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monograph of Paul Groner on Saichō, issued in 1984 (Berkeley). Moreover, although the author refers extensively to both Japanese and Western specialized works, there is only a Japanese bibliography. This Japanese bibliography merits the reader's special gratitude because all the titles are translated. On the other hand, it is divided, rather inconveniently, into three different lists, which contain a few regrettable omissions. A much-needed bibliography of Western sources is announced as forthcoming in the next book of the series, on the *Sakyo ui*. So often today, one must protest the lack of references to Western sources in Japanese books. Here, we find, in a French book, that same lack—owing to reasons of space. A novice reader will have much difficulty forming an idea of the Western scholarship on the subject. Let us hope also that in the next volumes, the text will benefit from a more spacious setting. A more generous dispensation of subheadings (even if they have to be put into brackets as the translator's insertions) is always welcome. Most of all, for such a text, the annotation (850 translation notes, pp. 189–381) should be set as footnotes on every page. Then, instead of becoming the bulkiest part of the book, a harmonious marriage can be achieved between the subtle translation of a compendium which is, by definition, elliptic, and the creative and enlightening annotation. It would have made this early and rather neglected Japanese Tendai classic even more precious.

HUBERT DURT

A STUDY OF DŌGEN: His Philosophy and Religion. By Masao Abe, edited by Steven Heine. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 248, ISBN 0-79145-0838-8 (pbk.)

A Study of Dōgen by Masao Abe is a kind of Eastern Monadology. The book is "a collection of essays written over nearly thirty years on various occasions" (author's introduction p. 12). Each essay is a sort of monad, a "worldlet" or little world, that embodies the whole of Dōgen's thought with varying perspectives and emphases.

The book is divided into six parts: I. The Oneness of Practice and Attainment: Implications for the Relation between Means and End, II. Dōgen on Buddha-nature, III. Dōgen's View of Time and Space, IV. The Problem of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen, V. and VI. The Problem of Death in Dōgen and Shinran. The first three essays are concerned exclusively with seminal

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aspects of Dōgen's thought; the last three are comparative in nature, one comparing Dōgen with Heidegger and two comparing Dōgen with Shinran.

I. The "oneness" of practice and attainment, which negates any means-end, teleological relationship, is not to be grasped as an immediate identity. Attainment or the Buddha-nature is the *ground* or *basis* for awakening, whereas resolution-practice is the *condition* or *occasion* for it. This absolutely irreversible relation between Buddha-nature or attainment as the fundamental ground and resolution-practice as the condition for that attainment is ultimately reversed due to the nonsubstantiality of attainment and the emptiness of Buddha-nature. There is no immediate identity between practice and attainment that exists apart from the mediation of any negation. This provided the answer to Dōgen's initial existential koan: if we already possess the Buddha-nature, what need is there for practice? In a similar vein one might ask what if Mozart had been trained as an investment banker and had never been exposed to music at all?

II. The second essay moves from the anthropocentric dimension of human beings and the question of birth and death, to the dimension of sentient beings and the question of generation and extinction, to the ultimate dimension of whole being or all beings and the question of being and nonbeing. True to the Middle Way of Buddhist tradition avoiding the two extremes of eternalism (*sasvata*) and nihilism (*uccheda*), Dōgen emphasizes no-Buddha-nature in order to clarify the nonsubstantiality of the Buddha-nature and emphasizes the bottomlessness or limitlessness of whole being or all beings in order to prevent its or their being objectified. Dōgen arrives at no-Buddha-nature which is free from the opposition of Buddha-nature and no-Buddha-nature. Both the eternalist and nihilist views, toward which we all tend to veer, substantialize and are attached to their "objects." Dōgen's ultimate step is to go from saying Impermanence is the Buddha-nature to being able to say The Buddha-nature is impermanence.

III. In this essay Abe tackles the difficult question of Dōgen's conception of time (and space) which will continue on in the next essay in a comparison with Heidegger. Here time is not conceived as a unilinear sequence *in which* things occur, but everything *is* time or temporality. Time does not just pass away or fly by, but is a spontaneous manifestation (*genjō*) making a passageless passage (*kyōryaku*) to other times while abiding in its own dharma-stage. Thus there is no becoming; for example, spring does not become summer, firewood does not become ashes. If we do not stand outside of time and thereby objectify it, we can live existentially in the present which turns out to have two dimensions: a "vertical," transtemporal dimension that embraces past, present and future and a "horizontal" dimension of temporal past, present and future moving unidirectionally. How is the transtemporal, vertical

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dimension of time to be experienced? In the practice of zazen we can cut through the horizontal dimension of time, completely negate the egocentric self by casting off body and mind and realizing the beginninglessness and endlessness of time without a bottom. As a bottomless depth this dimension cannot be objectified, but can only be existentially realized as no-self, which is the true Self.

IV. This essay on the problem of time in the early and the late Heidegger and Dōgen beings with a discussion of life and death. Life and death (*samsara*) was, of course, absolutely central for Dōgen, and Heidegger was the first Western thinker to make the problem of death central, unmitigated by promises of Platonic immortality of the soul of Christian afterlife. However, Abe finds that the earlier, and to a lesser extent the later, Heidegger still smacks of anthropocentrism which is utterly lacking in Dōgen.

While in Heidegger the human self (*Dasein*) is understood as being-unto-death or being-unto-end, and thereby life and death are realized dualistically, in Dōgen life and death are completely nondual, and the process of living-dying is understood to be without beginning and without end. With the clear, existential realization of the beginninglessness and endlessness of human living-dying, the Self transcends anthropocentrism and comes to stand on the horizon of the entire universe. (p. 126)

This self is neither anthropocentric nor anthropomorphic; it is profoundly cosmic.

Whereas the later Heidegger comes to approach a transanthropocentric stance, still that stance is incomplete because of the priority of time, which is not possible without human existence, over being. For Dōgen, all possible duality between time (Self) and being is overcome through the realization of the nonsubstantiality and emptiness of both being and time. One might say that although Heidegger polemicized his whole life against *Vorhandenheit* (objective presence) and thus against substantiality, he was never quite able to gain a positive experience of nonsubstantiality or emptiness. Nothingness remained for him "the veil of being."

V. and VI. These essays continue probing into the question of death, now in a comparison with Shinran's view. Essay V deals with the differences between Dōgen's and Shinran's conceptions of emancipation, not from death, but from birth-and-death itself. In general, Buddhism understands human existence not as something that must die, but rather as something that undergoes the vicissitudes of birth-and-death *at each and every moment*. For Shinran the sinfulness of birth-and-death and the corrupt karma-strickenness of the self can only be transformed by the power of the vow through Amida's merit-

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transference. This is the standpoint of so-called "other-power." In contrast, Dōgen seeks and finds liberation and self-extrication from the limitations of being and nothingness, not only from birth and death. This is the most comprehensive view possible and represents the standpoint of so-called "self-Power."

For Shinran practice and attainment are infinitely separated and opposed. Because of our sinfulness there is no way possible for us to gain enlightenment through our own efforts and practice. Faith in the power of Amida's vow alone is essential. The result is transformation, not emancipation. There is no realization of an original face as it is in the body-mind right here and now. Rather than conceiving rebirth in Pure Land literally as being reborn on the deathbed in another place, Shinran understands rebirth as the birth of no-birth in everyday life. The attainment of nirvana necessarily in the future is determined by this present existence. Shinran's standpoint is thus faith, not supreme realization, that of rebirth, not no-birth.

In contrast, Dōgen attains the realization of no-birth-and-death directly through birth-and-death by releasing birth-and-death. For him practice is already practice in realization. Since realization is already within practice, realization is endless. Any dualistic conception of practice and realization is based on the ego's calculation of a goal to be reached for its own selfish sake.

Both Shinran and Dōgen interpret human existence existentially from within, not from some standpoint outside of human existence. Kierkegaard would call the latter standpoint from without "fantastic." There is no duality of birth and death, both of which are fundamentally beginningless and endless. Neither thinker interprets that which undergoes the vicissitudes of birth-and-death as a continuous and therefore substantive being that passes "horizontally" from birth to death. The latter is a Western conception most rooted in Plato and Christianity, but it remains just that, a *conception*, an objectification. The Way or Dharma never exists objectively at all; it simply cannot be objectified because it is not substantial. It is manifested only upon our continuous practice.

Finally, Abe discusses the differences between Shinran's inverse correspondence of sentient beings to the Dharma and Dōgen's true correspondence. Inverse correspondence results in the formed reward body (*sambhoga-kaya*) of the Buddha; true correspondence yields the formless cosmic body (*dharma-kaya*) of the Buddha. One is faith in the promise of realization inherent in Amida's vow; the other is the casting off of body-mind and existential realization of the true Person or Buddha-nature.

Obviously these skeletal characterizations cannot do justice to the richness and profundity of Abe's essays. Actually, these characterizations constitute more of a sparse overview than review. They are meant to provide a glimpse of

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the cogent philosophical insights proffered in this volume. Abe knows how to create clarity and lucidity in what is probably some of the most difficult and elusive thought in any philosophical literature, West or East. We can be grateful that there is someone who can interpret these extremely difficult and important ideas and who also has a sound knowledge of Christianity and Western philosophy.

JOAN STAMBAUGH

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF NISHITANI KEIJI: Encounter with Emptiness. Edited by Taitetsu Unno. Nanzan Studies in Religion and Culture, James W. Heisig, General Editor. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1989, xv + 350 pp. ISBN 0-89581-871-1

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF TANABE HAJIME: The Metanoetic Imperative. Edited by Taitetsu Unno and James W. Heisig. Nanzan Studies in Religion and Culture, James W. Heisig, General Editor. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1990, xiii + 399 pp. ISBN 0-89581-873-8

These two volumes (henceforth abbreviated as RPNK and RPTH), collections of papers coming out of international symposia on the thought of Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990) and Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) respectively, draw attention to the significance of the Kyoto School and its contribution to world philosophy. They also further the conversation already going on in some circles on the issues raised by and about this religio-philosophical current, notably since the publication of English translations of major works of the two religious philosophers (Nishitani's *Shakyō to wa nanika*, published as *Religion and Nothingness*, trans. Jan Van Bragt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, and Tanabe's *Zangedō toshite no tetsugaku*, published as *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, trans. Takeuchi Yoshinori, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

The publication of the above mentioned translations, as well as the preparation of the symposia (held at Smith College, Massachusetts, in 1984 and 1989) and now the publication of the collections of papers based on these, are in great part due to the initiative and efforts of the Nanzan Institute of Religion and Culture (based at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan) under the director-