

BOOK REVIEWS

Fredericks, in presenting the case of pluralists and his own, lets us see that some intellectuals of religious faith have moved in their theological reflection, through the years of careful study, beyond more customary theological positions endorsed by their denominational congregations, their initially particular Christian constituents. His own position of comparative theology is instructive in reminding us of the importance of continuing a dialectical process of (1) maintaining one's penetrating insights into the religious heritage of others, (2) with one's articulation of a theology that incorporates all religious men and women, and (3) with one's reflective awareness of one's own religious pilgrimage in its delightful particularity, shared, in this case, by Christian men and women: Roman Catholic, Church of England, United Church of Christ, Church of South India, and Baptists, too.

WISDOM, COMPASSION, AND THE SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao. Edited by Jonathan A. Silk. Studies in The Buddhist Traditions. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000. pp. LX + 420, with Index.

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This collection of essays is a tribute, by many of the leading scholars in Buddhist Studies, to Professor Gadjin M. Nagao, surely one of the greatest scholars in the field and an individual whose wide-ranging intellect, character, lifestyle and longevity never cease to fascinate and inspire. Jonathan Silk, the editor of the volume, introduces Nagao's life and works in a "Short Biographical Sketch," from his birth (in 1907) in Sendai, through his education in Kyoto, his connections with Susumu Yamaguchi and other teachers, his professorial career at Kyoto University, numerous positions of responsibility in learned societies, academic awards, his unique interpretation of Yogācāra Buddhist thought and his other research in Indian, Tibetan and Chinese studies. Thereafter follows an extensive, and no doubt complete, bibliography of his publications, from his books, articles and reviews to rare miscellany.

One somewhat unusual feature of this *Festschrift* to Gadjin Nagao is that it begins with a hitherto unpublished article by Nagao himself, "The Bodhisattva's Compassion Described in the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*," a summary and précis of this practical, rather than theoretical, aspect of Asaṅga's thought. This is followed by an article by Noritoshi Aramaki, "Toward an Understanding of the *Vijñaptimātratā*," in which the author seeks to explain the "whence" of this doctrine by situating *vijñaptimātratā* (Aramaki's translation: "truth of appearing-conscious-

ness-only”) in the context of a general recurrent theme of *avavāda* (“instruction receiving and delivering”) that one finds in the Maitreya chapter of the *Sandhinirmocanasūtra*. Mark L. Blum, in his article “Samādhi in Hōnen’s Hermeneutic of Practice and Faith: Assessing the *Sammai hottokki*,” discusses the Pure Land master’s lifelong commitment to the cultivation of *samādhi*; the *nembutsu-samādhi*, however, is not regarded as a means or praxis by Hōnen, but an attainment of trance-like communion with the Buddha or aspects of the Pure Land, Sukhāvātī. Luis O. Gómez, in “Two Jars on Two Tables: Reflections on the ‘Two Truths’,” seeks to analyze, using methods of the social sciences, how Nāgārjuna’s doctrine is not a purely philosophical construction, but embodies the inconsistencies of religious life in a community and is an abstract formulation of a hierarchy of privilege and competence. Masaaki Hattori, in “Dignāga’s Theory of Meaning: An Annotated Translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. Chapter V: *Anyāpohaparīkṣā* (I),” gives us a fine, reliable translation of verses 1-6 and the *Vṛtti*. The text used is Hattori’s own previously published edition of the Tibetan text and Sanskrit fragments of *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* with Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.

The next author, Masamichi Ichigō, in “Śāntarakṣita and Bhāviveka as Opponents of the Mādhyamika in the *Madhyamakāloka*,” translates and discusses a section of Kamalaśīla’s *Madhyamakāloka*, in order to convincingly substantiate the claim, found in bsTan dar’s commentary, that when the *Madhyamakāloka* refers to an advocate of the conventional truth of Mind-Only, this is indeed Śāntarakṣita, while the advocate of external objects existing conventionally is Bhāviveka, who also reinterpreted the sūtra passages concerning Mind-Only so that they would not be incompatible with this limited acceptance of external things. The translation is by and large accurate, although a few oddities do occur, such as Ichigō’s recurring translation of *ngo bo* as “inherence” and *mi gnas pa* (*apraṭiṣṭha*, i.e., “not steadfast,” “not abiding”) as “not marked.”¹

J.W. de Jong, in “The Buddha and His Teachings,” one of his last publications before his demise, examines the relevance of Pāli canon verses for forming a picture of early Buddhism; he concludes that the prose texts are significantly more important to this goal. Yūichi Kajiyama, in “Buddhist Cosmology as Presented in the *Yogācārabhūmi*,” corrects and translates the Sanskrit to pp. 30,21–44,14 of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (ed. V. Bhattacharya), a section that presents a cosmology somewhat different from the usual one of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Shōryū Katsura, in

¹ Cf. e.g., the following passage on p. 149 in which both terms occur: *nang gi khams dang skye mched kyi ngo bor mi gnas pa'i phyir mi gnas pa'o* /. Ichigō’s translation on p. 154: “(It is) not marked, because it is not marked as the inherence of inner domain (*dhātu*) and department (*āyatana*).” Leaving aside the question as to how to translate *dhātu* and *āyatana*, the translation could be something like: “It is not steadfast, because it is not steadfast as the intrinsic nature of a *dhātu* or *āyatana*.”

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“Nāgārjuna and the Tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*),” attempts a reinterpretation of this infamously elusive logical structure by using the two sorts of negation familiar in Indian philosophy, viz. implicative negation (*pariyudāsapraṭiśedha*) and non-implicative negation (*prasajyapraṭiśedha*), or equivalently, “mere negation” (*nivṛttimātra*); the article is a case in point as to how analyses of logic are needed even in (or especially in) the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Leslie Kawamura, in “The Middle Path According to the *Kāśyapaparivarta-sūtra*,” gives the structure and contents of the *Kāśyapaparivarta* and then focuses on sections 52–71 treating of the Middle Path and *śūnyatā*; he presents Sthiramati’s interpretation as found in the *Ṭikā*. Katsumi Mimaki, in “*Jñānasārasamuccaya* kk.^o 20–28. *Mise au point* with a Sanskrit Manuscript,” reexamines the nine verses treating of the main Buddhist schools in the light of Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana’s manuscript of this text of Āryadeva II.

Next, Lambert Schmithausen, in “On Three *Yogācārabhūmi* Passages Mentioning the Three *Svabhāvas* or *Lakṣaṇas*,” attempts to show that the composition of the “basic section,” or *Maulī Bhūmi*, of the *Yogācārabhūmi* precedes that of the *Sandhinirmocanasūtra* and that of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. A problem arises in that in three sections of the *Maulī Bhūmi* we seem to find mention of concepts, like the threefold natures (*trisvabhāva*) and lack of natures (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) and others, which figure prominently in the *Sandhinirmocanasūtra* and/or *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and which may seem to presuppose these latter texts; Schmithausen argues, via stylistic, structural and other evidence internal to the texts themselves, that these passages are later additions to the *Maulī Bhūmi*. The reader will have to be the judge as to whether Schmithausen does, by these methods, convincingly avoid what he himself acknowledges could be a potential charge of question-begging.²

Jonathan Silk, in “The *Yogācāra Bhikṣu*,” reviews various passages in which this problematic term appears, concluding that the term is not clearly an antecedent of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school, nor a technical term designating a monk who is a specialist in meditation; it is more likely a generic term for a monk who is simply engaged in practice. Ernst Steinkellner, in “Manuscript Fragments, Texts and Inscriptions in the Temple of Tabo: An Interim Report with Bibliography,” summarizes the current progress and results of the research on the collection of Tibetan manuscript fragments, etc., found in this monastery in Spiti, India; the texts generally belong to an independent western Tibetan transmission and can provide older, different translations of canonical texts from those found in the Kanjur compilations

² Cf. p. 246: “Yet, I admit that this [i.e., seeing the problematic passages as later additions to the *Maulī Bhūmi*] is merely a possibility, and that resorting to it looks very much like clinging to a preconception at any cost. In order to turn possibility into probability, it would be necessary to discover some additional evidence, or palpable traces of later redaction or interpolation in, or in the context of, these passages.”

begun in the early fourteenth century. Jikidō Takasaki, in “*Samsāra eva nirvāṇam*,” traces this idea of the identity of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* in several texts and finds that the actual phrase is to be found in Sanskrit by the time of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, which cites the formula and says “it is taught that . . .” (*ity uktam*). This evidence suggests that *samsāra eva nirvāṇam* was already in current use at the time of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*’s composition; in an appendix the author mentions that it also figures in the *Upālīparśat* of the *Mahāratnakūṭasūtra*, and that the essential idea would be developed as the concept of *apratīṣṭitanirvāṇa*.³

In what is, in the opinion of the present reviewer, one of the most interesting articles in the volume, Teruyoshi Tanji, in “On *Samāropa*: Probing the Relationship of the Buddha’s Silence and His Teaching,” explains the schema of *samāropa-apavāda* in Yogācāra and Mādhyamika texts, arguing *inter alia* that some authors explained the possibility of teaching Dharma as being due to “superimposition” (*samāropa*) of words upon the inexpressible; Nāgārjuna’s approach, however, is not to rely on the *samāropa* of words, but to teach through silence, which is nothing apart from the inexpressible dependent arising itself. I might add that one thing which emerges from the article—although this is *not* Tanji’s only point—is how strongly the notion of *samāropa* figures in Mādhyamika commentators such as Candrakīrti and that, on this version of Madhyamaka philosophy, there has to be an all-important distinction between things and the intrinsic nature, or “own-being” (*svabhāva*), of things.⁴ This would seem, to me at least, to lend strong support to the view, like what we find in Tsong kha pa, that a Mādhyamika like Candrakīrti is making a significant difference between, on the one hand, what is simply conventionally existent and, on the other hand, the superimpositions of intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*), natures which are not

³ Cf. Takasaki’s translation (p. 339), “the unstable Nirvāṇa,” which has the unfortunate drawback of implying that this *nirvāṇa* itself is somehow literally unsteady or shaky. One might propose “*nirvāṇa* that is not permanently fixed [for the bodhisattva].” The central idea seems to have two dimensions, that the bodhisattva does not actually remain fixed in this state, and that he does not subjectively fixate upon a reified *nirvāṇa*, i.e., his being in *nirvāṇa* is with the knowledge that it is not genuinely something which *can* be dwelt in. Cf. Takasaki’s note 14 discussing the related phrase *susthito ’sthānayogena* “[the bodhisattva] well standing in a manner of no standing.”

⁴ Cf. Tanji, p. 353: ““However, Candrakīrti asserts that, strictly speaking, the effect of *samāropa* is not a thing but the own-being of a thing, as he observes that “the statement ‘things do not arise at all’ points out clearly that the first chapter of the MMK is written in order to remedy (*pratīpakṣa*) the *samāropa* of perverted (*viparīta*) own-being of things, and then the other chapters are written with the purpose of removing the own-being peculiar to a particular thing in each category” (Pr. 58.10–11). This observation, being the summary of the subjects of the chapters in the MMK, expresses aptly the core of Candrakīrti’s philosophy of emptiness. It is so important and cardinal that the meaning of all the other statements in his commentary ought to be estimated by way of meeting the view of this observation.””

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even conventionally existent at all. The latter is therefore the *dgag bya* “object to be refuted”, and the subtlety of the Madhyamaka philosophy is to distinguish between the two.⁵

Finally, Meiji Yamada, in “Buddhist Liberation and Birth in the Heavens.” offers an archeology-based investigation of the propagation of Buddhism in the Yangtze River region. The article was translated from the Japanese by James C. Dobbins and includes several plates of the figurines discussed. Akira Yuyama, in “Toward a New Edition of the *Fan-yü Tsa-ming* of Li-yen,” discusses various issues concerning a Sino-Indic glossary, including the dates of the author (viz. 706–789), the transmission of the text, its manuscripts and its printed editions. The projected critical edition of the text will, according to Yuyama, need interdisciplinary cooperation as it will involve issues concerning the phonological histories of Indic, Chinese and Japanese, and other relevant Asian languages.

The book is nicely and accurately prepared and comes with an index of Asian language terms and proper names. We owe Jonathan Silk our thanks for editing such a high quality volume collecting contributions by many of the finest scholars working in Buddhist Studies.

⁵ Ironically the Indian textual evidence that Tsong kha pa himself cites in support of the doctrine of the *dgag bya*, viz., a passage from *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX, is quite weak. See P. Williams, “Identifying the Object of Negation: On *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9:140 (Tib. 139),” *Asiatische Studien / Etudes asiatiques* XLIX, 4, 1995, pp. 969–985.