what was not. For instance, the reference to *The Gay Science* that appears as part of note 19 to chapter 5 should be included in the actual text, since the reference was present in Nishitani's original; the rest of the information could then be stated in the note. I noticed this type of inconsistency in several places. Regarding note 5 to the introduction, there was no "Sendai University" at that time; Löwith taught at the Tōhoku Imperial University (Tōhoku Teikoku Daigaku, the present Tōhoku Daigaku), which was in Sendai.

Overall, however, it is obvious that much thought and effort went into this book: both the translation and the notation are clearly the result of much painstaking work. Parkes and Aihara appear to have pioneered a new approach to translation, in which a trained language teacher explains the intent of the work to a specialist who is not a native speaker of the work's original language. The translators have in this case produced an accurate and lucid rendition that will be greatly appreciated by anyone interested in Nishitani's thought.

YUSA MICHIKO

STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE GREAT VEHICLE: Three Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts. Edited by Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk. Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature, I, Ann Arbor, 1989. ISBN 0 89148 0544; 0 89148 0552 (pbk.)

This book contains studies and translations of three Mahāyāna Buddhist works: the *Samādhirāja* (King of Samādhis Sūtra), a second-century Sanskrit work, introduced and translated by the Michigan group; the well-known *Vajracchedikā* (Diamond Sūtra), edited and translated by Gregory Schopen; and Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamkālamkāra*, introduced, edited and translated by Ichigō Masamichi. Regarding this volume, K. R. Norman, in his review in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, No. 2 (1990), points out that "the three texts and the treatment afforded them are of a widely differing nature . . . [that] the three editions [on which each of the translations is based] vary in their format . . . [that] the translations too vary very much in form and style . . . [and that] there is a similar variation in the form of the introductions to the translation." Although such variations are indeed apparent I do not think this book can be condemned for lack of a unifying principle. Much variety is to be found within the Mahāyāna literature itself, hence it is only to be expected that the works chosen to constitute a volume of studies on Mahāyāna

texts would not necessarily be consistent with one another. We should, rather, appreciate the fact that "the three contributions illustrate different methodologies employed in the studies of Buddhist literature and are motivated by different aims" (Preface, p. vii).

If any standardization is to be sought for in the textual study of Mahāyāna Buddhism I feel that one of the points which deserves consideration is the choice of words used when the translator renders into English a Sanskrit technical term that is of critical importance to the Buddhist teachings. If such a term is rendered by different English words in each translation, unless the readers can somehow determine the original Sanskrit from the English renderings they may be unable to grasp that they are encountering in different guises the same term whose different nuances require correspondingly different treatments.

I see such an example in the renderings of the term *kṣānti* in this book. No problem arises when *kṣānti* means "patience," as it undoubtedly does in the case of the third of the six pāramitās (e.g., Schopen's translation, p. 124, l. 13). We encounter a problem, however, when the same term is rendered by Schopen as "composure" or by the team translators of the *Samādhirāja* as "patient acceptance." Schopen comments (p. 139, n. 20): "As I understand the term, it [*kṣānti*] more commonly means not 'to endure' or 'to accept' but 'to remain unaffected by', . . . the phrase *nirātmakeṣu dharmeṣu kṣāntim pratilabheta*, which I translate as 'to achieve composure in the midst of things that have no self', is intended above all else as a positive expression of the state of mind that is much more commonly expressed in negative terms." In Part I (Studies on the *Samādhirāja*), on the other hand, *anutpattikeṣu dharmeṣu kṣānteḥ pratilambhaḥ* is translated as "the obtainment of the patient acceptance of the fact that dharmas are not produced" (p. 69, l. 18–9), and *sarvadharmeṣu śūnyatānulomikī kṣāntiḥ* as "the patience of being receptive to all dharmas in accord with emptiness" (p. 76, l. 5–6) or as (allegedly, 'lit.,') "patient acceptance agreeing with emptiness with respect to all dharmas" (p. 87, n. 45).

Which of these two apparently divergent understandings should we accept, or may we understand the term in yet another way? We here need to trace the term *kṣānti* back to the earlier Buddhist literature. The term *khanti* appears in the Pali canon where it is used in one of the following three meanings. (1) In Sn 879 and 944, *khanti* means nothing other than "desire." The word should be considered not to be derived from $\sqrt{kṣam}$, but from $\sqrt{kam}$, hence we find *kānti* as the corresponding Sanskrit form (Wogihara ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, p. 49). This *khanti*, therefore, has nothing to do with the present subject at hand. (2) In Sn 189, 266, 292, Dh 184, 399, etc., *khanti* is used undoubtedly in the sense of "patience." This would correspond to the third of the six

pāramitās. (3) In prose suttas we often encounter the phrases *diṭṭhi-nijjhāna-kkhanti* (S ii 115, iv 188, M ii 170, 218, 234, A i 189, ii 191), *dhamma-nijjhāna-kkhanti* (M i 140), *nijjhānaṃ khamati* (S iii 225, M i 133, 480), etc. *Khanti* in these phrases surely corresponds to the last of the three kinds of *kṣānti* enumerated in some of the Mahāyāna texts (i.e., *dharma-nidhyāna-kṣānti* in *Dharmasamgraha* §CVII; *dharma-nidhyānajñāna* in Levi ed., *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 105). It also relates certainly to *kṣānti* as expounded in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, i.e., the third of four *nirvedabhāgīya kuśalamūla* (*Abhidharmakośa* VI 18c) and the eight *ānantaryamārga* steps in the course of *darśanamārga* (Ak VI 28 ab). *Kṣānti* here represents no other than a certain phase of *prajñā*. It would have to represent an aspect of intellectuality, something akin to discernment or recognition, which I believe is the same as *kṣānti* in the set phrase *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.

Dharma is another term difficult to translate. Schopen comments (p. 137, n. 13): "In our text the term has at least two basic meanings, and in light of this I have used two renderings. When the term is used to refer primarily to 'teaching' or something taught, as in *dharma-paryāya*, I have consistently translated it by 'Doctrine'. When it is used in a more 'philosophical' sense as an element in assertions regarding 'reality', I have consistently translated it by 'thing' . . . There is at least one place in our text, the compound *dharmacakṣus*, where I do not know exactly which of the two basic meanings of *dharma* is supposed to be in play. As a consequence, in this case I leave the term untranslated. There is also one place in our text where the term appears to be used in a third basic sense—*sarvadharmā buddhadharmā iti*, etc., at 8ab—and here I have translated it by 'characteristics.' "

In the translation of the *Samādhirāja*, in most of the cases when the word is used in the first and the second of the three meanings as differentiated by Schopen, *dharma* remains untranslated as "(the) Dharma" or "dharma(s)." In the cases involving the third meaning, however, *buddhadharma* is rendered as "qualities of a buddha" (Ch. 3 G20, Ch. 4 G11), except for a few places (p. 59 l. 26, Ch. 2 G21) where, *dharma* remaining untranslated, the whole compound is rendered as "the (eighteen) dharmas unique to buddhas."

In Ichigō's translation, the term *dharma* mostly appears in the second meaning for which the translator simply uses the term "dharmas" (G69, G83), although in one place (G85) he translates *hetuphaladharma* as "the law of causal relation." I am not sure whether he sees in the latter case yet a fourth meaning of *dharma* (as "law"), or whether he considers its meaning to be derived from the first meaning (i.e., the Buddha's teachings > the truth > law), or whether he thinks it identical with the second meaning, that is, as the whole compound signifying that (all) "things" (without exception) are in causal relation.

In the preface to this book, the editors draw the attention of Buddhist studies majors in the United States to the significance of Buddhist textual studies. To my mind, this presents a curious contrast to the situation of Buddhist scholars in Japan, where people are often heard to complain that an abundance of text-critical philological studies on Buddhist literature may not always be conducive to the genuine understanding of the Buddhist teachings.

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ONCE UPON A FUTURE TIME: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline. By Jan Nattier. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1991. ISBN 0-89581-926-0

In East Asian Buddhism the topic of the demise of the Buddha's Dharma looms large in terms of sectarian development, historiography, soteriological innovation, literary achievement, and more. The importance of this topic has naturally resulted in a number of studies. To date, however, virtually all of these studies have been colored by that same East Asian perspective—so asserts Jan Nattier in an important new work which, by examining the same sources from a primarily philological point of view, challenges much of the received wisdom on this topic.

Her book is divided fairly evenly into two sections, the first dealing with the many strands generally treated under the rubric "decline of the Dharma," and a second that takes a detailed look at the Kauśāmbī story, a narrative of the invasion of India by non-Buddhist forces and subsequent dissension within the Buddhist sangha that leads to the ultimate demise of the religion. After a brief introduction, Nattier outlines the "Frameworks of Buddhist Historical Thought" in order to demonstrate that, while containing neither a sense of centrally decisive historical events (as in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions) nor a teleological orientation, still, for Buddhists, the "question of history . . . has been of central, not peripheral, importance" (p. 9). As is the case throughout this book, Nattier's philological acumen is demonstrated as she ranges through Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Uighur, and Mongolian texts to illustrate what she calls the "cosmological" and "Buddhological" frameworks of Buddhist history (see also her work on Maitreya, "The Meanings of the Maitreya Myth: A Typological Analysis" in Alan Sponberg and Helen Hard-