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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

I

MAHAYANA Buddhism in India divides itself into two great schools, the Madhyamika (中論) and the Yogācārya (瑜伽). A closer examination of the history of Buddhism may reveal the existence of other thoughts than these two, though they did not develop into independent systems and for this reason were not recognised in India. We read in I-Tsing's *Correspondence from the Southern Seas* (義淨, 南海寄歸傳): "There are two schools only in Mahayana Buddhism, one is the Madhyamika and the other is the Yogācārya. According to the Madhyamika, things are real when they are viewed in the light of the samvritta truth (俗), but they are empty in the light of the paramārtha (真), they are in essence void like vision. According to the Yogācārya, the external world (外, *vishaya*) has no reality, but the inner consciousness (內, *viññāna*) is real, all the particular objects are nothing but the productions of the viññāna. Both are in accordance with the holy teaching of the Buddha."

The Madhyamika and the Yogācārya are generally contrasted, the former is a philosophy of negation or emptiness while the latter studies consciousness as its special subject of

speculation. The ultimate conclusion of the Madhyamika metaphysics is what is known as the system of Śūnyatā, while for the Yogācārya the Alīyavijñāna is the final reality. If we designate the former as the ontology of Mahayana Buddhism, the latter will be its cosmogony psychologically constructed.

The founder of the Madhyamika school is generally recognised to be Nāgārjuna, whose doctrine was ably supported and brilliantly expounded by Āryadeva. The *Madhyamika-Śāstra* (中論) by Nāgārjuna, the *Śata-Śāstra* (百論) and the *Dvadasanikāya-Śāstra* (十二門論) by Āryadeva, are the principal works of this school. And on account of these three treatises on the Śūnyatā philosophy, the school is known in China and Japan as the "Sect of Three Discourses" (三論宗). The scriptural foundation of this system, Madhyamika, is, according to Chinese Buddhist scholars, the Sutras of the Prajñāpāramitā class.

The most prominent expositors of the Yogācārya school in India were Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu. The following is a list of the most important textbooks belonging to this school, which exist in Chinese translations, and the mastery of which will be necessary to understand thoroughly the intricacies of the Yogācārya philosophy:

- (1) Avatamsaka-Sūtra (華嚴經);
- (2) Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra (解深密經);
- (3) Lenkāvatāra-Sūtra (楞伽經);
- (4) Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra (瑜伽師地論), by Maitreya;
- (5) Mahāyānasamparigraha-Śāstra (攝大乘論),
by Asanga;
- (6) Abhidharmasamyuktasangīti-Śāstra (阿毗達磨雜集論),
compiled by Sthitamati;
- (7) An Exposition of the Sacred Doctrine (顯揚聖教論),
by Asanga;
- (8) Madhyāntavibhāga-Śāstra, (中邊分別論),
Commented by Vasubandhu;

(9) Vijñānamātrasiddhi-Śāstra, (成唯識論),

Compiled by Dharmapāla and others;

In China the Yogācārya school is better known as the Dharmalakṣha (法相宗) or Vijñānamātra (唯識宗) sect, and Hsüan-Tsang (玄奘) and his disciple Jiwon (慈恩, Tzu 'Ēn) were the chief agents in the propagation of this philosophy in the Far East.

II

Before proceeding to explain the important tenets of the Yogācārya school, it may be found desirable to point out those features of the school which are shared to some extent by all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. These features are enumerated as ten in Asanga's *Comprehensive Treatise of Mahayana Buddhism* (攝大乘論).^{*} Some of them are in fact quite peculiar to his own system, but as they generally describe what the Mahayana is as distinguished from the Hinayana, so called, reference to them here will be in this respect illuminating.

The ten features of excellence, according to Asanga, then are: Mahayana Buddhism excels (1) in its conception of the Alīyavijñāna as an ultimate reality; (2) in its proper understanding of the objective world as to its real nature; (3) in its absolute idealism; (4) in its method of spiritual discipline whereby the Mahayanists attain to their final realisation of Buddhahood, (by which the author means the exercise of the Six Virtues of Perfection, *Pāramitā*, 六波羅密); (5) in its gradual ascension through the ten stages (*daśabhūmi*) of Bodhisattvahood to the ultimate goal of the Buddhist life; (6)

* There are three Chinese translations of the text (1) by Buddhaśānta, A. D. 531, (2) Paramārtha, 563, and (3) Hsüan-Tsang, 649. The text has commentaries by Vasubandhu and by Wu-sing (無性), which were translated by Hsüan-Tsang, Paramārtha, and Dharmagupta. Each translation has its own features, not only in its literary form but in its interpretation of the original text and commentary. I have here chiefly followed Paramārtha.

in its moral precepts in which all the moral rules of good conduct (*sīlam trividham*, 三聚淨戒) are comprised; (7) in the power of meditation (*samādhi*); (8) in the attainment of transcendental knowledge (*prajñā*); (9) in the realisation of a Nirvana called "Abodeless" (*apratisthitānirvāna* 無住處涅槃); and finally (10) in teaching the Triple Body of the Buddha (三身).

Of these ten "Excellent Features" of Mahayana Buddhism, which the Buddha did not disclose in any of the scriptures belonging to the Hinayana, the following three may be fairly considered the most essential teachings of the Yogācārya as distinct from the Madhyamika school:

- (1) The classification of knowledge into three forms instead of two, the latter being that of the Madhyamika school;
- (2) The hypothesis of the *Alīyavijñāna* in and through which this apparent universe is constructed;
- (3) A new conception of Nirvana and the notion of the Triple Body of the Buddha.

What makes the Yogācārya philosophy characteristically psychological is the notion of the "Alīya-" or "Ālaya-vijñāna." Let us first explain what are the three forms of knowledge or rather the three aspects of reality as distinguished by Asanga and Vasubandhu.

III

According to Nāgārjuna our knowledge or world-view has two forms: the one is called relative knowledge or conditional truth (*samvṛitisatya*), or as we may term common-sense world-view; and the other is absolute knowledge, or unconditional truth (*paramārthasatya*), or a philosophical construction of experience. While acknowledging this classification, the Yogācārya proposes its own method of dealing with the human understanding. According to the *Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra*, which the Yogācārya philosophers consider to be one of the most au-

thoritative sources of their metaphysics, the three forms of knowledge are (*Parikalpita-lakshana*, 分別性相), *Paratantra-lakshana* (依他性相), and *Parinishpanna-lakshana* (真實性相).

Lakshana (相) generally means in Buddhist literature "sign," "character," "external appearance," "nature," "attribute," etc., and is quite frequently found contrasted to "essence," "substance," "being." It is an objective term, that is, a state of things as it is presented to our senses or understanding. Therefore, properly speaking, *Parikalpita-lakshana* is that aspect of the objective world, which the latter assumes to our contriving senses as influenced by our selfish desire. *Paratantra-lakshana* is the objective world as conceived by the understanding as something depending upon a higher principle and not final in itself. When we come to the *Parinishpanna* we have a true view of the world, or the latter presents itself to us in its "complete" final reality. Thus it may not be correct to translate the three *lakshanas* by three forms of knowledge concerning the external world; for a *lakshana* is an aspect of reality as it takes according to our subjective comprehension of it.

Parikalpita-lakshana literally means a "constructed or imagined aspect" of reality and is a world-view based on a wrong assumption that takes falsehood for truth and superficiality for ultimate reality. This assumption does not penetrate into the essential nature of things, but erroneously recognises them as they appear to the senses. As far as our deceptive sensual perception goes, the objective world looks like an ultimate fact, fully confirming our common-sense materialistic world-view. This view, however, is not supported by sound reasoning, for things are not in reality and in truth what they appear. Asanga finds similarity between this kind of knowledge and the vision of a man who erroneously takes a piece of rope for a snake. Both are merely an uncoordi-

nated and unconfirmed perception and are doomed to lead us to a fatal end.

By *Paratantra-lakshana*, which literally means "depending upon another," one recognises the relativity of all existences, depending upon a combination and interaction of causes and conditions. By this knowledge we come to perceive that the phenomenal world is devoid of finality, that it will disappear as soon as its causes and conditions are dissociated, that there is nothing in this relative world which is not subject to an ultimate dissolution, and that as things are thus transient and impermanent, to believe in them as real and final is not conducive to the salvation of the soul or to the enlightenment of the mind. To continue the analogy of rope and snake, *Paratantra-lakshana* is compared to the knowledge, of which one comes in possession after a closer inspection of the dreaded object, that the object is really a piece of rope and not a snake. The rope is composed of fibres and as such is not an ultimate reality, which latter is to be sought somewhere else than in things conditioned. When one's mental eye is cleansed of all clouds of ignorance and selfishness, it opens to the true state of being. *Paratantra-lakshana*, therefore, which recognises the unreality of particulars as such, induces us to go farther in order that we may finally come to something absolute and permanent.

Parinishpanna-lakshana is perfect or "complete" knowledge. When we come to the perception of an ultimate reality which serenely abides behind the veil of transient existence, our knowledge is said to have attained its perfection. We have then "supreme truth" (*Paramārthasatya*), which truly comprehends the suchness of things (*tathatā*, 眞如). Here transcending all forms of conditionality, the truth now illumines all sentient and non-sentient beings. To finish the analogy of rope and snake, the *parinishpanna* is the knowledge by which we come to recognise the real nature of the

rope. The rope is not by itself an ultimate reality, for it is made of flax or straw or cotton. There must be something higher than that, which makes up the *raison d'être* of the existence of the rope as well as its constituent, flax or straw, and the knowledge of which saves us from universal illusion veiling the light of pure intelligence. By the *Parinīshpanna* we know that the world in which we live is not final, but it is a manifestation of a higher reality. To reach this final perfection of knowledge, says the Yogācārya, is the object of the teaching of the Buddha.

The one most distinguishing feature of Yogācārya as the psychological school of Mahayana Buddhism is the conception of "Alīyavijñāna", from which originates our experience of multitudinous particulars. This is a very complicated idea and in the following pages I will try to present the Yogācārya's view in a most condensed form as we have in Asanga's *Mahāyānasamparigraha-Śāstra* (攝大乘論). Occasional references will be made to Vasubandhu's commentary on the same and also to his own work known as the *Vijñānamātra-Śāstra* (唯識論).

The *Mahāyānasamparigraha* opens with the proclamation that the text is based on the Mahayana Sutras and proceeds to enumerate the ten points of superiority which the author claims for the Mahayana over its rival school, the Hinayana. As was seen above, the first point of superiority consists in the conception of a fundamental reality, which is designated by the Yogācāryans as "Alīya-vijñāna" or "Ālaya-vijñāna." This was taught by the Buddha in a treatise known as the *Mahāyāna-Ablādharma* which was never translated into Chinese. In one of the Sutras quoted there, the Buddha described the Alīya as "existing from eternity and forming the foundation of all things, and without which no paths are possible, nor is there any attainment of Nirvana. This Vijñāna supports and sustains everything, is a storage where all the germs of exis-

tence are stowed away: therefore it is called Aliya. This I preach only to the higher men." Commenting on this, Asanga says: It is called Aliya because all living beings and defiled [i.e., particular] objects are therein mysteriously stored in the form of a seed, and also because this Vijñāna, being mysteriously stored within all objects, is the *raison d'être* of their existence, and because all sentient beings taking hold of this Vijñāna imagine it to be their own ego; therefore, it is called the Aliya [which means, according to Paramārtha, "not lost," or "not absorbed in"]. He then quotes a stanza from the *Sandhinimocana*, which reads:

"The Vijñāna that bears and sustains is deep and subtle;
Wherein the seeds of beings eternally flow:
To the vulgar I preach this not,
Lest it should be conceived by them as the ego-substance."

This Vijñāna is also called *Ādāna* (阿陀那識) because it carries and supports all the physical organs of our being, becoming their substratum as they come into existence. Why? If not carried and supported by this Vijñāna, all our physical organs would collapse, be lost and incapable of continuing their activities. Again, the birth of a sentient being would have been impossible if this Vijñāna did not gather around itself the skandhas (五蘊) and thus call into being the six forms of existence. The reunion and resuscitation of the skandhas is only possible by the presence and support of this Vijñāna. Therefore, it is called "the *Ādāna*", which literally means "depository" or "receptacle."

The Aliya is again called simply *Citta* (心) or soul, but this *Citta* is to be distinguished from *Manas* (意), mind, as the Buddha distinctly speaks of them as two separate notions. *Manas* is essentially at once intelligence and will, and when it reflects on *Citta*, it wrongly imagines the latter to be the ego-substance wherefrom we have the consciousness of Self. In *Manas* itself there is nothing which will suggest the existence

of an ego behind its activities, but owing to the presence of the Aliya or Citta, the intellect or Manas constructs the idea of an ego for its own selfish purposes. Manas then performs a peculiarly double function in our intellectual fields: It perceives an external world through the six senses (vijñānas, 六識), and at the same time reflects within itself. When it does the latter, it recognises there the presence of a vijñāna (i. e., the Aliya) which persistently makes itself manifest to Manas. And this is the chamber where hovers "absolute ignorance," ready at any moment to construct a defiled world of particulars. This is the storage where all the seeds of one's former karma are securely preserved waiting for the favourable conditions to germinate.

V

The Aliya, or Alaya as the later Chinese translators have it, is a magazine which functions depending on the habit-energy of all defiled objects and in which all the seeds of one's karma are systematically stowed away. The original Sanskrit term for "habit-energy" is *vāsanā* which the Chinese translators have rendered by *hsi ch'i*, (習氣), and means the impressions in the Aliya left by external objects as well as by inner activities. And these impressions dwelling in the Aliya quietly wait for an appropriate chance to be awakened from a dormant state and to resume their native functions good or bad or indifferent. In one respect, therefore, this Vijñāna of all seeds is the actual reason whereby the birth of all defiled objects become possible, but in another respect its own efficiency is derived from the habit-energy which is discharged by multitudinous defiled objects since beginningless time. In other words, the Aliya is at once the cause and the effect of all possible phenomena in the universe, the Aliya is the universe itself.

(In the way of footnote it may be noticed here that by "defiled" the Buddhists do not necessarily mean "immoral,"

“unlawful,” or “unrighteous,” but rather intellectually, “particular,” “individual,” “conditional,” “relative,” and other cognate ideas. Defiled objects or *dharma*s, therefore, are particular existences or individual phenomena not only in the external world but in our inner consciousness. “Dharma” is a very broad and comprehensive term and means many things, and in this case it is almost an equivalent for karma as well as for an individual act; for the objective world with all its concrete, individual realities is no more than the effects of our thought and consequent action, which takes place from our ignorantly defiling the original neutrality or immaculacy of the *Aliya-vijñāna*. The Sanskrit term for “defiled” usually is *kliṣṭa* meaning “troubled” or “afflicted”, or *vakta* in the sense of “tinged” or “stained”.)

The habit-energy (*vāsanā*) latently dwelling in the *Aliya* may be said to be a sort of subtle spiritual substance left behind by every being that thinks and acts: or would it be more appropriate to make it a kind of force which emanates from thought and action and is left behind when they cease to operate? As the odour emitted by a flower remains even after its destruction, so every deed or every existence leaves something in its trail even after its departure or completion. All the mental activities, good or bad, may be destroyed with the destruction of the mind itself, but this habit-energy remains and is invisibly stored in the *Aliya* in the form of a spiritual seed.

The *Aliya* is not a mere aggregation of all these latent seeds, but it keeps them according to its own laws. In a way the *Aliya* and the seeds are two separate things, but in another they are one. They act reciprocally. Their relation to each other is like that of a candle to its flame. It may also be likened to a bundle (*kalāpa*) of reeds or sticks, which stands together in a definite form. If the primitive Buddhists, so called, denied the existence of an individual soul-entity in

whatever manner it might have been conceived, the later Mahayanists, especially the Yogācāryans, as we see, are here trying to revive the idea of a soul in which all the karma of one's former deeds is securely preserved in seed-form (*bīja*).

The activity of the *Aliya* takes two forms, philosophical or intellectual and moral or psychological. The first is called by Asanga the activity that differentiates itself; the second, the activity that distinguishes between the desirable and the undesirable. By the philosophical activity, so called, heterogeneity of particular objects is evolved out of the essentially one *Aliya*, where the seeds multitudinous not only in character but in number are merged together. By the moral activity it is meant that from the *Aliya* there issue forth three things (*dharma*): desire (*kleśa*), action (*karma*), and its effect (*phala*). The original desire which is harboured in the *Aliya* is the impetus, by dint of which all deeds, characterised sometimes as desirable, sometimes as undesirable, and sometimes indifferent, are produced.

The Sāṅkhya philosophy does not know the first form of activity generated by the *Aliya*, for it considers Prakṛiti alone the cause of birth and death. Nor does the Lokayatika, for it simply upholds the efficiency of one's former deeds only. The Vaiśeṣika which teaches the doctrine of the *Ātman* with eight attributes, also fails to understand the theory of the *Aliya*. Those who adhere to the manifestation of *Īśvara* as well as those that contend that there is no such thing as a first cause,—they all fail to recognise the second form of activity generated by the *Aliya*; for they imagine that there is really a substance called the ego who is the actor, and that there is really the sufferer of the result of a deed. They thus all fail to perceive the true signification of the "Twelve Chains of Dependence" proceeding from the *Aliya*. The ignorant are like those blind men who fervently discuss the real elephant whose whole body they have never been able to survey.

VI

Now there are several reasons why the *Aliya* is to be called the storage of all seeds and why it is subject to the "infection" or "perfuming" (*adhiṅvāśhitam*, 薰習) of all kinds of acts performed by us.

(1) The *Aliya* is not a permanently fixed substance: it is not an absolutely rigid, inflexible reality, which is incapable of change and modification. On the contrary, it is nothing but a series or locus of constant transformations. It waxes and wanes, it comes and departs, it rises above the horizon and sinks in the abyss. It is an eternal moving, it is a succession of events. For otherwise the *Aliya* could not be more than a dead corpse.

(2) It is thus subject to the law of causation. Here is a cause and there must be its effect. Here is a movement and there must be its consequence. Whatever is done by the *Aliya*, it is not outside the pale of universal causation.

(3) As there is a time for all seeds to stop germinating because of their old age or of their decay, so there is an occasion for the *Aliya* to perish and lose all its efficacy. This is the time when the *Vajracitta* (literally, "Diamond-heart", meaning an enlightened, thoroughly purified heart,) replaces the *Aliya*. Then the latter *Vijñāna* ceases to be a storage which furnishes an inexhaustible supply to the nourishment of our egoistic prejudices. Its original function of accumulation and transformation is still in full force, but it is no more the source of ignorance and egotism, and is now known as "the *Ādhāna*" which holds only the seeds of immaculate karma.

(4) The *Aliya* does not fail to be the cause of reproduction after it has taken in a seed. That is, when it is infected with the karma of a deed, it will definitely reproduce it as soon as it matures under favourable circumstances.

(5) The *Aliya* begins to be efficient only when various

causes and conditions cooperate harmoniously, for a single cause is not capable of producing varied effects.

(6) The *Aliya* reproduces the original objects (*dharmas*) whose seeds have been conceived by it. A cause assisted by conditions bears its own fruit and no other's. The *Aliya* gives out only what was given to it.

For these reasons the *Aliya* is called the "Vijñāna of Seeds."

VII

How is it possible for the *Aliya*, as the *Yogācāryans* express it, to be infected by an efficient cause? To answer the question, we make the following considerations:

(1) Only those things that remain stationary or are regular in their successive movements can be infected or perfumed. The wind is too indefinite in its behaviour and naturally cannot be "perfumed", but the oil will take to the perfuming of fragrant flowers, for it definitely keeps its place.

(2) Things are infected or perfumed only when they are neutral, that is, when they do not have an odour of their own. Therefore, highly scented objects such as onions or musk or incense are not liable to be affected by other odours.

(3) There are things whose very nature refuses to be perfumed, for instance, stones and metals.

(4) To make the perfuming process effective, the perfuming and the perfumed must agree. By this it is meant that they must be existing at the same time, in the same place, and of such nature as to allow mutual infection.

From this, it is evident that (1) the *Aliya* is a definite form, and stationary as far as it is formally conceived, (2) but it is indeterminate in character, (3) there is the possibility in it of being affected by outside influences, and finally (4) it is "perfumed" by the karma of the same individual in whom it resides.

Having thus explained the nature of the *Aliya*'s inherent susceptibility to outside influences, *Asanga* now proceeds to establish the reasons why the hypothesis of the *Aliyavijñāna* is necessary and points out that if we did not allow its existence, our impulses, passions, and deeds, whether moral or neutral, would be impossible, no reincarnation could take place, our world of particulars as they present themselves to our senses would not exist, and finally our attainment of *Nirvana* and enlightenment would be an idle talk. He also insists that in the *Samadhi* where all mental operation is said to vanish, the *Aliya* alone must be rationally considered to continue existing.

VIII

To understand thoroughly the significance of the *Aliya*, we must know its relation to a mental faculty known as *Manas* in Sanskrit, by virtue of which alone it becomes efficient and productive. The *Yogācārya* admits the existence of three forces or factors or causes in our subjective realm, and through their cooperation the universe is considered to start with all its multifarious objects. The first is the *Aliya* or *Citta* or *Hridaya*; the second is *Manas*; and the third is the six *Vijñānas* or senses. *Manas* corresponds to what we understand ordinarily by mind or consciousness, and the six senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and thinking. This thinking is the function of a *vijñāna* called "*Manovijñāna*" and not of *Manas* itself.

The difference between the sixth sense, *Manovijñāna*, and *Manas*, is more fundamental according to the Buddhist philosophers than we may think. The *Manovijñāna* properly speaking is the mind and does all kinds of mental operation such as memory, judgment, imagination, desire, decision, willing, etc., but all these functions performed by the *Manovijñāna* are superficial compared with the work of *Manas*;

for the latter is a deeply seated consciousness which ignorantly clings to the ego-conception and to the reality of an external world. Manas is something like the will of Schopenhauer, and constantly asserts itself by influencing or "infecting" the whole system of one's mental activities.

Philosophically, therefore, Manas is to be sharply if possible to be distinguished from the Manovijñāna which is the sense whose base is in Manas. The act of seeing is possible because there is a special organ assigned to do seeing, and in a similar manner the Manovijñāna functions because of Manas which as it were prompts it. If the work performed by the Manovijñāna is not referred to Manas, that is, if all the mental activities are not attended by the unity of consciousness, they will certainly lack coordination, and the entire individuality will collapse. The consciousness, "It is I that thinks or does this or that," is ascribed by the Mahayanists to the function of Manas. The latter therefore is the author of this self-consciousness as it ignorantly interprets the significance of the *Aliya*. Manas constantly reflecting on the *Aliya* thinks that the latter is the real self, simple and absolute, and weaves the net of all mental operations.

The *Aliya* itself is wholly innocent of all this operative illusion on the part of Manas. It is Manas that supplies vital energy to the whole field of our mentality and makes the entire system work; and when this work leaves its "habit-energy" behind and "perfumes" the seeds already stowed away in the *Aliya* in its former lives, the *Aliya* spontaneously works out its effects, according to definite laws, but all the while being absolutely unconscious of the fact. There is however the intrusion of Manas, and the consciousness looms up suddenly above the horizon with its assertions and clings.

Manas is not a blind will, it is rather an intelligent will; for it is capable of enlightenment. It is due to its

ignorance only that it is tenaciously attached to the conception of the ego as a ultimate reality and contaminates the whole mentation with all its onerous prejudices. As soon as it realises the full import of the Aliya, it is denuded of its egoistic assumptions and opens the way to Nirvana. Manas, therefore, is the pivot on which turns the entire destiny of our spiritual life; according to the way it is set up, we are delivered or doomed. The six senses as well as the Aliya are Manas' neutral and innocent co-workers, or even its subordinate officers who are "perfumed", sweetly or odiously, according to the arbitrary will of their ever-vigilant master. The whole force of the Buddhist discipline is thus naturally concentrated on the enlightenment and subjugation of Manas. When Manas ceases to create its ill-scented and highly infectious germs for the absorption of the Aliya, the latter is no more contaminated and will forever maintain its original healthy neutrality and absolute tranquillity.

IX

I cannot help making reference here to Aśvaghosha's conception of the Aliya. According to some scholars, Aśvaghosha, a great Indian philosopher supposed to have been living at the time of King Kanishka, was not the author of the book known as *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*; the book was probably written by a Chinese Buddhist philosopher who was unusually learned and most acute-minded, but it somehow came to be ascribed to Aśvaghosha, whether unwittingly or no. Some however contend that no such work of a great philosophical insight and of an extraordinary power of analysis could have been written by a Chinese Buddhist unless it were Chigi (智顓) himself, the founder of the Tendai sect of Buddhism. He was the first and the last great Buddhist philosopher worthy of the name in China. The Chinese minds are great in other respects than in logic and philoso-

phy. If the historical Aśvaghosha did not write *The Awakening of Faith*, some other Indian mind as great as Nāgārjuna or Asanga, endowed with a wonderful power of speculation and analysis, must have produced it. Whatever this was, in view of the widest possible influence the book has played in the history of Buddhist thought in the Far East, I feel reluctant to ignore the doctrine of Aliya as expounded in *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*.

According to the author, the Aliya, that is the "Tathāgata-garbha", is a sort of world-womb, from which evolves this universe of particular objects, while that of the Yogācārya is an individual soul in which all the karma-seeds are registered for future germination. Aśvaghosha's conception is more ontological and comparatively simple in its constitution, being a psychological interpretation of Suchness (*tathatā*), though it is filled with possibilities: the Yogācāryan Aliya, on the other hand, is quite individual and is heavily laden with all the seeds formerly sown, but in itself indifferent to their development and final fructification, in which respect the Aliya is somewhat like Prakṛiti of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The Tathāgata-garbha is a stage in the self-evolution of Tathatā.

The Yogācārya school is disposed to consider the Aliya an independent vijñāna more or less concrete, endowed with the power of achieving some work if, assisted by Manas, it subjects itself to the laws of change. It is therefore naturally a relative existence capable of producing effect and suffering the consequence of ignorance. But the Aliya is conceived by Aśvaghosha as a unified something of the changeable and the unchangeable: as it is subject to change and transformation, the world is evolved out of it; but as it is unchangeable in itself, the relative world does not go astray altogether in its ignorance and therefore in its evil ways. The Aliya is originally pure and immaculate and illuminating, but because of these virtues it suffers ignorance and impurities to set up in

its own system. When in the heart of the originally-enlightened Aliya a thought is suddenly awakened and grows conscious of its own enlightening quality, the Aliya is then at once subjected to all the consequent errors or complications of thought. With the stirring up of the Aliya from its deep self-absorption in which there was yet no splitting of subject and object, karma has made its début and we have this world of relativity.

X

Here one may ask, Why did not the Buddha teach the existence of the Aliya to the Śrāvakas? Says Asanga: Because it is too subtle to be comprehended by them. They have no intelligence that will enable them to acquire *Sarvajñāta* (all-knowledge), while the Bodhisattvas have it; and again, it is added by Vasubandhu, they show no aspirations whatever for the salvation of all beings, as they are content if they achieved their own salvation or deliverance from ignorance and selfishness.

But the Buddha did not leave the Hinayanists altogether ignorant of the idea of Aliyavijñāna. For he gave them some hints on the subject in many passages in the sacred books of Buddhism, not very clear for them probably, but explicit enough for the Mahayanists. For instance, we read, says Asanga, in the Ekottara-Āgama to the effect that "to those people in the world who take delight in the Aliya, long for the Aliya, practice themselves in the Aliya, cling to the Aliya, the Tathagata preaches the right doctrine in order to let them do away with the Aliya." Here the Buddha hinted at the name of Aliya, but did not reveal its true nature and significance; for it is here used in the sense of the ego as something real.

In the Agamas of the Mahāsaṅghika school the Vijñāna is known by the name of the "Fundamental (*Mūla*?) Vijñāna;"

for it stands in relation to the other Vijñānas as the root of a tree does to its stems, branches, and leaves. In the Mahiśāsaka school it is designated as "that which transcends the mortal skandhas." All things that are physical or mental are necessarily subject to the cadence of birth and death. They never continue to exist eternally or act incessantly. But that which lies within these perishable phenomena and gathers in itself all the seeds and their karma, knows no interruption, and this is what the Mahayanists call *Aliya-vijñāna*.

It is thus straight and flat "as the royal road" the way paved by the Buddha towards the legitimate conception of the *Aliya*; only the Hinayanists did not have an insight penetrating enough to look into the bottom of the matter.

This *Vijñāna* was altogether erroneously interpreted by the other schools of Buddhism than those already mentioned. Some thought that between *Citta* (that is, *Aliya*) and *Manas* there was no distinction to be made; others thought that the *Tathagata* meant by "*Aliya*", as when he referred to the people taking delight in it, the clinging to worldliness; others thought again that the *Aliya* was our body consisting of the five skandhas, to which we are liable to cling as a final reality; still others maintained that the *Aliya* was the *Ātman* or *Pudgala* or *Kāya*, that is to say, the ego-substance. But as we have seen above, the *Yogācāryans* insist, all these views are altogether inadequate and do not tally with the true doctrine of the Buddha as interpreted by the Mahayanists.

XI

The *Yogācāryan* conception of *Nirvana* is not characteristically different from that of the other Mahayana schools, but as it is generally expounded in the special treatises belonging to the *Yogācārya*, let me here lightly touch upon the subject.

The problem of Nirvana must have been quite a perplexing one to the earlier followers of the Buddha, who left the term not fully defined. Especially when the death of their Master created such a sense of forlornness among them who lost the most cherished central object of their devotion and worship, the hiatus thus suddenly breaking up in their hearts could not be filled so easily with the idea of an utter annihilation. Nirvana, they thought, must have another meaning than completely vanishing into nothingness. Intellectually, they strived to follow the doctrine of Nirvana in its narrow and perhaps partial sense, but inasmuch as the human emotion is such as it has been from the beginning of life, they tried to construct such a theory of the Buddha's death as will satisfy both mind and heart. While on the one hand the idea of Dharmakaya, the Law-Body of the Buddha, was developing, the signification of Nirvana on the other hand was receiving a gradual change. When the former terminated in the Triple Body doctrine, the latter grew up into the theory by which four forms of Nirvana were recognised as was done in the hands of Asanga and Vasubandhu.

According to Vasubandhu's Commentary on Asanga's *Mahāyānasamgraha*, he distinguishes four forms of Nirvana: (1) Nirvana in its purest original forms (本來清淨涅槃); (2) Nirvana that leaves something behind (有餘涅槃); (3) Nirvana that leaves nothing behind (無餘涅槃); and (4) Nirvana that has no abode (無住處涅槃).

In this classification, the term "Nirvana" is used not in its ordinary sense of extinction, but rather in the sense of final beatitude, which is a blissful state of mind after liberation from the ego. In any event, "Nirvana" has acquired quite a different connotation now. The first Nirvana, that is, Nirvana in its purest, original, self-identical form is nothing but a synonym of Tathatā or Suchness, which is

considered by all the Mahayanists to be inherent in all individual beings, though in most minds it is found eclipsed by their subjective ignorance. In this sense Nirvana is not a state of mind but a virtue inherently possessed by it.

The second Nirvana that leaves something behind is a state of Suchness which though liberated from the bondage of desire is still under the ban of karma. It is the Nirvana attainable by the Śrāvakas in their life-time. When they become Arhats, they no more cherish any egoistic desires and thoughts, but they are yet susceptible to the sufferings of birth and death; for their mortal, material existence is the result of their former karma, which cannot be extinguished until its due course has been run.

The third Nirvana in which nothing remains is a state of Suchness released from the sufferings of birth and death, that is, at the time of material extinction. With our egoistic desires and impulses exterminated and with our corporeal being brought to its natural end, we are said to be entering into eternal Nirvana, in which nothing leaves its trace that is likely to entangle us again in the whirlpool of transmigration. According to the Mahayanists this is supposed to be the life-goal of the Hinayanists.

The last Nirvana that knows no dwelling (*Apratisthitānirvāna*) is a state of Suchness obtained by the extermination of the bondage of intellect. For two hindrances are recognised by the Mahayanists as lying in the way to final salvation: hindrance of desire (*kleśāvarana*, 煩惱障) and hindrance of intellect or knowledge (*jñeyāvarana*, 所知障). The first is moral and comes from egoism, while the second is philosophical and the outcome of imperfect knowledge. The first hindrance is destroyed when our instinctively egotistic desires are subdued; the second is removed when we acquire all-knowledge (*sarvajñatā*, 一切智) which belongs to Bodhisattvaship. Hence the Nirvana that results from the severance of the

intellectual bondage is sought by the pious followers of Mahayana Buddhism. At this stage of enlightenment there are awakened in the soul of a Mahayanist infinite wisdom and infinite love. By the wisdom that transcends the limitations of birth and death, he does not cling to the vicissitudes of the world. By the love that is free from the dualism of love and hatred, he does not "dwell" in the beatitude of Nirvana. On the contrary, he mixes himself among the masses, lives the life of an average man, subjects himself to the laws of a material world. But his innermost heart is free from all egotistic impulses and desires, and it is through his infinite love for his fellow-creatures that he is on earth trying every means of salvation and enlightenment to awaken them from the darkness of ignorance; for a Bodhisattva is never content with his own spiritual bliss.

By the attainment of this final Nirvana the *Aliya* is no more a storage of defiled seeds, for it has been deprived of all the causes and conditions which made this accumulation possible, and *Manas* no longer erroneously reflects on the *Aliya* to take it for the ego, the six senses are no more contaminated by ignorance and egoism. The *Aliya* at this stage is called the *Dharmakāya*.

XII

There are many more things I should like to write about in connection even with this briefest exposition of the *Yogācārya* philosophy, for instance, on such subjects as its absolute subjective idealism, the classification of things (*dharma*) into five groups and one hundred subjects, interactions between the eight *Vijñānas*, the Triple Body of the Buddha, etc. Of these the most important is the Triple Body doctrine, but as the subject was ably treated of by Professor Akanuma whose article appeared in the previous number of this magazine, I refrain from repeating it. As to the rest, I shall not attempt

in the present paper to go any further than making a short remark about the term "Aliya."

The Chinese equivalent for "Aliya" is 阿黎耶 (*a-li-yeh*) and that for "Ālaya" is 阿賴耶 (*a-lai-yeh*). Is this all-important conception of the Yogācārya to be transcribed as "Ālaya" or "Aliya"? As most Buddhist scholars are used to the Chinese form, "Ālaya", it may have been better in this article to adopt this form also. But as I have written it principally from the older translation of the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha* where "Aliya" is used, I have followed its example.

The Chinese translations of the Buddhist texts are generally divided into two classes, old and new. The dividing line chronologically starts with Hsüan Ts'ang (玄奘) who came back to China in A. D. 649 after long adventurous journeys in India and Central Asia. When he began to translate the texts he brought back, he found some dissatisfying features in the older translations and introduced many new terms which he thought would express the original ideas clearer. In all the Chinese texts prior to him, "Aliya" is uniformly used by such translators as Kumārajīva, Paramārtha, etc. Hsüan Ts'ang was probably more accurate, and literally more faithful to the original, but the new translations are invariably less pure and elegant as far as the style is concerned. In many instances, the older translations are still more popularly read and studied. But it was due to Hsüan Ts'ang that "Aliya" came to be replaced by "Ālaya."

According to Pao Ts'ang (法藏), the most noted Chinese commentator of Aśvaghosha's *Awakening of Faith*, who was well versed in Sanskrit and helped the Indian scholars in their great work of turning the Sanskrit into the Chinese in the seventh and the eighth century, we have the following concerning the term "Aliya." "*A-lai-yeh* or *a-li-yeh* is a local dialect of Sanskrit. Paramārtha literally translated it

無沒識 (*wu-mo-shih*, 'not-hidden vijñāna'), while Hsüan Ts'ang, according to the sense, rendered it 藏識 (*ts'ang-shih*, 'storing vijñāna'). *Ts'ang-shih* here means *ch'ih-ts'ang* (持藏, that is, containing, embodying, comprehending, embracing), and *wu-mo* means *pu-shih* (不失, that is, not losing). Though the characters are different, the sense is the same."

In spite of Pao Ts'ang, *a-li-ya* seems to be different from *ā-la-ya* not only in sense but in its grammatical form. The root may be the same for both terms, that is, "ī"; but the "a" of *aliya* is privative while "ā" of *ā-la-ya* is a particle with a definite meaning. The dialect theory solves many difficulties, and shall we adopt it here? Whatever this is, the text Paramārtha used for his translation of the *Mahāyāna-pariśamgraha* must have had *aliya* or *āliya* for 阿黎耶 (*ā-li-yeh*).

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