

phical, and methodological questions. The employment of the categories of heresy, reformation, and sectarian movement suggest a comparison of Hōnen's Pure Land movement to various schismatic movements within the history of Christianity. Such an implied comparison is problematic not only because it is impossible to compare the "orthodoxy of Nara Buddhism" with the "orthodoxy of the Roman Catholic church of the Middle Ages and/or sixteenth century Europe" but, more fundamentally, because it implies that the history of Christianity is paradigmatic or even normative for religious development in general. The problem here, I believe, lies, above all, in the methodological tools available to the scholars of comparative religions. A re-evaluation of Hōnen's Pure Land movement would require a dialogue between a textual study of the caliber of Kleine's work, a comparative study of different conceptions of truth, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy, and a historical analysis of the political and religio-political situation at the beginning of the early Kamakura period. In addition, the various textual and interpretative traditions evaluating Hōnen's religious, philosophical, and political significance will have to be evaluated not only concerning their historical accuracy or lack thereof but also with regard to the discourses and subtexts which underlie and influence the historical, textual, sectarian, ideological, and religious study of Hōnen. Kleine's study constitutes an important and necessary first step in such a dialogue.

Decorah, October 10, 1998

TEXTOS DE LA FILOSOFÍA JAPONESA MODERNA. Antología, vol. I (1995), pp. 375; LA OTRA FILOSOFÍA JAPONESA: Antología, vol. II (1997), pp. 434. Translated and edited by Agustín Jacinto Zavala. Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, ISBN 968 6959 38 6, 968 6959 55 6, respectively.

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TO PUT IT simply, Agustín Jacinto is a phenomenon sui generis. I know of no one in the Western world as familiar with the writings of Nishida Kitarō as he. Nor is there anyone who has done as much as he to introduce modern Japanese philosophy to the Spanish-speaking world. The two volumes of this

BOOK REVIEWS

anthology which he selected, translated, and annotated, together with *Filosofía de la transformación del mundo* (1989) and his detailed textual study, *La filosofía social de Nishida Kitarō* (1994), testify to the thoroughness and dedication with which he has pursued that interest for the past fifteen years and more. Together with his wife, Tamiyo Kambe Ohara, who assists in checking translations and tracking down footnotes, he has done most of his work alone at the prestigious Colegio de Michoacán in his native Mexico.

The overriding purpose of the present anthology, which has been many years in the making, is to deepen an appreciation of Japanese culture by showing the vitality and creativity of its best modern philosophers. The authors selected to represent the field are twelve: Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, Nishitani Keiji, Tosaka Jun, Miki Kiyoshi, Abe Jirō, Watsuji Tetsurō, Kuki Shūzō, Nakai Masakazu, Shimomura Toratarō, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and Kadowaki Kakichi. Some of the material translated here has not yet appeared in any Western language. Nakai's piece on "The Logic of Work in a Committee" was a special treat (the graph on II:237, however, was printed upside down and there is no direct reference to it in the text), as were the pieces on tradition by Tsurumi and Miki. Personally, I was pleased to find that the section on Tanabe centered on the still-neglected "logic of the specific."

The lodestone for the selection of material, as stated on the opening page of the first volume and in a conclusion at the end of the second, is the thought of Nishida: "What is clear is that *in less than one hundred years* Japan has been able to come up with a Japanese philosophy styled after the West and a philosophy that reflects the living reality of being Japanese. The best way to get an idea of how this came about seems to be to study in some measure the philosophical development of the 'father of Japanese philosophy, Nishida Kitarō' " (II:408). Figures were chosen for the influence they received from Nishida. That being so, the omission of Ueda Shizuteru and Takeuchi Yoshinori, presumably on the grounds that there are merely *mago deshi* of Nishida (I:374), will strike some readers as odd, as will the inclusion of Kadowaki, on whose shoulders the robe of the philosopher hangs unevenly by comparison. In fairness to the author, one hesitates to ask for more than the 800 pages of text and translation he has provided; and Kadowaki was, after all, the teacher who first introduced Jacinto to Nishida during his studies in Japan some twenty-five years ago.

The introductions provided to the collection as a whole and to each of the contributors contains information not only not previously available in Spanish but missing from standard references works in English and German as well. In addition, the author blends in his own assessment and historical placing of the individual figures chosen for the anthology, without ever allowing himself to be distracted by polemics with the secondary literature. In reading

his summary account of Japanese intellectual history, I found many points to question, but then again many more points that gave me pause to think. His own characterization of modern Japanese philosophy as having gone through six stages in Japan, while not entirely satisfactory, reminds the reader of the need for a solid survey of the field in book-length form to correct and update Gino Piovesana's 1968 *Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought*. Dr. Jacinto may be the right one to give us such a book in the future.

The author is to be applauded for doing his translations fresh, directly from the original texts (I:11, II:416). While it is clear that he has taken advantage of existing translations as a check against his own work, he is able to add subtleties missed or glossed over, and to do his own interpreting. Since this is the bread-and-butter of his work, I may perhaps be indulged a brief example. Note the following passage from the end of the opening chapter of Nishida's *An Inquiry into the Good*, first in the Abe-Ives translation:

Regardless of its nature, as long as consciousness maintains a strict unity it is a pure experience: it is simply a fact. But when the unity is broken and a present consciousness enters into a relation with other consciousnesses it generates meanings and judgments. In contrast to pure experiences that reveal themselves to us directly, the consciousness of the past has now become activated and connects with one part of present consciousness *while conflicting with another*. The state of pure experience thus breaks apart and crumbles away.

A recent Spanish translation of the work made directly from the above English and published under the title *La indignación del bien* (Barcelona: Gedisa, 1995), renders the Abe-Ives passage word-for-word, except for the italicized phrase which it misunderstands and renders as "without ceasing to be in conflict with it." This is what happens with translations of translations: they can mistranslate but not retranslate; they can disseminate scholarship but not advance it. For all that, they are often important intermediary steps, as in the case of *La indignación del bien*, which has helped to attract the attention of serious scholars in Spain to Japanese philosophy.

Now look what Jacinto does with the same passage, which I translate literally back into English for the sake of comparison:

Therefore, as long as any consciousness exists in a state of strict unification it is always pure experience, that it is say, it is simply a fact. On the contrary, when this unity is broken, that is, at the point that it enters into relation with another [unity], meaning and judgment originate. Because consciousness of the past at once comes into play, in contrast to pure experience which manifests itself to us di-

BOOK REVIEWS

rectly, it unites with one part of present consciousness and conflicts with another part of it, so that the state of pure experience is analyzed and destroyed. (I:73)

The gist of the two translations is entirely the same, but let us compare them sentence by sentence with a rather slavish rendition of the original:

Thus whatever kind of consciousness it be, while it is in a strict state of unity it is always pure experience, that is, it is simply a fact.

Abe-Ives begins with a new paragraph, which is a kindness to the reader; Jacinto, as is his custom, follows Nishida's paragraphing. Jacinto gives *any consciousness* whereas Abe-Ives speaks of *consciousness regardless of its nature*. Both *state of strict unification* (J) and *strict unity* (A-I) part from the original slightly. Abe-Ives speaks of consciousness as a pure experience, which disagrees both with Jacinto and with its own general omission of the particle.

On the contrary, when this unity is broken, that is, when it enters into relation with an other, it generates meanings and generates judgments.

Abe-Ives speaks of coming into contact with *other consciousnesses* and Jacinto with *another unity*. Nishida speaks only of *an other*, without obliging us to determine whether it has to be conscious human or not, let alone another consciousness in a state of unity. Abe-Ives follows Nishida in giving the impression that it is the broken unity that somehow generates meanings and judgments, while Jacinto omits the subject to avoid the unclarity.

In contrast to pure experience which shows up before us immediately, consciousness of the past straightaway comes into play, connecting with one part of presence consciousness and clashing with another; as a result the state of pure experience gets analyzed and destroyed.

Abe-Ives speaks of *pure experiences*, while Jacinto uses the singular, taking the phrase as a shorthand for "the state of pure experience." Whereas Jacinto captures Nishida's sense of the meeting with an other as *at once* calling up the past, Abe-Ives misses the implication with the softer word *now*. Jacinto follows Nishida literally to speak of pure experience as being *analyzed and destroyed*, whereas Abe-Ives prefers the more lyrical *breaks apart and crumbles away*, thus missing the connection between "judgment" and "analysis" which the text surely intended.

Such nitpicking may be as far from the concerns of the general reader as it is from the heart of the philosophical quest, but if there are to be reliable transla-

tions there must be precise scholars to rely on. As far as it is in my ability to judge, I must say I do not always find Jacinto's translations elegant or poetic, but I do find them examples of that high academic conscience that is the mark of a reliable scholar.

Given that the present book is aimed at a wider audience than devotees of Japanese philosophy, it is regrettable that comments and annotations have been interspersed into the body of the text, making the reader stumble over the brackets and interrupt the natural flow of reading; footnotes would have been a better choice. Anthologies are reference books, read out of sequence as often as not and therefore in need of good navigational tools. In this regard, it would have been a good idea to identify the authors in the running headers to save the reader the trouble of paging back and forth. More critical is the lack of an index. I began using these volumes several months ago, reading here and there in fits and starts, but when it came to putting my finger back on memorable passages, I often found myself at sea without a compass. Finally, a minor grievance, there are a handful of inconsistencies in annotation, Japanese readings, and Sanskrit orthography.

If there is one disappointment with the book that stands out above all the rest, however, it is the fact that his introductory comments do not more directly address the intellectual history peculiar to the Spanish-speaking world, if not to Mexico in particular. It is one thing to compare Japanese thinkers with those whom they considered their counterparts in Europe and the United States; this is, of course, too important to overlook. But it is another to open at least a few direct connections, as his direct translation intimates needs to be done, to the great thinkers of Spain and Latin America that might inspire younger scholars to follow up on with more careful study. I recall discussing with him some years ago on a Sunday afternoon at the bullfights in Mexico City my fear that his work will be set aside by more general audiences as esoteric and left to specialists in Eastern thought. I still carry that fear, and along with it the hope that future volumes will be able to redress the lack.

At present, I am engaged with young scholars from Barcelona in preparing a translation of Nishitani's *Religion and Nothingness*. The translations in Dr. Jacinto's *Antología* have already served us well in our work, as I am sure they will serve others similarly in the future. I wish these volumes every success, and hope that the author and his publishers will find a way to secure them a wider distribution so that they can begin to show up in the classrooms of Spain and Latin America where world philosophy is taught.