complex reality; but, selection of, and concentration on, one element of a complicated whole is also recognized in the historical process (especially in Hōnen and Nichiren).

In presenting simplicity as the distinctive quality of Japanese spirituality, Brinkman himself exhibits an intuitive grasp of Japanese reality as a whole—a grasp that is not available as long as one stays too close to the concrete details of one's field of specialization. The author makes a rather convincing case for his paradigm, which should be received, at the least, as a possibly fruitful working hypothesis, to be further tested by the specialists in the different fields. In conclusion, a pious wish: although the book is more than worth reading as it is, I dare hope that the book will soon appear in a thoroughly revised and emended form.

Hybrid Theology (*A Response*)

JOHN P. KEENAN

JOSEPH O'LEARY has lived in Japan for a dozen or more years now. He is well aware of Buddhist traditions and their potential impact upon western theological endeavors. I appreciate his article, "The Significance of John Keenan's Mahāyāna Theology" (*The Eastern Buddhist*, XXX, 1 [1997]: 114–32), even though he objects that my "commentary is a perpetual hybridization of two heterogeneous worlds (128)." I would grant the hybrid nature of a Mahāyāna theology, but I would argue that a hybrid is perhaps better suited to withstand the frost of the modern world. For we do live in a single world with no privileged realms of protected theological meanings. That sometime Vermonter Rudyard Kipling proclaimed of east and west that "Never the 'twain shall meet." This dictum, however, merely reflected his own narrow cultural viewpoint. (Perhaps he tarried too briefly among us here in Vermont.)

O'Leary is well aware that the house of Christian theology is tottering and, he implies, ablaze. Fire often does accompany earthquake. And so he speaks of the Mahāyāna net of emptiness rescuing people from the earthquake-damaged edifice of Christianity. I do believe that the cultural structure of Christendom has been shaken and is tottering—right and left—so that many engage in nostalgic attempts to regain a lost center. But I do not imagine Christianity as gone up in flames, in imminent danger of being consumed in the fire of postmodern malaise. And so I cannot agree with O'Leary that "Mahāyāna Buddhism has become structurally necessary to Christian faith." Nor do I think that the "thought-world of Hellenistic metaphysics . . . has now been exhausted" (115). I would argue, however, that, despite the honored place in Christian doctrinal history held by Hellenistic metaphysics, it must not be allowed to crowd out all other approaches. I would argue that Mahāyāna philosophy as well can play the role of *ancilla theologiae*, a handmaid in service of theology. Theology, that revered queen of the medieval sciences, can in fact have many different handmaids. A Mahāyāna approach is just one approach to use in exfoliating the kerygma, especially beautiful in that its wisdom focus directs our attention back to the indigenous Christian mystic tradition of holy skepticism. I believe, then, that there is no "necessity of applying these [Buddhist] ideas to Christian tradition" (115), but that there is much profit in the endeavor, for Mahāyāna thought "can assist Christian theology both in reclaiming the centrality of its own mystic tradition and in maintaining a valid place for theoretical systematics" (119). If the house of Christianity is indeed tottering from earthquake, the best course of action is not to jump out the window, but rather calmly and deliberately to make our way down its shaking stairs to seek the relative safety of the out-of-doors.

Ancient Frameworks for Christian Discourse

In partial faithfulness to our western forebears who championed reason over blind, unthinking faith, I would further argue that Christian thinkers cannot function authentically within the classical confines of past cultural assumptions, however metaphysical they be. Still, I would not say that the classical debates in christology "have divorced themselves from such mandatory reference to awakening" (124). In their time and in their culture, classical formulations were existentially crucial to the Christian practice. They were felt intensely and triggered deep emotions. People's very identities were at issue. Such emotive intensity can indeed be recaptured—by the engaged scholar immersed in the texts and histories of our shared western past. I do not think that "the conceptual labors of the Council [of Chalcedon] were tied to the pattern of imaginary reification" (126), but I do think the mere repeating of its definitions is largely an unskillful way for the theologian to enunciate the meaning of Christ to the present world. My critique is merely that the culture of metaphysics is past, available only by dint of long hours of historical study and imaginative reclamation. To insist upon that archaic framework for the presentation of Christian doctrine is to make unnecessary and unwarranted demands upon the Gospel. Furthermore, it excuses Christian thinkers from the very task that defines their activity: the enunciation of the Gospel meaning within modern cultures and frameworks. To argue, as I do, that all discourse is conventional, in no wise itself ultimate, is to say no more about "traditional

Christian discourse'' (124) than that, like any discourse, it is dependently co-arisen.

Nor do I think that there is ''nothing obscure or problematic in these notions [of emptiness, dependent co-arising, and the two truths]'' (115). These notions constitute the very central theme of Mādhyamika thought, have a long, and at times convoluted, history as they moved from India to China and Tibet, are the subject of innumerable scholarly efforts by western and Japanese Buddhologists, and still inform the ongoing flow of Buddhist thinking. I adopt a Mahāyāna approach not because its discourse is the clear winner in any comparative challenge, but simply because I am convinced of the beauty and cogency of that discourse. Such an alien approach provides a different set of interlocking insights from which to envisage the tasks of Christian theology. Thus, while I think that classical metaphysics are elegant and persuasive as long as one is familiar with, and moves within, their context of shared metaphysical principles, I argue that other approaches can carry the task into other areas of Christian experience, perhaps (and this is my hope) redirecting attention to the early and medieval mystic traditions of the Church. Never would I deny that Christianity at its best is ''a sophisticated self-critical religion'' (116).

The Two Truths

There is, I think, no ''level'' (115) or ''vantage'' (126) of ultimate meaning, and so it makes no sense to complain about consigning doctrine to the ''conventional register'' (126). The only register we have is conventional. The Mahāyāna notion of the two truths does not set up a double-decker hierarchy of truth, as if ultimate truth were the genuine article, with conventional truth the spurious pretender. The doctrine of the two truths is framed differently; it is about the language-formed and thus conventional enunciation of truth from ultimate silence.

From early on in Mahāyāna doctrinal history there was clear and profound awareness of the deluding force of language (*prapañca*), the power of words to construct mental pictures of reality (*abhilāpa-vāsanā*), and the penchant of the mind to cling to those pictures (*kliṣṭa-manas*) in the service of a false notion of self (*ātmagrāha*). Nāgārjuna presents his Mādhyamika corrective by inculcating a ''holy skepticism,'' an emptying of the supposed power of language to capture the essences of things and exercise control over life itself. All language is ''demoted'' from its usurped role of mediating final viewpoints on any reality. By this very demotion, however, language is reclaimed as language, as a human construct—more or less intelligently deployed, more or less rationally employed, more or less skillfully designed.

I do not think, however, that this renders the truth of ultimate meaning "extremely static, silent, monotonous, in comparison with the dynamic, communicative, and many-sided God of biblical tradition" (120). Rather, in Mahāyāna terms, ultimate meaning is neither static nor dynamic, neither silent nor enunciated, neither monotonous nor many-sided, because ultimate truth does not function within our frameworks of meaning or philosophy. It calls into question those very frameworks, recommending a skepticism not just of metaphysical theology, but of the arrogant claims of reasoned faith itself. Theology does have a well-earned reputation for pretense, mistaking its conceptual maps for actual realities.

The notion of the truth of ultimate meaning in Mahāyāna is meant, I think, to serve as a "holy skepticism," disallowing the putative capturing of reality—pulling the thinker back, again and again, to the silence of wonder and the givenness of the world. This skepticism does not gruffly dismiss faith claims with the arrogance of the existentialist hero, but it does hesitate to move so quickly from the questions to the answers. It is content to abide, perhaps for a lifetime, in the very act of questioning as itself a true pointer to reality, impelling one constantly to sift the scriptures anew, not to counterpoise a deist notion of a static god to the rich emotive contours of the biblical God. Those emotive contours call to mind the writings of Abraham Joshua Heschel, who countered sterile, metaphysical notions of the unchanging being of God by stressing the emotive, clearly conventional, nature of the biblical God (*God in Search of Man*). Like Heschel, one has to read and interpret the ancient narratives of scripture as the conventional embodiment of ultimate meaning. To deepen such interpretations, however, one should distinguish world-constituting myth from world-emptying parable (see John D. Crossan, *The Dark Interval: Toward a Theology of Narrative*). One is best served by a critique of the literal meaning of images of a cruel and capricious deity hurling rocks at enemies or coming on the clouds to take over the world, luxuriating perhaps in images of a playful and loving God, jostling Jonah and forgiving the Ninevites. To demote scriptures from ultimate meaning means that scripture, confessed as revealed, remains human enunciation, moved and propelled by the spirit of God, but not a divine packet of sacred information. Thus it is true that "[b]iblical revelation and salvation . . . dwell fully in the conventional realm," for that is where we live.

It is true that "the dimension of ultimate meaning, in its otherness from this realm, hardly gets a look in" (121), for there is nothing to look into at all. The truth of ultimate meaning is not a vantage nor a realm nor a register, not an "in" at which to look. Its silence is simply silent, entailing no further philosophical attachment. Therefore, there is no valid "monolithic view of ultimate meaning" (122) because it is not a view at all. Ultimate meaning does not entail a cross-culturally shared immediacy of pure experience, but is the guardian against any view of or claim for such an experience. The emptiness of ultimate meaning is a non-affirming negation of the ultimate validity of any language, and at the same time a reclamation of the logical, reasoned validity of conventional discourse.

It is true that there does function a myth of ultimate meaning, as O'Leary is aware from the current brouhaha among Japanese Buddhologists over the issue of the myth of Buddha-nature, of emptiness as the realm of pure non-discrimination, of ultimate meaning as the hidden deity behind phenomenal appearances—all versions of *dhātuvāda*, that is, any theory (*vāda*) that grounds itself upon a realm (*dhātu*), however ineffable, however numinous. Buddhist thinkers are not immune from the tendency to reify even the doctrine of emptiness, which is why Nāgārjuna insists that one empty even emptiness, for this is not the final view, but the expeller of all views. When I claim that ultimate truth is a matter of silence, the point is that our words about God must fall silent before the otherness of God. Thus to assert that doctrinal statements are "conventional, language-formed presentations of that [silent] awareness" (125) is not to reduce theology to a science of "the 'as if' or of 'supreme fictions' " (125), but merely to affirm that it is human discourse.

Still, O'Leary is correct to espy a mythic structure in my presentation of the two truths. No matter how absent I make the presence of ultimate meaning, no matter how other, ultimate meaning remains absent to a conscious presence. I indeed do revere ultimate truth as that which is covered over by the conventional languages we employ, and as covered, so indicated. A Mahāyāna theology does witness to the presence of God in God's absence from all images and ideas, and that divine presence is embodied in the darkening of all knowing. The apophatic darkness too is a mythic image, training people not to expect clear concepts of God. Perhaps that is why I first was attracted to Buddhist teachings and philosophies—fellow-travelers all. Yet, those same apophatic teachings play parable to myths of conceptual presence: They empty the center and direct attention to the margins of experience: God does not appear in the strength of the storm, but in a small, still voice of silence. Yet, that parabolic emptying of the centrality of divine presence draws its validity only by negating myths of centered presence. In the absence of emptying parable, any discourse on ultimate meaning, by the very force of its verbal enunciation, constructs a mythic presence of ultimate meaning, an unseen but very real absence, marked by the unknowing that delimits its reality. (See Malcolm David Eckel, *To See the Buddha*.) And that centering myth of a mystic unseen in its turn calls constantly for yet further emptyings, other parabolic deconstructions, in order to trace that which remains forever absent from any myth or any theology, much in the manner of Gregory of Nyssa, for whom the soul never comes to the term of its unending explorations into the depths of divinity; not ever is it static, even in the beatific vision.

The "objectivity" of theological discourse is then a conventional objectivity. To claim that language is conventional, however, is not to negate all objectivity. It is to negate any *essential* correspondence between language and reality. "Religious statements are shots in the dark, but they can succeed in hitting their mark," (125) O'Leary argues. And I concur, for among the basic meanings for the Sanskrit word for "meaning" (*artha*) in the truth of ultimate meaning (*paramārtha-satya*) is that of "aim, objective," from the root *arth*, "to strive for, to ask, to entreat." One could as well translate the phrase as "the truth of that which is ultimately (*parama*) aimed at (*artha*)." Yet, I do not think one can judge the validity of such truth by purely intellectual means—for example, by the adequacy of the questions raised and answered. One knows that one has hit the mark only when it is effective in leading sentient beings toward the practice of the path.

Comparative Perspectives

O'Leary in his *Religious Pluralism and Christian Truth* has written persuasively about religious truth in an age that is very conscious of multiple perspectives. With acumen he practices a careful and balanced comparative, intercultural theology. Indeed, we spent several pleasant afternoons at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture arguing the issues, and I have profited much from his insightful critiques. But the task I envisage for myself is different from his task. He says that "every single application of Buddhist categories to Christian discourse implies a 'fusion of horizons' raising the most difficult hermeneutical problems," (116) and warns about too facile comparisons and putative victories, one way or the other. No doubt comparative theology must come to terms with the hermeneutics of cultural crossing-over. Yet Christian thought from early times has adopted and adapted philosophical approaches to the enunciation of its doctrine. The classical models are precisely that: the adoption and adaptation of Greek philosophy for the expression of the Gospel.

My endeavor is to think and write Christian theology from a Mahāyāna philosophical perspective. Cherishing classical Greek theology, I still refuse to privilege that theology as the only Christian philosophical approach (against Ètienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, and his arguments for a specifically Christian philosophy). Furthermore, I urge that without the actual doing of a Mahāyāna theology, the hermeneutical problems about fusing horizons will never actually come into play at all, for hermeneutics is not a first, preparatory step toward theology, but a subsequent critique of what in fact occurs in human thinking. Textbooks like to place a chapter on hermeneutics at the beginning, as if the author had first evolved clear notions of how to proceed before proceeding. In fact, hermeneutical issues come to light only in the practice of reading and thinking. One can elicit norms of interpretation only by actually interpreting and reflecting upon that activity, just as one can develop a method of playing tennis only from actually playing tennis. To some poststructuralist philosophers, one should simply stop doing philosophy until all the proper hermeneutical concerns have been satisfied. Prāsaṇgika-Mādhyamika philosophers, by contrast, argue that all philosophies raise more questions than they can ever answer, and that all viewpoints, even hermeneutical viewpoints, eventually implode under their own weight.

So then, I attempt no "elaborate negotiation" (116) between Christianity and Buddhism. Rather, nurtured as a Christian since birth and immersed in Mahāyāna thought for some thirty years, I think about the Gospel from a Mahāyāna standpoint. This is within the revered tradition of all theology, and I consider myself to be doing straightforward theology, not brokering disparate discourses identified as Buddhist or Christian. I do not aim to identify parallels across traditions, as if I could know that "the experience of the world as it is, in its dependent co-arising, is identical with the discovery of God as 'Abba' " (117). I have no avenue to identify anyone's experience except, to some limited degree, my own. And I could scarcely claim that Buddhist experiences of awakening are the same as Christian experiences of resurrection. What possible evidence could I bring forward?

What I can and do claim is that I can gain fresh perspectives by contemplating my own Christian experience through the lens of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophical categories. It is quite clear that Jesus was not a crypto-Buddhist and I certainly do not try to "correlate Jesus with Zen" (122). Perish the thought! For many years now, I have been unable to identify Jesus very accurately at all. O'Leary thinks Jesus "speaks more as a prophet than as a master of spirituality," and perhaps he is correct. But there are many different Jesuses, each constructed by some species of theological reflection. (A host of scholars argue that Jesus' teaching was first and foremost a wisdom teaching. See J. S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom*, who argues that the earliest elements of the shared source—i.e., behind the shared passages in Matthew and Luke with Markan parallel—are wisdom sayings, with eschatological teachings added somewhat later. Also see B. Witherington, *Jesus the Sage,* and John D. Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography*.)

A Mahāyāna reading of the Gospel is not an attempt to uncover the hidden meaning of the Gospel, as if that had lain fallow until Mahāyāna came along to explain it. Rather, this is a constructive theological endeavor that attempts to coax new insights from our collective memories and textual witnesses in order to enliven the practice of the kingdom. I have no intention of "defin[ing] carefully the differences between the New Testament and Mahāyāna contexts," nor of "stag[ing] . . . an open confrontation between Buddhism and the Gospel" (128). I do not suppose that Mark is "an anonymous Buddhist" (128). Never in life should such a thought be thought! It is precisely because Mahāyāna maps such a different terrain and elicits such an alternate set of questions that it seems to assuage my theological itch.

Which brings me to the point about the plausibility of Mahāyāna interpretations of Mark.

Plausible Interpretations

O'Leary scolds me for "over-facile methods of coping with the Christian past, . . . with pure escamotage [i.e., juggling], . . . [with] over-interpretation, tangential associations"—in a word to the failure to ground scriptural interpretations in "a plausible construal of the text" (128). I do admit that I try to coax the text toward what my Mahāyāna lens brings into focus, for I find many of the accepted scriptural interpretations to be inane, self-serving, and implausible.

For instance, O'Leary accuses me of wishful thinking in refusing to see a replacement theology in Mark 12:9. He claims that the passage (Now what will the owner of the vineyard do? He will come and make an end of the tenants and give the vineyard to others.) "can have no other meaning" than a replacement theology (128). Note carefully that he does not champion such a theology. In fact, he rejects it completely. Boldly he holds that some of "Jesus' own world-view . . . can be revised in the light of Buddhist insights" (127). Indeed, history shows that we have frequently adjusted our theology by rejecting elements of views assumed or expressed in the biblical texts. We do not stone people caught in adulterous acts. We do not follow Paul's strictures on the relationship between husband and wife. We reject any sexism or hierarchical values expressed in the text, no matter how sacred the text may be. But I think O'Leary fails to read carefully here. A replacement theology is a self-serving reading of the story of the tenant landlord and, although this reading has become habitual by virtue of frequent repetition, it is not inscribed in the text itself. There is no question that the passage is aimed at the temple authorities, for it reiterates a frequent theme of the Hebrew Bible (Isaiah 5:1–7, Hosea 10:1–2, Jeremiah 12:1–17). The point in Mark, as in Isaiah, is that the vineyard of Israel is but leased to the religious authorities, here clearly the

Jewish temple authorities. Mark's Jesus indicts those authorities, with their elevation of human customs to absolute religious status. Yet it is an implausible stretch to imagine that Mark himself is arguing for the superiority of Christianity over Judaism, as if a critique of religious authorities entailed a rejection of the tradition they inauthentically represent. Does O'Leary really think Mark is treating the relative validity of religious traditions? The question is how we are to regard the chief priests, scribes and elders (11:27), who question Jesus' authority. Are they simply the representatives of Jewish tradition? Or are they faulted precisely because they misuse their own authority? Is Jesus' indictment a knock-down blow for Christian identity? Or, more simply, a rejection of the mutation of the traditional authority they usurp? I suggest, plausibly, that Mark's Jesus is rejecting such usurped authority, not the entire tradition of his ancestors. Indeed, in the remainder of chapter 12, Jesus engages in very traditional, friendly discourse with other scribes. What he rejects is frozen, hypocritical religion, i.e., "the falsity of clinging to any tradition, whether Jewish or Christian" (128). Jesus in Mark is not recommending a viewpoint called Christianity over another viewpoint called Judaism. Rather, he recommends the following of the path of true practice, as described by the Shema (Deuteronomy 6:4–5, Leviticus 19:18, cited in Mark 12:28–34): love God and neighbor. It is totally implausible to read into the Markan passage later concerns about the validity of identifiable religions—indeed, the term religion never occurs in the Gospel of Mark.

O'Leary also complains (128) about my interpretation of the sea into which faith can throw the mountain of the Temple, for I do contrast the mountain, identified by sound exegetes as the Temple mound, with fixed and deluded religiosity and am led thereby to understand the sea as the chaos that marks the absence of any human constructs. I admit that here I do coax out Mahāyāna insights, but the rhetoric of the passage invites us to do just that—it presents an obviously preposterous and impossible situation that begs for symbolic interpretation. No literalist has ever presented a plausible construal of this passage, precisely because no throwing of any mountain into the sea has in fact been accomplished through the faith of any saint, any pope, or certainly any theologian. The passage is symbolic in the extreme, and so I offer but one plausible symbolic reading.

O'Leary sees Jesus as an eschatological prophet and desires to maintain the historical impact of New Testament eschatology. He writes: "Thus the breaking-open of the dependently co-arisen world to ultimate divine reality which is effected in Christ is mediated by the eschatological aspect of Christ's existence, as always transcending itself toward the future of the kingdom" (*Religious Pluralism*, 258). In order to emphasize the historical concreteness of that "always transcending eschatology," he must critique my notion that the kingdom announced by Jesus in 1:15 has no linear time referent, being at hand at each and every moment. I counter that the absence of a time referent hardly means that it "ceases to be a concrete intervention within human history and becomes instead a universal, ahistorical wisdom teaching." Rather, I argue that eschatology itself is myth, not a map of linear time. We already have our concrete and unavoidable history, which is quite capable of satisfying any demand for social embodiment. Precisely because Jesus collapses the mapped hopes of linear time, the kingdom is history-only, worldly convention-only, and not an imagined realm of God-Taking-Over on that final day. I do think Mark's Jesus pushes eschatology beyond the negation of his present to the negation of any possible linear expectation, present or future. Wisdom, as in the passage O'Leary cites (117) transforms consciousness and "embodies the rule of compassion in the world of hard politics," hardly an ahistorical universal. Eschatology, too, is a myth to render bearable histories of oppression and hopelessness. Yet I think it chimerical to hope "to retrieve the concrete historical meaning of the Gospel call," as if that history were happening today. Our histories are different and our tasks for constructing the kingdom of justice and peace must consequently differ. O'Leary reads the eschatological accounts in the New Testament not in terms of their final victory, for they always move forward in history. But he wants to maintain their mythic structure as a never-ending map of our present journey. However, that reading of the eschaton as the end-time when God rules, is itself a precarious juggling of the textual witnesses. By contrast, I recommend taking the eschaton as the end of time itself.

Nostalgic Loss

Among theologians who have grown up within a classical culture there is indeed a sense of loss, for the abandonment of classical assumptions appears to rob us of previously assured truths. The problems that led to this undermining are not, I think, theological, but philosophical. Nietzsche perhaps is a plausible culprit; apparently he was the first to notice the cultural shift. That shift from classical values appears to demand that we be satisfied with the detritus of a once-glorious theological edifice. That is the edifice O'Leary envisages as tottering in flames (114). Yet this is not Christianity itself, but rather the theological constructs of our cherished past. There are still Christians aplenty in the world, and they seem to go to church with the same regularity (or lack thereof) as before. Theology, on the other hand, is in deep trouble, for its warrants of intellectual plausibility are not accepted, even by many of the very people who continue to frequent church services. No wonder that among its practitioners there are withdrawal symptoms. Things appear nebulous (114, 130) and therefore unreliable: nothing to rely upon! But how could the resurrection of Jesus not be clouded (nebula) to our understanding? Indeed, how can one trust in the unsupported air of a Mahāyāna emptiness? How can one abandon all attachments? These issues are not newly discovered; they are obstacles traditionally associated with the practice of mystic prayer in the entire tradition of mystic theologians, from Jesus through Gregory of Nyssa and John of the Cross to Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh.

Mahāyāna thinkers frequently describe their deepest insights by using the term "only" (*mātra*). They speak of worldly convention only (*saṃvṛti-mātra*), or conscious construction only (*vijñapti-mātra*). Yet this "only" is not meant to deprive anyone of anything real at all. It signals not privation, but rediscovered fullness. It sloughs off misleading addictions and deluded ideas about what in fact is real, about our grasp of reality. To metaphysicians, however, this "only" or "merely" signals privation, and triggers a metaphysical nostalgia. Who would not prefer to dwell in the solid, unmovable towers of self-assured certainty?

Resist! The task of modern theology is not to seek familiar comforts, but to develop the hybrid strength to abandon false supports and thrive in a world that is devoid of privileged enclosures. O'Leary well knows this. That is, I think, why he lives in Japan.

Response to Robert F. Rhodes' Review of *Madhyamaka Thought in China*

LIU MING-WOOD

I HAVE JUST come across Robert F. Rhodes' review of my book *Madhyamaka Thought in China* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994) in *The Eastern Buddhist*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1997). As I find most of the criticisms which the review raises misdirected and groundless, I feel obliged to respond.

The objections which Rhodes raises fall into two categories, one concerning the structure of the book and the other concerning the historical information that the book provides. Regarding the structure of the book, Rhodes complains that "each of the chapters is a self-contained unit," that "no attempt is made to relate the doctrines of one school with those of the others," that "also lacking is any attempt to discern how the different schools influenced each other" (p. 299). That Rhodes reads each chapter as "a self-contained unit" is his choice, but that is not the way the book is intended to be read. The book comprises four chapters forming an organic whole, with Chapter One