The Cardinal Virtues of the Bodhisattva in Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*

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STUDENTS of Dōgen 道元 (1200–1253) typically cut their teeth on the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 正法眼藏随聞記. Without a doubt, this text is "readily accessible" Dōgen in many respects, and a useful primer to successive forays into more complex texts such as the monumental *Shōbōgenzō* 正法眼藏. In recent decades, a fair amount of scholarship has been devoted to the interpretation of Dōgen's moral vision. Typically, presentations of this vision have drawn from various Dōgen texts in order to support a particular line of interpretation, and the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* makes its contributions to a greater or lesser extent. Consequently, we now have some sophisticated interpretations of the overall trajectory of Dōgen's moral thought, and these can be applied specifically to the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* itself.

We can begin with the observation that for Dōgen there is an inexorable link between morality and enlightenment, and an identity between enlightenment and *zazen* 坐禅. Ultimately speaking, morality proceeds from the enlightenment which is manifest in every moment of *zazen*. Thus *zazen* and moral capacity proceed hand-in-hand. Even in the first moment of practicing *zazen*, enlightenment is actualized, and correspondingly there is an advance in the practitioner's moral development. Subsequent moral growth is contingent upon continued actualization of enlightenment, and the primary locus for this actualization is the practice of *zazen*.

Of course, from this moral dynamic we readily infer that the novice practitioner of *zazen* is, comparatively speaking, on a lower level of moral attainment than the advanced practitioner. On a practical level, the novice

practitioner is in need of an ethical road map, an indicator of where he/she is, the terrain being traversed, and where he/she is heading. Dōgen provides it, and the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* is particulary useful inasmuch as a great deal of the text is devoted to relative newcomers on the journey.

To a large degree, the map the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* provides is composed of the Buddhist precepts. Time and again Dōgen mentions the precepts, exhorting the need to receive them, follow them, and return to them when one has gone morally astray. Indeed, his vision of moral goodness is largely clear from looking at the precepts he cites.

Yet Dōgen's morality is ultimately not a rule-based ethics. True, for the new student of Buddhism, the precepts provide clear guidelines of right and wrong, and he/she is exhorted to follow them. But in the course of *zazen*/enlightenment, the precepts are less and less *prescriptions* for the practitioner and more and more *descriptions* of his/her actual moral becoming. From an ultimate standpoint, the Buddhist precepts do not tell us how to be moral, but explain to us what we look like when we are moral. Also, from an ultimate standpoint, the fulfillment of the Buddhist precepts is not a condition of *zazen*/enlightenment, but a natural function of *zazen*/enlightenment. As Dōgen states, "When doing zazen, what precepts are not upheld, what merits not produced?" (Z 1.2).[1]

But Dōgen's picture of moral goodness in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* is not limited to invoking the precepts. Other markers appear which serve to give us a fuller picture. Among these are what Dōgen has to say about "virtues."

Regarding virtue-thinking, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies one philosophical avenue as "a simple monism of virtue." In this conception, "[virtue] is essentially a singular expression and its possession by an individual an all or nothing matter." To put it simply, either one has what we call virtue, or one does not; there are no intermediate degrees.[2] Taken individually, certain points in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* seem congruent with this conception; for example, in the course of a discussion on the essentials of Zen teaching and practice, Dōgen asserts: "When you look at a person, he should be seen from

[1] Masunaga 1978, p. 3. I am indebted to this work for the translated passages of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* which appear in this article. In order to avoid a cumbersome proliferation of footnotes, I have decided to include all citations of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* in the text of the article itself. I have adopted the citation method employed by Masunaga. Thus Z 1.2 refers to chapter one, section two of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*.

[2] MacIntyre 1984, pp. 168–69.

the standpoint of his true virtue (*jittoku* 實德). Don't judge by his outward appearance or his supposed virtue (*ketoku* 假德)" (Z 7.11).

Yet the few places where Dōgen speaks of virtue as a singular matter must be placed in the overall presentation of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, where the talk is predominantly plural. The best contextual link is found in 2.10, which begins as follows: "You do not deserve the respect of others unless you have true virtue within yourself. Because the people of Japan respect others for their outward appearance without knowing the true inner virtues, students with the mind that seeks the Way fall into evil paths and become the followers of demons." In the history of the English language, a "virtue" has sometimes designated an internal moral quality and at other times an outward manifestation of moral excellence,[3] and both meanings are interdependently present in Dōgen's usage. "Virtue practiced inwardly manifests itself on the outside," we read in 2.3. For Dōgen, this pertains not only to moral goodness in the general sense, but also to the fact that a particular virtue "practiced inwardly manifests itself on the outside." Thus Dōgen can be said to regard a particular "virtue" as designating both an internal, good disposition to be cultivated and the outward expression of this disposition at the same time. In order to retain the sense of this dynamic relationship between the inner and outer development of a particular virtue, I will at times speak of the cultivation/expression of that virtue.

Speaking of compassion and wisdom, Dōgen comments:

> In Buddhism there are some who are endowed with compassion and wisdom from the outset. Yet even though these qualities may not be present from the beginning, they can be acquired by study. Don't cling arbitrarily to your own views. Just cast aside both body and mind, plunge into the great sea of Buddhism and entrust yourself to the Buddhist teachings (Z 5.1).

Virtues are authentic expressions of moral goodness, and if we seek to know what specific virtues form the presentation of the good person in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, we can begin with compassion and wisdom. Furthermore, in line with Mahāyāna tradition, Dōgen asserts the ultimate nonduality of *karuṇā* and *prajñā*. Accordingly, henceforward I will refer to the virtue of compassion-wisdom in my analysis.

So how do we acquire the virtues? Note how 5.1 above begins its

[3] See *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 1984 ed., s.v. "Virtue."

explanations with the admonition to "cast aside body and mind." To cast aside body and mind is to actualize enlightenment. As noted in the introduction to this article, for Dōgen the primary locus for the realization of enlightenment is *zazen*. From this we can readily see that in Dōgen's moral thinking, self-cultivation of the virtues begins with *zazen*.

This relationship between *zazen* and the virtues is found in *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.4. Dōgen informs his listeners that, in order to be priests, one must be properly trained and must:

> cast aside attachments to the Self and conform to the teachings of the Zen Masters. The essential requisite is to abandon avarice. To do this, you must first free yourself from egoism. . . . Most people in the world like to regard themselves as good and to have others think the same of them, but such a thing seldom happens. If, however, you gradually forsake attachment to the Self and follow the advice of your teacher, you will progress.
>
> For a Zen monk the primary prerequisite for improvement is the practice of concentrated *zazen*. Without arguing who is clever and who is inept, who is wise and who is foolish, just do *zazen*. You will then naturally improve.

There is much one can say about this passage, but for our purposes it helps to begin with the assertion that "the essential requisite is to abandon avarice." Avarice is readily recognizable as one of those bad dispositions we label "vices." Dōgen's exhortation to abandon it is the functional equivalent of calling us to take up its opposing virtue; one must free oneself from egoism to realize this. But the primary prerequisite for realizing moral goodness as a whole and the requisite obtainment of the virtue opposing avarice is the practice of *zazen*. This improvement, furthermore, proceeds "naturally." The virtue in question, therefore, proceeds naturally from—or alternately expressed, is a function of—*zazen*.

Thus we begin to see a substantively more complete picture of moral goodness as presented by the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*. Generally speaking, moral goodness is a function of *zazen*/enlightenment. What moral goodness specifically looks like is delineated not only by reference to precepts, as discussed earlier, but also by reference to virtues. Furthermore, as with the fulfillment of the precepts, on a lower level virtues are things we are prescribed to obtain; "they can be acquired by study," as we saw in 5.1 above in relation to compassion and wisdom. But ultimately, as we can construct from a

reading of 1.4 and 5.1, the cultivation/expression of the virtues, like the fulfillment of the precepts, is a function of *zazen*/enlightenment.

That "abandoning avarice," mentioned in 1.4 above, is in effect an instruction to cultivate the opposing virtue, becomes evident when understood in the broader context of Dōgen's moral thinking. This requires us to return to the larger *Shōbōgenzō* where, in the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* 菩提薩埵四摂法 chapter, Dōgen expounds on: 1) *fuse* 布施, 2) *aigo* 愛語, 3) *rigyō* 利行, and 4) *dōji* 同事.[4] Along with noting the presence of compassion-wisdom, mapping these *bodaisatta shishōbō* provides us with a good picture of the virtue-thinking in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*.

Yet, if we can speak broadly of something called "Dōgen's moral thinking," we must also recognize that his ideas developed over time. Increasingly, historians have mapped the relationship between Dōgen's early views and his later ones. What emerges are vectors of thought that, at times, show a remarkable continuity between early and later "Dōgens" and at others, show radical differences.

I think there is a significant vector of intellectual continuity linking the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō* with the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*. The most direct evidence for this link can be stated as follows: If we read the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* in light of the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō*, substantial portions of the former text present themselves to us with greater clarity. Furthermore, this interpretive strategy illuminates how Dōgen resolved certain moral dilemmas—resolutions which prima facie may appear to the reader as either obscure or arbitrary.

Before we can pursue this thesis, some consideration of the historical contexts of these two texts is helpful. This will enable us to incorporate some historically-textured analysis at certain points. It will also provide background for seeing the link between the *bodaisatta shishōbō* in the *Shōbōgenzō* and Dōgen's discussion of *toku* 徳 in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*.

The *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* is a collection of Dōgen's conversations with various individuals recorded by his disciple, Koun Ejō 孤雲懐奘 (1198–

[4] The original source for translations of the *Shōbōgenzō* in this article is Ōkubo 1969–70. For sake of accessibility, I have tried as much as possible to conform my translation of a given passage to those found in one or more of the books in the list of references. I am indebted to these authors for the translations appearing in this article; at the same time, I must take responsibility for any shortcomings of the passages as presented in English. As with the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, I have included citations of the *Shōbōgenzō* into the text itself. Thus BS 1, for example, refers to the first section of the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō*.

1280). Scholars debate the precise time span of this recording—1234 being the earliest beginning date and 1237 the latest ending date. Precision on this matter is relevant because in October of 1236 Dōgen formally opened Kōshōji 興聖寺, the first Chinese-style Zen monastery in Japan, at Fukakusa, outside of Kyoto—the same location where Dōgen had already formed a community of followers.[5] How much of Dōgen's teachings in the text reflect the time just prior to the founding of Kōshōji, when Dōgen would presumably have been preoccupied to a considerable degree with the details of realizing the physical creation of his cherished temple and mentally preparing his monks for their new life there? How much of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* reflects the time just after the founding of the temple, when people from all walks of life traveled to marvel at the monks meditating in their new hall and, at the same time, receive Dōgen's instruction? Among other things, better answers to these questions would help us to understand the context of Dōgen's teachings, especially to whom they were directed.

That Dōgen's teachings were sometimes directed towards monks and sometimes towards laypersons, accounts for much of the seeming inconsistencies one finds in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*. In line with the Buddhist concept of *upāya*, Dōgen tailored his teaching according to the position and the capacity of the listener. What Dōgen had to say to his monks is of particular interest to us here, as it established one of the connections this text has to the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō*, to which we shall now turn.

The *Shōbōgenzō* is a collection of independent texts composed over a span of two decades; once again, the collector was Ejō. About two-thirds of the work dates roughly from 1240 to 1244. Among the texts Dōgen produced in this flurry of writing was the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō*, dated May 5, 1243. Thus its composition is about six or seven years after that of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*.

The date offered for the composition of the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* is of

[5] According to Itō Shūken's study on the chronological order of Dōgen's collected writings, the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* was recorded by Ejō between 1234 and 1236, during his novitiate period (see Itō 1998, pp. 223–23, 396–99). Masunaga Reihō notes that the colophon of the popular edition of the Tokugawa period lists the years as 1235–37, and according to *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 5.5, Dōgen invited Ejō to take the position of meditation director on January 28, 1327. Ejō's status is relevant, since 1) Ejō appears as a recipient of Dōgen's instruction in the text, and 2) while the recorded teachings belong to Dōgen, what has been recorded reflects Ejō's own interests.

interest because of its proximity to Dōgen's relocation of his monastic community to Echizen in July of the same year. Exactly why Dōgen made this move has been a subject of considerable debate. According to one proposed scenario, the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* was produced just after the destruction of Kōshōji by Tendai monks envious of the vitality and influence of the temple. A collection of Tendai texts, dating from the fourteenth century, includes the comment that Dōgen was forced out of Fukakusa by persecution.[6] Political and religious persecution may well have been a factor in Dōgen's relocation, though historians in this camp disagree on the details. Some scholars argue that corroborating evidence of an actual physical attack on Kōshōji cannot be found, and in any case is nowhere reflected in Dōgen's writings.[7] Yet hostility towards exclusive approaches to Zen in this era has been identified, as can be seen in the history of Tōfukuji 東福寺, a powerful Tendai temple which incorporated Zen meditation but expressly denounced independent Zen sectarianism. Possibly, Dōgen simply saw the writing on the wall, so to speak, and made a strategic move designed to ensure his own independence.

Whatever the exact historical circumstances of these two texts, it is clear that both were produced at a time proximate to a period of profound transition for Dōgen's community of monks, when he was preparing them for life and practice in a new temple. As we shall see, in both instances Dōgen produced instruction manifesting the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, and this was intended for his monastic community.

Translators of Dōgen have rendered the term "bodaisatta shishōbo" in a variety of ways. For example, Tanahashi Kazuaki renders it as "the bodhisattva's four methods of guidance," Thomas Cleary prefers "the four integrative methods of the bodhisattva," while Yokoi Yūhō offers us "the four ways for a bodhisattva to pursue." While all of these translations have merit, I prefer Hee-Jin Kim's translation as "the four cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva," largely because it has an explanatory power which is useful to my analysis.

We should immediately note that Dōgen himself never labels the *bodaisatta shishōbō* as "virtues" per se. But if we recall his discussion of virtues in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, we can understand why Kim suggests a link between the *bodaisatta shishōbō* of the later text with Dōgen's conception of *toku* in the earlier one, and why he interprets them as virtues. First of all, Dōgen's

[6] Bodiford 1993, p. 28.

[7] For a detailed presentation of this point of view, see Bodiford 1993, pp. 27–30.

bodaisatta shishōbō are derived from Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, wherein they were originally construed as "virtues" and were part of the "skillfulness in choice and means and methods, the seventh perfection" of a bodhisattva.[8] Second, and more importantly, whatever other role they play in Dōgen's thinking, the *bodaisatta shishōbō* are also both internal, good dispositions to be cultivated and the outward expressions of these dispositions at the same time. As noted in my previous analysis, this is precisely what Dōgen understands virtues to be.

That, on one level, the *bodaisatta shishōbō* fit the criteria of "virtues" for Dōgen can be seen in a careful reading of his exposition of the four found in the *Shōbōgenzō*. As I mentioned earlier, he draws upon the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition in developing his ideas. However, Dōgen was rarely content with merely passing forward Buddhist teachings; in his appropriation of the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, he transforms them as well.

Perhaps the most radical instance of this is seen when we consider *fuse*. The transformation begins when Dōgen defines this term as "nongreed," where "nongreed means not to covet; not to covet means not to curry another's favor." *Fuse* is typically translated as "giving," and certainly giving is a component of this virtue. This giving is meant in both a material and spiritual sense: "It is to give away unneeded belongings to someone you don't know, to offer flowers blooming on a distant mountain to the Tathāgata, or, again, to offer treasures you had in your former life to sentient beings" (BS 1.4).

However, according to Dōgen, *fuse* means nongreed, and by this he certainly has in mind our conventional understanding of avarice, i.e., an excessive hoarding of material goods. He also has in mind spiritual avarice, as evidenced in the passage quoted above. The sentence "nongreed means not to covet" partly reveals that Dōgen is not only thinking of avarice in the narrow sense, but the kind of craving desire mentioned in the tenth commandment of the Decalogue (Exod. 20:17) and, even more broadly, in the Second Noble Truth.

Fuse, then, partially corresponds to what the first virtue means in its original Mahāyāna sense. But in defining the term, Dōgen transforms it. In a bold stroke, he indicates that "giving" and "not coveting" are nondual. By this Dōgen is partly pointing to how the noncovetous person, who subsequently owns little beyond what he/she needs, frees up resources for giving to others.

[8] Dayal 1932, pp. 251–69.

We see an example of this in 1.16 of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, where Dōgen is quoted as follows:

> The Buddha has said, "Possess nothing except your robes and bowl and give to starving people the leftovers from what you have begged." If not a scrap is to be saved from what you receive, how much more should one avoid rushing about searching for things.

Yet Dōgen is also pointing to how the absence of covetousness, in its broader sense, is none other than giving as well: "To leave flowers to the wind, to leave birds to the seasons, are also acts of giving" (BS 1).

"Not to covet means not to curry favor" might initially sound as if Dōgen is deliberately courting obfuscation, but it makes sense if you follow how he has been constructing *fuse*. As a consequence of the nonduality between giving and noncovetousness, giving is to be performed without the intent of "coveting" a reward from someone or in some manner. Dōgen gives an example of noncovetous giving: "A king gave his beard as medicine to cure his retainer's disease; a child offered sand to Buddha and became King Aśoka in a later birth. They were not greedy for reward but only shared what they could" (BS 1).

Dōgen's understanding of *fuse* entails not only an external act of giving, but also an exhortation to develop an internal disposition, as we can see in the language of the definition itself ("nongreed", "not to covet"). Immediately following the definition, the nature of *fuse* as an internal disposition unfolds further, as we learn that proper giving is a function of our inward mental state: "Even if one should rule four continents, to provide education and civilization in the correct way is just a matter of not being covetous." That cultivation of *fuse* as an inward mental disposition is a component of, and indeed at the heart of, Dōgen's meaning, becomes evident when we take in his description of *fuse* as a whole. We can see this by juxtaposing three subsequent passages. Just after his statement about material and spiritual giving quoted above, he adds: "The size of the offering is of no concern; it is the sincerity with which it is given that is important." To this declaration of the "mind" one brings to giving, we are told later that "Not only should you make an effort to give, but also be mindful of every opportunity to give." Finally, in wrapping up his treatment of this topic, Dōgen tells us that the very act of giving itself cultivates the inner capacity to exercise *fuse*: "Moreover, in giving, mind transforms the gift and the giving transforms the mind" (BS 1).

Fuse, we can readily see, is both an internal moral quality and an outward manifestation of a moral excellence which can be cultivated—which is precisely how the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* describes a virtue. For Dōgen, then, *fuse* is a virtue that encompasses "giving" and "noncovetousness" at the same time. Granted, at times, he talks about the one without explicitly mentioning the other. Ultimately, however, one arises interdependently with the other. For that reason, I shall render the virtue of *fuse* as "giving-noncovetousness." The hyphen serves to convey the aforementioned interdependency. Virtues, furthermore, are typically expressed in a noun form, grammatically speaking, and this will harmonize *fuse* with other virtues expressed in the text. Finally, such a rendering retains the sense in which *fuse* is not only an outward act but an inner disposition.

If we play close attention to Dōgen's analysis of the remaining three *shishōbō*, we notice they also meet his criteria for virtues. Note the interdependent relationship between inner disposition and outward behavior in the definition of the second *shishōbō*, *aigo*. "*Aigo* means that in looking upon living beings one should *first arouse a mind of kindness and love* and should utter caring, kind words" (BS 2, emphasis mine). "Arouse a mind of kindness" points us to the cultivation of *aigo*, which like *fuse* is partly accomplished by its own practice: "Once one has taken to *aigo*, one will gradualy increase *aigo*." *Aigo* receives extended treatment in 1.7 of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, which begins: "Monks must not be scolded and castigated with harsh words; nor should they be held up to scorn by having their faults pointed out." As a virtue, *aigo* can more broadly be linked with the notion of right speech advocated in the Eightfold Noble Path, which is reflected in a comment by Dōgen in 5.4: "The essence of Confucianism is to check the bad and encourage the good by the skillful use of words. Zen monks, when guiding others, must also adopt skillfulness such as this."

Compared to *fuse*, *aigo* is straightforward and, one might say, conventionally Buddhist. It is typically translated as "kind speech." For the same reasons that I have rendered *fuse* by the dispositional term "giving-noncovetousness," however, I have chosen to identify *aigo* as the virtue of "verbal kindness." Reference in the definition and elsewhere in section 2 of the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* to arousing the mind of *aigo* is one reason we would do well to adopt this form.

Rigyō, the third virtue, is the most visible of the cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*. As with *aigo*, Dōgen's introduction of the term in the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* displays the interdependence of

inner disposition and outer action: "*Rigyō* means to devise ways of benefiting others, be they high or low. Those who aided the helpless tortoise or the injured sparrow did not expect any reward for their assistance; they simply acted out of the feeling of *rigyō*" (BS 3). Dōgen exhorts the cultivation of *rigyō*, noting that "once we have this benevolent mind, it will arise unremittingly even for grass, trees, wind and water." Among the numerous references to benefiting others in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* is this passage from 1.20: "Whatever events occur, consider things solely in terms of how to make Buddhism flourish and how to bring benefit to all beings." The connection between Buddhist practice and benefiting others receives further treatment in the text, as we shall see.

Rigyō has been rendered ably in English as "beneficial action" by some translators.[9] In keeping with understanding each of these *shishōbō* as at once an inward disposition and its outward expression, I have opted for Yokoi's translation of the term as "benevolence." As with "virtue," the history of this word in the English language makes it well suited for designating something that is, simultaneously, both an inward moral quality and an outward action.[10]

Finally, *dōji* "means nondifference. This applies equally to the self and others" (BS 4; all quotes in the next two paragraphs are from this source). The interdependency of inward disposition and outward behavior is evident in Dōgen's attempt to further refine the term: "The *ji* of *dōji* means right form, dignity, correct manner." "Dignity" points us to an internal disposition, "correct manner" towards outward behavior, and "right form" to both. It is evident that the performance of *dōji* towards others cultivates *dōji* for ourselves, because "when we know *dōji*, others and self are one."

Realization of the nonduality of self and others inwardly as a disposition, and outwardly as an action, encapsulates the fourth virtue of *dōji*. That nondifference applies equally to self and others has radical implications for the cultivation/expression of this virtue. "Others" are to be regarded nondiscriminately, just as the wise emperor "allots his praise and blame impartially"; "self" is to be regarded nondiscriminately, just as "the ocean does not exclude the ocean." In other words, in the cultivation/expression of *dōji*, all others are treated equally and the self is treated equally with all others. Ultimately, self and others are treated equally because "you cause yourself to

[9] See Tanahashi 1985, p. 46, and Cleary 1986, p. 119.

[10] See *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 1984 ed., s.v. "Benevolence."

be in identity with yourself," i.e., there is a fundamental nondifference between self and others.

Prima facie, we might regard this virtue as of little help when faced with the moral dilemma requiring a choice involving others, self, and self with others. But "the relationship of self and others varies limitlessly with circumstances," according to Dōgen. How *dōji* figures in Dōgen's moral decision-making in particular circumstances will be addressed below.

Of different translations offered for *dōji*, I prefer "identification,"[11] since this word captures both the inward disposition and the outer action. Futhermore, it can serve to call to mind how *dōji* is a virtue which cultivates/expresses: 1) nondiscriminating actions towards others, 2) nondiscrimination towards oneself, and 3) the ultimate identification of self and others.

As the above analysis reveals, *fuse*, *aigo*, *rigyō* and *dōji* as described by Dōgen in the *Shōbōgenzō,* meet the criteria for "virtues" as delineated in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* inasmuch as each one is an internal moral quality and an outward manifestation of a moral excellence which can be cultivated. Thus Kim's rendering of *bodaisatta shishōbō* as "the four cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva" is an insightful interpretive strategy. As we shall see, understanding the *bodaisatta shishōbō* as cardinal virtues enables us to better chart the moral territory of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki.*

The final sentence of the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* informs us: "The *shishōbō* encompass as many again respectively, so there are sixteen in all." The conclusion of the chapter is an application of the Mādhyamika teaching on *pratītya-samutpāda*, or "interdependent arising," to the four virtues of the bodhisattva. The doctrine of interdependent arising asserts that all psychological and physical phenomena constituting individual existence are interdependent and mutually condition each other. Drawing on the Mādhyamika formulation of this doctrine as "the interdependence of all things," Dōgen applies it to *fuse*, *aigo*, *rigyō*, and *dōji*, emphasizing how they are interdependent and mutually condition each other.

The *bodaisatta shishōbō* are important to Dōgen's presentation of moral goodness in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, as is evident by the many references to them we see in the text, some examples of which we have already noted. What we notice in the *Shōbōgenzō* is, in part, a refinement of Dōgen's thinking on these *bodaisatta shishōbō* which were manifested earlier in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*. But if this "refinement" expresses the continuity of

[11] See Yokoi 1986, p. 849.

his earlier and later teaching on the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, nonetheless it also indicates at least some degree of development, and therefore we may speculate as to why the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* chapter looks the way it does.

External factors may have played a role here. As noted above, both texts were produced at a time proximate to a transition point amongst Dōgen's monastic community. But the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* was composed around the time the community moved into Kōshōji; the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* around the time they abandoned it. If Dōgen was indeed forced to abandon Kōshōji because of religious and political persecution, this may help explain his radical opening words to the latter text: "*Fuse* means nongreed; nongreed means not to covet; not to covet means not to curry another's favor." Perhaps Dōgen was making an oblique reference to this historical situation: the monks, and indeed he himself, had to refrain from greed during this transitional period. They should not be greedily covetous of the glorious Kōshōji temple that they had been forced to abandon; nor should they try to curry favor in seeking patronage for the new Daibutsuji 大仏寺 (later renamed Eiheiji 永平寺) temple.

We do know that Dōgen's disciples complained of the poor living conditions in rural Echizen, which must have contrasted greatly with what they were accustomed to at Kōshōji, and Dōgen may well have anticipated this situation and sought to mentally toughen up his monks beforehand. This might be why we see numerous exhortations, both direct and implied, to pursue poverty in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* as well as in the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō*. "Give your valuables, even a penny or a blade of grass; it will be a wholesome root for this and other lifetimes," reads the latter text, and of course a penny or a blade of grass is only valuable to someone whose achievement of poverty is nearly complete.

Moreover, historical circumstances may have had something to do with why, out of a myriad of possible Buddhist topics, Dōgen chose to produce the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* chapter in the first place. If destruction, or at least persecution, of Kōshōji did indeed compel Dōgen and his monks to abandon it, maybe he saw in the *bodaisatta shishōbō* an interpretive vehicle that could help to reconcile himself and his monks to the new situation. Following this line of interpretation, he could be seen as exhorting a nonattachment, more specifically a giving-noncovetousness, towards Kōshōji, and preaching the virtues of verbal kindness, benevolence, and identification even towards those who persecuted them in their beloved temple. This might also explain

the subsequent chapters of the *Shōbōgenzō* produced in Echizen, wherein we do not find any subsequent reference to the persecution or any expression of anger, hatred, regret, and so forth, regarding this subject.[12]

Internal factors may also have been behind Dōgen's choice of topic. If we recall that he is, among other things, the author of the *Shōbōgenzō*, then we can imagine that he may have been quite aware of his unfolding oeuvre. We would then not be surprised to learn that Dōgen might have self-consciously attempted in the *Shōbōgenzō*, with varying degrees of success, to create a semblance of unity and consistency of structure which incorporated his earlier thinking. To the extent that this project was successful, we would find in certain places vectors of intellectual continuity between Dōgen's earlier works and his magnum opus.[13]

It appears that such a vector does exist between the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* and the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō*. As I stated above, the most direct evidence for this intellectual continuity lies in the explanatory power we achieve when we read the former text in light of the latter. We are now in a position to pursue the point.

We can begin by recalling that in his final statement of the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō*, Dōgen applies the concept of *pratītya-samutpāda* to *fuse*, *aigo*, *rigyō*, and *dōji*. True, at certain points in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, these appear briefly and individually. Yet, in most instances, one can recognize either explicitly or implicitly an expression of a given virtue's interdependency with one or two or three of the others. We see an example of this regarding the virtue of identification in a short passage taken from 3.3: "In considering people, do not differentiate between the intimate and the distant. Resolve to help all equally. Determine in your mind to benefit others, whether lay or clerical, without self-interest or profit, and without caring whether people know or appreciate your actions." Following upon the instruction to act in accord with the virtue of identification ("do not differentiate between the intimate and the distant"), Dōgen proceeds to qualify this in a manner consistent with the virtue of benevolence ("determine in your mind to benefit others") and giving-noncovetousness ("without self-interest or profit").

[12] I am indebted to Professor Aramaki Noritoshi of Otani University for directing me towards this interpretation. I must immediately add that this acknowledgement does not imply that Professor Aramaki would necessarily endorse my particular line of argument, and therefore I must take full responsibility for any flaws therein.

[13] For more discussion of this possibility, see LaFleur 1985.

The significance of the interdependency and mutual conditioning of each virtue of the *bodaisatta shishōbō* is evident when we consider potential alternatives. Confucius, for example, believed that one should practice benevolence, but (unlike his rival, Mo Tzu) did not think it should be exercised towards everyone *equally*; it had to be qualified in terms of the five great relations.[14] Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), a contemporary of Dōgen, at times spoke of, for example, a kind of "identity" between parents and children. This identity partially dictates how we should extend benevolence to them, but following Aristotle he maintained that our helping of others is effected by our relative degree of consanguinity to them,[15] which is certainly not an instance of "[no] differentiation between the intimate and the distant." The interdependency and mutual conditioning of the *bodaisatta shishōbō* has implications for what Dōgen has to say about other virtues, as we shall see below.

The interdependent arising of giving-noncovetousness and benevolence can be seen at the beginning of *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* 3.7. That compassion-wisdom is also mutually interdependent with the *bodaisatta shishōbō* is another aspect of the passage:

> Monks should take care to follow the conduct of the Buddha and the Patriarchs. Above all, do not covet wealth. It is impossible to put into words the depths of the Tathāgata's compassion. Everything he did was for the sake of all sentient beings. There was nothing that he did, no matter how small, that was not done for others.

Some have conceived compassion-wisdom as a virtue of passive sympathetic understanding. But in this passage, its interdependent arising with benevolence and giving-noncovetousness displays how active, indeed radically active, a virtue it can be. Compassion-wisdom, Dōgen tells us, extends to even the minute aspects of existence. Later in the section, he expands on his comments on giving-noncovetousness: "Masters warn against the accumulation of wealth. When other sects speak well of Zen, the first thing they praise is its poverty."

[14] The five great relations are: kindness in the father, filial piety in the son; gentility in the elder brother, humility and respect in the younger; righteous behavior in the husband, obedience in the wife; humane consideration in elders, deference in juniors; benevolence in rulers, loyalty in ministers and subjects.

[15] See Aquinas, *Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics* 1711.

But the passage reflects an even more fundamental relationship. In his analysis of the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, Kim observes: "Underlying these cardinal virtues is the principle of the non-duality of self and other in the context of which alone the selfless activities of the bodhisattva become undefiled, free, and natural. The hallmark of great compassion lies in this."[16] In part, Kim's comment helps us to see that what he calls the "cardinal" virtues of the bodhisattva are grounded in the "foundational" virtue of compassion-wisdom. Compassion-wisdom is both interdependent with, and prior to, the *bodaisatta-shishōbō*, inasmuch as the latter are part of the "selfless activities of the bodhisattva" which flow in a manner natural, free, and undefiled from compassion-wisdom.

This fundamental relationship between these cardinal virtues and this foundational virtue enables us to trace the cultivation of the *bodaisatta shishōbō* back to their ultimate source. For Dōgen, compassion-wisdom for others is predicated on the ultimate nonduality of self and others. "To love others as oneself," we might say, follows as a matter of course if there is no distinction between self and others. But realizing this compassion-wisdom is not a mere matter of intellectual assent. Rather, compassion-wisdom must be actualized by enlightenment; as discussed above, the primary locus for actualizing enlightenment is *zazen*. From *zazen*/enlightenment, therefore, proceeds compassion-wisdom; compassion-wisdom arises prior to, and mutually interdependent with, the *bodaisatta shishōbō*. Ultimately, therefore, these cardinal virtues derive from *zazen*/enlightenment.

The point may seem redundant, as we noted earlier how *all* the virtues ultimately derive from *zazen*/enlightenment. But I have gone back to make the point specifically about the *bodaisatta shishōbō* so that I can go forward to make a new one: These cardinal virtues of which we speak are virtues emphasized not for everyone, but for the bodhisattva. The point is perhaps obvious, but remains critical not only for understanding how the *bodaisatta shishōbō* appear in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, but the other virtues as well.

Dōgen well understood that compassion-wisdom is the sine qua non of Buddhist morality. Indeed, compassion-wisdom saturates the entirety of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, either explicitly or implicitly. But what he had to say depended on to whom he was talking. In these pages we see Dōgen employing Buddhist *upāya*, wherein the teacher tailors the message according to the listener's ability to understand and capacity to act. Consequently, his teach-

[16] Kim 1975, p. 273.

ings to monks differed from those to laypersons, and many of the seeming inconsistencies in the text can be attributed to this. Certainly, lay practitioners of Zen are constantly exhorted to practice *zazen* and become monks: "Even in China there were men who renounced hard-to-renounce family ties and abandoned hard-to-abandon worldly goods to enter a Zen monastery" (Z 5.20). But Dōgen nonetheless did not fail to answer/address listeners in terms appropriate to lay practice, including matters pertaining to compassion-wisdom.

Thus we must resist the temptation to interpret the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* as offering one fixed picture of moral goodness. Furthermore, what Dōgen has to say about compassion-wisdom and the other virtues cannot be reified to apply to all people at all times. But in the text we can discern, to some extent, how he addressed the matter of the virtues to monks vis-à-vis laypersons.

We can begin with the observation that a monk is one who has taken the bodhisattva precepts. Zen monks are regarded as bodhisattvas-in-training—better yet, they are bodhisattvas unfolding, inasmuch as every moment of *zazen* actualizes the very same enlightenment as the Buddha. Consequently, the *bodaisatta shishōbō* pertain particularly to monks. Subsequently, the cultivation and expression of compassion-wisdom are especially interdependent with these four virtues in the practice of a monk. To the extent that the compassion-wisdom of the monk can be described vis-à-vis a layperson, it can be partially achieved in relation to the four cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva.

We see an example of this in 3.6. Dōgen begins his talk by praising the T'ang Dynasty emperor, T'ai-tsung 太宗 (r. 626–49), who decided to forgo the building of a new palace during the harvest season because it would greatly inconvenience the people, and eventually abandoned the project altogether and remained living in his old, damp, disrepaired one. Dōgen comments:

> When even a layman feels this way about the people, he has transcended his own body. How much more compassionate should the disciples of the Buddha, who follow in the style of the Tathāgata, be! Their compassion for all the people should be like that towards an only son. Don't scold and make trouble for your attendants merely because they serve you. . . . Therefore, students should,

> without showing it, devote themselves to the good of others, without distinguishing between high and low, intimate or distant. Don't trouble others or hurt their feelings over matters, either trivial or important.

In this passage, we see an exposition on both the compassion-wisdom pertaining to a layman and to a monk. The emperor is praised for his compassion-wisdom. Furthermore, he is held up as a moral exemplar for the monks. Yet note how Dōgen proceeds: "How much more compassionate should the disciples of the Buddha, who follow in the style of the Tathāgata, be!" And how does Dōgen flesh out the kind of greater compassion-wisdom of the monk? As we can see, his description relies predominantly on the *bodaisatta shishōbō*. Verbal kindness is evident in the admonition not to scold and hurt feelings. (Later in the passage, Dōgen develops the point further, insisting one should admonish with gentle words, not harsh ones.) Students should devote themselves to the good of others, without distinguishing between high and low, intimate or distant (i.e., through benevolence and identification). Finally, the example of the emperor, who was content to live in a palace seriously in need of repair, introduces giving-noncovetousness into the discussion.

"How much better must the compassion-wisdom of the monk be," is a sentiment Dōgen expresses repeatedly in the text. We can see this all the more clearly when we acknowledge the mutual interdependence of compassion-wisdom and the *bodaisatta shishōbō*. The reader may recall that when we began a discussion of the application of *pratītya-samutpāda* to the four cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva, the first example cited was a passage from 3.3, wherein, within a short space, we could see reference to three of them in succession: identification, benevolence, and giving-noncovetousness. Immediately before launching into a remark about identification, however, Dōgen comments on what "true goodness" is for a layperson. He then proceeds to assert: "The truly good man does things for others, even if now or in the future they are in no way aware of it. How much better must the Zen monk be!"

Clearly, the Zen monk is to be better and more cultivated/expressive in compassion-wisdom in Dōgen's eyes. If we are to ask in what way this moral superiority arises and what it looks like, we can partly describe it by reference to the *bodaisatta shishōbō*. We see an example of this in the Myōyū-Myōzen story (5.12). Dōgen recounts how the Zen master Myōzen 明全

(1184–1225) was about to depart to China to seek the Dharma. His old teacher Myōyū 明融, however, fell seriously ill, and requested Myōzen to delay the trip in order to help him in his last days. Myōzen calls his disciples together to ask their advice. After outlining the situation, acknowledging how much Myōyū has done for him, he comes directly to the point: "It is difficult to disobey a teacher's request. But my going to China now at the risk of my life to seek the Way also derives from the great compassion of the bodhisattva and the desire to benefit all beings. Is there any justification for disobeying my teacher's wishes and going to China?"

Before proceeding, we should pause here to note how the foundational virtue of compassion-wisdom arises interdependently with that of the bodhisattva's cardinal virtue of benevolence. Indeed, Myōzen frames his invoking of compassion-wisdom in terms of "the great compassion of the bodhisattva." As we shall see, this sets the tone for the remainder of the story and the subsequent discussion of it.

Dōgen and the other disciples counsel him to honor the request and delay his trip. Myōzen, however, views the situation differently. Ultimately, remaining behind to care for Myōyū would amount to little more service than comforting an old dying man, "but if I can carry out my determination to visit China in search of the Law and can gain even a trace of enlightenment, it will serve to awaken many people, even though it means opposing the deluded wishes of one man." Declaring that it is wrong to waste precious time for the sake of benefiting a single man, he sets out for China.

Dōgen expresses his approval of Myōzen's conduct. However, one disciple is evidently not yet convinced:

> Even if we cast aside obligation and affections towards parents and teachers when we consider the activities of a bodhisattva, should we not set aside benefits for ourselves and work for the benefit of others? Since there was no one else to nurse his teacher in the infirmities of his old age, wasn't it contrary to the bodhisattva conduct for Myōzen to think only of his own practice and not take care of his teacher when he was in a position to help him? A bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good deeds. Do we base our understanding of Buddhism on what the circumstances or the occasion may be? Under this principle, should he not have stayed and helped him? Why should he not help his old and infirm teacher, instead of thinking only of his own desire to seek the Law? What is your opinion?

Ejō, the author of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, was Dōgen's chief disciple. Ejō himself appears several times in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, and 4.5 informs us that he was the first to fill the position of meditation director at Kōshōji. This means that Ejō, in his official capacity, would have occasionally taught in place of Dōgen, and indeed the section tells us that such was the case. So we have good reason to surmise that, at least in Dōgen's view, Ejō's spiritual attainment was considerable. We can also infer that Dōgen's response will be delivered at a comparably high level.

But first we must dissect Ejō's response. The issue at hand, we recall, has to do with what Myōzen should have done in the situation described. Myōzen claims to be acting from the great compassion-wisdom of the bodhisattva. He reasons that seeking the Law supersedes his obligation to take care of his former teacher, and Dōgen agrees. Ejō acknowledges that in seeking the Law, one must renounce obligations to parents and teachers—on this point all three are in agreement.

But Ejō still wonders if Myōzen did the right thing. His response essentially poses the issue to Dōgen in the same manner Myōzen posed it to all his disciples: compassion-wisdom in terms of "the great compassion of the bodhisattva." As with Myōzen's query, in Ejō's first question the concern about compassion-wisdom arises concurrently with the issue of benefiting others. In effect, Ejō's response reflects a point made earlier: the cultivation and expression of compassion-wisdom in the monk are especially interdependent with the *bodaisatta shishōbō*.

This becomes all the more apparent in the second question, when Ejō asks whether it was not "contrary to bodhisattva conduct" for Myōzen to think only of his own practice when he could help someone else. His reasoning? "A bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good deeds." Ejō continues his line of argument with a rhetorical question which amounts to whether or not "due circumstances" should be taken into account in a moral dilemma such as this. To this, Dōgen would undoubtedly answer yes—"good and evil arise according to circumstances," as he notes in 5.14. All that remains, then, is for Ejō to bring his line of reasoning to a conclusion in terms of benevolence: shouldn't Myōzen stay and help his teacher rather than only thinking of his own desire to seek the Law?

Section 5.12 concludes with Dōgen's response to Ejō:

> In both benefiting others and practicing yourself, to discard the inferior and adopt the superior comprise the good action of the

> bodhisattva. To offer a diet of beans and water in an effort to save the old and infirm merely caters to the misguided love and deluded passions of this brief life. If you turn your back on the deluded emotions and study the Way that leads to enlightenment, even though you have cause for some regret, you will establish an excellent base for transcending the world. Consider this well, consider this well!

Like Ejō (and Myōzen earlier), Dōgen invokes the compassion-wisdom of the bodhisattva concurrently with the virtue of benevolence. Furthermore, his reasoning also reflects the interdependency and mutual conditioning of the compassion-wisdom and the *bodaisatta shishōbō*. But Dōgen arrives at a different conclusion from Ejō—partly, at least, because of a more thoroughgoing application of these cardinal virtues to the situation.

We recall that Ejō pressed his point with the assertion that "a bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good deeds." Notably, Dōgen does not challenge this assertion about good deeds. However, before addressing the "good action of the bodhisattva," he provides an important subordinate clause: "In both benefiting others and practicing yourself . . ." Whereas Ejō construes benevolence as benefiting others, Dōgen construes it as applying not only to others but to ourselves as well. Thus Dōgen draws our attention to the mutual interpenetration of benevolence and identification. As he states in his exposition of identification, "after the self assimilates the other to itself, the self lets itself be assimilated to the other. The relationship of self and other is infinitely varied according to circumstances" (BS 4).

In employing a more thorough application of the interdependency of the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, therefore, Dōgen demonstrates for Ejō a fuller understanding of the notion that "a bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good deeds": he must be nondiscriminating not only in relations towards others, but he must be nondiscriminating between others and himself as well. The fact that identification is mutually interpenetrative with benevolence enables Dōgen to say in the concluding paragraph on the latter virtue: "Therefore, we should try to benefit our enemies and friends or ourselves and others equally. Once we have this benevolent mind, it will arise unremittingly even for grass and trees and water. We must also try to save the foolish single-heartedly" (BS 4).

In this instance, Myōyū would seem to be one of the foolish in Dōgen's eyes. Offering a diet of beans and water to Myōyū not only does nothing for

Myōzen's practice, but does not amount to much on behalf of Myōyū in this brief life either—"it would not have anything to do with his escape from the cycle of birth and death," as Myōzen says earlier in the story. Furthermore, fulfilling the request would be catering to the misguided love and deluded passions of this life, which a monk is supposed to have renounced. At first glance, Dōgen's words seem to be applied to Myōyū, but the subsequent passage indicates that they refer more directly to Myōzen. Granting Myōyū's request would be "to curry another's favor," which is diametrically opposed to the virtue of giving-noncovetousness a monk is supposed to cultivate/express. Though one may experience some regret, if one can exercise giving-noncovetousness and study the Way that leads to enlightenment, one "will establish an excellent basis for transcending the world."

Ejō followed a line of reasoning based on the benevolence of the bodhisattva in order to reach his conclusion. Dōgen skillfully proceeds from the same starting point, but notes how "to discard the inferior and adopt the superior comprise the good action of the bodhisattva." The monk, the bodhisattva-in-training/unfolding, is called to a superior cultivation/expression of benevolence. As we saw above, in Dōgen's articulation of what benevolence is, in these circumstances one can detect the interdependent arising of the virtues of identification and giving-noncovetousness. (That "verbal kindness" would be how Myōyū should present his decision is an obvious inference.) Benevolence can be a virtue cultivated/expressed by a layperson, but the monk is called to a "higher" benevolence.

This call to a higher cultivation/expression of benevolence vis-à-vis a layperson is also displayed in 3.3. Dōgen recounts how Emperor T'ai-tsung was informed that his subjects were criticizing him. He replied: "If I am benevolent and draw criticism, I need not worry. But if I am not benevolent and am praised, then I should worry." Dōgen, commenting on the emperor's benevolence, remarks: "If even laymen have this attitude, how much more so should a monk."

So far we have been analyzing the employment of the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, with some attention given to their relationship to compassion-wisdom. Yet these cardinal virtues also bear a relationship to other virtues expressed in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*. Consider the following passage:

> When one thinks about it, everyone has his allotted share of food and clothing while he is alive. Laymen leave such matters to fate, while they concern themselves with loyalty and develop their filial

> piety. How much less then should monks be governed by worldly concerns!" (2.6)

This passage embedded in 2.6 is part of a long discourse pertaining to giving-noncovetousness, and we see again how Dōgen calls monks to a higher articulation of the virtue in comparison to laypersons. But more importantly for our purposes, introduced into the discussion are two virtues which, we are told, are concerns of laypersons: loyalty and filial piety.

This section compels us to ask: What is the relationship, if any, between the *bodaisatta shishōbō* and other virtues like loyalty and filial piety? Also, how does the status of a monk vis-à-vis a layperson figure into consideration of this matter, if at all? While there are a number of virtues in the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* we could consider in seeking to work through these questions, perhaps the best one to pursue is filial piety, which crops up several times in the text, both explicitly and implicitly. "Filial piety," we recall, usually denotes the obligation children owe to their parents.

In section 2.19, Ejō asks: "Must we fulfill our obligations to our parents?" Dōgen replies:

> Filial piety is most important, but there is a difference between laymen and monks. Laymen, relying on such works as the *Book of Filial Piety*, take care of their parents during their lifetimes and hold services for them after their deaths. Monks, on the other hand, have severed their ties with the world and live in the religious realm. Thus their obligations are not limited to parents alone, but, feeling these obligations to all beings, they fill the world with good deeds. If they were merely to limit their obligations to their parents, they would be turning against the religious way. True filial piety consists in following Buddhism in everyday practice and in each moment of study under a Zen Master. Offering services on the anniversary of a parent's death and doing good for forty-nine days belong to the activities of the lay world. Zen monks must understand the deep obligations they bear their parents in the above terms. Does selecting just one day for doing good and holding services really reflect the spirit of Buddhism?

Dōgen's response indicates that the answer to Ejō's question is different depending on whether the agent in question is a layperson or a monk. For the laity, the answer is clearly yes. Dōgen takes the time to point out what a few

of these obligations are: taking care of parents during their lifetimes, holding services after their deaths, doing good for forty-nine days. To do this is to cultivate/express filial piety in the world.

But monks have severed their ties to the world. Are they, therefore, to exercise the virtue of filial piety? Yes, says Dōgen—but they are to do so on terms appropriate to their station. How is this possible? Dōgen's reasoned response advances along lines parallel to the concluding exchange of the Myōyū-Myōzen story. We recall Ejō's point that "a bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good deeds." This cultivation/expression of benevolence is an element here as well, inasmuch as a monk's obligations "are not limited to parents alone, but, feeling these obligations to all beings, they fill the world with good deeds." In terms of the *bodaisatta shishōbō*, we can understand this in the following manner: for the monk, the bodhisattva-in-training, the virtue of benevolence arises interdependently with the virtue of filial piety.

Dōgen notes the lay practice of doing good in order to karmically benefit and assist a deceased parent. He subsequently poses a rhetorical question about this benevolence: "Does selecting just one day for doing good and holding services [for just one person] really reflect the spirit of Buddhism?"[17] In the Myōyū-Myōzen story, we saw how if Myōzen helped his master at the expense of his efforts to help all sentient beings, this would reflect a failure in the cultivation/expression of giving-noncovetousness. We see much the same thing here, inasmuch as concentrating benevolence on just one person is to "curry their favor," even if the person is dead—and after all, within forty-nine days the deceased is reborn into a new form, and can continue to have an effect on the benevolent person's life in that existence. As in the Myōyū-Myōzen story, in Dōgen's account of what one should do in this situation, we see giving-noncovetousness interdependently arising with and conditioning benevolence.

In contrast to this lay practice of filial piety, Dōgen asserts that "following Buddhism in everyday practice and in each moment of study under a Zen master" is the cultivation/expression of true filial piety. How is this possible? As in the resolution to the Myōyū-Myōzen story, it seems that the answer can be articulated in terms of recognizing the interdependent arising of identification with benevolence. Recall that in the cultivation/expression of identification, we recognize that ultimately there is not only no distinction

[17] See Masunaga 1978, p. 115, n. 16.

between others, but between self and others as well. So the practice and study under a Zen master benefits not only oneself, but all others as well, inasmuch as ultimately all these others and the self are "not-two." And as we recall, Dōgen asserted that "in both benefiting others and practicing yourself, to discard the inferior and adopt the superior comprise the good action of the bodhisattva." For the monk, the bodhisattva-in-training, to practice under a master is to adopt the superior form of filial piety; it meets obligations and confers benefits to parents greater than attending to material needs or performing services. In *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.14, another long passage addressing filial piety, Dōgen remarks:

> If you cast aside the filial love and duty you have not discarded over numerous *kalpa*s and many lives, in this life when you have been born in the body of a man and have had the rare opportunity to encounter Buddhism, this would be the mark of one who is truly grateful. How can this not accord with the Buddha's will? It is said that if one son leaves his home to become a monk, seven generations of parents will gain the Way.

I noted above how, generally speaking, the compassion-wisdom of the monk can be articulated in terms of its interdependent arising with the cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva. To this point we can now add that the superior, "true filial piety" of the monk is also a virtue which we can explain as arising interdependently with the *bodaisatta shishōbō*. From the trajectory of this unfolding of Dōgen's virtue-thinking we are led to a hypothesis: For the monk, the foundational virtue of compassion-wisdom and the cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva can be said to arise interdependently with the cultivation/expression of any given virtue, reflecting Dōgen's radical application of *pratītya-samutpāda* to all the virtues. Proving this hypothesis, however, requires evidence and argument additional to what has been offered in this article.

But let us not be led astray by all this talk of the cultivation/expression of the virtues in Dōgen's moral vision. Earlier in this article, I noted how for Dōgen morality proceeds from *zazen*/enlightenment. The point of this article is that when we seek to describe this morality, we can refer not only to the precepts, but to virtues as well. From the above analysis, I hope it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the four cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva expounded upon in the *Bodaisatta Shishōbō* chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō* are a

useful starting point for articulating the virtue-thinking of *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*.

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