

Transcendent Perception in Jaina Logic

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1. According to traditional Jaina epistemology, as found in the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is pratyakṣa (perceptual cognition) and parokṣa (non-perceptual cognition). The former includes avadhi (visual intuition), manañparyāya (intuition of the modes of other minds), kevala (pure), while the latter consists of mati (sensuous knowledge) and śruta (scriptural knowledge). However, the Jaina logicians divided pratyakṣa into two categories, transcendent perception (avadhi, manañparyāya, kevala) and empirical perception. Under parokṣa, anumāna (inference), āgama etc. are enumerated. It was Siddhasena who, for the first time, introduced this new system into Jaina logic, which was also adopted by Akalaṅka and other logicians.

Hemacandra gives the etymological meanings of pratyakṣa as follows. [1] *akṣa* means *jīva* (self), since *akṣa* is derived from $\sqrt{aś}$ or $\sqrt{akṣa}$ meaning 'to pervade or to embrace' (all substance, space, time and mode). Therefore, what is resident (*prati*) in *jīva* (self) is entitled pratyakṣa. [2] *akṣa* denotes *indriya* (sense organ), because it pervades an object, and what is dependent upon the sense organs is pratyakṣa. Therefore the traditional usage of pratyakṣa which includes only transcendent cognitions is based on the first definition. However, the logicians of other philosophical schools did not allow this definition.

In order to bring Jaina system into line with the logic of other schools, the second definition of pratyakṣa was added by Jaina logicians. Upon making their new system which includes both transcendent perception and empirical perception under pratyakṣa, the influence of Buddhist logic can be found, wherein the yogin's intuition was regarded as a type of perception. It is notable that the terms

pāramārthika and *sāṃvyaavahārika*, very specific to Buddhist philosophy, were adopted by Jaina logicians for denoting transcendent perception and empirical perception.

11. The contents of transcendent perception (*mukhya*) in the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* is discussed here. The full manifestation of the luminous nature of the self is called *kevala*, and it is obtained upon the complete removal of all obstructive *karman*s by practice of the *śukla-dhyāna*. Further, according to the differences in degrees of the cessation of obstructions, there are cognitions of *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya*, the latter of which can be obtained only by those who have attained the *guṇasthānas* of the 6th to the 12th stages.

We can, therefore, conclude that the content of *mukhya* in the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is identical with *pratyakṣa* in traditional Jaina epistemology. The works on Jaina logic always discuss *mukhya* above and before empirical perception, putting much more emphasis upon this cognition than any other. Therefore Jaina logic can be referred to as a comprehensive religious system, far removed from the works of other schools.

111. The yogin's intuition, which influenced the system of Jaina logic, is regarded in Buddhist logic as a type of perception, because it is free from conceptual construction. *Dharmakīrti* defines that it is the intuition produced upon the final consummation of intensive meditation on reality. *Vinītadeva* interprets it as transcendent intuition attained by a saint in the *drṣṭi-mārga*. Therefore the yogin's intuition is identical with transcendent perception, although this is not emphasized very much in Buddhist logic.

IV. My Japanese translation of the section of the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, which deals with transcendent perception [Pm. 1.1.47—1.1.70], is given here.