Truth in Need: Kiyozawa Manshi and Søren Kierkegaard

MARK L. BLUM

WHEN considering the thought of Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), at the risk of sounding pedantic it is worth restating that the impact of religious thinkers in the nineteenth century, even men such as these, was limited in scope by the state of technology of their times. Kierkegaard lived at a time before the railroad, when travel between the capitals of Europe by boat or horse-drawn coach constituted "the world" for most people, and Japan was still in legal isolation from the rest of the world. Although Kiyozawa lived to see the dawn of the twentieth century, he died long before the advent of commercial airplanes, and never left Japan, not at all unusual for his generation. We know of Kierkegaard traveling only to neighboring Germany and that it took considerable time for his works to be appreciated outside his native Denmark. Kiyozawa's impact outside of Japan took even more time. Outside the distribution of his *Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion* (hereafter *Skeleton*), in English, at one panel of the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, an event with no apparent impact, and despite some sporadic translations published in Japan, he does not attract the attention of non-Japanese scholars until the 1970s.

In short, these two men probably held only the simplest and most naive notions of what the other's society was like, if they thought about them at all. And yet, when we compare their writings on core issues pertaining to the relationship between religion and ethics, despite coming from vastly different

spiritual traditions, they run remarkably parallel. This similarity in their ideas begs the question of whether or not Kiyozawa might have known of the earlier Kierkegaard and been influenced by his thought. In fact, as my investigation below into this matter hopefully will show, there is evidence to suggest that Kiyozawa did know something of Kierkegaard, though it is far less certain that he grasped the themes of Kierkegaard's project. But first we need to show the philosophical proximity of these two thinkers of such different religious backgrounds and to do this, I will present my understanding of their positions on one aspect of the important relationship between religion and ethics: how ethical concerns impact an individual's spirituality. The correlative issue of how religion impacts social morality, is also raised and one is struck again by the similarity of their approaches in that both are most explicit in framing this question in terms of how the ideal or "true" religious individual views ethical and moral questions, rather than attempting to construct a broad, pragmatic theory of religion and ethics. My thesis is that both Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard inevitably see religion as not merely giving birth to and subsuming ethics through its position as the first cause of ethics, but ultimately swallowing ethics so thoroughly as to imply a deconstructing of the very notion of a viable, authoritative ethics, independent of religious experience. Their thinking on these matters is all the more radical considering the significant social pressure both men faced to take positions in support of ethical norms that rationalized ecclesiastical and state authority.

Kierkegaard is not only the first so-called existential thinker that students typically read, but insofar as he has been canonized as the only philosophical author active in the first half of the nineteenth century to be so categorized, he is typically referred to, accurately or not, as the father or founder of the "modern" school of existentialist philosophy. More recently, the entire category of "existentialism" has been put into question,[1] but Kierkegaard's voice remains compelling for many today. His employment of Hegel's dialectic method to attack Hegel, his rational discourse in the service of deconstructing speculative metaphysics to argue for a quite irrational notion of faith, and his frequent use of the medium of fiction to make these arguments, have made

[1] Paul Ricoeur, while recognizing the impact of Kierkegaard on philosophy, has criticized this father-of-existentialism characterization of Kierkegaard as "pure illusion," concluding that existentialism itself was never a valid rubric, in that most thinkers considered representative of existentialism, such as Marcel, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre, did not share a set of doctrines, methodology, or even the same questions. See Reé and Chamberlain 1998, pp. 10–12.

Kierkegaard the focus of an entire subfield of philosophical inquiry, and the reader is directed to the continually growing mountains of Kierkegaard scholarship for a more thorough understanding of his thought than what I will be able to offer here. Both Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard are more easily understood against the background of their times in terms of religion and society, and below I offer only the briefest overview of the lives of both men, before considering the way they responded to the problem of ethics and religion. Using Kierkegaard's paradigm of three or four stages in the ethico-religious life of the individual, I will try to show that we can discern not only a parallel approach in Kiyozawa's writings, but nearly identical conclusions as well. Let us begin with Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard's Assault on Christendom

Søren Kierkegaard was born into a successful merchant's family in Denmark in 1813. His father was a devout Lutheran, and his family appears to have felt comfortable within the cultural fold of the Danish State Church. But his mother, his sisters, and two of his brothers died before Søren reached the age of twenty-one, and this appears to have set him on a confrontational course with many of the religious and ethical presumptions with which he was raised. An impressive university student enrolled in a theology course, during those years his intellectual interests seem to have turned more toward philosophy and mythology. He managed to complete a master's degree in theology and received ordination as a Lutheran minister, and though he later wrote that he repeatedly intended to become "a rural pastor" after finishing one book or another, in fact Kierkegaard never made a serious effort to take up that path.[2] Quite the contrary, the criticisms of his native Danish Church he penned in his youth did not dissipate as he grew older. These led to personal attacks on him in local newspapers and only served to deepen his alienation from that institution. In the end, Kierkegaard accepted the reality that his religious voice lay in writing, albeit one that took a stand toward his church and European Christianity in general that could often be merciless in its disparagement. Although we know that he spent considerable time in young adulthood enjoying the sensual side of life, Kierkegaard never married. Indeed, his sudden breaking off of his engagement in 1840 to the beautiful seventeen year-old Regine Olson, seems to have signaled a kind of awakening for him, as he was

[2] Based on a draft of "The Accounting" in *On My Work as an Author*, as quoted in Kierkegaard 1992, p. 154.

to comment later that his failure to complete the marriage revealed to him his own lack of faith.

Kierkegaard lived in a place and time when overt criticism of the church was considered unseemly. His many essays critical of Christianity as it was practiced in Europe—he claimed, for example, that genuine Christianity could not be found in the Danish Church—caused him considerable personal difficulties, which in turn contributed to his poor health and no doubt served as a causal factor in his early death. Although he published a considerable amount, during his lifetime Kierkegaard was essentially unknown outside his native Denmark and never escaped a lifelong financial dependence upon the inheritance provided by his father. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Kierkegaard's ideas began to receive significant attention on the international stage, largely through their influence on Ibsen, and it was not until the 1920s that his major works became accessible in German, French, English, and Japanese translations.

Kierkegaard's writings all present philosophical discourses, but often communicated by means of fictional dialogues published under different pseudonyms. Although he called these his "indirect communication," many have become classics of today's philosophical canon. Perhaps, the best read of this genre is *The Sickness unto Death*, published under the name Anti-Climacus. This is an investigation into the awareness or consciousness of self and its relation to God, where the individual's alienation from the truth of God is glossed as undying despair. Those works he signed his name to, his "direct communication," are where scholars have traditionally sought his views on ethics and religion. But these days most students of Kierkegaard do not distinguish between the representative nature of the two categories of his writing, and it is often in the "indirect" works that sentiments on issues closest to the concerns of Kiyozawa are found, particularly *Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, The Concept of Anxiety*, and *The Sickness unto Death*. Yet, it was not until the posthumously published *The Point of View for my Work as an Author* that Kierkegaard explained that "I am and always was a religious author, that the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the problem of becoming a Christian." The similarities to this statement are obvious in Kiyozawa's famous essay, "Waga shinnen 我信念 (My Faith)," where he confesses his outlook has always been that of a Pure Land Buddhist.

Like Kiyozawa, in his youth Kierkegaard was extremely taken with Kant and Hegel, but if he dove into philosophy in hopes of finding a system of ideas

to replace the dogma of the Danish Lutheran Church, he came up empty-handed, for as he aged his alienation from both philosophers, particularly Hegel, grows. Such distancing is only implicit in Kiyozawa's work, but I think we can infer a similar frustration in Kiyozawa with the idealism of Kant and the rationalism of Hegel, and this is particularly evident in his later writings on ethics. It is interesting that their methodology is not affected, however; even after their disaffection is apparent, neither Kierkegaard nor Kiyozawa wanes in their use of the Hegelian dialectical form of argument.

Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel is one way to understand the core values lying at the base of his views on ethics and religion, most explicit in his rejection is the latter's sense of a "Universal" characterized by rationality. In his *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Kierkegaard attacks Hegel's presumption that there are rational laws impelling change in human experience, a principle that implies only a corresponding inevitability to human behavior and its resultant history, both seen as a necessarily dialectical movement within a natural evolution of this principle. This presumes not only a corresponding inevitability to human history, but also a rational principle for everything judged meaningful in personal experience. By contrast, Kierkegaard saw meaning for the individual as a personal discovery uncovered within one's own subjectivity. The influence of Kant's system of universals is implied in Kierkegaard's dispute with Hegel, for Kant's insistence that all principles of reason must be universally applicable to all people in similar situations, is similarly at odds with Kierkegaard's esteem of the authority of the individual and his self-consciousness.

While asserting that any status-quo would inevitably "transition" into something else in the course of history, Hegel's basic affirmation of the social status-quo as something "meant to be" and thereby a source of authority is anathema to Kierkegaard. This is clear from his rather unforgiving criticism of social institutions and the human impulse to identify with them. In his notion of *Sittlichkeit*, Hegel subsumes individual ethical understanding in a broad, societal-based emphasis on accepted universal norms, something akin to what today we would call "politically correct" norms of behavior. Kierkegaard sees this presumption first as unreliable, since public thinking is often erroneous and pernicious for the individual in that it ignores his particular situation. This analysis emerges from Kierkegaard's own experience, which taught him that spiritual awakening within individuals is only possible when they realize their *alienation* from such norms of behavior. This conclusion marks Kierkegaard as having broken from his contemporaries who

were, by and large, more interested in "scientific" or systematic approaches that ignored exceptions.[3] In addition to their common insistence on the need for individual realization as the basis for religio-ethical existence, Hegel, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Kiyozawa all share a distrust of pure empiricism consistent with basic Buddhist notions of perception. In the search for an authority of knowledge, Hegel finds it in social and legal convention. As such, he affords the State a position of ultimate moral authority, summed up in his famous dictum: "The history of the world is the judgment of the world." The social justification of common morality, found in Hegel's *The Philosophy of History*, is based on the principle that "the State is the actually existing realized moral life" because "the State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth." This "glorification of the State" as Bertrand Russell terms it, has serious implications for the individual, because in Hegel's system the "rational State" is regarded as the historical embodiment of his Universal, an "objectified Spirit," that he also labels a "Divine Idea," resulting in a religious affirmation of political and social policy reminiscent of Peter Berger's sacred canopy. Politically and religiously, this sets out the path to ethical righteousness for each individual in a rather fixed manner; the key issue for Kierkegaard is that the State in Hegel's system becomes the authority for knowable morality, for the individual "only has objectivity, truth, and morality in so far as he is a member of the State."[4]

In contrast to Hegel's nationalist sentiments toward his native Prussia, Kierkegaard composes ten essays in the last year of his life for the specific purpose of critiquing normative ways of thinking in his native Denmark. Expressly critical of Christian attitudes, they originally appear in the serial

[3] This approach is perhaps most clearly expressed in distinction of philosophy as analysis of the empirical and religion as an inquiry into the subjective and personal as discussed in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, published in 1846. His value of subjective certainty is more meaningful than analyzed, speculated objective truth, even while admitting that subjectively found truth always includes some degree of uncertainty, which marks his stance as "unscientific." But Kierkegaard is not denying the value of objective truth, even that of the self as an empirical object, when he states that "Truth is Subjectivity" as a chapter title in the *Postscript*, rather he is stressing the inescapable need of each individual to understand whatever objective (or any other) truth is on his own terms, in terms of who he is himself, yet, admittedly, by means of a reference point outside the self.

[4] Russell 1945, pp. 739–40. Hegel compared the relationship between the individual and the State as that of the eye and the body, such that the eye can be examined and valued outside the body but it only has functionality, the true source of its existential meaning, as part of the greater whole of the body.

The Moment,[5] but he later collects them together in one volume which he publishes under the title *Attack upon Christendom*. Clinging in this context to the subjective individuality of Socrates, he not only questions the value of the scientific apparatus but, standing on the doctrine in Matthew 7:14 that the true way is narrow and difficult and "there are few who find it," Kierkegaard rejects the possibility that the social setting of any historically-established Christian society could safely be Christian. He titles one chapter, for example, "Is it Defensible for the State—the Christian State!—to Make, If Possible, Christianity Impossible?" In another he writes :

> Now, however, to stay only with Denmark, we are all Christians; the way is as broad as possible, the broadest in Denmark, since it is the one we are all walking on, easy and comfortable in every way, and the gate is as wide as possible—indeed, no gate can be wider than one through which we all walk *en masse*: *ergo* the New Testament is no longer truth.[6]

Kierkegaard does not doubt the fact that man sees himself as autonomous and that a normative, socialized Christianity defines religion for most people. But he sees this modern condition as leading not to historical development or progress in a Hegelian sense, but to a woeful state in which the individual unconsciously abnegates accountability for himself and his actions in his rush to find himself through the various collectivities with which he identifies, only one of which is his church. This produces an alienation from one's actual self,

[5] *Dieblikket*, also translated as *The Instant*. There were ten issues in all, each containing a group of articles by Kierkegaard, and all written in his last 6 months.

[6] Kierkegaard 1998, p. 115. Kierkegaard also stresses that real "transitions" should be viewed as possibilities rather than inevitabilities. For Kierkegaard, as for Heidegger and Sartre after him, things that may occur only when contingent factors of "non-necessity" are operative. In the traditional scientific world-view, the viewer strives to reduce his visibility in the service of approaching the goal of objectivity, the logical conclusion of which yields an observation from no point of view, as the self ideally disappears. It is no accident that capitalism and the scientific revolution are essentially born at the same time, as they both embody the presumption that humans are originally autonomous organisms capable of reshaping themselves and their surroundings at will and therefore capable of adapting as the need arises en masse, i.e., impersonally. In rejecting these hallmarks of the modern age, Kierkegaard's focus on the value of individual anomalous experience presages the move from Newtonian physics through Einstein to quantum physics. Key here is his belief that the individual must stand in *opposition* to God to realize the reality of God and himself, and thus precluding any socially normative forms of Christianity that preach uniform concepts of faith.

a lack of sensitivity as to the nature of this problem, and bewilderment as to how and why to solve it.

This is the central theme of his later writings and the basic content of the "despair" that is the focus of *The Sickness unto Death* where, in Part Two, he declares that this "despair is sin." But though fundamental and universal, Kierkegaard never equates this notion of sin with the Christian doctrine of Original Sin because he insists there is always choice involved. His sense of sin does not result from any one act, nor does he accept the conclusion of Socrates that sin is ignorance.[7] Rather, sin for Kierkegaard in this work seems more of an "existential attitude," to quote Louis Dupré.[8] In this, I think Kierkegaard's notion of sin is very close to Shinran's use of the words *tsumi* 罪 (sin) or *akunin* 悪人 (evil person), and hence directly relevant to Kiyozawa. The ambiguity that follows upon a notion of sin that is neither inherited nor produced by behavior only amplifies the ambivalence that pervades all notions of ethics in the modern age when norms of behavior change so quickly. Here again, Kierkegaard and Kiyozawa tread similar ground.

Kierkegaard's stance has immediate ethical implications because in asserting the centrality of a personal accommodation of religious truth, he not only rejects the kind of pietistic acceptance of religious and moral norms that so characterized his father's faith, but he also affirms an "existential" accountability for the individual in all fundamental choices that he/she makes. A core theme in his project, therefore, is the assertion that despite the given distance between Man and God, for each individual the self is culpable for its own despair, and the need to do something about it, should strike him as a moral imperative. As Alastair Hannay explains:

> Kierkegaard's notion of self-consciousness is clearly moral. That is, it is neither merely introspective nor merely practical in the sense of strategic. What Kierkegaard's self is conscious of is itself as being in a state of despair, but also of itself as despair*ing* [sic], as being responsible for failing to keep to its ideal of fulfillment, or failing to keep that ideal in view.[9]

There are many who have rejected the presumption of moral or ethical authority in the State under which they live or in the Church in which they are raised, but Kierkegaard and Kiyozawa are unusual in that they not only deny the

[7] Kierkegaard 1980, p. 87ff.

[8] Dupré 1987, p. 85.

[9] Kierkegaard 1989, p. 24.

ultimate authority of Church or State, but in that they also do not see this lack of authority as leading to any sense of victimization in the individual and its accompanying rationalized avoidance of ethical responsibility. Rather they both offer discerning arguments as to why the awareness of this problem should be seen positively as providing the impetus to religious awakening.

The problem of subjectivity and ethics led Kierkegaard to a theory of three phases of understanding within an individual existence—aesthetic, ethical, and religious—all of which demand a personal choice that jettisons one path in order to embrace another. Beginning with the choice of aesthetic or ethical in *Either/Or*, the full schematic is most fully developed in *Stages on Life's Way* (1845) and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846), his last two pseudonymous works. Although there is a kind of a natural movement from one concern to another, Kierkegaard uses the terms "spheres" or "existence spheres" far more often than "stages." In this, he was probably trying to avoid the presumption that the three necessarily imply an inevitable progression. Taken together, they nevertheless form a natural three-stage pilgrim's progress toward personal liberation that is the fruit of realizing religious truth. In *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, the religious stage is further split into Religiousness A and Religiousness B, wherein the former must be transcended to reach the final goal, which has led to interpretations yielding four- or even five-stage schema.[10] Below is an outline of these four stages and the inferred principles the realization of which motivates the individual to move from one stage to the next.

Kierkegaard's Three Stages to Religious Truth

(1) Aesthetic Existence

As an individual moves from adolescence into young adulthood, one typically becomes devoted to the pursuit of pleasure. Whereas in adolescence one accepts the binds of social convention in pursuit of a sense of identity in conformity, which in Kierkegaard's time must have meant self-discipline and

[10] In addition to the commonly accepted three stages of aesthetic, ethical, and religious, A. Rudd adds a first, preliminary stage he calls the "crowd life," and divides the religious stage into two: Religiousness A (non-Christianity) and Religiousness B (Christianity). See Rudd 1993, pp. 24–26. On Kierkegaard's terminology for these, see Kierkegaard, 1988, pp. x–xi. An important part of Kierkegaard's discussion involves the relationship between these spheres or stages in the life of the individual and how one makes the leap from one to another, but there is only room for a cursory look at this issue here.

restraint, the lives of most young adults are dominated by a different value system wherein the conformity need yields to the allure of beauty and the urge to pursue hedonistic goals. Representative of this outlook is the attitude found today in college students and young adults, whose lives are typically dominated by the pursuit of personal enjoyment and who generally regard the ethical norms of church and "adult" society as arbitrary and dehumanizing. Meeting one's responsibilities is often rationalized as merely putting on a required face for one's superiors rather than any expression of personal agreement with the principles underlying that need. Simply stated, the purpose for living this kind of existence is to enjoy oneself, and the individual's sense of self is rarely seen in moral or religious terms. For such a person, notions of morality, ethics, or religion figure in their lives largely in a materialistic way, as such he/she is usually incapable of committing to any set of beliefs originating outside his own experience. Such a person is ruled by mood, whim, imagination, or chance, and their greatest fear is boredom.[11] Their psychological profile is characterized by doubt or skepticism in a profound, existential way, and their sense of self presumes a given isolation from society.[12]

(2) Ethical Existence

In the second volume of *Either/Or*, strong criticism is presented against someone devoted to the aesthetic, amoral existence described above, and a case is made for the value of committing oneself to an ethically proper life. The argument against the aesthetic existence stems from the fact that living amorally prevents the individual from making long-term commitments, and a life without commitments leads to lack of purpose and psychological despair. In response, the path to true self-fulfillment is now sought in intentionally integrating into adult society by committing oneself to a series of confining relationships in marriage and work. Not only does one accept the validity of traditional norms of society but he/she gains a stake in history by devoting himself/herself to the enhancement and continuation of these norms for future generations. In contrast to the person living an aesthetic existence who resists or rejects norms of morality and ethics, in an ethical existence the individual embraces the responsibility of deciding what constitutes good and evil behavior, and thus people typically do not enter this phase until they have some

[11] See Kierkegaard's discussion on how to avoid boredom in the essay, "The Rotation of Crops," contained in Kierkegaard 1987, vol. I, pp. 281–300.

[12] The following outline of the three stages of existence is largely based on the summary provided by Rudd, especially Chapters 3 and 4.

decision-making experience as adults to draw from. Kierkegaard stresses the important role played here by *intentionality* and *choice*, or what he calls "choosing to will," which I understand to signify the choice to avoid or participate in what may be a complex or morally ambiguous situation and to assert one's will in how one lives with that choice and, if participating, rationalizes their subsequent judgments within the limits of their involvement. Clearly, the key element here is commitment to a certain way of life and accepting that the standards for judging that way of life are determined by a negotiation between social and personal realities. The purely subjective world of the aesthete is thus surrendered to the intersubjective realm of society.

While Kierkegaard notes that not everyone transitions from the aesthetic to the ethical, the normative nature of this move is implied when his authoritative fictional character, Judge William, stresses that personal satisfaction cannot be but in social terms, as ultimately we are a product of our society.[13] This transition begins when the importance of spontaneity in the aesthetic existence becomes overshadowed by a sense of hollowness before the ethical life and its offering of continuity and stability. Over time, an existence dominated by aesthetics leads not only to despair but even madness and suicide, and that freedom is easily sacrificed for a return to a participatory social identity with its promise to an individual, of a sense of personal balance that comes from membership in a community. But while the move to an ethical existence goes a long way to solving the anxiety associated with isolation, it also ushers in a new series of problems related to "practice." That is, while at this stage Kierkegaard does distinguish personal virtues from civic virtues, nevertheless as one's responsibility in the community grows, the individual is forced to grapple with determining precisely what is ethical and what is not, as well as how the most ethical choice should be properly implemented.

(3) Religious Existence

While an ethical existence initially suppresses the fundamental despair inherent in the human condition by providing a path to social integration via acceptance and validation by one's peers, it ultimately fails to satisfy us completely because it is based on dubious religious grounds that, when exposed, make it look capricious, unjust, and only of relative value. Because it naively assumes that we relate to religious truth—to God—primarily in an ethical way, "mainly by the simple performance of our social duties," the latent religious consciousness within the ethical individual will arise at some point and suggest

[13] Rudd 1993, p. 77.

to him that something significant is lacking because he is "not religious in any decisive sense."[14] On the one hand, as fundamentally a religious person, Kierkegaard simply could not abide the ultimate authority of any atheistic scheme of morality, as any such notion ultimately devolves into a Hegelian justification of the status quo. On the other hand, Kierkegaard viewed each individual as ultimately responsible for making sense of his own existence in a way that required him to confront and seek confirmation of his religious beliefs in a completely personal way. Ethics when it is merely ethics is therefore too limited, too unsubstantiated, too dependent upon society's need to maintain its own norms. If not through religion, then how does an individual find values, even ethical ones, that are not contingent, not conditional? Kant and especially Hegel presume a teleology of ethics based on the presumption of principles that are universal, rational and thereby discernible, and whose relationship with religion is more accidental than derivative. Kierkegaard's Judge William represents just such a view when he proclaims his satisfaction with who he is and what he is in his position atop society, where he can see how the value of religion lies in its authoritative support for the normative ethical and moral values of that society.

But Kierkegaard's own view is that the religion of Judge William is not religion at all, but a convenient social construct. True religion does not affirm what we know of ourselves and our world, it *disturbs* it. His textual proof for this is what the Jewish tradition calls the *akedah*, the story in Genesis where Abraham is called by God to sacrifice his son Isaac as a burnt offering. Discussed in detail in *Fear and Trembling* (1843), Kierkegaard concludes by taking a rather conservative interpretive stance, one of three found in traditional Jewish exegesis,[15] that regards Abraham's unquestioning acceptance of God's decree a towering achievement. For Kierkegaard, this marks Abraham as a "knight of faith" for all to emulate. In this story of the unassailable authority of the Biblical God directing a father to murder his son, Kierkegaard finds a revelation of what we might call the deep or esoteric structure of the ethico-religious conundrum, soaring like a rocket into the edifice of societal norms of morality and ethics otherwise justified by religion. He explains the significance of the story in this way:

> The story of Abraham contains, then, a teleological suspension of the ethical. As the single individual he became higher than the uni-

[14] Ibid., p. 116.

[15] On the traditional Jewish interpretations of the *akedah*, see Jacobs 1981, pp. 1–9.

versal. This is the paradox, which cannot be mediated.[16]

The "universal" here refers to Kant's notion of universal principles that define morality as such (*Moralität*), inherited and expanded in Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*. From this universal point of view, Abraham is a tragic figure, albeit a tragic hero because he has been chosen by God for this communication, who ends up in a situation where he cannot avoid committing infanticide. But in seeing Abraham instead as a "knight of faith," Kierkegaard is rejecting the tragic hero model and all it represents precisely because he wants to argue that a religious existence is one that must leave behind the ethical as an absolute *telos*. That this shifts the focus from the universal to the personal is what he identifies above as the paradox, but from the perspective of one living a religious existence, that paradox becomes moot the moment he leaps into the religious sphere. And it would appear that a leap is required here, for any discussion of the *akedah* story must recognize that Abraham was about to become a murderer, especially in that infanticide is condemned in numerous other places in the Hebrew Bible.

(4) Religiousness A and Religiousness B

Finally, we have the important split within religious existence between Religiousness A and Religiousness B, presented in *Sickness Unto Death* and further detailed in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Religiousness A represents the first stage of religious existence whereby subjectivity is no longer dependent upon an ethical *telos*; that is, the "finite is abandoned." Kierkegaard views this initial religious identity as a kind of "natural religion," a term that like the other nomenclature in his scheme, is initially used positively but later gives way to an outlook undeniably pejorative. For many this will take the form of Christianity. Natural religion, as defined by Kierkegaard, is characterized by immanence of the sacred and in this "existence" the individual seeks both "eternal happiness" and spiritual balance via a ritualized integration with an objectified sacred realm whereby the goal is realization of the self as part of that sacred realm. That this definition is appropriate for "primitive," typically animistic religions outside of Europe is explicit in Kierkegaard, but he also means it to apply to establishment Christianity as it was practiced in Europe (or at least Lutheran Europe) in his time. Although less ideal than Religiousness B, reaching Religiousness A is nevertheless a significant step, for abandoning the finite involves abandoning a definition of

[16] Kierkegaard 1983, p. 66.

self that up to that point had been deeply invested in that finite world, and this is painful, particularly when combined with the guilt that comes with the realization that the infinite cannot be totally embraced.

Religiousness B designates awareness of the true state of things. Here the sacred is defined not as Nature but as the creator God, and is *totally other*. This B stage is inconceivable except from the vantage point of A, for only the individual settled in Religiousness A realizes the implications of the fact that he inevitably stands imperfect before the sacred and that, despite his idealism, integration with it is impossible. It is at that moment that he opens up to Religiousness B. If Religiousness A brings on feelings of joy and affirmation, Religiousness B brings on "fear and trembling" and repentance before the absolute authority of God, for here it is abundantly clear that no amount of any "will to practice" can change the fact that one is weak and unable to completely love God in the way that God requests. Religiousness A, then, is religion that confirms identity, but Religiousness B is religion that disturbs it. It brings not peace but deep agitation, anxiety. This is life's despair, the "sickness unto death," but the realization that launches one into an existence at Religiousness B also illuminates a path to the resolution of that despair because of the new-found proximity to God. Religiousness B is what Kierkegaard calls "primitive Christianity" standing in opposition to Christendom, his term for the social phenomenon that uses Christ to promote a set of values that affirms social norms of morality, i.e., the Lutheran pietism of his native Denmark and most of northern Europe.

Subjectivity

A final point about subjectivity is in order, because this theme is so prevalent in both Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard often says "truth is subjectivity," which is his way of stating that the path to God is through subjectivity. Yet, this subjectivity always functions in a relationship of tension, not only with the world but also with the self itself. Levinas describes this as Kierkegaard's conviction that "human subjectivity, together with its dimension of interiority, needs to be maintained as an absolute," and notes Kierkegaard's fierce opposition to Hegel's efforts at reducing (elevating for Hegel) the subjective to an idealism in the form of transcendent Reason.[17] Yet, the experience of frustration in Religiousness A is, in some sense, a statement that this subjectivity itself is still not enough. Thus we have yet anoth-

[17] Emmanuel Levinas in Reé and Chamberlain 1998, pp. 26–27.

er paradox, for this realization

> . . . does not represent a return to objective philosophizing. On the contrary, it insists that, formally or ideally speaking, subjectivity is the truth—I only arrive at the relationship to God via a passionate concern to find meaning in my life, not via objective speculation. But, as a fallen creature, a sinner, wholly alienated from God, I am unable to relate to Him even through the most passionate subjectivity, for there is, from the start, a corruption, an "untruth" within me.[18]

For Kierkegaard, then, alongside the pervasive theme of despair or suffering, subjectivity is always at the heart of the argument. The religious existence could even be said to be characterized by a return to the subjectivity that also lies at the center of the aesthetic existence, but from the aesthetic viewpoint, the biblical message of Religiousness B is incomprehensible. At the level of Religiousness A, subjectivity means that I am aware of the presence of God and actively seek to deepen my relationship with him as the source of meaning in my life. This is described by Kierkegaard as a "dialectical inward deepening,"[19] that serves to establish a relationship between the self and the sacred. Religiousness B, on the other hand, begins where this dialectical movement is pushed aside entirely. That is, as subjectivity deepens, my pathos deepens, but the awareness of an internal "untruth" within my nature also deepens, ultimately revealing this to be the fundamental cause of my suffering. Kierkegaard thus describes a progression of "pathos awareness" that moves from resignation to suffering to guilt, the guilt coming from the realization that before God I am *not* true in my faith, however much I may will it to the contrary. It is here that the true relationship emerges wherein I see my absolute dependence upon God, in essence deconstructing the religion I managed to awaken to and took comfort in at the stage of Religiousness A. Religiousness B is therefore a religion of revelation rather than striving. It is so irrational that it cannot be known by any other means, to wit, "Religiousness A must be present to the individual before there can be any consideration of becoming aware of the dialectic of B."[20] It is not surprising, therefore, to read that by his own admission, Kierkegaard's "intention is to

[18] Rudd 1993, p. 159.

[19] Kierkegaard 1992a, p. 556.

[20] Ibid., p. 647.

make it difficult to become a Christian."[21]

Kiyozawa Manshi and Ethics in the Meiji Period

In 1863, eight years after Kierkegaard's death, Kiyozawa Manshi was born on the other side of the world into a low-ranking samurai family in Nagoya, Japan. Like Kierkegaard, his family was relatively devout but as a Japanese Buddhist, that meant more than one stream of learning. That is, from his father he learned Zen discipline, Zen literature, and Confucian philosophy, while his mother instilled in him the values of a pious follower of Jōdo Shinshū (浄土真宗, also referred to as Shinshū). When the Meiji Restoration in 1868 brought the end of privileges for the samurai class, his family was reduced to poverty. Left to the whims of a society in upheaval, Manshi experienced a decidedly unstable educational experience. The secular focus of this early schooling, combining the texts and values of late Edo period Neo-Confucianism with Meiji moral education and nationalism, was cut short at the age of fifteen when he was sent to a Buddhist secondary school in Kyoto run by the Ōtani branch of Jōdo Shinshū. Attracted by the promise of temple scholarships for bright students, he was also ordained at that time. Academic achievement and Honganji support led to his admission and matriculation at Tokyo Imperial University, where he joined the first generation of Japanese to study Western Philosophy under Ernest Fenollosa. While a few European philosophers in Kierkegaard's time did take a hard look at Buddhism, most notably Schopenhauer, there is no evidence of any Buddhist ideas in Kierkegaard's writings and it is unlikely he would have been attracted to the atheism of Schopenhauer. Kiyozawa, on the other hand, needed to become familiar with the basics of Christian theology to succeed in his philosophy studies, and while living in Tokyo in the 1880s he undoubtedly encountered the first wave of generally intolerant Christian missionaries whose ideas poured into Japan along with other new concepts in science, technology, social and political culture. Ethics was of great concern to the leaders of Japanese society both in *bakumatsu* and Meiji political culture and, aside from references to the emperor cult, the values promoted in the Imperial Rescript on Education were not appreciably different from what was taught in the *tera-koya*, or local temple schools, before the Restoration. What changed in the Meiji period was that ethical and moral education was now grounded in a new kind of nationalism as expressed in terms like *kokutai* and *kokka*. In addition

[21] Ibid., p. 557.

to the promotion of literacy and the creation of a national language, one of the prime goals of the powerful Ministry of Education, newly formed in 1871, was the creation of normative cultural values that strongly encouraged identification with the nation-state among people at all levels of society.

Much like Kierkegaard's Denmark, in Kiyozawa's Japan ethical rhetoric was tethered to, nay, anchored by a religious discourse that flowed from society's leaders, including university professors, though many intellectuals saw this to be of dubious legitimacy. But a major difference between their situations is that whereas ethics in Denmark was largely defined by the Danish State Church whose pietistic Lutheranism also dominated the Kierkegaard family, the religious basis of ethics promoted by the Japanese Ministry of Education in Kiyozawa's time was defined as Shinto, while the Kiyozawa family subscribed to Buddhist views, albeit with some diversity. Thus while both grew up in devout households, during Kiyozawa's youth his government expressed open antipathy toward his family's religion, and as a child he experienced the infamous *haibutsu kishaku* persecution between 1868 and 1873 that sought to weaken Buddhism's influence in Japan in order to promote State Shinto. This meant such things as the legal appropriation of temple land and art objects, the purging of Buddhist elements from Shinto shrines and rituals, and various public steps taken to discredit the Saṅgha.

But despite the initial enmity between his church and the State, as a young adult Kiyozawa came to take a critical stance toward his home institution, a stance decidedly similar to that of Kierkegaard. Entrenched socially and doctrinally, with deeply held political and financial interests in the status quo since the sixteenth century, by the mid-1880s when Kiyozawa began to write for publication as a graduate student, this long-standing conservatism led both Nishi and Higashi Honganji to find their way back into the graces of the new ruling class. Unlike Kierkegaard, Kiyozawa had no inheritance and, feeling relatively comfortable in a university setting, he fully intended to make a career for himself teaching philosophy. In 1887, while still an undergraduate at Tokyo Imperial University, he served as co-editor for the first five issues of the new journal *Tetsugakkai zasshi* 哲學會雜誌 (Journal of the Philosophy Association), put out by the academic group Tetsugakkai launched by his elder classmate Inoue Enryō, and was accepted into graduate school majoring in philosophy of religion. But in 1888, at the age of twenty-five, he was asked by Higashi Honganji to return to Kyoto to become principal of a middle school and lecturer at the Takakura Gakuryō, which functioned as a seminary for Higashi Honganji. That meant leaving school before finishing and

though he only remained in that position for two years, he never returned to graduate school. Upon returning to Kyoto as a young scholar and working in the midst of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the *honzan*, he soon became critical of an overzealousness on the part of many Buddhist clergy ready to compromise with the prevailing nationalist rhetoric in hopes of regaining their status in society, as well as with the many intellectuals who advocated that Japan jettison its Buddhist values in a fawning reverence for Western notions of "rational morality."

Kiyozawa's first published writings on ethics, for example, were apologia for Buddhist theories of karma directed at the Meiji elite Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916), who ridiculed the Buddhist idea that retribution for good and bad acts could come "naturally."[22] As a founding member of the Meirokusha, president of Tokyo Imperial University, member of the Diet and advisor to the Emperor, Katō found a broad audience in his promotion of utilitarianism, Spencer's mechanistic positivism, and social Darwinism as the right philosophies for turning Japanese society into a modern nation as powerful as Great Britain. The debate between them reminds us although Buddhist thinkers have not been traditionally sensitive to specific problems of ethics or morality, that has not always been the case. And given the political circumstances within which Kiyozawa lived, when centuries of tacit government support for Buddhism's influence on society was being overturned in service of a new ethic of material competition and rising xenophobia, one wonders if Kiyozawa's felt need to speak out on religion and ethics may have merely been a convenient vehicle for him to reassert the importance of traditional Buddhist values in a new and more relevant context. He was not the only person to publish tracts opposing Katō's positions,[23] but at a time when a reasoned argument based on the contribution of Buddhism to social cohesion and responsibility would have served him well, his career-imperiling conclusion

[22] Katō's views are found in a number of articles in *Tetsugaku zasshi* 哲學雜誌, such as "Ningen to shizen shinkaron 人間ト自然進化論 (Humans and Natural Evolution)," 3:36, "Bukkyō ni iwayuru zen'aku no inga ōhō ha shinri ni arazu 佛教ニ所謂善悪ノ因果應報ハ眞理ニアラズ (Buddhist so-called Retribution for Good and Evil is Not the Truth)," 10:100 (1895). Kiyozawa published his counter-arguments in the same journal in two pieces: "Katō sensei ni tadasu 加藤先生ニ質ス (Asking Professor Katō)," 10:102 and "Zen'aku no inga ōhō ron ni tsuite futatabi Katō sensei ni tadasu 善悪の因果應報論に付て再ひ加藤先生に質す (Asking Professor Katō Again Regarding the Buddhist Theory of Retribution for Good and Evil)," 10:106. The last two can be found in *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū*, vol. 2 (Iwanami Shoten, 2002), pp. 293-306.

[23] Ikeda 1980, pp. 259–262, also cites Inoue Enryō, Ōnishi Hajime, and Kashiwagi Gien.

that the real significance of ethics lay in how its ambiguity serves as a vehicle for religious insight is quite remarkable, and remarkably close to that of Kierkegaard. Let us now consider how Kiyozawa came to that conclusion.

Kiyozawa's Writings on Ethics and Religion

Kiyozawa's writings on ethics can be roughly broken down into two periods: a cluster that appears in the years 1891–92 (Meiji 24–25), written at the end of his twenties, and another group of writings that begins in 1899 and continues until his death in 1903 at the age of forty-one. The early writings, some of which only appeared posthumously, are collected in volume three of both the Hōzōkan and Iwanami Shoten editions of his collected works.[24] These essays reflect Kiyozawa's interest in prevailing trends in European philosophy as understood in Japan, and although his religious concerns are evident, they rarely address specifically Buddhist problems. The latter collection of essays displays a passion lacking in the former and he has dropped any hesitation previously held about arguing from the perspective of Buddhism and Jōdo Shinshū in particular. The first set of essays therefore appears to be written for a more general audience, whereas the second group reflects his stature as leader of his *Seishin-shugi* 精神主義 movement and reads like well-argued testimonials directed to his disciples. All these works are relevant to ascertaining Kiyozawa's thoughts on the meaning and role of ethics for the individual and society, but two stand out as particularly mature statements on the relationship between ethics and religion: "Shūkyō to dōtoku to no sōkan 宗教と道徳との相関 (Interrelationship of Religion and Morality; hereafter abbreviated as *Interrelationship*)," published in the journal *Mujintō* 無盡燈 (Inexhaustible Lamp) in 1899, and "Shūkyōteki dōtoku (zokutai) to futsū dōtoku to no kōshō 宗教的道徳（俗諦）と普通道徳との交渉 (Negotiating Religious Morality and Ordinary Morality; hereafter abbreviated as *Negotiating*)," published in the *Seishinkai* in 1903.[25] *Negotiating* was writ-

[24] Akegarasu Haya and Nishimura Kengyō, eds., *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* (Hōzōkan, 1953); Ōtani Daigaku, ed., *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* (Iwanami Shoten, 2002-03). In the former edition, Kiyozawa's writings on ethics are in volumes 3 and 6, with this early group gathered under the title "Rinri kenkyū 倫理研究." The latter edition divides the essays differently, but they are also found in volumes 3 and 6, with most of the early pieces under a similar rubric, "Rinrigaku 倫理学." References in this essay will be to the latter edition, abbreviated as KMZ.

[25] "Shūkyō to dōtoku to no sōkan," in KMZ, vol. 6, pp. 223-34; "Shūkyōteki dōtoku (zokutai) to futsū dōtoku to no kōshō," in KMZ, vol. 6, pp. 148-58.

ten after the recurrence of tuberculosis, the illness that eventually took his life, and ends with the colophon: "Written after illness has struck, I extend my apologies for passages where a certain roughness was unavoidable." It is quite likely that he wrote this tract in a state of mind accepting his imminent death. As such, it serves as his final statement on this topic, and stands alongside the famous "Waga shinnen"—also written in the same period—in defining his religious perspective. Whether or not the inferred premise that Kiyozawa chose to write about the problem of ethics and religion during his final days because of its importance to him is true, it cannot be denied that this essay has been largely overshadowed by the attention given "Waga shinnen." *Negotiating* also includes discussion of the Shinshū interpretation of the two-truth theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism, a controversial issue at the time because it was often used by Meiji Buddhists to rationalize the government's imperialistic policies.[26]

Before considering Kierkegaard's three- or four-stage schema in terms of Kiyozawa's thought, let us first look at how Kiyozawa typically framed the problem of ethics and religion. In general, three basic questions may be gleaned from his writings:

(1) Subjectively viewed, where can we locate the authority for our ethical judgments?
(2) What is the proper relationship between religion and ethics?
(3) What standpoint should Jōdo Shinshū take on the issue of ethics?

(1) Ethical Authority

The question of ethical authority is something that Kiyozawa studied in Kant and Hegel, but his view of this issue is more focused on practical matters rather than the kind of idealism seen in those two thinkers. Echoing Kierkegaard, in *Negotiating* Kiyozawa asks what happens when an individual who has relied upon a heretofore wonderfully built ethical system in his heart, unexpectedly finds it does not apply well to a problem before him. That person's ethics may be based on universal principles (Kant), perfectly rational (Hegel), and have served him/her well for years until this moment, but Kiyozawa's point is that *any* ethical system—regardless of its basis—can prove disfunctional when confronted with a serious dilemma. Living in a time of great social change, Kiyozawa notes that established notions of good and evil (*zen'aku* 善悪) in one country may not be acceptable in another, and even within the same country the content of what is deemed good or acceptable

[26] See Shigaraki 1988, pp. 7–88. See also Kawamoto 1988, pp. 147–173.

frequently changes over time. His conclusion is that creating a truly universal system of ethics that would function well in all cultures at all moments in history is impossible.

In fact, Kiyozawa expressed much the same sentiment a decade earlier in the essay "Gentoku 原徳 (Ethical Principles)" written in 1891, the contents of which are summarized in a section of his better-known *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu* 宗教哲学骸骨 of 1892, translated as *Skeleton*.[27] In the former piece, he begins by considering the problem of *ryōshin* 良心 or "conscience" for Japan. The word *ryōshin* (Ch. *liangxin*) was used by Mencius to designate an inherent ability to judge right from wrong, and became an important concept in the Neo-Confucian thought of Zhuxi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1528); it was also settled upon in the Meiji period to translate the Western concept of "conscience." If Kiyozawa was aware of the Western overlay on *ryōshin*, he does not mention it; he makes no reference to Luther's religious use of the term conscience as the mechanism by which man knows his sinful nature. Instead he presupposes *ryōshin* to be a kind of natural moral compass that requires honing or tuning to one's contemporary surroundings, analyzing the five Confucian relationships in terms of where people in contemporary Japan go to seek authoritative systems of thought for their ethical judgments. He offers four prevailing "principles" (changed to "standards" in *Skeleton*): utilitarianism (*kōri shugi* 功利主義), intuitionism (*chokkaku kyō* 直覚教), rigorism (*genshuku shugi* 厳粛主義), and rationalism (*dōri kyō* 道理教). His methodology was to analyze each theory in terms of their pragmatic effect upon "conscience" in terms of three ethically relevant "principles" and across three aspects of each. The three ethical principles are (1) how [they affect] the relative pain or joy of the conscience, (2) how they clarify the operational understanding of good and evil, i.e., what is their pragmatic value, and (3) can they lead to the sublime goal of the highest infinitude. The three aspects are the beginning standpoint, progress toward the goal, and whether or not they reach their intended goal. Of course, the "people" seeking authority for their ethical values here, are not fishermen or rice farmers, as this essay is really intended as a critique of all four "-isms" or principles named above, commonly debated among students of Western philosophy in Japan at that time.

[27] "Gentoku" (in KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 347-51) is in Hōzōkan edition vol. 3, pp. 307-11under the title "Rinri no gensoku, 倫理の原則"; *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu* (Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion) is in KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 3-107. The English translation of *Skeleton* (KMZ, vol. 1, pp. 109-50) is by Noguchi Zenshirō with significant revisions by Kiyozawa himself.

Although he does not name sources, his description of utilitarianism identifies good with pleasure, evil with pain, and thus can be traced directly to Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and perhaps John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Kiyozawa finds the utilitarian viewpoint plausible as a starting point, but it offers no system for helping the individual progress to reach spiritual goals. Standing in opposition to utilitarianism is intuitionism, where good is not deduced from analyzing experience but sensed internally, and here Kiyozawa is probably reflecting the ideas of Zhuxi, Wang Yangming, Shaftesbury (1671–1713) and possibly G.E. Moore (1873–1958).[28] Kiyozawa argues the principle that one's intuition can clarify good and evil for us but is incapable of being the vehicle of progress, and hence will fail to be the means to understanding higher truth. Rigorism rejects the hedonism of the utilitarians, instead opting for strict adherence to established morals, and is not only identified with the Stoics but also linked to Kant because in this perspective established morals and ethics are justified by their very operational presence. This category is changed in *Skeleton* to the biblical sounding "divine-will theory" (神意を標準とする宗教の説), which he defines as moral rules based on scripture, but this suggests that he intended rigorism to represent traditional Buddhist, Shinto, and Confucian norms of morality. Naturally disposed to self-discipline himself, Kiyozawa esteems the discipline and practical applicability of rigorism, but doubts it can bring one to realize *anjin* (安心), or personal liberation. In his response to rigorism, we may infer something of the inevitable conflict between the faith of his mother and that of his father, with his mother's *tariki* (他力 other-power) side prevailing; in fact his response to all four ethical positions reflects a deep commitment to the Pure Land perspective. Although the term *dōri* (道理) in the Meiji period has many meanings and some even used the word *dōrikyō* to represent Buddhism,[29] his gloss in *Skeleton* points to the primacy of rational principles, and thus probably represents thinkers like Descartes (1596–1650), Leibniz (1646–1716), Kant and Hegel. In this category, moral truth is discernible through reason. Kiyozawa rejects rationalism as well, because it only illuminated the process, the progression, but not the goal.

[28] However Moore's major treatise on intuitionism, *Principia Ethica*, was not published until 1903.

[29] Shaku Sōen uses *dōrikyō* as a gloss for Buddhism as a "teaching based on principles" to contrast it with *tenkeikyō* (天啓教), or religious "teachings based on revelation from a god." See Chapter 3 of Shaku 1909, pp. 6–9.

Unlike his later essays that attempt to look at how the ethical and religious dimensions impact each other, in "Gentoku" the two have somewhat disparate concerns:

> It is essential that the goal of an explanation of true ethical principles (真正の道義) clarifies the three matters of objective (目的), process (行程), and foundation (立脚). The objective should yield *anjin*, the process should indicate the reasons, and the foundation must determine the actual situation. Yet among these three, only the foundation [aspect] may be elucidated solely in terms of ethics; the other two cannot possibly be interpreted without recourse to religion.[30]

What marks this essay as something more than philosophy is Kiyozawa's criterion of *anjin*, a term denoting Buddhist liberation (sometimes used as a synonym for the spiritual goal of *shinjin*[信心]in Shinshū). This shows how even in this early, philosophical period, Kiyozawa saw and ultimately judged the value of any ethical system in terms of its religious benefit.

(2) Religion and Ethics

Another essay from the first period of Kiyozawa's ethical writings that presages his deep concern for the relationship between ethics and religion in his final writings, is entitled "Shinsei no dōtoku 真正の道徳 (Morality of Truth)," written either in 1891 or 1892.[31] Reflecting both his encounter with ethics as a central theme in European philosophy and the political situation in Japan, Kiyozawa puts aside his own renunciative sentiments[32] in this short piece and concedes that morality is of utmost importance for individuals in order to function properly in society. He then critiques the rational morals and ethics devoid of any religious basis that are extolled by the utilitarians and social Darwinians because, he asserts, morality is finite and like all finite phenomena, it is controlled (統制) by means of infinite forces. Hence, moral instruction without a religious foundation only prepares people to deal with what is immediately confronting them, rendering them unable to think and act for long-term, higher objectives and thus dulling their sensitivity to religious truths.

"Shinsei no dōtoku" also presents an interesting analysis of how *jiriki* (自

[30] "Gentoku," KMZ, vol. 1, p. 351.

[31] "Shinsei no dōtoku," in KMZ, vol. 3, pp. 264-67.

[32] This was his "minimum possible" period when he was devoted to asceticism.

力 self-power) religion and *tariki* religion approach ethics or, in Kiyozawa's approach, what ethics means to each form of religion. Reflecting Japanese terminology since the Kamakura period, *jiriki* religion refers to "traditional" forms of Buddhism wherein keeping monastic precepts and self-discipline aim at self-transformation to bring the individual to the goal of buddhahood; *tariki* religion denotes a position where lack of faith in the *jiriki* path motivates the believer to direct his attention and practice to access powers beyond the known self, which usually means promises of assistance from buddhas and celestial bodhisattvas. Kiyozawa glosses *jiriki* religion as "attempting to reach the Infinite by means of personal training." In that the *jiriki* focus is on "training the finite person," morals are immediately relevant because they are part of that training (they form an important component of the Buddhist precepts, for example). This path is limited in its applicability, however, in that a person devoted to a *jiriki* religious existence shows little regard for moral questions outside the realm of his training. Turning to the *tariki* religious existence, Kiyozawa defines this as "using the power of the Infinite to enable one to reach the Infinite." A person on this path is concerned about following the instructions manifest from the "sacred essence" and simply "does not worry himself about any other [behavioral] requirements." Before he looks seriously at questions of ethics and morality relevant to the finite world, a person of *tariki* religion typically must reach his religious goal of an "immovably pacified mind" based on the Infinite. This essay is therefore characterized by Kiyozawa's strong support for the tradition of morals playing a prominent role in the *jiriki* path.[33] The *tariki* path needs to keep the moral/ethical sphere separate from the religious one but should not denigrate it as a result. Borrowing a classic metaphor, Kiyozawa refers to them as two wings of a bird.[34] He concludes by stating, "Therefore if someone seeks a religion wherein morality is established as something separate, it is clear that they can only choose a *tariki* religion." In other words, *tariki*-based religions are the only ones wherein moral concerns do not interfere with the goal of religious experience. This sentiment is explained more elegantly in *Interrelationship*, which

[33] This stance seems to reflect his respect for the traditions of early Indian Buddhism and their traces among the Japanese schools, particularly Zen. In the early formulations of praxis such as the Eightfold Path, various forms of practice were often collected under three categories: morality (*śīla*), wisdom (*prajñā*), and meditation (*dhyāna*).

[34] Metaphors like "two wings of a bird" or "two wheels of a cart" were often used in late Heian and Kamakura period writings to describe the relationship in Japanese society between the political realm and the Buddhist realm, usually termed *ōbō-buppō* 王法仏法 (king's law and buddha's law).

we will look at below, but it is worth noting here how remarkable this statement is for the early 1890s, when a great many leaders in society regarded ethics as commensurate with, if not more significant, than religion.

Kiyozawa's strong advocacy of the *tariki* position, coupled with the fact that he presents no other rubric for religious typology in this context, suggests a comparison with the Religiousness A–B model of Kierkegaard. By way of clarification, it should be mentioned that when Kiyozawa extols the *tariki* path as the only religious form that is not hindered by moral/ethical concerns, he is talking about Pure Land Buddhism. Not only is he excluding other forms of Buddhism practiced in Japan such as Zen, Tendai, Shingon, and Kegon but Christianity is never suggested here, either. Although in Kierkegaard, ethical attitudes are central to the discussion of the aesthetic and the ethical, his first two forms of "existence," ethics clearly takes a secondary role in both Religiousness A and B because these categories are defined by the individual having attained a state when ethics ceases to be "an absolute *telos*." In that Kiyozawa also looks at the significance of ethical concerns for Buddhism in "Shinsei no dōtoku" as a component of the religious path rather than its goal, he and Kierkegaard share the same perspective; in other words, for Kiyozawa, too, ethics brings out our commitment from a sense of responsibility that is both public and personal, but it should never be considered an absolute *telos*.

Interrelationship, written some eight years later, is a more considered, more elaborate look at this same question of ethics and religion. Here, Kiyozawa presents us with more concrete examples of the discourse concerning ethics among Japanese intellectuals at that time, that is, over the decade from 1892 to 1902. He first examines the standpoint where religious individuals should serve the cause of social ethics, then the view that ethics should serve the interests of religion, and then the sort of fusion outlook that regards them as actually the same—that is, the rational and irrational aspects of the same "gestalt." But his critical apparatus reveals he has moved to a position more radical than what we saw above, for now he states unambiguously that religion and ethics are best kept separate. Outlined in charts and descriptive definitions, Kiyozawa frames the issue as two distinct problems: ethics as the relationship between individuals, and religion as the relationship between an individual and the Absolute. Both are complex and difficult to discern in their own way but, stressing the subjective nature of the religious problem, in content they are fundamentally different. Therefore ethics should be addressed and taught by specialists who focus on human relations, and we should look

to the professional religious for questions pertaining to that realm. Man is composed of both a finite (ethical) and an infinite (religious) nature, and his deep concern for both thus reflects something intrinsic in his existence. But in a statement that shows a consistency with his essays written ten years earlier, Kiyozawa states with conviction that whatever is relative and finite in an ultimate sense "is dependent in all ways upon the Absolute, Infinite existence."[35]

In a statement reminiscent of Kierkegaard, in *Interrelationship* Kiyozawa states that we are naturally drawn to ethics as an authoritative system of thought and behavior not for religious reasons but from the desire for self-fulfillment. Thus, the order of our understanding and commitment is one that begins in the search for individual fulfillment, and this leads to heightened ethical concerns in the hopes of finding satisfaction in taking obligatory and responsible action, calling to mind Kierkegaard's move from the aesthetic to the ethical existence. But, as Kiyozawa then points out, one often experiences a disparity between ethical ideals and ethical action. The more serious one is about ethics, the more frustrated and insecure one becomes when trying to live the ethically correct life. This inevitably alienates the individual from his/her devotion to the ethical, leading to a deep appreciation for religious concerns. Beginning with *Interrelationship* and then further developed in *Negotiating*, we are thus walking a path that runs parallel to that of Kierkegaard, not only regarding the process of how one is devoted to first ethics, and then to religion, but also in explaining *why*. This is not to say that either Kierkegaard or Kiyozawa abandons ethical concerns altogether, but in struggling to explain the psychology of how an individual finds meaning through personal religious insight independent of participation in an institutional religious tradition, both men require a certain rejection of socially normative behavior. Seen from the perspective of the problem of how one subjectively comes to religious liberation, then, the value of ethics manifests from an individual's subjective need for meaning rather than as a natural expression of truth, religious or otherwise, and thus in essays like *Interrelationship* and *Negotiating*, ethics is treated as something ultimately instrumental.

(3) The Shinshū View of Ethics

Kiyozawa's effort at clarifying his position of the relation between religion and ethics, reaches its peak in three essays: "Rinri ijō no an'i 倫理以上の安慰

[35] KMZ, vol. 6, p. 232.

(The Solace Beyond Ethics),"[36] written in 1902, "Rinri ijō no konkyo 倫理以上の根據 (The Authority Beyond Ethics)"[37] and *Negotiating*, both composed just months before his death in 1903. Although he had written about *jiriki* and *tariki* ethics previously, in "Rinri ijō no an'i" he brings Shinran's voice into the discussion of ethics for the first time, probably reflecting his own confrontation with finitude. Here Kiyozawa quotes what is now a famous statement attributed to Shinran, "I know nothing about the dual matter of good and evil," taken from the epilogue of the *Tannishō*, a text Kiyozawa is credited with bringing back into Shinshū orthodoxy. Here is the complete passage in the *Tannishō*:

> Our Venerable Teacher said, 'I know nothing about the dual matter of good and evil. For, were I to thoroughly understand what good is in the same way that the Tathāgata Amida considers this matter in his own mind, then I would [certainly] know when something was good. Were I to thoroughly understand evil in the same way that the Tathāgata understands it, then I would know when something was evil. But as a foolish being besotted with mental afflictions (*kleśa*), [I find that] whatever is said about anything in this burning house of an impermanent world is not to be believed; nothing is genuine (*makoto*). Only the nenbutsu alone is genuine.[38]

Kiyozawa's gloss on this statement illustrates its relevance for religion and ethics. He explains that the passage instructs the believer

> to throw off all notions of self, lift up the mind and hurl it into the ocean of the Tathāgata, wherein all things become the work of the majestic power of the Tathāgata, distinctions as to right and wrong or good and evil disappear even further, and all one can see is the activity of this majestic power.[39]

In other words, until *anjin*, or religious attainment, is achieved, on what basis are we to have confidence in our ethical judgments? Here Kiyozawa does not

[36] Ibid., pp. 121-24.

[37] Ibid., pp. 132-34.

[38] T. No. 2661, 85.734c20, *Shinshū seiten*, pp. 640-41 and elsewhere. Compare with translations of the *Tannishō* by Taitetsu Unno, *Tannisho: A Shin Buddhist Classic* (Honolulu: Buddhist Study Center Press: 2nd rev. ed., 1996), 34; and *The Collected Works of Shinran* vol. I, p. 679.

[39] KMZ, vol. 6, p. 122.

entertain even the possibility of a telos of ethics prior to religious awakening, although he was of course aware that that is precisely what some of his contemporaries such as Katō Hiroyuki were doing. Kiyozawa's rhetoric of urging his readers to cast off self and mind into the ocean of the Buddha is strikingly active, more of a piece with later Kyoto School thinkers like Nishida and Nishitani than the usual depictions of Shinshū religiosity as passivily acceptance of the workings of the Buddha. In Kierkegaard's theology of the absolute transcendence of God standing over the individual, we instead see a stress on the *given* fact that "this single human being is *before God*."[40] On the other hand, this abandoning of self brings a result that is very much akin to the Religiousness B we saw above; that is, total reliance on the transcendent other, the source of infinite knowledge and truth. Returning to the "Rinri ijō no an'i," after his statement about the admitted inability to discern good and evil, Kiyozawa then asks what the limits of ethical responsibility would reasonably be for someone so honest about their inability to discern right from wrong. Would such an attitude permit that person to take any action without consequences—could he kill his parents, for example? He answers that the fact that such questions arise reflects a common misunderstanding of human behavior, for the motivation for something like murder stems from a strong assertion of self while he is advocating a world-view where the sense of self within the individual is completely gone.

If we lay the rhetoric structure of the above essay next to Kierkegaard's model of aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence in two stages, it would appear that Kiyozawa is moving in a similar pattern except that he is skipping the Religiousness A step and jumping directly from ethical existence to the final stage of religious existence, Religiousness B. But in fact *jiriki* Buddhism plays the corresponding role of Kierkegaard's Religiousness A, for Kiyozawa recognizes it as legitimate religious awareness but limited in its reward, ultimately most valuable for clarifying what is special about *tariki* Buddhism. The lack of a detailed description of the experience of *jiriki* religion is probably due to a more direct approach characteristic of his final years rather than any disparagement toward it. That is, missing in these late essays is the careful delineation that we saw in his earlier writings of how the *jiriki* and *tariki* aspects of Buddhism would approach the problem of ethics and religion differently, as Kiyozawa's concerns are dominated by a new urgency to communicate the Shinshū point of view. This intensity is perhaps most

[40] Kierkegaard 1980, p. 117.

pronounced in *Negotiating*, his final essay on this topic.

In *Negotiating* the specific Shinshū spiritual attainment known as *shinjin* enters the ethical discussion for the first time. Admittedly, in "Gentoku" Kiyozawa frequently resorts to the term *anjin* to express the Buddhist notion of liberation or attainment, and this term does have an identity in the writings of Rennyo and other Pure Land thinkers in Japan, stemming from the Hōnen tradition. But *anjin*, the "pacified mind," is rather a generic term for awakening or emancipation in East Asian Buddhism as a whole, and is not uncommon in Zen writings, for example. But with few exceptions, *shinjin*, or "the believing (or "entrusting") mind" is a term specific to Shinran and the lineage stemming from him.[41] So although in content the two words may be interchangeable when Kiyozawa discusses the relationship of religion and ethics to *shinjin*, he is specifically indicating the Shinshū perspective in *Negotiating*.

As one reads *Negotiating*, it becomes clear that Kiyozawa has reached a point of frustration on the subject of ethics. As pointed out above, it is not a rejection of the value of ethics per se (as some have misunderstood), but a revulsion toward the authority placed in systems of ethics that have no plausible religious or philosophical grounding. As he reminds his readers more than once, notions of right and wrong are generally driven by social conditions rather than deep insight into human nature; for that reason they are mutable and their mutable nature precludes them from any *religious* authority. The paradoxes inherent in ethical idealism both in discerning what the most responsible ethical response should be for a given problem and in the actual carrying out of the "proper" action in the expression of that response, stem from this lack of transcendent authority. Kiyozawa offers a compromise solution here: let the professional ethicists be responsible for ethics rather than the professional religious. An ethicist devotes his/her life to studying the conditions of society and is thus in the best position to argue what ethical standards are most appropriate for that society. A monk or nun, on the other hand, is devoted to penetrating the meaning of the Dharma for the purpose of liberating himself/herself and others from the dilemmas and defilements of their own consciousnesses. One is a social matter, taking place on the plane of human relations; the other is internal and intensely personal, focusing on prob-

[41] The word *shinjin* was used by other Pure Land thinkers in the Kamakura period in the Hōnen lineage, but although it later became a key concept for Shinran's Jōdo Shinshū, it was never adopted by Jōdoshū, the other major Pure Land school in Japan and has thus come to resonate particularly strongly with believers in that tradition.

lems within the mind of an individual. The ethicist is no more qualified to teach religion than the monk is to teach ethics.

We know from other writings that Kiyozawa was also frustrated at the Buddhist clergy. In "Bukkyōsha, nanzo jichō sezaruya 仏教者盍自重乎 (Buddhists, Why do you Lack Self-Respect?),"[42] he rails at the obsequiousness of monks toward government officials and the wealthy. Living at a time when the curriculum for ethical instruction was mandated by the Ministry of Education and that the curriculum had strongly political overtones, it is not surprising that Kiyozawa would define the "sphere of ethics" as something only social (i.e., secular) in nature, as he does in *Negotiating*. To those unsympathetic with the government's expansionist policies, the concept of ethics in late-Meiji Japan probably seemed like little more than obligatory political ideology. Thus, his critique of the role of monks as teachers of morals and ethics is not only motivated by a need to remind his readership of the importance of each person clarifying their own religious identities, but also to admonish the Buddhist clergy to return to their primary obligation: serving the spiritual needs of the people, accomplished by putting Buddhist values first, by making efforts to deepen their own spirituality through the study and practice of things religious, and by making themselves available to their communities in these roles.

The way Kiyozawa contrasts the ethical and the religious realms in all these essays is strikingly similar to Kierkegaard's description of the process whereby an individual's identity undergoes a change from being dominated by ethical to religious concerns. It can thus be argued that we are essentially seeing the same values at work in both thinkers. Given that Kiyozawa was born less than a decade after Kierkegaard's death, this inevitably brings forth the question as to whether Kiyozawa could have known of Kierkegaard's ideas and thus, been influenced by him. Let us now consider that possibility.

Kierkegaard in Meiji Japan

Although philosophers and scholars of comparative religion have found much to compare and contrast between Kierkegaard and Shinran, I am not aware of any study that considers the possible influence of Kierkegaard on any specific thinker, Shinshū or otherwise, in the Meiji period. It is therefore understandable that no one has thus far considered the possibility of Kierkegaardian influence upon Kiyozawa. Indeed the obvious signs of interest in Kierkegaard

[42] KMZ, vol. 7, pp. 139-44

in Japan prior to Kiyozawa's death in 1903 are absent: the first published essay title in Japanese that includes Kierkegaard's name does not appear until 1906, the first Japanese translation of Kierkegaard not until 1911, and the first monograph devoted to Kierkegaard (written by Watsuji Tetsurō) is not published until 1915.[43] Moreover, there is no mention of Kierkegaard in any of Kiyozawa's writings and no evidence of Kierkegaard's viewpoint in Kiyozawa's outline of religious philosophy presented in the *Skeleton*.

But that presumption needs to be reconsidered. *Skeleton* was published in 1892, the same period of his first essays on ethics, but some seven years before the appearance of his mature ethical writings that are characterized by a more prominent role for religion. Moreover, it has been shown that in writing *Skeleton*, Kiyozawa relied heavily on an English translation of a two-volume history of philosophy by Friedrich Uberweg, particularly in discussing how different philosophers have understood religion, and Uberweg's work does indeed discuss Kierkegaard, albeit not in any great detail.[44] There is also evidence that after 1895 (and particularly after 1901) a number of specific people connected with the philosophy program at then Tokyo Imperial University began to look at Kierkegaard as a result of greater attention directed toward him in Europe, and there are enough connections between some of these individuals and Kiyozawa to suggest the likelihood that Kiyozawa also learned about Kierkegaard through contact with them. Although Kiyozawa himself did not travel to Europe, many of these individuals did, and as an avid student of trends in European thought, it is entirely plausible that Kiyozawa also learned about Kierkegaard at the end of the 1890s when such travel became more common. Here is what we known about the flow of Kierkegaardian ideas into Japan in the six or seven years prior to Kiyozawa's death in 1903.

The story begins within Denmark itself. The first serious effort to rehabilitate Kierkegaard after his death was made by the Danish writer Georg Brandes (1842–1927), a literary scholar and critic who, though raised as an atheistic Jew, was deeply shaken as a young man upon reading Kierkegaard.[45]

[43] Watsuji 1915.

[44] There is a copy of this English translation in the list of books in Kiyozawa's library, so we know that he had his own personal copy. Although the date of that work is not known, Kierkegaard is mentioned on p. 346 of vol. 2 of Friedrich Uberweg, *History of Philosophy, from Thales to the Present Time*, tr. G. Morris (New York: Scribner & Armstrong: 1874). On Kiyozawa's utilization of Uberweg, see Patricia Honda, "Kiyozawa Manshi and the *Skeleton of the Philosophy of Religion*," unpublished M.A. thesis, Otani University.

[45] His full name was Georg Morris Cohen Brandes. See Hertel and Kristensen 1980. See also Anderson 1990 and Nolin 1976.

The publication in 1877 of Brandes' monograph, *Søren Kierkegaard: A Critical Presentation in Outline Form*, which takes the form of a psychological biography, was not only "the first of its kind in Kierkegaard research,"[46] but also a milestone in Denmark as a work of modern, critical thinking. By 1879, Brandes' work had already appeared in German translation.

Influenced by Brandes' study was Harald Høffding (1843–1931), arguably the most influential Danish philosopher of the second-half of the nineteenth century. In 1882, he published *An Outline of Psychology on the Basis of Experience and Ethics*,[47] and in 1888, *Outlines of Ethics*.[48] In 1887 and 1888, these were both published in German translation. They appeared in English as early as 1891,[49] and the English translation of *An Outline of Psychology* was purchased by the Tokyo Imperial University Library. Japanese students of philosophy began to read Høffding soon after these translations appeared, and Kierkegaard's thought is featured in both works. Evidence of Høffding's impact in Japan can be found in the fact that Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944), who had studied in Germany between 1884 and 1890 and later became a professor of philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University upon his return, payed a visit to Høffding at his home in Copenhagen in 1889 en route to a conference in Sweden. Further evidence that the Japanese were reading Høffding is found in the fact that Ishida Shintarō 石田新太郎 (1870–1927) in 1895 published a translation of the first five chapters of Høffding's *An Outline of Psychology*, and then in 1897 put out a revised and completed translation.[50] Kierkegaard's name appeared for the first time in print in Japanese in Chapter Six of Ishida's 1897 edition in a Japanized German pronunciation as *Kierukega'aruto*.[51] In 1884–85, Høffding completed a massive two-volume compendium of nineteenth century Danish philosophy within which Kierkegaard is discussed in significant detail; this work was translated into German in 1895–96. An English translation appeared in 1900, a copy of which was also acquired by Tokyo Imperial University Library. In 1892, Høffding

[46] Mortenson 1996, p. 37.

[47] Høffding 1882.

[48] Høffding 1888.

[49] See Lowndes 1891.

[50] The first five chapters of Høffding's work were published under the title *Shinrigaku* 心理學, so the final edition came out as *Kōsei kaiteiban shinrigaku* 校正改訂版心理學. (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1897).

[51] Masugata 1989, p. 51. There is also a Japanese version of this paper at <http://kierkegaard.cs.kyoto-wu.ac.jp/masugata/juyoshi1.html>.

published the monograph *Søren Kierkegaard as Philosopher*,[52] which was translated into German in 1896.[53] The 1896 German and 1900 English translations of Høffding's *A History of Modern Philosophy*[54] were also purchased by the Tokyo Imperial University Library. Note that Kiyozawa returns to Tokyo in 1899 to found Shinshū University (later renamed Ōtani) and is there until 1902.

Ōnishi Hajime 大西祝 (1864–1900) also played an important role in introducing Kierkegaard's ideas to Japan. Brought up by devout Christian parents, Ōnishi studied at Dōshisha High School before entering Tokyo Imperial University, where he graduated in philosophy, studying under Inoue Tetsujirō. Ōnishi became fascinated by Danish philosophy, and mentions Høffding twice in his graduation thesis.[55] While still a student, Ōnishi was hired in 1891 to teach psychology, ethics, and logic at Tokyo Speciality School (Tokyo Senmon Gakkō, the forerunner of Waseda University), and used Høffding's *Outlines of Psychology* as one of his textbooks.[56] During a brief study trip to Germany in 1898, Ōnishi devoted considerable time to taking notes on Høffding's *Kierkegaard as Philosopher*, and he is thought to have been influential during his short career.[57]

Another avenue in which Kierkegaard's ideas reached Japan during Kiyozawa's lifetime was via his impact on Scandinavian writers of fiction. Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) and August Strindberg (1849–1912), whose new, psychological approach to literature and theatre had a deep impact on late-nineteenth century European thought, were heavily influenced by Kierkegaard. Brandes also had a large role to play here, as he advanced the interpretation of Kierkegaardian influence in Ibsen, and it was Brandes who

[52] Høffding 1892.

[53] Høffding 1902.

[54] Høffding 1894–95. English title: *A History of Modern Philosophy: A Sketch of the History of Philosophy from the Close of the Renaissance to Our Own Day*, trans. by Meyer, 1900. In addition, in 1901 Høffding published *Philosophy of Religion*, Danish title *Religionfilosofi*. A German translation came out the same year, but this was not translated into English, also by Meyer, until 1906.

[55] Ōnishi contributed greatly to the appreciation of modern Danish thought in Japan by publishing "Denmakoku tetsugaku no kinkyō 嗹馬國哲學の近況," in *Tetsugakkai zasshi* 哲學會雜誌, 5:54–55 (1891), pp. 1106–1112 and 1159–1176, based on a German translation of an article by Knud Ibsen ("Die daenische Philosophie des letzten Jahrzehnts") centering on Høffding.

[56] Masugata 1989, p. 50.

[57] Mortensen 1996, p. 39.

personally introduced Strindberg to the ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The views of Brandes, Ibsen, Strindberg, and Nietzsche all figure prominently in Berlin's so-called Modernist movement in the last decade of the nineteenth century, a side-effect of which was the airing of Kierkegaard's ideas stemming primarily from an 1890 German translation of a Brandes essay on Ibsen. In 1892, Tsubouchi Shōyō 坪内逍遥 (1859–1935) introduced Ibsen's *A Doll's House* and *An Enemy of the People* to Japan in two articles published in *Waseda bungaku* 早稲田文学.[58] In the next year both plays appeared in Japanese translation and Tsubouchi began to produce them for the stage in Tokyo. According to the initial interpretation of Brandes, the main character in Ibsen's play *Bran* was, in fact, based on Kierkegaard. It is Tsubouchi who hired the above-mentioned Ōnishi Hajime at Waseda, and Ōnishi also published two pieces on Ibsen in 1894, also largely following the interpretations of Brandes. Ōnishi discussed the anti-Christian sentiment in Ibsen, but did not go so far as to identify Kierkegaard as Ibsen's major theological influence, or to identify the main character of *Bran* as Kierkegaard himself. In 1901, the nationalist Takayama Chogyū 高山樗牛 (1871–1902), another student of Inoue Tetsujirō, published an article comparing Ibsen and Nietzsche that also basically followed Brandes; the death of Nietzsche in 1900 led many to romanticize what they saw as an extreme individualism in idealized thinkers like Nietzsche, Ibsen, and Kierkegaard.[59]

But in the meantime Brandes himself, based on a conversation with Ibsen, had been rethinking his position. He went through a "second impression" that rejected his previous identification of the *Bran* character with Kierkegaard and instead understood it to be based on another anti-church Christian named Adolphe Lammers. Yet once again he underwent a "third impression" in which he concluded the character was a fusion of both Kierkegaard and Lammers. This was all contained in a study of Ibsen that Brandes published in 1898, and which appeared in English in 1899.[60] Takayama Chogyū followed Inoue Tetsujirō politically at that time, and Tsubouchi came out strongly opposing the nationalistic writings of both, particularly those of Takayama that promoted Nietzche's thought. This led to a public dispute concerning the relationship of the individual to the State among Takayama, Tsubouchi, Mori

[58] These are contained in the section called "Jibun hyōron" 時文評論 in *Waseda bungaku* No. 27 (1892), p. 28, and No. 28 (1892), p. 7.

[59] Takayama 1901.

[60] The original title is simply *Henrik Ibsen,* which was translated and combined with another essay in Morrison and Muir 1899.

Ōgai 森鷗外 (1862–1922), and Shimamura Hōgetsu 島村抱月 (1871–1918), to name but a few, and in which the interpretation of Ibsen's *Bran* often served as the point of contention. As a personal friend of Ibsen and the major Danish interpreter of Ibsen at that time, highly influential in Germany as well, Brandes' own interpretive revisions were well scrutinized in Tokyo when his book on Ibsen came out in English in 1900.[61] It is in this context in 1906 that a former student of Ōnishi named Kaneko Chikusui 金子筑水 (1870–1937) published the first article in Japan devoted entirely to Kierkegaard, where he argued against the ultra-individualism of Takayama Chogyū, who was arguing for the first Brandesian view of *Bran*.

There are other areas related to philosophy in which traces of Kierkegaard may be found prior to the death of Kiyozawa. One of the foreign scholars teaching philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University, Erich von Kröber (1848–1914), a lecturer in the philosophy program from 1893 until 1914 is said to have given "lectures on Kierkegaard."[62] In 1901, the English scholar J. M. Baldwin published a *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion* with an entry for Kierkegaard, and this book was not only purchased by the Tokyo Imperial University Library but we also know it was well-read among its philosophy students, for when Tomonaga Sanjūrō 朝永三十郎 (1871–1951) wrote his *Tetsugaku jiten* 哲學辭典 (Dictionary of Philosophy), published in 1905, his article on Kierkegaard was little more than a translation from Baldwin.

There is thus ample evidence of Kierkegaard's ideas circulating among Japanese intellectuals in the decade prior to Kiyozawa's death, particularly among philosophy students and teachers at Tokyo Imperial University where he had attended. There are three individuals who stand out, however, as having had the strongest possibility of influencing Kiyozawa directly in this area. Probably the most likely person with whom Kiyozawa would have discussed Kierkegaard is Tomonaga Sanjūrō, the author of the *Tetsugaku jiten*—the first dictionary of Western philosophy published in Japan. In addition to the fact that Tomonaga was aware of Kierkegaard from his reliance on Baldwin's work, it is also certain that he knew Kiyozawa personally. Both graduated

[61] Mori Ōgai was a physician, but more influential as novelist, translator, and playwright. See Bowring, 1979. Shimamura Hōgetsu was a student at Waseda (Tokyo Senmon Gakkō) under both Tsubouchi and Ōnishi who, after graduation, went on to study in England and Germany, later teaching at Waseda himself, and gaining fame as a theatrical director and literary critic. See Marra, 2001, for a description of the thought of Tsubouchi, Mori, Ōnishi, Shimamura, Takayama, and others.

[62] Mortensen 1996, p. 39, but he gives no source for this information.

from the same philosophy program at Tokyo Imperial University, and upon graduation in 1898 Tomonaga was hired immediately by Kiyozawa as philosophy lecturer at the new Shinshū Daigaku. When Kiyozawa moved this school to Tokyo in 1901, Tomonaga agreed to move as well, and remained at the school until taking a position at Kyoto Imperial University in 1907, some time after Kiyozawa's death. Not only was Tomonaga working under Kiyozawa at a time when they were probably the only two teachers of Western philosophy at the college, but like Kiyozawa, Tomonaga was also a Higashi Honganji Shinshū follower who had studied Hegel, and when Kiyozawa launched his new journal, *Seishinkai* in 1900, from the very first volume Tomonaga was among its active contributors.[63] The two others from whom Kiyozawa may have learned something about Kierkegaard were Ōnishi Hajime and his teacher Inoue Tetsujirō. Both read Høffding closely, both were familiar with Høffding's writings on Kierkegaard, and Inoue actually visited Høffding at his home in Copenhagen. While Inoue and his colleague Erich von Kröber may have lectured on Kierkegaard at Tokyo Imperial University during Kiyozawa's lifetime, this would have taken place after Kiyozawa had left the institution. On the other hand, like Tomonaga, Ōnishi was a likely candidate to have discussed Kierkegaard with Kiyozawa directly. As Kiyozawa was only one year older than Ōnishi, they spent a number of years together in the same philosophy program at Tokyo Imperial University and both were personally religious. Ōnishi viewed Inoue's nationalism with the same disdain as Kiyozawa and we know that he went to Germany at least partly if not wholly to study Kierkegaard, so it is all but certain they discussed Kierkegaard at some point in their friendship. It should be noted, however, that their communication on this or any other subject after Ōnishi's return from Germany may have been limited because in 1899 Ōnishi moved to Kyoto to take up a position at the newly-formed Kyoto Imperial University, the same year Kiyozawa moved to Tokyo with his newly-constituted Shinshū University. Ōnishi also became sick while in Germany, and died in 1900, only one year after his return.

Consider that all these men, Kiyozawa included, were products of the philosophy department at Tokyo Imperial University where both faculty and students studied the works of Høffding and lectures on Kierkegaard are thought to have been given. We also know of at least one book in Kiyozawa's library that mentioned Kierkegaard, and even if we cannot confirm Kiyozawa's per-

[63] Tomonaga has two articles from the very first year of publication. See Tomonaga 1901a and 1901b.

sonal interest in Ibsen, Strindberg and the debate surrounding Ibsen's play *Bran* and the impact of the interpretations of the critic Brandes, Kierkegaard's views by 1900 had clearly become a topic of conversation among students of Western philosophy and culture. Thus we may safely conclude that Kiyozawa probably did know the name of Kierkegaard and something of his thought. But considering the complexity of Kierkegaard's writings, much of them in fictional format, the lack of any Japanese translations or published writings devoted to Kierkegaard studies within Kiyozawa's lifetime, and his absence from all of Kiyozawa's surveys of Western philosophy, it is highly unlikely that Kiyozawa read any of Kierkegaard's writings. We may therefore surmise that the likelihood that Kiyozawa did know something about Kierkegaard should be considered quite high. But absent any direct evidence that Kiyozawa himself was reading Høffding, whatever knoweldge he may have held was probably limited to what he learned from short summaries found in surveys such as those of Uberweg and Baldwin, or conversations from friends like Ōnishi and Tomonaga. If the instances of parallel ideas appear only in Kiyozawa's latter "ethics and religion" phase, it would strongly suggest the possibility that we are indeed seeing the influence of one thinker upon the other, but in fact most of Kiyozawa's conclusions are presaged in the ethical writings from his early period, long before Ōnishi went to study in Germany and interpretations of Ibsen and Brandes were debated among Tokyo intellectuals.

In other words, Kiyozawa did not need Kierkegaard to reach very similar if not the same conclusions about religion and ethics, but we should not rule out the possibility that learning of Kierkegaard in the period between 1898 and 1902 helped clarify his thinking.

Truth in Need

Above, I have tried to illustrate the fundamental positions held on the relationship between ethics and religion in Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard with an eye to their similarities, which are many. I have also sought to uncover what we know about the introduction of Kierkegaard's thought into Japan during Kiyozawa's lifetime to consider the possibility that those similarities reflect influence. This inquiry has been motivated by a desire to understand the radical stance that both of these religious thinkers take toward ethics. What is most striking, of course, is that both thinkers discuss the allure to the individual of devotion to ethics in what is called a *teleology* in the West or *ikigai*

in Japanese, that is, an ultimate source of meaning and authority, and that both conclude that despite enormous social pressure in support of such a worldview, it is doomed to failure because of its contingent nature. In Kiyozawa's language, this is the limitation of worldly (*saṃvṛti*) or relative truth, a Buddhist notion that includes religious truth, and both strongly affirm that true self-affirmation only comes through an opening up to the realm of the Absolute, a move that, at least in its experience as a momentary "leap," is inherently nonrational, nonsocial, and nonethical.

Such conclusions are not unique to these thinkers but given their historical contexts, for both men to have published such ideas so explicitly to such a wide readership when the prevailing ideological winds in their respective societies were blowing in the opposite direction reflects unusual strength of conviction. Thus, we inevitably return to the question raised above of whether Kiyozawa could have known about and been influenced by the prior example of Kierkegaard. There are two final points I would like to put forward, one historical and one philosophical.

First, concerning the question of influence, I believe I have shown that although Kiyozawa died before any translations or detailed studies of Kierkegaard appeared in Japanese, his name was known among intellectuals interested in Western philosophy and theatre through materials in English and German. How much of Kierkegaard's standpoint was understood in Japan is another matter, however. We do have discussion of Kierkegaard in a book that we know was in Kiyozawa's personal library and was something he used extensively as a sourcebook for his own writings, and we know that Kiyozawa did have communication with individuals who were interested in Kierkegaard such as Ōnishi Hajime and Tomonaga Sanjūrō. On the other hand, we have no evidence that Kiyozawa actually discussed Kierkegaard with these friends, and neither he nor Ibsen nor Brandes is mentioned in any of Kiyozawa's extant writings.

But it would be a mistake to state with confidence that Kiyozawa did not know of Kierkegaard merely because he is not mentioned in Kiyozawa's various outlines of Western philosophy. For example, in Volume Five of the Iwanami edition of his collected works is a series of short pieces, based on a series of lectures given on major thinkers in Western philosophy between the years 1889 and 1892, and in addition to the fact that Kierkegaard is not found here, we do find others who lived at the same time or even later, such as Comte (1798–1857), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Schelling (1775–1854), Schopenhauer (1788–1860), and even Spencer (1820–1903) and Eduard von

Hartman (1842–1906), who Kiyozawa notes was still living at the time he wrote his essay.[64] While this does suggest that Kiyozawa did not know enough of Kierkegaard to warrant even a short essay on his thought, it is important to remember that Kierkegaard was not a major object of study even in Europe at that time and essentially unknown in Japan. Danish was a completely inaccessible language in Japan during the mid and late Meiji period, as Japanese scholars depended entirely upon German and English publications of primary and secondary works on philosophy. While a German edition of Brandes' monograph on Kierkegaard appears as early as 1879, it is really the work of Harald Høffding that draws attention to him in a major way in both Europe and Japan. Thus it is not until the 1891 publication of the English translation of Høffding's *Outline of Psychology* that Japanese students have the opportunity to read about Kierkegaard, and not until 1897 that his name first appears in Japanese in a translation of this work. Kierkegaard's absence from both Kiyozawa's lectures of 1889-1892, or his monograph *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu* dated 1892, is to be expected and these works alone do not preclude the possiblity that Kiyozawa had known about Kierkegaard. This situation changes dramatically, however, in the decade following the publication of *Skeleton* in 1893, that is, the last decade of Kiyozawa's life. In addition to the Japanese translation of *Outline of Psychology*, Høffding's *Kierkegaard as Philosopher* appears in German (1898) and English (1900). Kiyozawa's philosophy classmate at Tokyo Imperial University, Ōnishi Hajime publishes two articles on Ibsen (1894) and studies Kierkegaard while in Germany (1898). Lecturer Erich von Kröber arrives at Tokyo Imperial University (1893) and lectures on Kierkegaard. Tomonaga Sanjūrō, a junior colleague from the same philosophy department, who includes Kierkegaard in a reference work on philosophy, is hired by Kiyozawa at Shinshū University (1898). Brandes' study of Ibsen, replete with his Kierkegaardian interpretations, appears in English (1899), and a literary controversy erupts in Japan over interpreting Ibsen's *Bran* (1900) in which the Brandes interpretation is central. I am merely restating the grounds for the above conclusion that Kiyozawa had numerous opportunities to learn about Kierkegaard in his later years, particularly after 1898. But while he may have been enouraged or inspired by Kierkegaard during his second period of addressing the religion/ethics conundrum that begins in 1899, despite their similar approach there is not enough

[64] Labelled *kinsei tetsugaku* 近世哲学 and *kinsei tetsugaku hoi* 近世哲学 補遺, this material can be found in KMZ, vol. 5, pp. 149–422.

evidence to conclude that Kiyozawa borrowed from him, consciously or unconsciously.

But even if new evidence emerged that conclusively demonstrated Kiyozawa's borrowing of something from Kierkegaard, it would be entirely erroneous to reduce Kiyozawa's stance on religion and ethics to something like a Shinshū interpretation of Kierkegaard. Kiyozawa's stance on the problem of ethics is Mahāyāna in origin and is, as I have shown, very much part of the doctrinal legacy of Shinran, at least Shinran as represented in the *Tannishō*. Therefore, rather than argue influence, I would like to suggest something of a common principle that underlies the writings of both men, what may be called an "existential religious need."

While admittedly Ricouer's point about the lack of common philosophical agenda among the so-called founders of Existentialism is problematic, the adjective "existential" is nonetheless useful for expressing matters of deep concern pertaining to the meaning of one's own existence. Whether or not one believes in the reality of identity independent of environment, the perception by the individual of his or her own subjectivity may, at times of crisis, lead to existential issues—that is, issues of fundamental importance to the concept of self and its relation to the world. In this sense, we not only find what may be identified as an existential religious need in both thinkers, a sense that their identities rest in some fundamental way upon clarification of certain religious questions, but we find this imperative stands at the very core of their conclusions about ethics.

As ethics is about man's place in the world among other men, creatures, and today even inorganic substances, this need may be somewhat clearer when we recall the worlds the two men lived in. Although delayed for historical and geographical reasons, Kiyozawa's Japan did experience the same deconstructing of religious norms brought on by the European Enlightenment, and he and Kierkegaard both lived in States that were growing ever more powerful in their ability to demand behavioral norms from their citizens. These governments were able to exploit a presumed moral authority derived from an even grander political and religious authority, and that moral authority was often expressed in terms of ethics. While the upheaval in the early and mid-Meiji period is well documented for scholars of Japan, Denmark in the first half of the nineteenth century was similarly destabilized by the French Revolution. These similar social situations were undoubtedly relevant to the "choice" or "realization" by both men of a religious path over an ethical one when the two are seen as serving different, and for these two thinkers, com-

peting goals. But it is also important to keep in mind that both men did not rationalize their valorizations of the religious authority they had discovered on the basis of social instability or the lack of moral authority in the ruling powers in their respective cultures. Each describes an awakening to a religious authority that lay beyond or behind the ethical authority of social custom and even established religious institutions. Whatever occurs to turn one's outlook from the ethical to the religious, by the term "religious existence" Kierkegaard was indicating not merely a new appreciation of religion, but a new identity constructed from religious culture, or more specifically religious experience itself, wherein the "teleology of ethics" had been deconstructed and ethics had thereby assumed a secondary role. Although Kiyozawa did not construct the same elaborate fictional display, his direct approach was no less plausible precisely because it presumed the authority of religious values and the authority of subjective experience. In other words, both Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard used the modern objectification of subjectivity to locate a religious authority *for the individual* in that subjectivity.

One way in which this need was expressed came in the distance that both writers felt from Hegel. In contrast to Kierkegaard's repeated dismissal of Hegel's view of ethics, which is well known, Kiyozawa was not so explicit. But while a sound analysis of Kiyozawa's feelings about Hegel is yet to be written, from the above discussion we may infer a similar rejection of the Kant/Hegel notion of universal, rational ethical principles expressing some kind of Higher Spirit. Most interesting in this regard is the fact that Kiyozawa expresses this sentiment not only in the later "religious" phase of his life, but even in "Gentoku," written in 1891. The monograph *Skeleton* also displayed seeds of doubt in the authority of ethical systems, and this doubt blossomed into the instrumental thesis, argued a decade later, that ethical concerns are valued precisely because they lead to realization of a religious truth that may contradict well-accepted ethical norms. Kierkegaard never goes so far as to argue for instrumentality, but he is similarly aware that belief in an absolute moral law regardless of the existence of God, or belief that religion's primary ethical role is to sanctify the existing social norms of behavior, inevitably subverts religion because ethics should be based on religious truth and not the reverse. But when Kierkegaard asserts that belief in ethics as moral law inevitably "must repudiate Christianity, since it (Christianity) demands a transcendence of the purely ethical,"[65] he is taking the identical position as

[65] Rudd 1993, p. 146

Kiyozawa in that idealized or "true" religion stands outside of any particular ethical scheme and by its authority subsumes it.

Thus we may conclude that ethical coherence for both thinkers ultimately fails and ultimately falls away before their greater need for religious honesty, however incoherent that stance may turn out to be. Their true needs were spiritual. Kiyozawa and Kierkegaard both take their readers through a similar process whereby religious need results from realization of the limitations of what an individual can do in the areas of ethical practice, religious practice, and religious faith. The Kiyozawa essay "Tariki shinkō no hottoku 他力信仰の発得 (Gaining Other-Power Faith, 1899)" frames the process of grasping faith in terms of subjective reflection on the implications of personal finitude:

> The Infinite is just the other side of the finite; but we cannot gain any understanding of the Infinite without first [working to] grasp the finite. Thus our first task must be to clarify what this finite is. When religion does not flourish in the world, when morality is not practiced in the world, it stems in the main from man's ignorance about his own finitude.[66]

We find a similar approach in Kierkegaard's essay "To Need God is a Human Being's Highest Perfection," where he affirms that a religious understanding of self-knowledge is really about knowing one's own limitations:

> People do say that not to know oneself is a deception and an imperfection, but often they are unwilling to understand that someone who actually knows himself perceives precisely that he is not capable of anything at all.[67]

Kierkegaard's "not capable of anything at all" is of course strikingly similar to Kiyozawa's phrase "Absolute Other Power," made famous in his essay "Zettai tariki no daidō 絶対他力の大道 (Great Path of Absolute Other Power);" both point to the existential reliance on the infinite, saving other. But one need not look to something so abstract to see the confluence of their standpoints. In "Waga shinnen (My Faith)," Kiyozawa expresses what may truly be called a Kierkegaardian reflection of how his "graduation" from an ethical existence, with his own version of the teleological terror of social duty, came when he realized the impossibility of constructing himself and the world based solely on reason:

[66] KMZ, vol. 6, p. 214.

[67] In Kierkegaard 1992b, p. 318.

> In the past I, too, feared that if we did not clarify the norms for judging truth or good and evil, that heaven and earth would crumble and society would become unmanageable. But now I have reached the conclusion that human knowledge could never create standards for truth or goodness.[68]

For his part, Kierkegaard occasionally makes statements that sound like he read the *Tannishō*:

> [S]omeone who is conscious that he is capable of nothing at all has every day and every moment the desired and irrefragable opportunity of experiencing that God lives.[69]

In other words, the inability to succeed in the ethical sphere creates a special receptivity to the religious sphere, and the receptivity to the religious sphere creates a new, religious sense of ethics and morality. Kiyozawa puts it like this:

> Self-reflection is what awakens us to the fact of our being finite and imperfect, and this awakening to being finite and imperfect in the end is what enables us to perceive (認知) the truth. In this way the relationship between finite and Infinite is what brings us to the attainment of faith in the Infinite, and the result of this faith in other power is sympathy for our fellow man, and as this sympathy develops into morality, it eventually expands to where it will bring us to a truly peaceful civilization.[70]

ABBREVIATIONS

CWS — *The Collected Works of Shinran*. Hirota, Dennis, et. al., trans. 2 vols. Kyoto: Jōdo Shinshū Hongwanji-ha 浄土真宗本願寺派, 1997.

KMZ — *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* 清沢満之全集 (The Collected Works of Kiyozawa Manshi). Ōtani Daigaku 大谷大学 ed. 9 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2002–03.

KMZ (Hōzōkan edition) — *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* 清沢満之全集 (The Collected Works of Kiyozawa Manshi). Akegarasu Haya 暁烏敏 and Nishimura Kengyō 西村見暁 eds. 8 vols. Kyoto: Hōzōkan 法藏館, 1953–57.

[68] KMZ, vol. 6, p. 333.

[69] Kierkegaard 1992b, p. 322.

[70] KMZ, vol. 6, p. 215.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Zsuzsanna Bjorn. 1990. *Il y a cent ans, la Belgique: texts et documents du critique danois Georg Brandes.* Bruxelles: Editions Labor.

Bowring, Richard. 1979. *Mori Ōgai and the Modernization of Japanese Culture.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dupré, L. 1987. "The Sickness Unto Death: Critique of the Modern Age." In Robert Perkins, ed. *International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death.* Georgia: Mercer University Press.

Hertel, Hans. & Kristensen, Sven Møller, eds. 1980. *The Activist Critic: A symposium on the political ideas, literary methods, and international reception of Georg Brandes.* Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

Høffding, Harald. 1882. *Psykologi I omrids: paa grundlag af erfaring.* København: P.G. Philipsen.

———. 1888. *Etiske undersøgelser.* København: P.G. Philipsen.

———. 1889. *Die Philosophie in Daenemark im 19.* Jahrhundert. In Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd.2.

———. 1892. *Søren Kierkegaard som Filosof.* København: P.G. Philipsen.

———. 1891a. *Outlines of Psychology.* Trans. Mary Lowndes. London: Macmillan.

———. 1891b. *Outlines of Ethics.* Trans. Mary Lowndes. London: Macmillan.

———. 1894-95. *Den nyere filosofis historie: en fremstilling af filosofiens historie fra renaissancens slutning til vore dage.* København: P.G. Philipsen.

———. 1900. *A History of Modern Philosophy: a sketch of the history of philosophy from the close of the renaissance to our own day.* Trans. B. E. Meyer. London: Macmillan.

———. 1902. *Sören Kierkegaard als Philosoph.* Trans. A. Dorner & C. Schrempf. Stuttgart: Frommann.

Honda, Patricia. 1986. "A Study of Kiyozawa Manshi's *The Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion.*" Unpublished Master's thesis, Otani University.

Ikeda Eishun 池田英俊. 1980. "Kindai bukkyō ni okeru rinri to shūkyōsei ni tsuite 近代仏教における倫理と宗教性について." In Shimode Sekiyo 下出積与, ed. *Nihon ni okeru rinri to shūkyō* 日本における倫理と宗教. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館.

Ishida Shintaro 石田新太郎. 1895. *Kōsei kaiteiban shinrigaku* 校正改訂版心理學. Tokyo: Kōbundō 弘文堂.

Jacobs, Louis. 1981. "The Problem of the Akedah in Traditional Jewish Thought." In Robert Perkins, ed. *Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals.* Tuscaloosa: Alabama University Press.

Kawamoto Gishō 川本義昭. 1988. "Kiyozawa Manshi no kyogakuteki Kansei 清沢満之の教学的陥穽" (Kiyozawa Manshi's Doctrinal Trap). In Shigaraki Takamaro 信楽峻麿, ed. *Kindai Shinshū shishōshi kenkyū* 近代真宗思想史的研究. Kyoto: Hōzōkan.

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1980. *The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening.* Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1983. *Fear and Trembling/Repetition*. Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1987. *Either/Or*. Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1988. *Stages on Life's Way*. Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1989. *The Sickness Unto Death*. Trans. Alastair Hannay. London: Penguin Classics.

———. 1992a. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Volume II: Historical Introduction, Supplement, Notes and Index*. Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1992b. *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses : Kierkegaard's Writings, Vol. 5*. Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1998. *The Moment and Late Writings*. Trans. and eds. Edna Hong and Howard Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Marra, Michele F. 2001. *A History of Modern Japanese Aesthetics*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Masugata Kinya 桝形公也. 1989. "Kierkegaard's Reception in Japan." In *The Memoirs of Osaka Kyoiku University*, Series 1, vol. 38:1.

Morrison, Mary & Muir, Jesse, eds. and trans. 1899. *Henrik Ibsen, Bjorstjerne Bjonson: Critical Studies*. London: Heinemann.

Mortenson, Finn Hauberg. 1996. *Kierkegaard Made in Japan*. Odense: Odense University.

Nolin, Bertil. 1976. *Georg Brandes*. Boston: Twayne Publishers.

Reė, Jonathan & Chamberlain, Jane. eds. 1998. *Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rudd, Anthony. 1993. *Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Russell, Bertrand. 1945. *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Shaku Sōen 釈宗演. 1909. *Senteiroku* 筌蹄録. Tokyo: Kōdōkan.

Shigaraki Takamaro 信楽峻麿. 1988. "Kindai Shinshū kyōgaku ni okeru shinzoku-nitairon no shosetsu 近代真宗教学における真俗二諦論の諸説" (Explanations for the Two-Truth Theory in Modern Shinshū). In Sharaki Takamaro, ed. *Kindai Shinshū shishōshi kenkyū*. Kyoto: Hōzōkan.

Shinshū Seiten Hensan Iinkai 真宗聖典編纂委員会, ed. 1978. *Shinshū Seiten* 真宗聖典. Higashi Honganji Shuppanbu 東本願寺出版部.

Takayama Chogyū 高山樗牛. 1901. "Bunmei hihyōka toshite no bungakusha 文明批評家としての文学者." In *Taiyō* 太陽 Meiji 34:1.

Tomonaga Sanjūrō 朝永三十郎. 1901a. "Hijinkaku-teki shōgon no fukuin 非人格的荘厳の福音." In *Seishinkai* 精神界1:4.

———. 1901b. "Genjitsu no onri to geijutsu, shūkyō tetsugaku jō no an'i." In *Seishinkai* 1:10.

Uberweg, Friederich. 1874. *History of Philosophy, from Thales to the Present Time*. Trans. by G. Morris. New York: Scribner & Armstrong.

Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎. 1915. *Ze'eren Kierukegōru* ゼエレン・キエルケゴオル. Tokyo: Uchida Rōgakuho 内田老覺圃.