

# Two Models of the Modernization of Japanese Buddhism: Kiyozawa Manshi and D. T. Suzuki

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## Preface

THE present article, originally titled “Seishin to Reisei—Bukkyō Kindaika no Nitenkei 精神と靈性—仏教近代化の二典型 (Spirit and Spirituality: Two Models of the Modernization of Japanese Buddhism),” was written by Hashimoto Mineo 橋本峰雄 as an Introduction to *Kiyozawa Manshi/Suzuki Daisetz* 清沢満之・鈴木大拙 for the 43rd volume of *Nihon no meicho* 日本の名著 (The Greatest Books in Japan), published by Chūōkōron-sha 中央公論社 in 1984. The reason we have translated and republished this article in our special issue on Kiyozawa Manshi is that it aptly illustrates the personality and thought of Kiyozawa Manshi, a man little known among foreign scholars in contrast to the highly renowned Suzuki Daisetz.

Hashimoto Mineo (1924–1984) studied Western philosophy at Kyoto University, taught the same at Kobe University and also became the head priest of Hōnen-in 法然院, a famous Buddhist temple in Kyoto. Hashimoto’s path from a philosopher to a Buddhist was the same as Kiyozawa’s and the shift from a layman to a priest was also common to both. Hashimoto was very proud of their common background and admired Kiyozawa Manshi as his forerunner.

Since Hashimoto’s original Introduction is long, we have omitted some parts of it for this publication. Moreover, so that it can be read more easily, we have added chapters and sections in order to reorganize the original text.

The three sections, “Suzuki no shōgai 鈴木の生涯 (Life of Suzuki),” “Suzuki Daisetz ron 鈴木大拙論 (Discourse on Suzuki Daisetz)” and “Sokuhi no ronri 即非の論理 (Logic of Sokuhi),” are omitted from Chapter 3: “Reisei no hito-Suzuki Daisetz 靈性の人・鈴木大拙 (Man of Spirituality—Suzuki Daisetz).” Furthermore, in order to make it more readable as an independent article, some expressions have been changed and some historical facts, which may be hard for foreign readers to follow, have also been omitted. Lastly, *The Collected Works of Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之全集* (8 volumes) referred to in the Introduction, have been published by Hōzōkan 法蔵館.

— Editors

## I. Introduction

### 1. Two Unsurpassable Giants

Kiyozawa Manshi and Suzuki Daisetz are two lofty peaks, rising high in the century-old history of the modernization of Japanese Buddhism. While this is a term with a variety of meanings, here it means to reform, strengthen and promote traditional or conventional Buddhism, by responding to and resisting the introduction of Western thought and civilization after the Meiji period. For that purpose, Buddhism first had to be equipped with logic and turned into an academic discipline, i.e., reconstructed into a coherent philosophical system. To put it simply, Buddhism had to be accepted by modern intellectuals first in order to have the possibility of shaking the foundation of their modernist consciousness. Although all religions consist of ideas (doctrines), actions (rituals), and community (religious organization), the modernization of Buddhism had to be started in the area of doctrine; in other words, the initial modernization of Buddhism was the active reconsideration of traditional Buddhist teachings. In this respect, Kiyozawa and Suzuki are the representatives and reformers of Pure Land (Shinshū 真宗) and Zen Buddhism, respectively. Moreover, they both went well beyond the boundaries of the Buddhist schools mentioned above.

During the history of modern Buddhism in Japan, there have been a number of great scholars, ascetics, preachers and activists. Among these, Kiyozawa and Suzuki are, at least for me, unsurpassable, in the sense that they were attractive enough for others to want to imitate yet, at the same time, powerful enough to make these people think that such imitation was impossible.

## 2. Notability of Kiyozawa and Suzuki

How well known is Kiyozawa Manshi today? When you see his name and Suzuki Daisetz's listed as representatives of modern Japanese Buddhism, many of you may be puzzled. The name and achievements of Suzuki Daisetz, as an exponent of modern Zen, are quite well recognized throughout the world. Kiyozawa Manshi's name and achievements, on the other hand, are only known among a limited number of intellectuals and within specific religious orders, and are probably half-observed from public awareness. Even in Nagoya, where he was born, and in Kyoto and Tokyo, where he made his career, his name has almost disappeared from people's memories. The principal of Tsutsui Elementary School 筒井小学校, where the monument commemorating Kiyozawa's birthplace stands, hardly knew of his achievements. More amazingly, his grandchild, who is now the head priest of Kiyozawa's home temple, Saihō-ji 西方寺, in Ōhama 大浜 (Aichi prefecture), turned to me and asked with all honesty: "Was my grandfather such a great person?" While this was a rather refreshing experience for me, and Kiyozawa would have been happy to hear it, it shows that since even his nearest relatives feel this way, no wonder the public do not know his name. When the plan for *Nihon no Meicho* was first announced, I was told that the most common questions and complaints from readers to the publishing company (Chūōkōron-sha) were about why Kiyozawa's name was included among some fifty or more great figures representing Japan. They kept on asking who this Kiyozawa Manshi was.

This reaction seems only natural. In terms of notability, there is a world of difference between Suzuki Daisetz and Kiyozawa Manshi. Suzuki, who has closed his life of ninety-plus years recently and whose name was first known abroad, left 30 volumes of writings and received the Order of Culture (文化勲章). Kiyozawa, on the other hand, ended his short life of forty-one years in the Meiji period, published only a few books, and was active only within a specific religious organization. His thoughts and actions, however, are easily on par with those of Suzuki. In my mind, the main goal of this volume is to introduce Kiyozawa to the world again and, for that purpose, asking the world-renowned Suzuki to play a supporting role. Therefore, I am intent on proceeding with this Introduction in such a light.

## 3. Suzuki Daisetz's View on Kiyozawa Manshi

Kiyozawa was born in 1863 and was seven years older than Suzuki, who was born in 1870. In the mid-Meiji period, when the former was making his career,

Suzuki was in the United States. Thus, there was no direct contact between the two. In 1963, he expressed his own views on Kiyozawa when writing for the one-hundred-year commemoration of his birth. Though it is rather long, I would like to quote this passage as our introduction to Kiyozawa:

Although I've never met Kiyozawa in person, the first time I heard his name was at the time of the World's Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893. I was partially involved in this convention and at that time, I came across his book, *Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion*. The exact content of that book I do not recall, but he seemed to have quite unprecedented ideas for that time. The Meiji period was the time when remarkable progress was made in every area of Japanese cultural history. Effervescent, up-and-coming young people were everywhere, and among those, Kiyozawa was prominent not only due to his intellect, but also because his strong will and passion were penetrated by the depth of his faith. Today, such prominence is still maintained among his pupils. You may say that Kiyozawa was indeed a type of genius in this realm.

Kiyozawa's emphasis on Absolute Other Power (*zettai tariki* 絶対他力) was certainly passed down from the founder of Shin Buddhism, Shinran 親鸞. At the basis of this emphasis, we can also detect Kiyozawa's own living faith. For mere words about Other Power usually have no power in themselves. Any adherent of Shin Buddhism can speak such words, but their truth can only be achieved in someone like the *myōkōnin* 妙好人, such as Asahara Saiichi 浅原才市. Kiyozawa added intellectual acuity to this faith and there is something in his thought that is readily accepted by today's younger generation. The influence of his vibrant, living faith must have resonated through the hearts of those who had close contact with him in his time.

Though living to be 100 may be difficult for anyone, I believe he would have lived to my age (94 years old), if modern advanced medicine had been available at that time. If that were the case, I believe his thought would have been even more brilliant than what it had been in the short span of thirty or forty years. However, since all this ultimately depends on the working of the Tathāgata, there is little more I can say.

The idea of *jinen hōni* 自然法爾 (natural becoming through the working of the Dharma) is deeply embedded throughout Buddhism. This teaching is where we can find the deepest meanings of Eastern thought, as well as where we can most easily fall into shallow inertia. I insist that within “*jinen hōni*,” we must acknowledge a sense of constant endeavor. Things need to be renewed each day. Now progress is expected of Buddhism in all areas. We await a second Kiyozawa or the second coming of Kiyozawa.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. The Nature of Buddhism in the Thought of Kiyozawa and Suzuki

Kiyozawa and Suzuki each represented a different, but equally complete, model for the reconceptualization of Buddhism in the modern age. In his experiment to modernize Buddhism, Kiyozawa approached Buddhism (religion) through the medium of the dialectic logic of Western philosophy. In other words, he moved from philosophy to religion. Suzuki, on the other hand, tried to modernize Buddhism by moving from religion to philosophy. Through his Zen experience, he uncovered the logic of non-duality (*sokuhi no ronri* 即非の論理). While Kiyozawa attempted to realize Buddhism through the exclusive choice of the Pure Land tradition, Suzuki aimed at a universal Buddhism by demonstrating the ultimate oneness of Zen and Pure Land teachings. It can be said that, in their respective approaches, Kiyozawa provided the model for an ethical take on Buddhism, while Suzuki represented an aesthetic one.

Although this is a rather bold outline of their vast work, to summarize it even more roughly, the central concept in Kiyozawa’s modernization of Buddhist thought was “*seishin* 精神 (Spirit),” while that of Suzuki’s was “*reisei* 靈性 (Spirituality).” The former is a concept mediated by Western philosophy, presupposing dualism in the reality and logic of religious experience. The latter is a genuine Japanese or Eastern concept based on monism.

If religion is considered to be the relationship between a “subject” and the “Absolute” (sacred), for Kiyozawa, “*seishin*” means the attempt of the subject to realize its mutual relationship with the Absolute, while for Suzuki, “*reisei*” means the work of the Absolute to subsume the subject. In other words, Kiyozawa tries to leap from “*seishin*” (i.e., the West) to “*reisei*” (i.e., the East) and Suzuki tries to encompass “*seishin*” (i.e., the West) inside of “*reisei*” (i.e., the East). Since religion is a self-realized fact concerning “the

<sup>1</sup> “Foreword” in Fukuda 1963.

Absolute,” it is meaningless to ask who, Kiyozawa or Suzuki, is right. However, I must confess that I personally respect Kiyozawa more than Suzuki. While Kiyozawa remains unsurpassable for me, Suzuki feels like a famous, distant relative.

Further, Kiyozawa was also a reformer of Buddhism as an institution. I mentioned earlier that the modernization of Buddhism needed to cover all three aspects of doctrine, ritual, and organization. As a minister of a Shin Buddhist denomination, Kiyozawa promoted reform not only in the area of doctrine, but also in the other two areas. Although Buddhism has been professed by many of the greatest intellectuals of each historical period and has occasionally been through restoration and transformation, in reality, the custom of so-called Funeral Buddhism (*sōshiki bukkyō* 葬式仏教) has sustained institutional Buddhism throughout Japanese history. It can also be said that the biggest problem of Buddhism today may still lie in this gap between intellectual and popular Buddhism. Someone has to reform the religious organization so that the gap between the two threads of Buddhism can be bridged. Kiyozawa Manshi tried very hard to do this, though finally, he seemed to end in failure. Here again, I cannot help but feel that Kiyozawa is simply beyond compare.

##### 5. My Relation to Kiyozawa and Suzuki

I think I should put down a few words about my own religious inclination. In terms of religious experience and ideas, I am following about the same path as Kiyozawa Manshi, in the sense that I too have moved from Western philosophy to Pure Land Buddhism. I was born into a lay family, and in my youth, having neither interest in nor need for religion, I pursued Western philosophy. After passing the age of thirty, and led by various conditions, I became a Buddhist priest. Now, I am teaching Western philosophy at a university and have become the head minister of a small Pure Land temple. Below is a brief outline of my understanding of the Pure Land teaching.

Its core is in the “faith (*shinjin* 信心)” of Amida Buddha’s “Original Vow (*hongan* 本願).” This Original Vow of the Tathāgata for the salvation of all sentient beings is explained in the form of a myth in the *Larger Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra* (*Daimuryōjukyō* 大無量壽經). For me, a major problem lay in the way this myth is set out. When Amida Buddha was still the Bōdhisattva Dharmākara (Hōzō Bosatsu 法藏菩薩), he made 48 Vows, all of which are expressed in the Chinese Buddhist scripture as “If, when I attain Buddhahood, [this condition is not fulfilled], may I not attain perfect

Enlightenment (設我得仏 . . . 不取正覚).” In the Japanese translation of the Sanskrit scripture, it reads: “If, after I have attained Enlightenment, [as long as this condition exists], may I not attain true supreme Enlightenment.” Dharmākara had accomplished these Vows and became Amida Buddha. His Pure Land of Ultimate Bliss has surely been completed. However, is the Pure Land entirely the Other Shore (*higan* 彼岸)? Could it be that the light of the Tathāgata of Immeasurable Light, unhindered throughout the ten directions, will never reach this defiled world (*shaba* 娑婆)? If not, then how could people in this defiled world attain “faith” through the working of Absolute Other Power? Amida is the Buddha of Immeasurable Light. And yet, Dharmākara could not have attained perfect Enlightenment until this defiled world became a Pure Land. If he became the Buddha and remained transcendent in the Other World like the God of Christianity, then wouldn’t we in this defiled world be left in the lurch? Don’t Dharmākara’s Vows take this form (“If, when I attain Buddhahood, . . . , may I not attain perfect Enlightenment”) because these were made specifically with us, of this defiled world, in mind? (These are my own ideas, and not to be confused with the official doctrine of the Pure Land denominations.) It is troubling if Amida Buddha has not become a Buddha; if he has, however, that also becomes troublesome. This was my problem.

Then, I came across the following poem by a *myōkōnin* Tochihiro Fuji 栃平ふじ, a farmer’s wife from Oku-Noto 奥能登. With this, my “faith” became steadfast:

Where does Hōzō [Dharmākara] have his place of practice?  
All of it is in the pith of my bosom, Namu Amida Butsu.

It was Suzuki’s *Myōkōnin* 妙好人 (published in 1948) that told me about her for the first time. In this sense, Suzuki was my guide to Pure Land Buddhism. The first book I read of his was *Shūkyō keiken no jijitsu* 宗教経験の事実 (Truth of Religious Experience), also a study of the *myōkōnin*, published in 1943. I came across it by chance while I was in high school during World War II. My next book by Suzuki was *Zen no shisō* 禅の思想 (Zen Thought), which I purchased second-hand at around the same time. In the back of this book, the previous owner had scribbled: “I don’t understand what it means. I have no idea what it is about. I sort of understand, but don’t understand,” which also reflected my own feelings after reading this book. My understanding of Zen still remains the same today due to my lack of intelligence. However, now I do have the task of explaining Suzuki Daisetz and there is no other way for me to approach him but as my Pure Land teacher. I think Buddhism, in spite

of its diversity, must ultimately be one. Suzuki, who claims the oneness of Zen and Pure Land Buddhism, is an irreplaceable teacher for me.

It was much later that I found out about Kiyozawa Manshi. I first knew about him as a pioneer of importing Western philosophy to Japan. More importantly, however, he was the first to search for the “logic” of a religious peace of mind (*anjin* 安心), which was deeply concerned with my own problem: How is it logically possible to say that Amida has already attained Buddhahood and, at the same time, has not?

By following the thoughts and actions of Kiyozawa and Suzuki, let us now explore the possibility of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism today.

## II. Kiyozawa Manshi—Man of *Seishin*

### 1. His Birth

The significance of Kiyozawa Manshi as a modern Buddhist was aptly characterized by Soga Ryōjin 曾我量深 (1875-1971), one of his spiritual successors, as follows: “Until Kiyozawa appeared, no one seriously considered Other Power faith. Without him, Shinran would never have been regarded as one of the pinnacles in Japanese intellectual history. The faith, which Kiyozawa devoted his entire life to achieving, will long remain in the annals of Japanese Buddhism and may be the greatest accomplishment since Hōnen and Shinran.”

Before Kiyozawa came into the picture, from the time of its formation Japanese Pure Land and Shinran’s schools had been ignored by most intellectuals as a religion for the ignorant masses. What kind of path did he have to tread to achieve it? Let us now trace his journey from its beginning.

On June 26, 1863, Kiyozawa Manshi (Mannosuke 満之助) was born in Nagoya as the eldest son of Tokunaga Naganori 徳永永則, the chief of a foot soldiers’ regiment of the Owari Tokugawa house. The fact that he was born into a low-ranking samurai family on the Tokugawa side during the Meiji Restoration, meant that he had no hope of advancement in the Satsuma/Chōshū-dominated government. Many intellectuals of that time, especially in the field of religion, such as Inoue Enryō 井上円了 and Murakami Senshō 村上專精 of Buddhism, Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 of Christianity, Uemura Masahisa 植村正久 and Nijijima Jō 新島襄, were all in the same situation.

After the Meiji Restoration, the family was reduced to poverty and his father had to peddle tea from a bamboo basket. According to his own “Outline of my Academic Record (*shūgaku rireki gairiyaku* 就学履歴概略),” Kiyozawa



entered a newly-established foreign language school (English) in Nagoya at the age of 12 in 1875, but this was closed down in 1878. Then, he studied German at Aichi Prefectural Medical School but stopped soon after, probably due to financial difficulties. The record then states: “In 1879 (16 years old), moved to Kyoto in January, was ordained a Shin Buddhist priest in February, and entered Ikuei School in March.” Later, Kiyozawa confessed that, “I became a priest because Honganji told me if I did so they would support my studies, and not with the noble intentions that Hōnen or Shinran had had.” Such a sentiment seems understandable considering that the young Kiyozawa had already learned English and German, and was excellent in his schoolwork. Incidentally, Hōnen and Shinran were also ordained when young, but did not experience their true calling until much later when they became true Buddhists. At any rate, the main reason for Kiyozawa’s ordination was poverty.

## 2. His Studies

With respect to his ordination, Kiyozawa’s family background should also be noted. The Tōkai region where they lived was a stronghold of the Higashi Honganji (Shinshū Ōtani-ha) organization. His parents, especially his mother, were ardent followers. Together with them, he had been reading Shinran’s *Shōshinge* 正信偈, *Wasan* 和讃 and Rennyo’s *Ofumi* 御文 every day from the age of five or six. This background qualified him for support under the denomination’s educational policy, which stated that “exceptional students are to be recruited from among the children of our followers and to be educated using scholarship funds.” Higashi Honganji founded the Ikuei School in July 1876 and the abbot stated that it was created “to build a firm foundation from which we can compete with Shintō, other Buddhist denominations, and foreign religions,” and also to better the situation where “some followers’ children seemed to go astray and even violate laws, because they neither receive proper education nor understand the truth of Shin Buddhism.” In other words, the scholarship system was established to restore and maintain the religious institution, which was facing an external threat from the Meiji government’s anti-Buddhist, pro-Shintō policies and Christian advancement as well as internal concern over the degeneration within the denomination.

After studying in Kyoto for four years, Kiyozawa was sent to Tokyo to further his learning. He entered the Preparatory School of Tokyo Imperial University in January 1883 and was enrolled in its Philosophy Department in September, 1884. Throughout his study at university, he was always first in

his class and received a scholarship. How he felt about his studies may be found in the following passage of his diary:

Almost 20 years have already passed since I was born. If I convert this into the number of days, with 360 days a year, that would be 7200 days. If I convert that into minutes, that would be 10,368,000 minutes and, in seconds, 622,080,000. This is an enormous amount of time indeed, but what I have accomplished so far has been growth in the length of my body and (an ever so slight) change in my brain.<sup>2</sup>

As Shiba Ryōtarō 司馬遼太郎 acutely pointed out, Kiyozawa was a cerebral type who had to calculate 20 years in such a manner to feel the actual length of time. According to him, Kiyozawa “was not the type who can grasp the heart of the matter with artistic intuition, but who reaches a certain conclusion after rigorous rational investigation.”<sup>3</sup>

Kiyozawa also made the following remark: “During the cherry blossom season, people carry their bottles of sake and picnic baskets and go under the floriferous cherry trees and pleasantly drink and eat. I don’t know why they do this. It does not make sense to me.” Kiyozawa was truly a man of the Meiji period; he was indeed already a man of “*seishin*,” especially in terms of his strong work ethic and stoicism.

### 3. Encountering Hegel through Fenollosa

Kiyozawa studied Western philosophy under Ernest Fenollosa, the first foreign professor in the Philosophy Department at Tokyo Imperial University, who gave lectures on German Idealists such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel as well as British philosophers such as Mill and Spencer. Fenollosa taught that the harmony between Hegel and Spencer, the pinnacles of German and British philosophy, should be the goal for the development of philosophy in the future. However, for Kiyozawa’s “philosophy,” his encounter with Hegelian philosophy came to have a great significance.

Along with Miyake Setsurei 三宅雪嶺, his senior in the Philosophy Department, Kiyozawa was the first to critically deal with Hegelian philosophy in Japan. Hegel’s organic system with universal “Reason” and the dialectic syllogism of the finite, the Infinite, and “Spirit” was later reinterpreted from a Buddhist perspective in Kiyozawa’s philosophy (Philosophy of Religion).

<sup>2</sup> KMZ, vol. 8, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Shiba 1969.

Kiyozawa's original intention in studying in Tokyo was to become a philosopher. While there, he joined the Philosophy Society, founded by Inoue Enryō, also a recipient of the Higashi Honganji scholarship, and became the editor of *Tetsugakkai zasshi* 哲学会雑誌 (Journal of the Philosophy Association) along with Okada Ryōhei 岡田良平. After graduating in July 1888, Kiyozawa continued his studies in the philosophy of religion at the graduate level and became a board member of the newly-established Tetsugakukan 哲学館 (Academy of Philosophy), where he taught classes in psychology, logic, and philosophy. Virtually all Japanese philosophers at that time were members of the Philosophy Society, including Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之, Nishi Amane 西周, Nishimura Shigeki 西村茂樹, Toyama Shūichi 外山正一, Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄, Tanahashi Ichirō 棚橋一郎, and Miyake Setsurei. According to the prospectus written by Inoue Enryō, this group, through a comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophy, looked towards “the incorporation of the merits of both traditions to formulate a new philosophy.” Kiyozawa, himself, must have been eager to become such a philosopher. Inoue Tetsujirō, the founder of academic philosophy in the Meiji period, thought that “in our country, we have had the tradition of the philosophy of Shintō, Confucianism and Buddhism since ancient times” and, therefore, considered Western philosophy as little more than “another system of philosophical thought.” Kiyozawa, on the other hand, was keenly aware of the logical and academic nature of Western philosophy.

#### 4. Metaphysics in the Meiji Period

Metaphysics (or “Pure Philosophy”) in the Meiji period before Kiyozawa held an organic, pantheistic world-view. Inoue Enryō's “non-dualism of body and mind in true suchness (真如物心の相即論),” Inoue Tetsujirō's “phenomenon as real existence (現象即実在論),” and Miyake Setsurei's “monism of the universe (宇宙渾一觀)” were all examples of such world-views. However, we can see little substantial philosophical reflection on their logic when Inoue Enryō and Inoue Tetsujirō attempted to unify the binaries of body and mind, phenomenon and reality, relative and absolute. This was set forth in their ideas of “the reason of dualistic consubstantiation (二元同体の理)” and “the view of complete harmony of all binaries (円融相即),” respectively.

Miyake Setsurei was the first Meiji philosopher to study Hegelian philosophy and its dialectics. His metaphysics owes a great deal to Hegel, yet his methodology was not that of dialectics but of analogical inference from the known to the unknown, based on an outmoded anthropomorphism. Yet

Miyake made the first attempt for a metaphysics using a logical method based on “Eastern philosophy,” in that he tried to “correct the problem of losing track of priorities and being caught up in wording.” In other words, he realized that a method of metaphysics had to go beyond “rhetoric” and attain “logic.”

### 5. Kiyozawa Manshi as a Philosopher

Kiyozawa’s “philosophy” was not fully formed until after his return to Kyoto in 1889, when he gave up an academic career as a philosopher in Tokyo and started on his path as a man of the Shinshū Ōtani denomination. Let us now analyze his “philosophy” and clarify its significance. In the Meiji period, prior to Nishida Kitarō’s 西田幾多郎 *Zen no kenkyū* 善の研究 (An Inquiry into the Good), Kiyozawa was the leading intellectual who “carefully and rationally” investigated metaphysics with a strict sense of logic. Kiyozawa’s metaphysics was essentially very similar to that of both Inoues and Miyake in the sense that it was a philosophy based on an organic understanding of the world. However, his critique of Hegelian dialectics and his restructuring of a Buddhist dialectics clearly indicate his acute sense of logic and his demand for academic rigor in his method. Furthermore, his logic served as a clear basis for Nishida Kitarō’s logic of “self-identity of absolute contradictories (絶対矛盾的自己同一).” Also as a historian of philosophy, Kiyozawa’s *Seiyō tetsugakushi kōgi* 西洋哲学史講義 (Lectures on the History of Western Philosophy) was the first in Japan, preceding *Seiyō tetsugakushi* 西洋哲学史 (The History of Western Philosophy) by Ōnishi Hajime 大西祝 and *Seiyō tetsugakushiyō* 西洋哲学史要 (A Historical Outline of Western Philosophy) by Hatano Seiichi 波多野精一.

Kiyozawa’s metaphysics and philosophy of religion can be understood by looking at his *Junsei tetsugaku* 純正哲学 (Pure Philosophy), *Shisō kaihatsu kan* 思想開発環 (The Developmental Circle of Thought), and *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu* 宗教哲学骸骨 (Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion). Let us, for instance, trace his logical elucidation of the idea of “religion.” First of all, *Junsei tetsugaku* “was based upon the theory of German philosopher Rudolf Lotze (*Metaphysics*)” and, just like Lotze, tried to construct a metaphysics in the manner of Leibniz. According to Kiyozawa, “pure philosophy” examines “varying entities” (things, events, and relationships) and “seeks a universal organic connection among all things.” “Pure philosophy,” furthermore, “places emphasis on order (logic) as primary and does not emphasize style (rhetoric).” In his analysis of “actual existence,” Kiyozawa advocated the the-

ory of the “oneness of all things (万物一体)” and stressed that “both the ‘one that includes all things’ and its respective manifestations” are “spiritual entities (靈性的実体).” Here, his approach was entirely analytical. On the “becoming” of entities, he stated: “Existence is not non-existence and non-existence is not existence. No matter how we ponder this, it is impossible for us to consider that both existence and non-existence are included in the same entity. However, ‘becoming’ is impossible without the unity of existence and non-existence. We are then compelled to accept the unity of existence and non-existence as an inconceivable mystery.” Moreover, referring to the theory of the “oneness of all things,” he stated: “It is obvious that if we posit that the many and the one are the same, the rule of logic would collapse.” He then continued, stating that for now this can be settled by “explaining the ‘one’ in terms of the Unlimited (Infinite), and the ‘many’ in terms of the limited (finite). The combination of these is called the ‘oneness of all things.’” This problem, i.e., how to discover a logic of this “inconceivable” unity of being and non-being, the many and the one, became a serious issue, not only for Kiyozawa, but also for all Japanese metaphysicians to follow.

6. *Seiyō tetsugakushi kōgi* [Lectures on the History of Western Philosophy]—  
Critique of Hegelian Dialectics I

Kiyozawa’s *Seiyō tetsugakushi kōgi* was the first historical survey of Western philosophy in Japan. He covered “From Thales to Spencer” and even provided criticism on modern philosophers to express his insights. In this piece, we can see his implicit “critique” on the dialectic logic of Hegel for the first time.

Kiyozawa asked: “Should the first pure being [the Idea] and the syllogism [dialectic] be considered as one or two, and if they are two, which comes first? Also, when one influences the other, what rules should it follow? If they are one, how do the many develop from the one? If we critique [Hegel’s logic] in this way, we find there are still some inadequacies.” We must say this is acute criticism which revealed Hegel’s surprisingly poor methodological awareness, since “if pure being and the syllogism exist side by side, that would be relative, and not absolute philosophy.” At the same time, Kiyozawa also stated that “what I like about Hegel’s argument” is that he claims “opposites are equal” and clarifies that “everything has two aspects: that of being equal and that of being different. Seen from one position, all things in the universe, being this and that, oppose each other. However, from another viewpoint, they are positively related, namely being equal to each other.” Kiyozawa then con-

cludes here that “therefore, it is appropriate to say that there have been two or more things since the beginning,” and continues “there are more than two from the beginning and that is said to be one. One is, from the beginning, not one. The many exist as the one and the one exists where the many exist. They are neither completely the same nor entirely different (不一不異). The one as many and the many as one, only this is immutable. Call it Nature, it is all of nature. Think of it as True Suchness (真如), and it is True Suchness. Call it myriad things, and it is myriad things.” In this way, by critically incorporating Hegelian dialectics, Kiyozawa was building a foundation for new Buddhist thought.

### 7. *Shisō kaihatsu kan* [The Developmental Circle of Thought]—Philosophy and Religion

Kiyozawa’s *Shisō kaihatsu kan* links Hegel’s logical and systematic thought with the *Lotus Sutra*’s “ten suchnesses (十如是).” He argues that the progress of “thought” needs to form a continuously revolving “circle,” always shifting from one category to another. This was a confirmation that the “truthfulness” of metaphysics remains within its systematic “consistency.” General philosophy does not form such a “circle” because “it cannot be easily attained.” “However, one like the Buddha, with his all-seeing wisdom clearly perceives the actual form of all phenomena and can freely explain this truth. Hegel, on the other hand, understood that philosophy, in its entirety, constitutes a circle, but in his explanation, as most students of philosophy know, he could not avoid confusion and error.” Speaking about the relationship between philosophy and religion, Kiyozawa stated that, through philosophy, “when one completes the developmental circle of thought, returning to the original, fundamental category, where reason is satisfied, one then flips into religion.” At this stage of Kiyozawa’s thought, the path is leading from philosophy to religion; and religion is what should be reached at the end of philosophical enterprise.

### 8. *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaijōtsu*—Critique of Hegelian Dialectics II

The results of his intellectual quest are compiled in *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaijōtsu*. As previously mentioned in the quote from D. T. Suzuki, this book was translated by Noguchi Zenshirō 野口善四郎 and brought to the World’s Parliament of Religions at the World Exposition in Chicago in 1893, where it received recognition from foreign readers.

The central categories here are “Infinite” and “finite.” While the reason-

ing mind relates to the “Infinite” through “investigation,” the religious mind relates to it in “acceptance.” Kiyozawa insists “when reason and faith are in contradiction, we should take the former and throw away the latter.” This was his extreme position as a philosopher. Although he created a philosophy of religion, he still hadn’t had “the experience” of faith “which accepts the Infinite.”

His philosophy of religion can be summarized as follows: the finite (dependent, relative, part, imperfect), and the Infinite (Independent, Absolute, Whole, Perfect) are of the same substance (“identity of the two terms” *nikō dōtai* 二項同体). The universe is “an organic constitution, in which innumerable finite entities make up one body, the Infinite.” Moreover, Kiyozawa stresses “the principle of persistent identity” in the “becoming” of these finite entities, which is “an action of the entire universe or of the Infinite itself.” Then, he goes on to criticize Hegel’s syllogism [dialectic] of thesis-antithesis-synthesis:

Thesis (A) necessarily and inevitably leads to its antithesis (not-A), and the two (A and not-A) again necessarily and inevitably lead to synthesis (B). So again, thesis (B) leads to its antithesis (not-B) and the two (B and not-B) again lead to the synthesis (C), and so on. Here are the two steps or processes: First, (A) leads to (not-A), one antecedent leading to a consequent. Second, (A) and (non-A) lead to (B), two antecedents leading to a consequent. The second process is quite a new view of the law. However, we must ask why, in one case, only one antecedent leads to a consequent, while in the other, two antecedents lead to a consequent. If a single antecedent could lead to a consequent, why not always so? Where is the necessity of introducing a new process? However, we can never understand how a single antecedent could lead to a consequent.<sup>4</sup>

According to Kiyozawa, “whenever a thing changes, there must be an outstanding something, a guest 客 so to speak, to stimulate the master 主 for the meeting 会.” Thus, Hegelian dialectics should not be thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but rather Master-Guest-Meeting. This is “the Law of Cause and Condition” in Buddhism; Master-Guest-Meeting is the Buddhist dialectics of Cause-Condition-Effect.

Why does Hegel’s thought have such a methodological inconsistency? According to Kiyozawa, “since Hegel tries to develop a ‘pluraristic relative’

<sup>4</sup> KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 21–22.

out of a Christian, ‘monistic Absolute,’” he “confuses these two modes as though they are governed by the same principle.” However, “there is no cause-and-effect relationship between the relative and the Absolute.” Kiyozawa continues: “The Infinite, True Suchness, and the finite, myriad things, are two aspects of the same entity, neither separate entities nor the successive states of the same entity. That the One itself develops into two or the Absolute becomes relative, is inconceivable to us.” In this way, Kiyozawa rejected the Christian theory of a transcendental God but accepted that of immanent pantheism. For Kiyozawa, “the Absolute developing itself to the relative” meant that “True Suchness (cause) and Ignorance (condition) give birth to myriad things (effect).” Ignorance is “nothing but the incapacity of our intelligence, the inconceivability personified.” The development of the Infinite spirit in that of the finite should be a finite being turning its ideal or boundary from the finite to the Infinite. Kiyozawa’s Buddhism was that of “peace of mind, culture of virtue,” that is, self-disciplined Buddhism. Moreover, he continuously had to face the alogical paradox of religious experience—“the relation of the finite many within the Infinite One is truly inconceivable.”<sup>5</sup>

For Kiyozawa, the choice between the two mysteries—“the Absolute One becoming the relative many” (Christianity) and “the finite many within the Infinite One” (Buddhism)—was beyond logic or “faith” that transcends logic. In order to modernize Buddhism, Kiyozawa chose the latter and tried to systematize it as a philosopher. As he states “the work of religion begins at the point at which philosophy ends,” Kiyozawa first engaged in a “philosophical” enterprise of “pursuing” the Infinite, after which he devoted himself to the “religious” task of “accepting” the Infinite.

Moving from Tokyo to Kyoto, Kiyozawa decisively abandoned “philosophy” and attempted to live “religion.” He put aside worldly benefits and chose to seek the path of faith. In such straightforwardness too, Kiyozawa was a man of *seishin*.

## 9. Obligation to the Religious Order

Why did Kiyozawa decide to return to Kyoto? He mentions his indebtedness to the religious order (Higashi Honganji): “I was born into a secular household, but by fate, entered the priesthood of Shinshū and received an education from the head temple; for this, I feel greatly indebted and am determined

<sup>5</sup> KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 21–24.



to pay back such kindness.” While he demonstrated such a Confucian ethic, his decision to go back to Kyoto could have been based on his religious desire to experience “the inconceivability” of “the finite many within the Infinite One,” which could not be theorized, and thus, could not be reached through his academic/philosophical enterprise. He tried to approach religion through “experiments” to develop “peace of mind, and to foster virtue.” In a letter, he writes: “There is nothing in this world as interesting as these experiments.”

In July 1889 at the age of 26, Tokunaga Manshi (whose family name was changed to Kiyozawa after 1896) became the principal of Kyoto Public Middle School (later to become Kyoto First Middle School), whose management was entrusted to Higashi Honganji by the city of Kyoto. In August of the same year, he entered Saihō-ji, a large temple in Ōhama, (present-day Hekinan city, Aichi prefecture), and married Kiyozawa Yasuko. As a principal with a good salary, he established a residence, grew a mustache, wore a frock coat, walked with a cane, and used a rickshaw when going out. It was a short, colorful moment in his personal life, and quite a drastic contrast to the coming “experiments” of a stoic lifestyle.

In 1891, Kiyozawa completely changed his situation. He shaved off his hair, switched from Western-style clothes to priestly vestments, and began to walk to work in wooden clogs and a black robe. He stopped smoking and eating meat, kept away from his wife and children, strictly structured his daily life and chanted the *Three Pure Land Sutras* morning and evening. Ultimately, he reached an ascetic lifestyle, cutting out salt and cooked food from his diet, eating only buckwheat flour mixed with water at each meal. Such a lifestyle indeed reflected his *nom de plume* at the time, Skeleton. His asceticism seems to intensify after his mother’s death in 1892. Through these “experiments,” Kiyozawa attempted with his own body to prove what he wrote in his *Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion*, seeking to realize “the inconceivable” within himself. While struggling in these self-power practices, which attempt to reach the Infinite from the finite, he did, in fact, find the teaching of the Other Power, where the Infinite embraces the finite.

Later, in “Shūkyō teki shinnen no hissu jōken 宗教的信念の必須条件 (Requirements for a Religious Conviction),” he wrote: “If you decide to go after religious conviction, you must first stop depending on anything except religion. Unless you go through the gateway of pessimism once, where you leave your house behind, throw away your possessions, and turn away from your wife and children, it is difficult to attain true religious conviction.”<sup>6</sup> Surely, without “the cultivation of virtue” through self-power practice, one

may never gain *anjin* from the Other Power. Here, Kiyozawa had already practiced and experimented with the abstinence promoted in the four *Āgama* sutras of Southern Buddhism, which he would later discover.

In the midst of such rigorous practice, working together with Inaba Masamaru 稲葉昌丸 and Sawayanagi Masatarō 沢柳政太郎, Kiyozawa engaged himself in lecturing, management, and reform at Kyoto Jinjō Junior High School, Ōtani Middle School, Shinshū University Dormitory, and Okazaki Gakkan 岡崎学館 (an educational institute for the Abbot of Higashi Honganji). His goal was the independence of Shin Buddhist studies from sectarian politics, but his reform policy was too radical to be accepted by the head temple. Furthermore, in his religious education policy, he established very strict rules of conduct in which students had to wear hemp garments and black robes. Consequently, he was confronted with a school strike by the junior high dormitory students. Finally, in April 1895, as he was pushing his “own-power” practice to the limit, his innate frail constitution, exhausted from hard work and malnutrition from a strict diet, succumbed to tuberculosis and he was sent to a sanatorium in Nishi Tarumi in Kobe, Hyōgo prefecture. He said to his friends who had recommended a change of air: “Old Tokunaga died here. Now I leave this corpse at your disposal.” This marked the beginning of his quest for Other Power faith.

#### 10. Awakening

In May 1903, the year before his death, Kiyozawa recollected the process of his attainment of faith:

I remember that during my medical retreat in 1895 and 1896, my view on life altered completely and I almost changed my feelings about self-power, but the ebb and flow of human affairs still kept bothering my mind and heart. For example, the administrative issues concerning Higashi Honganji in 1896 and 1897 prompted the reform movement with the publication of the journal, *Kyōkai jigen* 教界時言 (Timely Words for the Religious World) in 1897 and 1898. From the end of 1898 to the beginning of 1899, I read the four *Āgama* sutras and, with the discontinuance of the journal, disbanded the above-mentioned movement in April of that year. I then had the opportunity to rest in my own temple and reflect upon my own

<sup>6</sup> KMZ, vol. 6, p. 76.

thoughts, but was not able to maintain my calm against the troubles in human affairs due to the lack of my own spiritual discipline. In autumn and winter of 1899, I came across the writings of Epictetus and was deeply impressed. After accepting the invitation to go to Tokyo in 1900, I had more opportunities for spiritual discipline and felt like moving forward on that path.

Now the Buddha has given me more difficult tasks and led me further on the spiritual path, for which I shall always be grateful.

May 31, 1903.<sup>7</sup>

From this passage, we can clearly see Kiyozawa's "awakening (*eshin* 回心)" and "attainment of faith (*gyakushin* 獲信)." For the external circumstances of such awakening, we see the onset of his illness, the failure in the religious reform and troubles at home (temple). For its internal circumstances, we see his committed contemplation on the *Āgama* sutras, Epictetus and Shinran. With these circumstances, Kiyozawa established "*Seishin-shugi* 精神主義 (Spiritual Activism)" that defined his position on "religion."

For the first time, on his sickbed in Nishi Tarumi, Kiyozawa began to pay close attention to the teachings of Shinran, who had also trodden the long path of philosophical inquiry and then come under Hōnen, who had already realized Other Power faith after traveling along the same spiritual path. Kiyozawa did not simply accept Shinran, as presented by Higashi Honganji, but had discovered him on his own. Without relying on existing dogmas, he studied anew the Teaching (*kyō* 教), Practice (*gyō* 行), Faith (*shin* 信) and Realization (*shō* 証) of Shinran's *Kyōgyōshinshō* 教行信証 and tried to develop his own philosophy in the *Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion* that would be more relevant, historically, existentially and experientially. The result was amassed in "Zaishō sangeroku 在床懺悔録 (The Record of Repentance in Bed)," which he had written in Nishi Tarumi. Here, we need to pay special attention to the element of Faith, which stresses both the active nature of the Infinite Other Power and the passive nature of finite living creatures.

For Kiyozawa, who had experimented with self-power practices, the awareness of "being extremely evil, and the worst practitioner" as well as the "inevitability of karmic retribution" and the subsequent sense of "repentance (*sange* 懺悔)" became real for the first time, which was what awoke his faith in the Other Power. "Zaishō sangeroku" was Kiyozawa's self-acquired Shin

<sup>7</sup> KMZ, vol. 8, pp. 441-2.

Buddhist studies. Subsequently, how did he view Higashi Honganji with this new realization?

## 11. The Religious Reform Movement

The main concerns of this denomination in the mid-Meiji period were the reconstruction of Honganji's burnt down main hall and a large debt. These two important tasks were handled through bank loans and donations from branch temples under the rigid administration of Atsumi Kaien 渥美契縁, who was put in charge of the head temple's internal affairs, accounting and doctrinal studies in 1889. This naturally furthered the predominance of secular power over religious power, the denomination's degeneration, and the stagnation of Shin Buddhist studies. This situation was unbearable for Kiyozawa who had set the advancement of these studies as the main goal of the modernization of Buddhism. When the fundamental educational reform to which Kiyozawa and his comrades had devoted themselves was rejected by such conservatives as Atsumi in 1895, they were prompted to appeal for the denomination's general reform. In October 1896, Kiyozawa established the *Kyōkai jigen-sha* 教界時言社 in Shirakawa Village in the north-east of Kyoto with Inoue Hōchū 井上豊忠, Kiyokawa Enjō 清川円誠, Tsukimi Kakuryō 月見覚了 and others, and published seventeen issues of *Kyōkai jigen* from October 1897 to April 1899, engaging in a spectacular fight with the head temple. These four together with Inaba Masamaru and Imagawa Kakushin 今川覚神, who raised money by working as local teachers, founded the so-called "Shirakawa-tō 白川党 (Shirakawa Party)." They were also the original drafters of the impeachment letter to Higashi Honganji in the first issue of *Kyōkai jigen*.

The main purpose of Kiyozawa's movement was clearly expressed in this journal, which discussed the ideas applicable not only to the denomination, but also to the general reform of all Buddhist schools in Japan.

Kiyozawa's ideas were quite radical. The readers may well have felt as though they were reading the manifesto of the recent left-wing student movement. In fact, Kiyozawa was facing the same problem, for he was dealing with the democratization of Higashi Honganji with emphasis on the liberalization of Shin Buddhist studies. Kiyozawa received nationwide support and a national reform alliance was also established. The issues he raised did not simply concern Atsumi or any other single administration. In fact, it implied the overthrow of Honganji's feudalistic system. If Kiyozawa's ideal had been realized, Higashi Honganji could have done nothing but collapse (although Kiyozawa was still blind to the issue of the abbot's hereditary succession,

which made him a typical Meiji person). However, though 20,000 people signed the reform petition supporting Kiyozawa, it was still only 2 percent of the one million followers belonging to the denomination. Most of the priests and followers were not particularly pleased with the reform or were simply indifferent. The progress of Kiyozawa's battle also resembled that of the left-wing student movement. Although superficially his demands appeared to have been accepted, in reality Kiyozawa and his allies were outsmarted by the Atsumi administration, as well as the following one headed by Ishikawa Shuntai 石川舜台.

Kiyozawa must have known how the situation was at the branch temple level, as he, himself, was not welcomed by his parishioners. He looked unkempt, had lung disease, rejected the ideas of hell and the Pure Land, and only discussed complex issues. He was often not allowed to perform services and was about to be banished from his own temple. Once, he gave a talk at the Hō-on-kō 報恩講 service with his spittoon. Reportedly, when the service began, the hall was overflowing with people, but by the afternoon, only a few still remained. What sort of reform could he possibly carry out in such a desperate condition? He fought a hopeless battle from the start, and the issues he struggled with are still unresolved today.

In the end, the six reformers were excommunicated and the movement ended in failure. Kiyozawa had no choice but to admit that he had underestimated the difficulty of reforming Higashi Honganji with 7,000 branch temples and “now will abandon the reform movement entirely and devote myself to gaining religious conviction.” Through this movement, Kiyozawa recognized that, before the reform of the structure and system, the spiritual growth of each priest and follower need to come first. Hence he decided to advance the *Seishin-shugi* Movement as a teacher.

## 12. The Four *Āgamas* and Epictetus

According to his “Byōshō zassi 病床雜誌 (Journal from the Sickbed),” Kiyozawa had started reading the four *Āgamas* on New Year's Day in 1899 and finished them by February 15th. He was the first Meiji scholar to appreciate the *Āgamas*, which had formerly been neglected as being Theravāda scriptures. With the spirit of a Buddhist practitioner, he was trying to discover the everyday practice of Śākyamuni from these ancient texts.

After being pardoned by Higashi Honganji in April 1899, Kiyozawa first returned to Saihō-ji from Kyoto with his family. Then moved to Tokyo in September to become the President of Shinshū University 真宗大学, which had

just been moved there. While staying at his friend Sawayanagi Masatarō's residence, he came across and read *The Discourses of Epictetus*, which he called "the best book in the West." Why did this Stoic philosopher from Rome impress Kiyozawa so much? In *Rōsenki* 臘扇記 (December Fan), Kiyozawa divided Epictetus' lessons into ten items. Among these, the first and the most important one was to distinguish between the voluntary 如意 and involuntary 不如意 and to dwell in *anjin*, which does not pursue involuntariness. Kiyozawa states:

There exist voluntary and involuntary things. The voluntary things are opinions, actions, and likes/dislikes; the involuntary things are physical bodies, properties, honors and status. The former belong to one's own doing while the latter do not. In dealing with voluntary things, one is free, unlimited and not interfered with. With respect to involuntary things, one is feeble, enslaved and in the palm of another's hand. When perceiving this distinction incorrectly, one encounters interference, lapses into sorrow, cries out, and comes to curse and slander gods and people. Those who correctly recognize what 'voluntary' is experience no oppression, encounter no interference, slander no one, do not curse heaven, hurt no one, are hurt by no one, nor have any enemies in the world.<sup>8</sup>

What Kiyozawa wanted to stress was to "accept what's given by Heaven and to do one's best."

### 13. Kōkōdō

In his administration at Shinshū University, Kiyozawa aimed at educating students as Buddhists. His policy was, however, compromised by the secular demands of the students, who wanted the school to be accredited by the Ministry of Education in order for them to obtain teaching certificates. In October 1903, Kiyozawa submitted his resignation. Though he was not successful as a reformer, those three years in Tokyo were his most productive as a religious person, for Kiyozawa's *Seishin-shugi* was consummated and his related movement expanded.

Pupils such as Akegarasu Haya 暁鳥敏, Sasaki Gesshō 佐々木月樵, Tada Kanae 多田鼎, and Tokiwa Daijō 常盤大定 had gathered around Kiyozawa in Tokyo in September 1901, marking the beginning of Kōkōdō 浩々洞. "Kōkō"

<sup>8</sup> KMZ, vol. 8, p. 356.

implies “one’s direct experience of a thing itself” and the state of being fulfilled, while fully relying on the Absolute Infinite. This gathering moved from Hongō to Sugamo and continued even after Kiyozawa’s death until 1919. The journal, *Seishinkai* 精神界 (Spiritual World), also continued to be published, and in addition to the above-mentioned four, other bright minds contributed to modern Pure Land Buddhism. Those who joined the group were: Kusunoki Ryūzō 楠竜造; Kondō Jungo 近藤純悟; Andō Shūichi 安藤州一; Soga Ryōjin 曾我量深; Kaneko Daiei 金子大栄; Akanuma Chizen 赤沼智善, and Yamabe Shūgaku 山辺習学. This free and egalitarian society, resembling “the original *sangha*,” was opened to anyone who was interested in Buddhism.

In those days, what Kiyozawa loved to read most was the *Tannishō* (歎異抄), which was written by Yuien 唯円 twenty or thirty years after Shinran’s death. Although Rennyo 蓮如, the 8th Abbot of Honganji, first acknowledged its importance, he later stipulated that it should not be circulated indiscriminately, due to its possible dangers for the denomination. It was Kiyozawa Manshi, along with Nanjō Bun’yū 南条文雄 and Chikazumi Jōkan 近角常観, who reintroduced it as the most important text for Pure Land Buddhism in the Meiji period. Although Kiyozawa had already read the *Tannishō* when he was a student, it did not become part of his own experience until years later, when he admitted that “my ‘Three Great Sutras’ are the *Tannishō*, *Āgamas* and *The Discourses of Epictetus*” and his three great people were Shinran, Śākyamuni and Socrates. Nishimura Kengyō 西村見暁, one of the editors of *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* observes that:

What Kiyozawa learned from reading the *Āgamas* was “Śākyamuni’s spirit of renunciation” and from Epictetus was the “awareness of one’s limited self.” If we are to say that Kiyozawa understood the Nembutsu 念仏 of the *Tannishō* through the *Āgamas* and *The Discourses of Epictetus*, it means that he saw renunciation in “*namu* 南無” and our limited self in “*amidabutsu* 阿弥陀仏.” One leaves one’s family and the world in a single-minded entrusting of *namu*, and at that same moment, both the family and the world reemerge as the merit-giving activity of Amida Buddha. This conversion is *Seishin-shugi*, and hence its true meaning is none other than *Nembutsu-shugi* (Nembutsu-ism).<sup>9</sup>

According to Kiyozawa, the *Āgamas* and *The Discourses of Epictetus* had

<sup>9</sup> KMZ (Hōzōkan edition), vol. 8, p. 620.

to be read first, and then the *anjin* of the *Tannishō* could be experienced, and consequently, the *Āgamas* and *The Discourses of Epictetus* could also be embraced in the world of the *Tannishō*. If this world existed first, the *Āgamas* and *The Discourses of Epictetus* would be outside of it, and hence the *anjin* of the *Tannishō* would not be experienced.

For Kiyozawa, the path from philosophy to religion, as well as that from thought to experience, was the same as the one from the *Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion* to “*Zaishō sangeroku*,” and further still, to *Seishin-shugi*, which was the shift from “choosing reason over faith when these two contradict” as found in the *Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion* to “abandoning reason and choosing faith.” Kiyozawa’s “Three Great Sutras” were indeed significant in such a conversion.

#### 14. *Seishin-shugi*

The “*seishin*” that Kiyozawa ultimately reached was the religious attitude “that accepts the Infinite,” and such *Seishin-shugi* was “religious conviction.”

Kiyozawa produced three works entitled “*Seishin-shugi*.” The first one was an article (no. 1) and the other two were lectures (no. 2 & no. 3). They were all rough drafts, but surely present *Seishin-shugi* from the standpoint of the *Āgama* sutras, *The Discourses of Epictetus*, and the *Tannishō*. The first emphasizes “the establishment of self;” the second, “subjectivism;” and the third, “faith in Other Power.” If I were to put its essence into just a few words, I should quote Kiyozawa, himself, “the way *Seishin* sits,” i.e., to maintain *anjin*, is what religion is all about.

The fact that *Seishin-shugi* is “religious conviction,” means that it is not concerned with “academic theories,” i.e., “scientific and philosophical studies,” and is distinguished from “common morality.” Namely, “religion provides a different world besides that of social benefits and ethical behavior.” Such clear duality existed in Kiyozawa’s mind.

It also means that *Seishin-shugi* needs to include having an unshakable stoic mind that does not waver at anything. Kiyozawa stated: “We simply are to depend on the Absolute Infinity. The matter of life and death is not worth worrying about, let alone the following matters: excommunication is acceptable, imprisonment bearable, and slander, exclusion and all kinds of insults are not minded at all. Rather, we shall entirely enjoy what is given by the Absolute Infinity.”<sup>10</sup> What is required here is the opportunity for “spiritual discipline,” as we see in Kiyozawa’s recollection of his “attainment of faith,” [II, 10]

<sup>10</sup> KMZ, vol. 6, p. 110.



which has to be “something to be resolved through actual experiment.”

The essence of the “conviction” of *Seishin-shugi* is “*banbutsu ittai*.” Kiyozawa states: “Since *Seishin-shugi* focuses on actions, there is no particular need for academic theory. In order to promote actions, however, it speaks of a single ideal. Such an ideal may be called the idea of *banbutsu ittai* or the principle of *banbutsu dotai* 万物同体 (single-body-of-all),”<sup>11</sup> which is not however a philosophical theory or principle, but rather, “in *Seishin-shugi*, we can reach the perspective of *banbutsu ittai* by “the way *Seishin* sits.” In the *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu*, the *banbutsu ittai* theory is seen as a “logical mystery,” but is now recognized as “conviction” in a subjective “action.” Kiyozawa went beyond the Kantian philosophy of dualism in theory and practice with his “Faith in Other Power.”

What needs to be emphasized here is that “with much introspection and reflection on one’s standpoint, the first thing we detect is our ignorance and inability and the fact that we are mediocre people 凡夫, who commit evil and are born and die.” To obtain *anjin* means to “totally depend on the Great Compassion (*daihi* 大悲) of the Infinite Other Power.” There is *banbutsu ittai*, but the duality of the finite and the Infinite still remains—this mystery is the Great Compassion of the Infinite. At this important juncture, we find repentance and faith. “*Seishin-shugi*,” according to Kiyozawa, “is none other than pragmatism, which develops at the place where the relative enters into the Absolute and the finite meets the Infinite.” “At such a place,” however, “we speak of the Absolute outside of the relative and the Infinite outside of the finite and above all, what we call satisfaction in our hearts is given by the Absolute Infinity.”<sup>12</sup> Using Hegelian terminology, Kiyozawa called the initiator of this Great Compassion “the Absolute Infinite” in “*Seishin-shugi*, no. 1 (January 1901).” In nos. 2 and 3 (July 1901 and June 1902) he called it “*tenchi banbutsu* or *banbutsu ittai* (all-things-in-the-universe)” and “Other Power” or “Tathāgata” respectively. In his last piece of writing right before his death, entitled “*Waga shinnen* 我信念 (My Faith),” he mostly called it “Tathāgata.” As Soga Ryōjin suggests, this shifting of the terms may be understood as the deepening of Kiyozawa’s “faith.” This Tathāgata was “the Tathāgata for oneself” and “Tathāgata for one’s convictions.” In Kiyozawa’s own words, it was “the Tathāgata that I cannot help but trust.”

His “faith” was built on the logic of duality; his notion of “*seishin*” was

<sup>11</sup> KMZ, vol. 6, p. 298.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

mediated by Western philosophy, but never equated with either “the objective Spirit” or “the Absolute Spirit” of the Hegelian kind—it was “subjective Spirit” through and through. Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治 called it the “humanistic Spirit.”<sup>13</sup> It was “*seishin*” of a “religious human being.” While Kiyozawa spoke of *Seishin-shugi*, he never said that the Tathāgata was *Seishin*, and precisely because of this duality that “Tathāgata” [is not *Seishin* but] exists in *Seishin*, his Other Power faith can be, as dictated by “Tathāgata,” the driving force in social critique and structural reform. Yoshida Kyūichi 吉田久一 (to whom this paper is greatly indebted), who has written the only detailed biography of Kiyozawa to date, calls our attention to the article, “*Seishin shugi undō no genkai 精神主義運動の限界* (The Limits of the *Seishin-shugi* Movement),” and comments that “Kiyozawa’s spiritual awakening was at odds with the ordinary mass of people, whose wishes were not necessarily part of his faith.” The task of bridging this gap, however, should belong to the Pure Land followers in today’s modernized society rather than to Kiyozawa.

The last line of his diary reads: “Be a slave to the Tathāgata and not to any other.”

### 15. Death

On November 5th, 1903, Kiyozawa made a prediction to one of his students, Chikazumi Jōkan, as follows: “Everything has collapsed this year—the school, my wife and children, and now I will collapse.” After returning to Saihō-ji, and while coughing up blood, Kiyozawa finished writing “*Shūkyōteki dōtoku (zokutai) to futsū dōtoku to no kōshō 宗教的道德 (俗諦) と普通道德との交渉* (Negotiating Religious Morality and Ordinary Morality),” and “*Waga shinnen*.” The latter was his final written piece completed a week before his death. After coughing up a large amount of blood on the 3rd and 4th of June, another student, Harako Hironobu 原子広宣, asked him: “Teacher, you won’t make it this time. Do you have anything you want to say?” “There is nothing to say,” Kiyozawa replied, and at 1:00 a.m. on the 6th, “finally took his last breath while smiling wryly.” His last *nom de plume* was “*Himpū* 浜風 (Shore Breeze).” He wrote to Akegarasu Haya in Tokyo on June 1st as follows: “The *nom de plume*, *Himpū*, is my recent acquisition and came from the idea that Ōhama is a windy place, which now seems so appropriate for a half-dead ghost like myself. I also find it amusing that this name has synthe-

<sup>13</sup> Nishitani 1990.

sized all of my previous *nom de plumes*, namely *Kenpō* 建峰 (while residing in Nagoya), *Gaikotsu* (in Kyoto), *Sekisui* 石水 (in Maiko 舞子), and *Rōsen* 臘扇 (in Tokyo). With my new name, I will vanish into thin air.” This was the first and last humorous comment from Kiyozawa.

### III. Suzuki Daisetzu—Man of *Reisei*

#### 1. *Nom de plume*, “Daisetzu”

It is easy to understand how Kiyozawa Manshi changed his *nom de plume* from *Kenpō*, *Gaikotsu*, *Sekisui*, *Rōsen* and eventually to *Himpū*, in order to express different periods of his state of mind or how he defined himself. However, when it comes to the “Daisetzu 大拙” of Suzuki Teitarō 鈴木貞太郎, “the Buddhist scholar who dominated an entire intellectual period” and represented modern Zen, people may feel lost as to how to make sense of his state of mind or self-definition. “Daisetzu” is said to come from a passage in the *Hekiganroku* 碧巖錄: “Great skillfulness (*daigyō* 大巧) is similar to unskillfulness (*setsu* 拙),” a name which Suzuki kept for his entire life. This passage is quite different from “the wisest resembles the unwise,” which means to define and evaluate others. First, it has to be an expression of self-confidence when one evaluates oneself as “the most skillful.” At the same time, it also has to be an expression of frustration when one sees oneself as “the unskillful.” What of this frustration? Suzuki, who had had his *kenshō* experience at the age of 25 while practicing *zazen* at Engaku-ji 円覚寺 in Kamakura, becoming “the most skillful,” must have experienced the frustration of being “unskillful” while trying to describe his *kenshō*—the realization of the “true nature” of human existence—in “language.” It was the frustration of a person who had decided to devote his lifetime to trying to explain, through relative language, “special transmission outside the scriptures (*kyōge betsuden* 教外別伝),” “not relying on words and letters (*furyū monji* 不立文字),” “directly pointing to a person’s mind (*jikishi ninshin* 直指人心),” and “attaining Buddhahood by perceiving one’s nature (*kenshō jōbutsu* 見性成佛),” all of which belong to the absolute world beyond “words.” The life of Suzuki was that of a tireless writer who had tried to make Zen and Buddhist thought understandable to modern readers.

#### 2. Suzuki Daisetzu, the Writer

However, no one dares call Suzuki, the world-renowned torch-bearer of Zen, “unskillful.” All the credit for introducing Zen abroad and creating today’s Zen popularity in the West—be it substantial or not—goes to Suzuki alone.

The enjoyable nature and skillfulness of his writings in Japanese are obvious just by reading *Nihonteki reisei* 日本的靈性 (Japanese Spirituality) published in 1944. Many of his English works have also been praised, for instance by Masutani Fumio 増谷文雄 describing them as, “with invigorating tension and refreshing feeling.”

One day, Suzuki supposedly told Masutani the following:

In *Awakening of Faith* 起信論 by Memyō 馬鳴 (Aśvaghōṣa), there is a story about taking out a wedge by another wedge. By driving a wedge, you formed a crack, but that wedge is in, right? When you want to take out that wedge, you need to drive in another, then another and again another one. In this way, wedges are needed infinitely. Language is replaced by language. That is the human limitation, always using and destroying language repeatedly. In rigorous Zen practice, you just thunder out or say something incomprehensible. That is where one must reach at the very end.

Can we now understand Suzuki’s frustration? His *nom de plume*, “Daiset,” must have been the expression of such frustration. Although we should not be caught up too much in the matter of *nom de plumes*, I still find it significant that he chose “great unskillfulness” rather than “great fool,” “great fake” or “great evil.” Kiyozawa’s Buddhism sought either truth or falsity, as well as good or evil, while Suzuki’s, on the other hand, seems to represent a religiousness that valued skillfulness and aesthetic values. How skillfully can one express the state of Zen, which is grasped by aesthetic intuition, beyond language?

### 3. The Magnitude of Daiset

As mentioned earlier, for myself, Suzuki is like a distant relative of prominent standing. His work includes more than eighty books in Japanese and close to thirty volumes in English, several of which have also been translated into German and French. He played a magnificent role as an illuminator of Buddhist thought, especially Zen, inside and outside Japan. His role, in fact, was not limited to just being that, but also an elucidator and excavator of Buddhism itself. His most popular masterpiece may be *Zen Buddhism and its Influence on Japanese Culture* published in 1938. Also significant are his studies of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* and the *Gandavyūha Sūtra* in Indian Buddhism, the history of Chinese Buddhism (especially Bodhidharma 達磨), and the history of Japanese Buddhism (especially Zen and Pure Land Buddhist

thought), with which Suzuki brought modern intellectuals close to their understanding. Especially, in the area of Zen, he unearthed “Unborn Zen (*fushō-zen* 不生禪)” of the Zen monk Bankei 盤珪, who had been completely buried in the history of Japanese Zen Buddhism. Along with those of Dōgen 道元, Hakuin 白隱, Suzuki counted Bankei’s Zen as one of three types of Zen thought in Japan. At the same time, Suzuki also studied Pure Land doctrine, unraveling the ultimate form of popular Japanese religious experience for modern intellectuals and stunning them with a series of provocative studies on the “*myōkōnin*.” These two specific accomplishments are most remarkable for the history of Japanese ideas. Furthermore, in *Mushin to iukoto* 無心ということ (On ‘No-mind’) published in 1940 and *Jōdo-kei shisō-ron* 浄土系思想論 (Studies in Pure Land Thought), published in 1942, Suzuki clarified the ultimate common ground between Zen and Pure Land Buddhist thought and advanced what he would later call the concept of “Japanese Spirituality.” That concept, from this editor’s standpoint, is Suzuki’s greatest achievement and that is why we have included *Nihonteki reisei* as his representative work in this volume [of *Nihon no meicho*].

The breadth of Suzuki as a man, however, seems to have derived not from such external accomplishments but rather from the depth of his own “realization.” Although it sounds very strange to say that breadth comes from depth, it seems appropriate for Suzuki. Furuta Shōkin 古田紹欽, one of his students, states that what is most remarkable about Suzuki was “the depth of his Zen experience.”<sup>14</sup> While Kiyozawa went through changes and developments in his ideas during his short life of forty-one years, Suzuki underwent none in his fundamental thinking during his long life of ninety-six years. Moreover, the latter’s monistic view of *Nihonteki reisei* seems to overwhelm Kiyozawa’s dualistic *Seishin-shugi* at times.

#### 4. *Nihonteki reisei*

The Zen experience that Suzuki had maintained since his earlier age was ultimately termed “*Nihonteki reisei*.” Its origin, history and details were systematically articulated in his essay *Nihonteki reisei*. In the introduction to its new postwar edition published in 1948, he commented that he “had well before established the opinion” that there was such a thing [as *Nihonteki reisei*]. During World War II, Suzuki strongly felt that nationalism, totalitarianism and State Shintō were not “what our country should stand on in the future”

<sup>14</sup> Furuta 1961.

and decided to dig further into the inner life of the Japanese “to unearth what was buried until now.” According to him “*Nihonteki reisei*” was supposedly a universal reality in its origin, but it had surfaced through consciousness “in its purest form” in the Pure Land and Zen Buddhism of the Kamakura period. “The Pure Land experience is manifested on the affective or emotional side of Japanese spirituality, while its intellectual part appears in the transformation into Zen of Japanese life.”

The Pure Land Buddhist *myōkōnin* “Saichi always employed *Namu Amidabutsu* with absolute independence” and this “is his Person and one person ‘for the sake of this one individual person, Shinran;’ at the same time, he is also Rinzai Zen’s true man of no title 無位の真人 and ‘the only one in all the universe.’” While *reisei* means religious (Buddhist) consciousness, Suzuki stressed its specific characteristics such as earthwardness, non-literality, straightforwardness, concrete truthfulness and immediate life facticity. Especially important was its two-in-oneness where, according to Mutai Risaku 務台理作, “the Mother of Life, Great Compassion’s embrace, burning desire, and the certainty of hell all exist together.” According to Suzuki, “the logic of the Earth,” where such *Nihonteki reisei* manifests itself, is the same as “the logic of the non-duality in the wisdom” in Zen and “the faith of the Earth” becomes the *Namu Amidabutsu* of the Shin Buddhist denomination. Whether or not “the logic of the Earth” and “the faith of the Earth” are the same, still remains an important question for Japanese religion, but Suzuki was certainly the great pioneer, who tried to ultimately unify various types of Japanese religious experience and overcome “sectarianism” within the history of Japanese Buddhism. Suzuki was such a “man of Spirituality.”

### 5. *Reisei* and *Seishin*

Suzuki distinguishes his idea of “*reisei*” from that of “*seishin*,” which can be considered a Western concept. “*Seishin* always contains dualism within itself,” but *reisei* “sees that the two are, after all, not two but one and the one is, as it is, two.” It is said that “spirituality is the operation latent in the depths of *seishin*; when it awakens, the duality within *seishin* dissolves. It can sense, think, will and act in this true form.” Kiyozawa’s dualistic *seishin* seems to be encompassed by Suzuki’s monistic *reisei*.

As articulated by Suzuki in *Nihonteki reisei*, “the heart of Pure Land thought lies in the Nembutsu 念仏 and not in attaining birth in the Pure Land.” “I am rather inclined to think of *ōjō* 往生 as a kind of symbol... What is important is Nembutsu itself; single-minded Nembutsu alone is important.

Tentatively, we think that *ōjō* lies beyond the denial of the present world, but in *Namu Amidabutsu*, *ōjō* and the denial are really unified.” If it were otherwise, it would not be true that “the relation between this world and the Pure Land is mutually reflective, mirror-imaged, continuous of discontinuity, and thus “*ōcho* 横超 (side-wise leap).”<sup>15</sup> However, in this Pure Land logic of *sokuhi* presented by Suzuki, does the Pure Land really exist or not? If it does, its reality will not be monistic. In Kiyozawa’s Pure Land Buddhism, “we believe in Shintō and Buddhist deities not because these exist, but rather, that they exist for us. Moreover, we believe in hell and the Pure Land not because hell and the Pure Land exist. When we believe in them, both exist for us” (“religion is subjective reality”). Thus, “there is no point in arguing whether hell and the Pure Land exist or the spirit perishes or not.” Furthermore, for Kiyozawa, we see an intellectual restraint making him say that “if religion is subjective reality, it is not fair to ask whether the facts of religion and faith are objectively accurate or not.” Such restraint represents what Kiyozawa meant by *seishin*. For Suzuki’s *reisei*, does the Pure Land exist? When he states *shaba* (this suffering world) is the Pure Land (*shaba soku jōdo* 娑婆即淨土), what kind of logic is he implying? Will “the logic of the Earth” and “the faith of the Earth” necessarily be one or not? Which path shall we take—choosing “the logic of the Earth” through constructing the logic of *Nihonteki reisei* like Suzuki (i.e., drawing Pure Land Buddhism toward Zen and unifying them) or choosing “the faith of the Earth,” by giving up the logic and depending on the “mystery” like Kiyozawa? As long as religion is based on the absolute reality of each individual, the choice must be up to one’s religious experience. In any case, it seems that we are witnessing two types of modern Japanese Buddhism in Kiyozawa’s “*seishin*” and Suzuki’s “*reisei*.”

#### IV. Remaining Issues

##### 1. Kiyozawa, Suzuki and Nishida Kitarō

Although we have been looking at Kiyozawa Manshi and Suzuki Daisetz as representatives of modern Japanese Buddhist thinkers, it is generally accepted that Nishida Kitarō was the first person in modern Japan to formulate a “philosophy” based on the Buddhist world-view. It is often said that if Japan were to export an original philosophy overseas, it would be called “Nishida Philosophy,” though both Kiyozawa and Suzuki had a great influence upon him.

<sup>15</sup> Suzuki 1968.

Nishitani Keiji, Nishida's student, was the first to pay attention to Kiyozawa's influence on Nishida's thought. When Nishitani was about to teach at Otani University, Nishida reminded him that it was the university where Kiyozawa had once taught. In Nishida's diary, there are four references to Kiyozawa. On January 14, 1903, it says "I read and was impressed by Kiyozawa's piece in *Seishinkai*." On July 17, 1904, immediately after Kiyozawa's death, it reads, "I visited Inaba at Jōkō-in 常光院 around 6:00 p.m. and talked about Kiyozawa." On May 9, 1906, it states, "I read Kiyozawa's *Shinkō zadan* 信仰座談 (Talk about Faith)," and finally on August 3, 1908, it reads, "I wrote an article called 'Chi to ai 知と愛 (Knowledge and Love)' for *Seishinkai*." Could it be Kiyozawa's "Meimonsha no an'i 迷悶者の安慰 (Consolation of the Lost and Agonized)" or "Hotoke niyori yūki 仏による勇氣 (Encouraged by the Buddha)" that Nishida read in *Seishinkai* in 1903? After Kiyozawa's death, Nishida visited Kōkōdō in Tokyo, where he used to attend the reading group of Kiyozawa's last written piece, "Waga shinnen," while teaching at the Fourth Imperial School. His article, "Chi to ai" mentioned in his diary entry from 1908, became the last chapter of *Zen no kenkyū*. There we read, "Although science and morality receive the Light of this Other Power of each individual phenomenon, religion directly touches the Absolute, the Infinite Buddha on the whole universe. And knowing this Absolute, Infinite Buddha or God becomes possible by merely loving it." As Shiba Ryōtarō pointed out, the close resemblance to Kiyozawa's writing, not only in terms of content but also in expression, is noticeable in this sentence.

When regarding Kiyozawa as a philosopher, what are the similarities and differences between Kiyozawa's and Nishida's metaphysics? Earlier I mentioned that Kiyozawa's Buddhist reconstruction through Hegelian dialectics had served as a bridge for Nishida's "self-identity of absolute contradictories," which was the basis for "the logic of place" and "the dialectic of nothingness," as both philosophers formulated their metaphysics (philosophy of religion) through the critical adoption of such dialectics. Concerning Hegel's thesis, antithesis and synthesis, Kiyozawa commented as follows: "Between thesis and antithesis, there must a bridge which connects both sides. Without both the opposite and common features, there won't be any philosophy nor any change in things. When we seek the development in philosophy or change in things, the common element, standing between thesis and antithesis, becomes most important." Here, Kiyozawa was suggesting that the antithesis is not "contradiction" of the thesis, but its "opposite" and, as Hegel, himself, stated, its "limited negation," thus stressing that these must be



“self-limitation” of “the Universal” as Nishida later articulated. Therefore, ultimately, while Kiyozawa’s dialectic of Master, Guest and Meeting tries to remain as the Universal at the bottom of the “opposite,” Nishida’s “dialectic of absolute nothingness” sought the Universal at the bottom of the “contradiction.” Here, their difference may be understood as that between Pure Land Buddhism and Zen. Ironically, by regarding “being” as the basis of both, the dualism of this world and the other stands, and denying it with “nothing,” monism prevails. After all, however, the religious logic is still paradoxical.

Suzuki’s influence on Nishida, his best lifetime friend, was undeniable. We can even reconsider whether the latter’s idea of the “self-identity of absolute contradictories” was his own or a collaboration between both of them. Suzuki claimed that the logic of the illiterate *myōkōnins*’ faith was none other than “the self-identity of absolute contradictories” and playfully teased Nishida by saying that “a common, old woman can readily speak of what a philosopher has obtained after a lifetime of extracting all his ideas.”<sup>16</sup> In his final years, he frequently quoted Suzuki and even appeared to have Suzuki as the basis of his arguments. The fundamental experience embedded in their thinking was the same; “the dialectic of nothingness” is no different from “the logic of *sokuhi*.” If we regard Nishida as a philosopher and Suzuki as a religious person, the former’s life’s work was to “philosophically” articulate the same milieu that Suzuki described “rhetorically.” Ueyama Shunpei 上山春平, the editor of *Nishida Kitarō in Nihon no meicho*, made the final evaluation of his philosophy as follows: “The originality of Nishida’s thought lies at the level of germination and not that of the finished product; it merely opened the door for a new type of philosophy.” Similarly, we should also say that Suzuki’s work merely opened the door for a new type of religion, and the issues raised for the former should also be raised for the latter as well.

## 2. Some Issues for Modern Japanese Buddhism

Japanese Buddhism in the past 100 years since the Meiji period has made various efforts in so-called modernization through philological studies and modern translations of the Buddhist scriptures, theorization and systematization of its thought, the reform of religious organizations, and confrontation with modern ideas. In this “Introduction,” we have neglected to place Kiyozawa and Suzuki in such a historical context within modern Japanese Buddhism. For example, Kiyozawa’s *Seishin-shugi* Movement should be contrasted with

<sup>16</sup> Suzuki 1976.

the New Buddhist Movement of Sakaino Kōyō 境野黄洋, the No-self Love Movement of Itō Shōshin 伊藤証信, Kyūdō Gakusha 求道学舎 of Chikazumi Jōkan 近角常観, Ittō-en 一灯園 of Nishida Tenkō 西田天香, and the Nichirenism 日蓮主義 of Takayama Chogyū 高山樗牛. As Kiyozawa, himself, mentioned in his article, “Bukkyō no kōki 仏教の興起 (The Rise of Buddhism),” that there were three periods even within the Buddhist history of the Meiji period. The first was when Buddhists became just like secular people (*haibutsu kishaku* 廢仏毀釈, in the first decade of that period), the second was when, overwhelmed by Christian advancement, Buddhism resisted it with science and philosophy (i.e., the second decade, when Inoue Enryō and others took initiatives), and the last period was when the Original Vow of Faith was realized (the third decade of Meiji and afterwards). If we were to analyze the historical background of Kiyozawa’s *Seishin-shugi* Movement or why “*ian-jin* 異安心 (heretics)” like Kiyozawa, Ito and Chikazumi emerged from Higashi Honganji rather than Nishi Honganji, we should have returned to “the heretical incident” of the so-called *Sangō wakuran* 三業惑乱 in the Edo period. Furthermore, we should have continued to trace from the *Seishin-shugi* Movement after Kiyozawa’s death to the troubles in the Ōtani denomination today. For Suzuki’s place in the history of Buddhism, we could have also discussed what Furuta Shōkin meant by “[Suzuki as] a back road walker.” While my lack of ability and preparation could certainly be blamed for all these shortcomings, it is also true that I am most interested in the thoughts of Kiyozawa and Suzuki.

Now, while realizing that these two are unsurpassable, I wish to present them with questions concerning today’s Buddhism, namely, the problem of Buddhism and the state. In its teachings, the state has originally been part of the “human” and not of “nature.” Primitive Buddhism held the “theory of state contract” and often regarded the king and thief in the same light, telling people to stay away from both.<sup>17</sup> For Indian Buddhists, Buddhism meant “to construct an ideal society (*saṅgha*) with its own spiritual connections, separating itself from the sovereignty of kings.” However, for most Japanese Buddhists who had already accepted Buddhism as a state religion in the Nara period, they rejected such an idea as “Theravādin.” They conceived of the realization of the Buddhist ideal with state power as “Mahāyānist” in nature and supported its scriptures, which advocated such a view. However, the leaders of new Buddhism in the Kamakura period, such as Hōnen, Dōgen and

<sup>17</sup> Nakamura 1989.

Shinran, did not positively uphold the view that affirms the state. Rather, their Buddhism criticized or denied the state itself (Nichiren's nationalistic Buddhism was their shadow image).

We can detect that both Kiyozawa and Suzuki saw that Buddhism should not depend on state power. If that's the case though, be it dualism or monism, shouldn't their philosophies have clearly included ways to criticize the state and challenge the status quo? I believe that it would be a difficult though possible "philosophical" endeavor, but with this, we can say that Buddhism stood at a new "starting line" in Kiyozawa and Suzuki.

(Translated by Murakami Tatsuo)

ABBREVIATIONS

- KMZ *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* 清沢満之全集 (The Collected Works of Kiyozawa Manshi). Ōtani Daigaku 大谷大学 ed. 9 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2002-03.
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