

from other Buddhist traditions” (pp. 102–3). Thus Gekkan’s charge that Saigin was taking a “mind-only” position with regards to the Pure Land could be read as part of a broader struggle over the value of comparative approaches to Shinshū doctrinal studies in general.

In the end, Ducor argues that while Gekkan’s real motivations remain obscure, “the vehemence of his attacks may also be explained by a real problem engendered by Zen interpretations of the Pure Land that were developing at the time,” and does concede that Saigin’s own doctrinal position may not have been purely orthodox (p. 114). Institutionally, Honganji and its abbots emerged from this dispute secure in their doctrinal and administrative authority over their own network of temples, benefitting from the shogunate’s mandate on familial temple registration (*terauke*) and thereby contributing to the government’s ideological control over Japan over the next two hundred years (p. 115).

Rounded out by a comprehensive bibliography and detailed glossary, Ducor’s *Terre pure* is a solid contribution to the field of Pure Land studies and a fascinating look into the early history of Shinshū doctrinal studies.

*Neglected Themes & Hidden Variations*. Edited by Victor Sōgen Hori and Melissa Anne-Marie Curley. *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy* 2. Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2008. 261 pages. Paperback ¥ 1,000.

MELANIE COUGHLIN

“Frontier,” or “*saizensen*” in Japanese, connotes novelty, fringe, and contention. As the second in the *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy* series, this work’s particular focus on “neglected themes and hidden variations” brings the reader out to the edges of the field conventionally known as the Kyoto School. Contrary to what one might expect, this liminality effectively offers a new place for centers of concern driving the broader fields of philosophy and religion today, such as the methodologies of systematic ontology vs. comparative literature, the ethics of autonomous rule-following vs. those of particularistic concern, scientific explanation vs. phenomenological description, liberalism vs. totalitarianism, and so on. Hence, the frontiers at stake here, so artfully traced by the papers in this book, are not limited to

the conventional frontier between East and West. They are, rather, the multiple frontiers currently being explored by scholars of Japanese philosophy, with new perspectives of relevance both inside and outside the field.

The work is distinguished, first of all, by the value it offers to a variety of backgrounds and depths of specialization. It is not inaccessible to beginners, since care is often taken to explain the complex religio-philosophical concepts introduced, along with the relevant historical background to those concepts. It would, however, be mostly of interest to a variety of specialists, thanks to the diversity and complexity of the opinions represented therein. First and foremost, the series is a great resource of cutting-edge English-language scholarship in a field where Japanese, German, and French scholarship has often forged ahead. This second book in the series is especially commendable for a diversity not limited to topic and discipline, but also extended to a diversity of specialized opinions on shared themes and interests. In the summary and critique of the work which follows, I try to make both kinds of diversity visible by discussing the essays in pairs or sets, which follow the order of the essays in the original book, but do not reflect actual divisions in the original text.

The specific new contribution made by each of the collected papers is succinctly explained in the introduction by co-editor Victor Sōgen Hori. Telling of the book's birth at a conference in March 2007 at McGill University, Hori describes its intent to, "focus attention on the more marginal figures and less studied lines of thought in the Kyoto School" (p. 1). Putting flesh on the figures' names, Hori's introduction augments summaries of the book's papers with pertinent historico-biographical and interpersonal details about the members, and "non-members," of the school. Hori deftly avoids the danger of an editor well-versed in his topic by not drowning the reader in details before they set out to sea. The result is an informative and interesting place to start reading.

The first few papers of the collection present a figure on the edge of the Kyoto School by bringing his relation to continental philosophy explicitly to the fore. With perspectives from phenomenology to comparative literature, the three separate accounts of Kuki Shūzō use his philosophy and poetry to focus on the experience of encounter central to his thought. They bring to our attention a figure who clearly deserves his recent rise in popularity and interest.

The first paper, "Is There a Method to Chance? Contrasting Kuki Shūzō's Phenomenological Methodology in *The Problem of Contingency* with that

of his Contemporaries Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert,” by Graham Mayeda, distinguishes Kuki’s approach to the problem of contingency from his neo-Kantian contemporaries. Unlike Windelband and Rickert’s shared interest in a scientific explanation of contingency, Kuki’s philosophy offers a phenomenology of contingency, which instead of deriving it logically from an analysis of necessity, describes the experience of contingency within our everyday lives.

In a tightly structured comparative argument, Mayeda argues that this methodological difference opens up face-to-face ethical possibilities in Kuki’s philosophy of contingency. In particular, the contingency of the everyday encounter between persons is said to accompany and be contained within the profound meaning of the encounter. Mayeda contrasts his own interpretation of this meaning with previous comparisons of Kuki’s philosophy to *bushidō* and the Nietzschean notion of *amor fati*. For Kuki’s ethics, according to Mayeda, point towards a unique responsibility arising from the contingent encounter, which limits one’s own future possibilities.

The next paper on Kuki, “The Contingencies of Kuki Shūzō,” by John Maraldo, explains the fringe status of Kuki’s natural and existential philosophy of contingency with reference to their basis in relative, as opposed to absolute, nothingness. This focus on a relative “non-being” in relation to “being” means that Kuki’s philosophy is dualistic—or even, as Maraldo postulates, pluralistic—in a manner unusual for the Kyoto School. While drawing knowledgeably from both Kuki’s later work, *The Problem of Contingency*, and his doctoral dissertation, *Contingency*, Maraldo nonetheless presents a distinctly internalized understanding of Kuki’s notion of contingency.

This paper makes the prevalence of contingency palpable by proposing that all appeals to necessity ultimately generate contingency. Maraldo illustrates this point by discussing intelligent design theory; drawing on figures in modern and contemporary philosophy, he shows how both sides in the debate inevitably end up in primal contingency. In addition to, as Maraldo calls it, this natural philosophy of contingency, the paper also discusses Kuki’s philosophy of selfhood. In the latter, a specific kind of contingency, as the recognition that things could be otherwise, takes on what Maraldo terms an existentialist meaning. This philosophy of selfhood is contrasted with modern universalistic ethical projects. Maraldo also distinguishes Kuki’s philosophy of selfhood from other forms of existentialism, since it does not have their usual emphasis on transcendence.

Maraldo's picture of a natural and an existential philosophy in Kuki poses interesting questions of comparison with Mayeda's description of Kuki's methodology as phenomenological. The third and final paper on Kuki in this work, "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer: Kuki Shūzō's version," by Michael Marra, presents us again with a different perspective on related themes. In this third essay, Kuki's poetry is used to present an alternative account of the encounter with the Other than that portrayed in Martin Heidegger's "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer." According to Marra's interpretation of the poetry written by Kuki during his studies in Europe, the encounter with the Other is—in the case of a truly foreign other—ultimately impossible.

In this paper, Marra uses his own, excellent, translations of Kuki's poetry to present a critique of Hegelian dialectic and Heideggerian ontology. Fundamentally, Marra argues that the Other these philosophers claim to encounter is ultimately a merely homogenous one. Not stopping there, however, he also asks how we can talk about heterogeneity, even if we do admit a critique of homogenous time and space, universal rational categories, and so on. In this regard, the explicit argumentation of the paper seems to offer little positive response, except to state that "the unnamed, unexpressed, un-articulated, are as powerful tools to make sense of life as any fully articulated techniques based on purely technical terms" (p. 68). However, as Marra intimates at the end of the paper, reading and enjoying Kuki's poetry is one such un-articulated act of encountering the Other, and in that regard, speaks volumes.

The next pair of papers takes us away from Kuki and the debates among phenomenological, natural, existential, and literary perspectives, towards more publicly controversial questions about where the religio-philosophical meets the politico-historical. There has, of course, already been much work done to grapple with the Kyoto School's ambivalent relation to the Japanese powers during the Second World War. These two new papers, by contrast, do not address such well-explored questions explicitly, but instead find a different point of access. Their work to explore the relationship between the political and the religious in the philosophy of two more fringe figures of the Kyoto School, Miki Kyoshi and Watsuji Tetsurō, leaves the concrete politico-historical questions about the School mostly out of the picture, but may offer new perspectives relevant to them.

The title of "The Subject of History in Miki Kiyoshi's 'Shinran'" plays on the dual meaning of "subject" to introduce the questions of self and his-

tory central to Melissa Anne-Marie Curley's contribution. More precisely, Curley analyzes the relation between the subject (*shutai*) and history in a contentious essay written by Miki about the Jōdō Shinshū patriarch Shinran. Contentious as an unfinished and posthumously published work, Curley presents Miki's Shinran essay against the backdrop of a debate as to whether Marxist or Buddhist influences are more prominent therein.

In a clear and convincing argument, Curley explains that Miki's later essay is neither anthropological, nor theological, but rather historiographical. The main line of this argument demonstrates that "in taking up the question of the Buddhist view of history, Miki is in fact writing through and about Marx" (p. 80). For the interior subjectivity at stake in this essay is not, according to Curley, that of the individual ego; it is, rather, a socio-historical reality, and what is produced out of this realization (*jikaku*) is a new socio-historical reality. This internalized socio-historical reality does not, however, present the self as an example of a category such as class, and in this regard, Curley notes the distance Miki's notion of existential religious equality has taken from Marxian categories of analysis.

An earnest discussion of religious philosophy in connection with the next fringe figure presented in this collection of essays may sound surprising to those familiar with his best-known work. In fact, as we see in Bernard Bernier's intensely informative paper, "Transcendence of the State in Watsuji's Ethics," both politics and religion should be understood within the context of Watsuji Tetsurō's ethical philosophy—which connects the two in ways that may, after all, justify surprise. Distinguishing Watsuji's notion of the state from views of it as a "thing" or "contract," Bernier explains how the state for Watsuji is not one thing amongst others within a society, nor is it the substantiality of wealth possessed in common, but instead the state is the locus (*basho*) in which a common ethical life is lived.

On this ground Bernier offers an alternative, sophisticated reading of Watsuji's proposition that the state (*kokka*) is the ethical organization of ethical organizations (*rinriteki soshiki no rinriteki soshiki*). In addition to the more conventional interpretation of this statement to mean that the state is the highest level in an organizational hierarchy, Bernier explains that Watsuji's notion of the state is of a sacred totality which enforces and guarantees ethics. The irreducible sovereignty of the state for Watsuji, while different from that of a personal God or abstract principles, has, nonetheless, a distinct sort of transcendence. According to Bernier, Watsuji found this sacred, transcendent nature hidden by the modern definition of a secular state, and best revealed by the Japanese imperial state. As Bernier also sug-

gests, however, Watsuji has a distinct notion of sacred transcendence, insofar as the state remains a relative and limited totality.

As we have seen so far, the fringe of the Kyoto School can be a place for opening up new perspectives beyond conventional dichotomies. Both of the next two papers in the collection explicitly contrast Watsuji Tetsurō with certain ideals of modern Western philosophy. The two authors' respective evaluations of this contrast, however, are diametrically opposed. Still, both authors share the task of drawing on Japanese philosophy in order to inform and critique current trends in other philosophical fields.

"Guiding Principles of Interpretation in Watsuji Tetsurō's *History of Japanese Ethical Thought: With Particular Reference to the Tension between the *Sonnō* and *Bushidō* Traditions*," by David A. Dilworth, uses an analysis of Watsuji to make a more general point with regard to the discipline of philosophy as a whole. For, according to Dilworth, the dialectical and agonistic patterns of interpretation in Watsuji's approach to Japanese history exemplify, and in fact precede, post-modern hermeneutical practices. These hermeneutical practices, while poetically or mythologically valuable, are from Dilworth's perspective inferior to a more universalistic approach to philosophy as globally perennial.

Presenting a distinctly interesting view of the history of philosophy, Dilworth traces the practice of hermeneutics along cultural divides to Hegel's philosophy of history. Then, due to their having been carried on through Heidegger, Dilworth rues what he perceives as the present predominance of these practices, and supports instead Kant's earlier claim that the philosophy of history is not philosophy itself. From this critical perspective, Dilworth presents Watsuji's history of Japan in terms of the dialectical and agonistic relation between *sonnō* (veneration of the emperor) and *bushidō* (way of the warrior) as having pre-modern, theocratic, tendencies. Taking issue with Watsuji's claim to be uncovering patterns of ethical significance, such as the "pure and clear heart" (*seimyōshin*), Dilworth concludes that insofar as these patterns are based in vertical relationships, they are political, as opposed to ethical concepts.

In Erin McCarthy's essay, "Towards a Transnational Ethics of Care," the critique of the place of ethics in vertical relationships takes on further significance. Here, Watsuji's ethics are once again contrasted with the modern, liberal, individualistic project, but from an entirely different evaluative perspective. McCarthy contends that Watsuji's conception of an irreducibly relational self can help to inform an ethics of care whose relevance would not be limited to a particular gender or culture. Drawing on sources from

Japanese philosophy, psychology, and care ethics, the crux of the problem addressed is the matter of exploitation. According to McCarthy, the liberal ideal of the individual is autonomous, and yet human beings are embedded within relationships. The issue with this gap is that “the reality of human dependence without morality results, often, in exploitation” (p. 123). Hence, what is needed is not only the recognition of care, but also an ethics of care.

In light of this need, McCarthy uncovers a positive significance in Watsuji’s conception of the human as *ningen*; this conception not only recognizes interdependence, it also proposes an ethics where neither the individual nor the social is given ultimate priority. Finding parallels with care ethics in Watsuji’s discussion of family and friends, McCarthy argues that despite his lack of feminist views, ignoring Watsuji’s account of the relational self would be detrimental to today’s feminist ethics of care. Conversely, since Watsuji’s account was intended to describe the human, McCarthy thinks that it may help avoid the reduction of an ethics of care to the feminine. Concretely, McCarthy suggests that Watsuji’s emphasis on the everyday interdependence of the human body could contribute significantly to an ethics of care.

Both of the two previous papers raise the question of particularistic as opposed to universal, or transnational, philosophy. The following two expand the conventional boundaries of the Kyoto School to include its Sino-Japanese context, where the role of German philosophy remains pivotal. Drawing dialogues between the Japanese Kyoto School and the Chinese New Confucianists, both of the following papers continue to thematize this role, and suggest a broader, more comprehensive picture for philosophy today.

“Subjectivity, *Rinrigaku*, and Moral Metaphysics: Watsuji Tetsurō and Mou Zongsan.” by Lam Wing Keung, constructs a philosophical dialogue between a fringe figure of the Kyoto School and a representative of China’s New Confucianist movement. Lam uses this dialogue to make a broader philosophical point about a relation between differing notions of subjectivity and differing accounts of ethics. This relation is shown to be significant insofar as both Watsuji and Mou base their ethics in human subjectivity, as opposed to an examination of ethical standards. The main distinction that Lam draws between Watsuji and Mou is one between, respectively, a social ethic of betweenness (Jp. *aidagara*), and one that is grounded in the metaphysical notion of Heaven (Ch. *tian*). Supporting this distinction is Watsuji’s influence from Heidegger’s ontology, and Mou’s by Kant’s moral metaphysics.

Lam also, however, distinguishes the originality of Watsuji's and Mou's philosophies by describing the distance they take from their respective German influences. For one, Watsuji's notion of subjectivity differs from Heidegger's insofar as the former's notion of human subjectivity is always one of intersubjectivity, and this intersubjectivity has no ground other than the everyday relations of humankind. For the other, Mou argues in contrast to Kant's de-ontology, that the subjectivity through which we approach ethics must necessarily be grounded in metaphysics. In conclusion, Lam re-grounds the reader in the Sino-Japanese context by contrasting Watsuji's notion of study (Jp. *gaku*) and Mou's notion of study (Ch. *xue*), which are two terms based in a symbolic character that is used by both the Chinese and Japanese languages, and yet has a different nuance of meaning in each.

The other paper to present a Sino-Japanese dialogue in this book is, "The Comparative Philosophies of Mou Zongsan and Nishitani Keiji," by Xiaofei Tu, where the theme of cross-cultural dialogue is developed by bringing to fore the question of comparativist methodology. Tu's main point is that rejecting all comparativist thought would effectively block other cultures from participating in world philosophy. To make this point, Tu addresses two sides of a critique of comparativism as being essentialist in its treatment of traditional thought—in particular the use of modern Western philosophical categories to convey philosophy stemming from indigenous Eastern thought. One side of this critique is that the modern philosophical terminology used, in effect, masks the originality of that which it attempts to convey. Another side of this critique argues that the parallels between the indigenous and Western forms are, due to present-day comparativists' ignorance of the socio-historical conditions which gave rise to the former, superficial and naïve.

Tu first answers this critique by presenting two case-study philosophies, from the Kyoto School in Japan and the New Confucianist movement in China, as being fundamentally comparative. He then demonstrates how this comparative nature of Nishitani's and Mou's philosophies signifies a use of their respective indigenous traditions to go beyond the mere repetition of German influences. Then, Tu addresses the other side of the critique with an argument originally used by Nishitani to criticise Eurocentrism. Here, Tu turns this argument against the supposed limitation of authentic scholarship to historical positivism or deconstructionism.

The last four essays of the book focus on neglected themes and hidden figures more directly associated with the conventional borders of the Kyoto

School. The first two address themselves to the theme of “time,” which, despite being a central topic within the School itself, has had little treatment in English scholarship on the School. The second of these two essays, as well as the essay which follows it, were translated by Robert F. Rhodes especially for inclusion in this collection. With their shared topic of the imagination in Nishitani’s late work, these two essays are also representative of recent work, groundbreaking, in the field.

Finally, the second of these two translated essays, along with the very last in the book, stand on the ground where the Kyoto School has already gained some recognition. That is, they base their own original arguments regarding first sensation, then ethics, explicitly on the rubric of interpretation wherein the School is a self-conscious movement beyond ‘being-centred’ or ‘dualistic’ philosophy towards absolute nothingness or emptiness. By first applying this rubric to the novel theme of *sensus communis* and imagination in Nishitani, and then to a major contemporary figure in the tradition of the School, Ueda Shizuteru, the new directions point towards a future rich with possibility.

The first of this last set of essays, “Hidden Aspects of Temporality from Nishida to Watsuji,” by Jacynthe Tremblay, discusses time, the self, and the problem of representation. Tracing the movement from a vision of time as flowing out of the past into the future, to Nishida’s interpretation of time as a “continuity of discontinuity” (*hirenzoku no renzoku*), Tremblay explores the ramifications of this re-interpretation for notions of time in Kuki, Tanabe, Watsuji, and Nishitani. This discussion takes the reader across questions of how these notions of time re-interpret the past and future, how past and future are re-grounded in an absolute present, as well as problematizes the relation between time and the self. Last, Tremblay asks what it means to represent absolute notions like time and self.

Tremblay chose well in using Nishida’s response to Augustine’s *aporia* of time as a framework for interpreting other Kyoto School figures’ philosophies of time. Over and above the interest of the paper’s content-based contrasts, its final contrast of ways that the absolute is represented in Nishida and Nishitani opens up important new questions about their respective methodologies. According to Tremblay, Nishitani’s philosophy illustrates the difficulty of representing an absolute present by his use of spatial metaphor. We see this use, for instance, in Nishitani’s description of the absolute as an infinite openness below the world. The contrasting example of Nishida’s use of metaphor which Tremblay gives is that of the absolute as an unlimited circle whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is

nowhere. Tremblay presents such examples in order to argue that Nishida's use of metaphor differs from Nishitani's, insofar as the latter uses metaphor to present the reader with a "representation limit."

The status of metaphor becomes especially thought-provoking in light of the next essay in the collection, "Sensation and Image in Nishitani's Philosophy," by Hosoya Masashi. Continuing themes from the previous essay, Hosoya argues that Nishitani's existentialist standpoint of emptiness (*kū*) is based in temporality, as opposed to ontology. For, in Hosoya's view, the thoroughly existential nature of Nishitani's philosophy means that his description of the absolute as emptiness must be realized at the pre- and post-philosophical level of sensation, and hence in a place before representation. Hosoya traces this standpoint to the Mahayana Buddhist conception of nirvana as being immediately the world of birth and death (*shōji soku nehan*). From this perspective, Hosoya contends that Nishitani's notion of immediacy surpasses the creative nihilism of Nietzsche, insofar as Nietzsche's standpoint of the will retains nihilism as a kind of metaphysical construct. The summative point of this contrast, that Nishitani's standpoint of emptiness does not negate existence, but instead re-interprets it in terms of time, is especially profound.

In a discussion grounded in the influences of Nishitani as disparate and venerable as Augustine and Dōgen, Hosoya focuses especially on the processes of making being transparent (*u no tōmeika*) and the imaging of emptiness (*kū no imējika*). Connecting these two processes with the immediacy of sensation, Hosoya describes how things, given their brute facticity (*ganko na jujitsu*), are nonetheless made transparent. The significance of this description is that transparency is not a simple negation of the existence of things through which they become reduced to representations within a subject. Instead, Hosoya offers the reader Nishitani's analogy of two rooms sharing a wall, as well as an illuminating piece of poetry by Sōgō to illustrate the standpoint of emptiness.

The nature of the imagination is further explored in the next essay, "Nishitani Keiji's Theory of the Imagination: The Theory of the Imagination in 'Emptiness and Immediacy,'" by Ono Makoto, where Nishitani's standpoint of emptiness is again clearly distinguished from that of contemplation. Continuing the theme of sensation and imagination in Nishitani, Ono focuses his paper on the question of why the imagination became so important a theme at the end of Nishitani's career. His findings are meaningful for the philosophy of religion as a whole, insofar as they address the status of image.

In a subtle and well-researched argument regarding Nishitani's notion of the imagination, Ono describes how it develops Aristotle's *sensus communis* within the horizon of Buddhist thought. Noting the challenges of doing so, given Aristotle's distinctly non-Buddhist notion of the unmoved mover, Ono explains how Nishitani re-appropriates the *sensus communis* by getting behind Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle. That is, instead of emphasizing the identity of knower and known in thought thinking itself (*noesis noeseos*), Ono draws out Nishitani's interpretation of Aristotle's notion of *sensus communis* as having both passive and active aspects within sensation itself. What this means is that, according to Ono's interpretation of Nishitani, Aristotle could have recognized a kind of continuity between sensation and reason, and therefore points towards a standpoint, not only of unity between knower and known, but one that would be prior to the standpoint of knowing.

The essay that concludes this collection is "Letting Go of God for Nothing: Ueda Shizuteru's Non-Mysticism and the Question of Ethics in Zen Buddhism," by Bret W. Davis. Alluding to Meister Eckhart's characteristic phrase, "letting go of God for the sake of God," Davis gives it a new look in light of the philosophy of the central contemporary member of the Kyoto School tradition. Davis' main question in this regard is what happens to ethics if one lets go of God as a transcendent foundation of values. His answer responds to potential criticisms of Zen enlightenment as an end to all ethical judgment, or a reduction to the mere following of convention. Instead, Davis proposes that Zen's anti-nominalism has something positive to offer ethics "as it cultivates a response-ability to the presence of unique singularities rather than a formula for subsuming particulars under universal rules" (p. 246). To this insight Davis adds the stipulation that cultivating response-ability can de-construct and revitalize thoughtful discrimination and ethical deliberation, but not replace them.

Davis bases this argument upon an interpretation of Ueda, against the backdrop of Eckhart, showing subtlety and depth. According to this interpretation, Ueda's non-mysticism (*hi-shinpishugi*) is a kind of de-mysticism (*Ent-Mystik* or *datsu-shinpishugi*), broken down by Davis into a four-step movement. This movement of de-mysticism is said to surpass Eckhart's mysticism, insofar as the former goes beyond union with the divine, to an absolute affirmation of the everyday qua everyday. Accompanying this account of Ueda's philosophy in terms of its distinction from Eckhart's, are concrete reasons for why going beyond mysticism may be evaluated positively. Most

memorable, are the examples Davis gives from Ueda's work detailing how non-mysticism can be found in the everyday practices of breathing and bowing.

I suggested at the beginning of this review that Victor Sōgen Hori's introduction would be an informative and interesting place to begin reading this book. Let me now suggest that, alternatively, one could also start at the end. A glance at the handy index of personal names provided at the back of the book—Abe, Adams, Aihara, Aitken, Akizuki, Alighieri, Amaterasu, Ames, Amida, Ananda, Adolfato, Angelus, Anselm, Aquinas, Arai, Arendt, Aristotle, Aubenque, Augustine—would probably pique the interest of any scholar on either side of the traditional East-West divide, and indubitably please those currently working across it.

Granted, the geographical and historical breadth of this list might also raise qualms with regard to scope. I would, however, note that the historical facts of the Kyoto School, not only justify such a scope, but require it. With regard to the scope of this particular review, I have focused on the work's arguments and implications with relevance to the field of philosophy—especially German philosophy. Given the nature of the work, however, a review focused on topics currently being considered within religious studies—particularly Buddhist thought—would be equally valuable.

Finally, it is the scholarly integrity and care of the work's contributors that help to prevent its breadth from becoming a methodological weakness. Moreover, the work has no cohesive meta-narrative within which to fit its various parts, and yet its diverse themes and figures are deeply inter-related. This inter-relatedness causes the work as a whole to exhibit an exceptional kind of unity for a collection of essays. Even contrasting opinions seem to but prepare the ground for future discussion and debate, and I hope that an ever greater breadth of readers continue to join the fray.

