

## Criticism of Kālavāda from the Standpoint of Mahāyāna Buddhism

—A Japanese translation of Candrakīrti's *Catuḥśataka-ṭīkā*  
(*kālārthapratīśedho nāma ekadaśam prakaraṇam*)  
from a Tibetan text—

ICHIJO OGAWA

It is only natural that the Indian Kālavāda's ontology and its insistence on the eternal nature of time should severely be criticized by Mahāyāna Buddhism in the light of the Buddhist insistence that all things are without self-nature because of the law of dependent origination. Nāgārjuna (150-250), who laid the foundation for Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, thus referred to and criticized Kālavāda's insistence, not only in the 19th Chapter on "Time," but also in the 2nd Chapter on "Contemplating on Coming and Going" and in the 11th Chapter on "Contemplating on the Extremity of Past and Future" of his main work, *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*.

Āryadeva (170-270), one of Nāgārjuna's disciples, inheriting his master's philosophical viewpoint, also criticizes Kālavāda more concretely in the 11th Chapter "Negating the idea of time as substance" of his main work, *Catuḥśataka*.

The present thesis is made up of my translation and study of Candrakīrti's (600-650) *Ṭīkā* (commentary) on Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (11th Chapter).

1. Criticism of Kālavādins— with regard to the interrelatedness of

the three phases of time, past, present and future—(verses 1-2)

2. Negation of the reality of the future (verses 3-4)
3. Negation of the reality of the past (verse 5)
4. Criticism of Sarvâstivâda's insistence on the reality of the three phases of time—on account of its conflicting with the Buddha's teaching of the impermanency of all things—(verses 6-8)
5. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (1)—by fault of its being equal to fatalism (verse 9)
6. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (2)—by fault of its falling into vicious eternalism —(verse 10)
7. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (3)—through the transcendental wisdom based upon the original vow —(verse 11 a-b)
8. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (4)—on the proximity of things—(verse 11 c-d)
9. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (5)— on the uncreated and the insistence on the presence of effect within the cause—(verse 12)
10. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (6)— on the impermanency of thing and the insistence on the presence of effect within the cause— (verse 13)
11. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (7)— on the insistence on the absence of cause and effect— (verse 14)
12. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the future (8)— a summary of the insistence on the presence and absence of effect —(verse 15)

13. Criticism of the insistence on the development of the world from the first cause—on the transition from the future to the present—(verse 16)
14. Criticism of the insistence on the “duration of things” (1)—on all things that form the basis of time—(verse 17)
15. Criticism of the insistence on the “duration of things” (2)—on the impossibility of knowledge of one object by way of two kinds of consciousness—(verse 18)
16. Criticism of the insistence on the “duration of things” (3)—on the relationship between the present moment and the duration of things—(verse 19)
17. Criticism of the insistence on the “duration of things” (4)—on the relationship between impermanency and the duration of things—(verses 20-24)
18. Criticism of the insistence on the reality of the past—on the memory—(verse 25)