud, *A Note on the Unconscious*. p. 53.

[158] Jung, *On the Nature of Psychic Energy.*. para. 367, 363.

[159] Gudmunsen, op. cit., p. 25.

[160] Whyte, *The Unconscious Before Freud.* Julian Friedmann Publishers, London: 1978. p. 26.

[161] ibid. p. 27–8.

[162] See Wijesekera, O. H., *The Concept of Viññāṇa in Theravāda Buddhism.* Journal of American Oriental Society. July-Sept. 1964. pp. 254–59. Johansson, Rune. *Citta, Mano, Vinnana.* University of Ceylon Review. V. 23, # 1–2. Ap., Oct., 1965. pp. 165–215; and *The Psychology of Nirvana.* Anchor Books, Garden City, N. Y.: 1970. Johansson cites D III 105 which says that the stream of *vijñāna* is uniterrupted (*viññāṇasotam . . . abbocchinnam*); in S III 52 *vijñāna* attains "growth, increase, abundance" (*vuḍḍhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullam*). But one is freed when *vijñāna* comes to cessation (S III 61; *viññāṇassa nibbidā . . . vimuttā.*). pp. 192, 200. From his study of the early Pali texts Johansson concludes that "it is taken for granted that our existence is accumulative . . . and our present state is continually changed through the effects of the past. *Viññāṇa* is the carrier of these accumulations, and is conceived as a stream flowing ceaselessly in time if not made to stop." *Psychology of Nirvana,* p. 66.

[163] In his *Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism,* Curzon Press, London: 1979, Johanson emphasized this older use of *vijñāna* in the Pali texts: "the information supplied through the senses can be interpreted only by being compared with this stored information; this information can from a Buddhist point of view be envisaged as provided by *viññāṇa . . . . Viññāṇa* is, for this and other reasons, a precondition of perception." p. 92–93.

[164] This is close to what William James called the "psychologist's fallacy" that all mental states are aware of themselves. *The Principles of Psychology.* op. cit., p. 196.

[165] Alasdair MacIntyre, in his *The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis* (Roultledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1958), suggests that since "Freud retains from the Cartesian picture the idea of the mind as something distinct and apart, a place or a realm which can be inhabited by such entities as ideas" (p. 44), to speak of mental events as substances or things that happen *in* the unconscious is already "half-way to reduplicating the Cartesian substantial conscious mind by a substantial unconscious mind. The unconscious is the ghost of the Cartesian consciousness." (p. 73).

[166] Ricouer, op. cit., p.21.

[167] Freud, *A General Intro. to Psychoanalysis.* p. 291. Lec.18.

[168] Hakamaya, 1979, p. 40–43. T. 31. 581c3-581c24. D. 8a2-8b3.