

Chih-I's Interpretation of *jñeyāvaraṇa* An Application of the Three-Fold Truth Concept

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I. The Meaning of *jñeyāvaraṇa*

a) Introduction

The technical term *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa* refers to an important distinction made by Mahāyāna Buddhists, for it is one way in which the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva or Buddha is claimed to be superior to the Hīnayāna Arhat. The Arhat, it is said, severs the passions [*kleśas*] which are an obstacle [*āvaraṇa*] to enlightenment, but it is only the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva or Buddha which severs or overcomes the more basic obstacle called *jñeyāvaraṇa*. The content of *kleśāvaraṇa* is clear; they are the various and sundry passions, delusions, and attachments to which the average man is subject. The content of *jñeyāvaraṇa* is not at all clear. Is *jñeyāvaraṇa* like *kleśāvaraṇa*, a *karmadhāraya* compound, in which case the *jñeya* itself is the obstacle, consisting of mistaken, imperfect knowledge? If so, then *jñeyāvaraṇa* should be understood as "the obstacle of knowledge." Or, is *jñeyāvaraṇa* a *tatpuruṣa* compound, in which case the *jñeya* itself is the goal of correct knowledge? If so, then *jñeyāvaraṇa* should be understood as "the obstacle to knowledge," and the content of this obstacle would need further investigation. This is a complicated issue which cannot be fully covered here, but the purpose of this paper is to argue that *jñeyāvaraṇa* was interpreted as the "obstacle to knowledge" in the Yogācāra tradition, interpreted as the "obstacle of knowledge" in other

traditions, including perhaps the later Mādhyamikan tradition, and that both of these interpretations were incorporated and integrated into Chih-I's T'ien-t'ai philosophy by means of the concept of the three-fold truth.

b) *jñeyāvaraṇa* in the Yogācāra Tradition

Since the interpretation of *jñeyāvaraṇa* as "the obstacle to knowledge," or more literally "the obstacle to knowables," is common knowledge, especially among Japanese scholars,¹ I will refer only to a couple of sources from among the many Yogācāran references to this term.

1) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* discusses four aspects of the nature of reality in its fourth chapter [*tattvārthapaṭaḥ*]. The fourth aspect is explained with reference to *jñeyāvaraṇa*.

jñeyāvaraṇaviśuddhijñānagocaras tattvaṃ katamat /

jñeye jñānasya pratighāta āvaraṇamityucyate /

'What is the reality [which occurs within] the range of knowledge which is completely purified of obstacles to what is knowable? When there is obstruction to the knowledge of a knowable, one speaks of an obstacle.'² In this case *jñeyāvaraṇa* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound with a locative case relationship between the members and should be understood as "the obstacle to knowledge," or "the obstacle to what is knowable." *Jñeya* is the goal of the Buddha's perfect knowledge or omniscience, and *jñeyāvaraṇa* is something, as yet undefined, which remains after *kleśas* are destroyed and which hinders the attainment of the omniscience of the Buddha.

2) Sthiramati (510 to 570?), in his commentary on the *Trimśikāviññapti-kārikā* defines *jñeyāvaraṇa* as follows:

jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmin jñeye jñānapravṛttipratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam

ajñānam.

jñeyāvaraṇa is the undefiled lack of knowledge which hinders the activity of knowledge concerning all knowables.³

In this case also *jñeyāvaraṇa* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound and “knowledge” is the desired goal which is being obstructed. The obstruction is caused by a lack of knowledge [*ajñānam*] which is nevertheless undefiled [*akliṣṭa*] due to the previous severance of the *kleśāvaraṇa*. Whatever the content of the obstruction may be, *jñeya* is good, positive, and desirable.⁴

c) Other Interpretations of *jñeyāvaraṇa*

The understanding of *jñeyāvaraṇa* in Western languages, in contrast to Japan, has tended towards the interpretation of *jñeya* itself as the obstacle, i.e. *jñeyāvaraṇa* as “the obstacle of [discriminative, cognitive, mistaken] knowledge.” Conze, in his dictionary of *Prajñāpāramitā* terms, defined *jñeyāvaraṇa* as “the covering produced by the cognizable.”⁵ Takasaki Jikido, in his English translation of the *Ratnagotra*, has an “obstruction on account of knowable things.”⁶ D.T. Suzuki translates *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa* in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* as “the two-fold hindrance of passion and knowledge,” which is explained later as “...knowledge-hindrance, Mahamati, is purified when the egolessness of things is distinctly perceived.”⁷ Edgerton, in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, refers to the work of Suzuki and defines *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa* as “(hindrances constituted by) depravities and objects of (false, finite) knowledge.”⁸ Lamotte, on the other hand, probably because he was working on a Yogācāra text, translates *jñeyāvaraṇa* in the *Mahāyāna Saṃgrāha* as “l’obstacle au savoir.”⁹

These definitions [with the exception of Lamotte] come close to what

may have been the interpretation of *jñeyāvaraṇa* in the later Mādhyamikan tradition. Recently Ogawa Ichijō of Otani University published an article entitled "Notes on *jñeyāvaraṇa*"¹⁰ in which he argues that the later Mādhyamikan tradition of Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ-kha-pa¹¹ as preserved in Tibetan clearly defines *jñeyāvaraṇa* as the "obstacle of knowledge."

In Candrakīrti's *Mādyamaka-avatāra-bhāṣya*, with commentary attributed to Jayānanda,¹² the concept of *jñeyāvaraṇa* is utilized to explain how a Bodhisattva who has extinguished all "defiled ignorance" [*kleśa*] can continue to perceive this illusionary world which arises through dependent co-arising. The answer is that the Bodhisattva still has the "undefiled ignorance" of *jñeyāvaraṇa*, i.e. the obstacle of [discriminative conceptual] knowledge. The Bodhisattva still experiences and has knowledge of this illusory world through conceptual thoughts. Objects which are "blue" are still perceived by the Bodhisattvas as "blue." The Buddhas, on the other hand, are perfectly awakened and have put an end to all thoughts and conceptual knowledge. The Buddha never perceives "this world only" [*samvṛti mātra*]. The "experience" of the Buddha is beyond words and his "knowledge" can be expressed only by negative means.

Tsoṅ-kha-pa's commentary on this section clarifies further the meaning of *jñeyāvaraṇa* as "the obstacle of knowledge." He writes:

'The habitual propensities of ignorance [*avidyavāsanā*] obstruct the severence of *jñeya*.....It is explained that the habitual propensities of covetousness and so forth obstruct the severence of *jñeya*, therefore the habitual propensities of *kleśa* are [the content of] *jñeyāvaraṇa*.'¹³

In this case *jñeya* is not the goal which is being obstructed, but something

which is acting as the obstruction and which needs to be removed. Tsoṅ-kha-pa further explains that the Buddhas have completely severed *jñeyāvaraṇa* because they are forever in *samādhi* where “all mental activity is forever stilled.”¹¹ Bodhisattvas can sever *jñeyāvaraṇa* temporarily by entering *samādhi*, but when they come out of *samādhi* back into this world of conceptual thoughts and understanding, *jñeyāvaraṇa* is once again present. Thus it is in *samādhi* where all mental activity is suppressed that *jñeyāvaraṇa* is absent; when one comes out of *samādhi*, there is *jñeyāvaraṇa*. Therefore it is mental activity itself, conceptual thoughts and their “knowables” [*jñeya*], which is the obstacle to Buddhahood.

II. Chih-I's Application of the Three-Fold Truth Concept in Interpreting *jñeyāvaraṇa*.

a) Chih-I's concept of the three-fold truth is an extension of the traditional Mādhyamikan doctrine of the two truths, i.e. worldly truth [*samvṛti-satya*] and ultimate truth [*paramārtha-satya*].¹⁵ The classical formulation of this teaching is found in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, particularly in chapter twenty-four, verses eight and nine:

The teaching of the Buddhas is wholly based on there being two truths: that of a personal everyday world and a higher truth which surpasses it. Those who do not clearly know the due distinction between the two truths cannot clearly know the hidden depths of the Buddha's teaching.¹⁶

The direct literary inspiration for Chih-I's formulation of the three-fold truth concept, however, is found in verse eighteen of the same chapter.

yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe

sā prajñaptirupādāya pratīpat saiva madhyamā.

This verse speaks of the identity of the two truths, i.e. emptiness [*śūnyatā* = *paramārthasatya*] and co-arising [*pratītyasamutpāda* = *saṃvṛtisatya*], as the Middle Way [*madhyamā*]. Kumārajīva's Chinese translation, on which Chih-I relied completely, more clearly implies the understanding of the Middle Way as a third component in a single unity.

衆因緣生法 我說卽是無 (空)

亦爲是假名 亦是中道義 [T. 30, 33 b 11]

The co-arising of all things



I explain as emptiness [空].

Again, it is a conventional designation [假名].

Again, it is the meaning of the Middle Way [中道].

Thus reality is a single unity with three aspects. First, emptiness [*śūnyatā* 空], or absence of substantial Being, which is often identified with the ultimate truth [*paramārthasatya*]; second, conventional existence [假], the temporary existence of the phenomenal world which is co-arising, which is often identified with the worldly truth [*saṃvṛtisatya*]; and third, the Middle [中] Way, which is a simultaneous affirmation of both emptiness and conventional existence as aspects of a single integrated reality.

For Chih-I these three components are not separate from each other but integral parts of a unified reality. They do not form a pyramid of contrasting realities [diagram A] but are simultaneous aspects of all of One Reality [diagram B]:



The objects of our experience have a temporary reality. We do experience something. Nevertheless, the world which we experience is empty of an eternal, unchanging substance. Lest one lapse into a mistaken nihilism, one must realize the Middle Way. One must realize the emptiness of phenomenal reality simultaneously with the temporal reality of these empty objects. This Middle Way, however, must not be grasped as an eternal, transcendental Reality; it is, rather, manifested in and through temporal, phenomenal reality, which is again in turn empty of an unchanging substance. The circle is complete in itself, a perfectly integrated three-fold truth.

This concept is summarized by Chih-I in his *Fa-hua-hsüan-i* as follows:

The 'perfect three-fold truth' means that the Buddha-Dharma contains not only the Middle Way but also the 'real' and the 'conventional.' This three fold truth is perfectly integrated; one-in-three and three-in-one.

圓三諦者。非但中道具足佛法。真俗亦然。三諦圓融一三三一。¹⁷

This concept of the three-fold truth is a major part of Chih-I's T'ien-t'ai philosophy and provides the structure for interpreting the Buddha-Dharma. Let us now see how this three-fold truth concept was utilized for interpreting *jñeyāvaraṇa*.

b) The term *jñeyāvaraṇa* was understood by Chih-I only through the Chinese translation 智障, the pre-Hsüan-tsang translation of this term. I have rendered this as "wisdom-obstacle," for reasons which will be clear in the course of this paper. This term is not common in Chih-I's writings. In fact, it is not found at all in two of his three major works, the *Fa-hua-hsüan-i* [法華玄義, T. 33, No. 1716] or the *Fa-hua-wen-chu* [法華文句, T. 34, No. 1718]. It is discussed at length in only two sections of the *Mo-ho-chih-kuan* [摩訶止觀, T.

46, No. 1911], Chih-I's *magnum opus* on the theory and practice of contemplation. In the following pages I have translated these two sections from the *Mo-ho-chih-kuan*. It will soon be clear that Chih-I interpreted *jñeyāvaraṇa* to be both the obstacle to wisdom and the obstacle of wisdom. Both excerpts are from the section in which Chih-I discusses the fourth of the ten kinds of contemplation, that of 'destroying undesirable dharmas [破法徧],' which is one of the longest and most detailed sections of this work. Chih-I has just discussed the contemplation of emptiness [空] and the contemplation of conventional existence [假] and is about to discuss the contemplation of the Middle [中]:

Section on Contemplating the Middle Way [T. 46, pg. 80b ff.] [81c12].....Third, the correct cultivation of contemplating the Middle. This contemplation correctly destroys ignorance [無明, *avidyā*]. Ignorance is hidden and cannot be seen with the eyes nor known through intellectual speculation [眼慮見知]. Then, how can one contemplate (this ignorance)?

For example, it is like the earlier contemplations of the true [眞, i.e. contemplating the truth of emptiness]. The true has no color nor form nor any extension. One merely contemplates the mind from among the aggregates [five *skandhas*] and the sense objects and sense organs and their consciousnesses (twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*) and analyzes the three delusions of conventional existence¹⁸ with the tetralemma; skillfully cultivates meditation; and attains a state of no-outflow (of passions). This is called the "true." Next, one contemplates conventional existence. How is conventional existence contemplated? Merely by con-

templating the wisdom of emptiness and realizing that it is not empty, and (contemplate) all activity in the mind one by one. This means arousing the Dharma-eye [法眼, *dharmacakṣus*] and knowing the antidote for all dis-eases. Therefore it is called contemplating conventional existence.

Now, contemplating ignorance is like this. In contemplating the wisdoms (of emptiness and conventional existence) gained from the (above) two contemplations, that which was called 'wisdom' is now the delusion which must be destroyed. Now one is aspiring for the Middle Way, so the wisdom (of emptiness and conventional existence) become delusions. These delusions are the obstacle to the wisdom of the Middle [中智], therefore they are called 'the obstacle of wisdom [智障].'¹⁹ Also, this wisdom (of emptiness and conventional existence) is an obstacle to the wisdom of the Middle, so the wisdom of the Middle cannot arise; therefore it is called 'the obstacle to wisdom.' *The first is called wisdom as an active obstacle [智能障], the second is wisdom which is passively obstructed [智被障].* (emphasis mine)

Here Chih-I is able to have it both ways: *jñeyāvaraṇa* as both the wisdom which is obstructed and the inferior wisdom which is the obstruction.

For example, it is like the sixty-two heterodox views.²⁰ These views have a certain sapience [慧性]. This sapience is a worldly wisdom. If one aspires for the state of no outflow (of passions), then this sapience, along with mistaken views and thoughts, is an obstacle to the true (realization of emptiness). In the same way, the wisdom of the two truths (of emptiness and conventional existence/co-arising, or the true and the

worldly: *paramārthasatya* and *samvṛtisatya*), along with ignorance, are obstacles to the Middle Way. That which obstructs is called a delusion; that which is obstructed is the wisdom of the Middle. *It is called 'wisdom-obstacle' because it refers both to that which obstructs and that which is obstructed* (emphasis mine).

Chih-I then continues with an analysis of the contemplation of ignorance, for the purpose of its destruction [T. 46, 81c26–85b22]. He then picks up the subject once more to discuss the meaning of *jñeyāvaraṇa* in various authoritative texts and its content. The significance of Chih-I's philosophy lies partially in the fact that he brought together all of the teaching of Buddhism available in the China of his day into an all-inclusive syncretistic philosophy. This is clear in his analysis of *jñeyāvaraṇa*: he attempts to come to terms with all the interpretations and all of the texts dealing with this idea which were known in his day.²¹

[85b22]...There are different understandings and disagreements concerning the wisdom-obstacle. Now I will discuss the interpretation of Dharmauttara.²²

Kleśas are deluded thoughts, therefore *kleśas* are an obstacle (to enlightenment). Wisdom is clear understanding [明解], so how can one explain wisdom as an obstacle? [Answer] There are two kinds of wisdom: the wisdom of awakening [證智] and the wisdom of [human] consciousness [識智]. The wisdom of consciousness discriminates. It differs from the essence (of true understanding) and corresponds to conceptual understanding. Because it corresponds to conceptual understanding, it is called 'wisdom' (in a worldly sense). Since it differs from the essence (of

true understanding) and discriminates, it hinders the wisdom of awakening. Therefore wisdom is called an obstacle.

Also, (the sutras say that) the Buddha attains liberation from the obstacles. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* says, "By severing passion one attains the mind of liberation. By severing ignorance one attains the wisdom of liberation."²³ The *Bodhisattva bhūmi* says that "passion is the essence of *kleśa*, therefore the mind of liberation is the antidote for the obstacle of *kleśas*. To part from all ignorance and defilement and to know all there is to know [所知—*jñeya*] without obstruction is called pure wisdom. Pure wisdom is the wisdom of liberation."²⁴ If we say that the hinderance to the knowables [所知—*jñeya*] of wisdom [智] is the wisdom obstacle, then ignorance is the obstacle to wisdom. Thus, truly, ignorance is the essence of the wisdom-obstacle.²⁵

The *Ju-ta-ch'eng-lun* says that transworldly ignorance is the wisdom-obstacle.²⁶ The wise are already far removed from worldly ignorance; that is, they first sever the obstacle of *kleśas*. The two obstacles (of passions and ignorance) are both *kleśas*. How can one say that ignorance is the wisdom obstacle? Ignorance is the delusion that corresponds to wisdom. Wisdom is the essence and it is in reference to this wisdom that one speaks of an obstacle. For example, it is as when one speaks of 'unconditioned transmigration' [*asaṃskṛtaḥsaṃsāraḥ*? 無爲生死], it is in reference to transmigration that one uses the (conventional) name 'unconditioned.'²⁷ There are four categories of passions which are able to obstruct wisdom. However, these are delusions which are different from the mind, in which understanding and delusion are not together

and *kleśas* are its essence. Therefore, due to its essence, it is called the obstacle of *kleśa*.

Also, passions [愛, which are identified by the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* and *Bodhisattva bhūmi* as an obstacle to enlightenment] lead all phenomena to continue, enflames the mind and makes the mind troubled. Though (sentient beings) are covered with ignorance, nevertheless the impetus for birth is watered and strengthened by passion. Therefore passion is the (content of) the *kleśa*-obstacle. Ignorance is something incomplete; it is truly the opposite of liberation. The nature of passion, though it is different (from ignorance), has ignorance as its basis. The nature of ignorance is delusion; it is clear how this is an obstacle to wisdom [障智]. Therefore, because it is an obstacle, it is called the wisdom-obstacle.

Ignorance [which is identified by the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* and *Ju-ta-ch'eng-lun* as an obstacle to enlightenment] is of two types. First, delusion concerning reality [迷理], and second, delusion concerning phenomena [迷事]. Which of these is called the wisdom-obstacle? The *Bodhisattva bhūmi* says that for those of the two vehicles who have attained the state of no-outflow (of passions), the knowledge of the non-substantiality of the self is the knowledge purified of the obstacles of *kleśas*; and for Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, the knowledge of the non-substantiality of phenomena is the knowledge purified of the wisdom-obstacle.²⁸ If this is so, then for both (those of the two vehicles and Bodhisattvas and Buddhas), the delusion concerning reality is the wisdom-obstacle. However, if the hindrance of that known [所知—*jñeya*] by

wisdom is called the wisdom-obstacle, since the knowledge (of a Buddha) is unobstructed concerning all phenomena, then the wisdom-obstacle refers only to the delusion concerning phenomena.

If so, then what is our conclusion? Wisdom understands both reality and phenomena. Though (in this sense) there are two wisdoms, there is no (ultimate) distinction in the essence (of reality; i.e. reality is not a transcendent existence apart from this phenomenal world.) The wisdom-obstacle and ignorance thus do not have two (different) natures; though it is said to be two, they are not two.

Also, if we say that the mind of wisdom [心智] is the obstacle, then (this refers to) discriminatory wisdom [*vikalpa*jñāna?] which in the final analysis (conceptualizes the objects of experience).²⁹ This hinders (insight into) Suchness so that one does not attain the wisdom of awakening [證智]. This also is a wisdom which is nevertheless an obstacle. To extinguish conceptual thoughts and thus extinguish thought [心]; this is the meaning of “severing (discriminative) wisdom [斷智].” If one abandons discrimination, then this wisdom-obstacle is purified.

Chih-I’s rationale is at times unclear, but he is trying to deal with the problem of having both ignorance and (imperfect) wisdom as that which obstructs the highest, perfect wisdom of the Buddha, and attempting to interpret the various interpretations of *jñeyāvaraṇa* as found in different available texts. His solution is that a certain level of wisdom is attained upon severing the passions [*kleśāvaraṇa*]. However, a more fundamental ignorance, or what is at times called the ‘habitual propensities of ignorance [*avidyavāsanā*] still re-

mains. This acts as an obstacle to the highest wisdom of the Buddha, which is the wisdom of the Middle Way. Also, if one clings to the imperfect wisdom already attained by severing the passions, this can be an obstacle to attaining the highest wisdom. Thus both ignorance and imperfect wisdom are obstacles to that highest wisdom which is being obstructed.

CONCLUSION

The problem of interpreting the meaning of *jñeyāvaraṇa* is a complicated one which raises many fundamental questions. Should *jñeya*, and 智, be understood as knowledge, wisdom, or the more literal 'knowables?' What is the difference between knowledge and wisdom? What is the content of *jñeya*? Is it the goal to be attained, or an obstacle to the goal of Buddhahood? What are the philosophical and practical implications and assumptions that accompany the interpretation of *jñeyāvaraṇa* as an obstacle to knowledge or the obstacle of knowledge? As we have seen, different Mādhyamikan and Yogācāran texts give various interpretations.

We can make the following summary conclusions concerning Chih-I's interpretation of *jñeyāvaraṇa*:

1) *jñeyāvaraṇa* [智障] was interpreted within the structure of Chih-i's three-fold truth concept. The wisdom-obstacle is explained in the context of realizing the highest wisdom of the Middle in contrast to the imperfect wisdom of merely emptiness or conventional existence.

2) Chih-I quotes the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, *Bodhisattva bhūmi*, and the *Ju-ta-ch'eng-lun* to show that the more fundamental obstacle of 'ignorance' remains after *kleśas* are severed. The highest wisdom of the Middle (which in-

tegrates the wisdom of emptiness and conventional existence) is attained through the contemplation of ignorance and the as yet imperfect wisdom concerning emptiness and conventional existence.

3) The realization of the truth of emptiness and conventional existence is called 'wisdom' because it reveals a high level of understanding. Nevertheless if one remains at this level of wisdom, this becomes a delusion and an obstacle to the attainment of the highest wisdom.

4) In short, *jñeyāvaraṇa* is understood in both ways:

a) that the highest wisdom is obstructed by both incomplete understanding or imperfect knowledge (which is nevertheless a kind of wisdom), and by fundamental ignorance or the habitual propensities of ignorance which remain even after *kleśas* are severed;

b) that the attainment of the highest wisdom is being obstructed.

Thus the wisdom-obstacle refers to both that which obstructs the highest wisdom and the wisdom of Buddhahood which is obstructed.

NOTES

¹ In fact it is assumed by Japanese scholars that this is the correct interpretation. I believe this is due to the influence of Hsüan-tsang (玄奘, 600–664) and the Fa-hsiang (Hossō) school with their Chinese translation of *jñeyāvaraṇa* as 所知障, in contrast to the pre-Hsüan-tsang translation of 智障, and also the numerous Yogācāra texts which more or less clearly interpret *jñeyāvaraṇa* in this way. Most Japanese Buddhist dictionaries define *jñeyāvaraṇa* under the heading of 所知障 and under 智障 one is referred back to 所知障. Ui's *Concise Bukkyō Jiten* [Tokyo: Daito Shuppan, 1938, pg. 728]

refers the reader to 所知障, and then defines 智障 as the state of ignorance [*avidyā*] which obstructs *bodhi* so that correct wisdom cannot arise. Oda's *Bukkyō Daijiten* [Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1969, pg. 1316c] distinguishes between the two translations and defines 所知障 as that which obstructs the clear manifestation of knowable objects, and 智障 as that which obstructs the arising of knowledge, and together they refer to the delusions, ignorance, and so forth which obstruct the attainment of knowledge/wisdom. The *Bukkyōgaku Jiten* [Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1955, pg. 415b], which is strong on T'ien-t'ai terminology, nevertheless defines 所知障 (including 智障) as 'delusions which are caused by an attachment to phenomena (as substantial Being) so that the true aspects of reality which should be known are hidden and the awakening of *bodhi* is obstructed.' Nakamura's *Bukkyō-go Daijiten* [Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 1975] quotes Sthiramati and gives the traditional Yogācāra interpretation of *jñeyāvaraṇa* as that which obstructs the knowledge of what should be known (pg. 685c). However, 智障, after being identified as a synonym of 所知障, is defined as 'the hindrance to fully knowing what should be known. *The obstacle which has conceptualization as its cause. The intellect obstacle*' (pg. 952c, emphasis mine).

² I am indebted for this translation to Paul Griffiths and his paper "A Preliminary Note on *jñeyāvaraṇa* in Early Yogācāra Literature," unpublished seminar paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison, April 10, 1982. This text is found in the *Bodhisattva bhūmi*, ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo: Shōgōkenkyūkai, 1930–1936, pg. 38, line 18–19. For the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang see *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, ed. and comp. Takasaki Junjirō, Watanabe Kaigyoku, et. al., Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankō Kai, 1924–1934,

Volume 30, pg. 486, column c, lines 15–17 [T. 30, 486c15–17].

³ See Levi, Sylvain, *Vijñaptimātratasiddhi*, Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1925, pg. 15, lines 9–10.

⁴ There is disagreement between texts as to what exactly is the obstruction which hinders the attainment of the Buddha's perfect knowledge. Some define the obstacle as attachment to the idea of phenomena as substantial Being, rather than admitting the emptiness of both the self and phenomena; the habitual propensities [*vāsanā*] of *kleśas* even after the so-called active *kleśas* are severed; a remnant of fundamental ignorance; and so forth. A discussion of what would be the content of the 'obstacle to knowledge' in the Yogācāran tradition is beyond the scope of this paper. Those interested in this topic are referred to Funahashi Naoya's article "*Kleśajñeyāvaraṇa* and *Pudgaladharmanairātmya*" in the journal *Bukkyōgaku Seminar*, Kyoto: Otani University, vol. 1, May 1965, pg. 52–66.

⁵ Conze, Edward, *Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1967, pg. 185.

⁶ Takasaki Jikido, *A Study of the Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966, pg. 161.

⁷ Suzuki, D.T., *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1978, pg. 208; and *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1981, pg. 177, 404.

⁸ Edgerton, F., *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, pg. 198.

⁹ Lamotte, Étienne, (tr.) *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga* [*Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*], Tome II, Louvain: Bureaux du Museon, 1938–39, pg. 98.

¹⁰Ogawa Ichijō, "Shochishō ni kansuru Nōto," in *Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Sanzō shū*, vol. 4, Tokyo: Daitō Shuppan, 1978, pg. 141–158. I am indebted to Professor Ogawa for the information in his article and for his time in discussing and clarifying this issue.

¹¹Bhāvaviveka's position is ambiguous. He mentions *jñeyāvaraṇa* in his commentary to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* [*Prajñā-pradīpa-mūla-madhyamakavṛtti?*; not extant in Sanskrit, see T. 30, No. 1566, 106b], but only in relation to *kleśāvaraṇa*. He does not elaborate on the specific content or meaning of *jñeyāvaraṇa*.

¹²see *Madhyamakāvatāratikā*, in the *Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Peking edition, ed., D.T. Suzuki, Kyoto: Otani University, 1957, vol. 99, No. 5271, Ra. 175a4–177a3. See also Ogawa, *op. cit.*, pg. 146–147.

¹³*Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Peking edition, vol. 154, No. 6143, 107b–108a.

¹⁴*op. cit.*, pg. 109a.

¹⁵see *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* chapter 24, especially verses 8ff. For background on the two truths see any book on Nāgārjuna or Madhyamika philosophy, but especially see Sprung, Mervyn, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way. The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti*, Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1979; and Sprung, Mervyn, ed., *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, Boston: D. Reidel, 1973.

¹⁶Sprung, *op. cit.*, *Lucid Exposition* ..., pg. 230–231.

¹⁷T. 33, 705a5–7.

¹⁸三假, i.e. conventional existence due to causal arising, continuity, and relativity;

¹⁹A classical Japanese commentary on this text [止觀輔行私記] raises the

question of whether or not fundamental ignorance and the wisdom of emptiness and conventional existence are the same if they are both the content of the wisdom-obstacle. The answer is that of course the two are not the same, yet they are both obstacles to higher wisdom. Chih-I deals with this question later. [see *Bukkyō Taikei: Makashikan*, Vol. IV, Tokyo: Nakayama Shōbō, 1919, pg. 246; hereafter BT-MIV]

²⁰ as presented in the *Mahāyāna Brahmajāla Sūtra* [? 梵網經], T. 24, No. 1484, pg. 997–1010.

²¹ There are few extant pre-Chih-I texts which would allow us to trace the early development of certain Buddhist ideas in China. An indispensable text is the *Ta-ch'eng-i-chang* [大乘義章] by Hui-yüan, T. 44, No. 1851, 465 ff. This text discusses the “two obstacles,” i.e. *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa* on pages 561–564.

²² 達摩讎多羅: The identity of this man is uncertain. Chan-jan, the sixth T'ien-t'ai patriarch, in his authoritative commentary on this text [止觀輔行傳弘沢; BT-MIV, pg. 315] identifies Dharmauttara as an Arhat who lived 800 years after the death of the Buddha, and who took three hundred verses from the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* to compile the abbreviated *Samyukta-abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra* [SAHS]. The above mentioned Japanese commentary disagrees, pointing out that the SAHS does not contain any reference to *jñeyāvaraṇa* and that the Chinese characters for the author's name [達磨多羅 Dharmatrata] are different.

²³ Chih-I's quote appears to be from Dharmakṣema's [曇無讖] translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* of 421 AD [T. 12, 587c13–14]. One interesting difference is that the original Dharmakṣema translation uses the character 慧

wisdom, whereas Chih-I substitutes the character 智. Both Chinese characters mean wisdom, and Chih-I may have substituted 智 in order to make his text consistent.

²⁴An early version of the *Bodhisattva bhūmi* section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* was translated into Chinese by Dharmakṣema in the early fifth century. Chih-I's reference is to the Bodhipāṭalam chapter of the first section of this work [T. 30, 901b15–21 ; for an English translation from the Sanskrit see John Keenan's translation of Hakamaya Noriaki's paper on "The Realm of Enlightenment in *Viññaptimātratā*: The Formulation of the Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas," in *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Vol. 3, No.2, pg. 33]. This reference corresponds to the Bodhipāṭalam chapter of the *Bodhisattva bhūmi* section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* [for Hsüan-tsang's translation see T. 30, 498c20–27]. Dharmakṣema translates *jñeyāvaraṇa* as 智慧障 or 智障.

²⁵Here Chih-I uses the words 所知 later used by Hsüan-tsang to translate *jñeya*. Here 所知 is the content of that which is known by wisdom [智], and is used to show that ignorance is the content of that which obstructs wisdom.

²⁶入大乘論, or *Introduction to Mahāyāna*. This text is not extant in Sanskrit. As the title suggests, it consists of an introduction to basic Mahāyāna doctrine. It was translated into Chinese between the years 397–439 AD by Tao-t'ai [道泰]. The text is attributed to an Indian called 堅意菩薩 [Sthiramati, Sāramati ?], who Japanese scholars have been unable to identify, but who is believed to have lived around 350–400 AD. Paramārtha says that this man wrote a commentary on the *Lotus Sūtra*, which is very likely since this text quotes the *Lotus Sūtra* extensively.

Chih-I's reference is found near the end of this work in T. 32, 46c8–9.

A full translation of the context is helpful:

The Arhat first severs *kleśas*; later he removes the wisdom-obstacle, cultivates the *bodhi*-path, and attains perfect awakening. Among Arhats there are those who sever a few wisdom-obstacles, who have not severed [wisdom-obstacles], who have attained the concentration of non-contentiousness [*araṇā-samādhi*], who have not attained the concentration of non-contentiousness, who have attained the five superknowledges [*abhiññā*], who have not attained the five superknowledges, who have attained the four fluencies [*catuspratisamvid*], who have not attained the four fluencies, who have attained the mastery of entering and coming out of meditation, who have not attained the mastery of entering and coming out of meditation.

Why is this so? Because they have not severed all wisdom-obstacles. Question: what is that which is called wisdom-obstacle? Answer: Transworldly ignorance [*loka-uttara-avidya?*] is the wisdom-obstacle.

It is as Balaruci [? 婆羅留枝] explains in a verse in the Jataka tales:

There are two types of ignorance:

The worldly and the transworldly.

Those who are wise have long ago parted

From the deeds of worldly ignorance.

Those who are foolish do not have subtle understanding

And are not able to know this truth. [T. 32, 45c2–13]

²⁷Or, as Chan-jan explains, transmigration is not really unconditioned and ignorance is not really wisdom. It is only in reference to the wisdom-

obstacle, i.e. ignorance as the obstacle to wisdom, that one speaks of ignorance in this way [BK-MIV, pg. 318].

²⁸ This is a summary of the *Bodhisattva bhūmi* analysis of *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa* as found in T. 30, 893a and 901b ff., although I could not locate a passage which makes the same tidy identification of the idea of non-substantiality of the self with *kleśāvaraṇa* and the idea of non-substantiality of phenomena with *jñeyāvaraṇa*. For a discussion of the development of the identification of these ideas, see Funahashi's article mentioned above in note 4.

²⁹ 究竟 (尋求) 分別智: although Chih-I does not refer to the source of this phrase, later T'ien-t'ai commentaries identify it as a quote from Vasubandhu's *Treatise on Consciousness-Only* [?, 唯識論, T. 31, 63–76]. This treatise is extant in three Chinese translations, the first by Prajñāruci [?, 般若流支] around 538–542 [T. No. 1588], followed by Paramārtha [T. No. 1589] and finally by Hsüan-tsang [T. No. 1590]. See BĀ-MIV, pg. 321.