

TRANSLATION

The Relationship between Religious Morality and Common Morality

Kiyozawa Manshi

TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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Introduction

INTENDED AS a sequel to "Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning of Buddhist Ethics," I have prepared this translation of one of Kiyozawa Manshi's essays on the subject of the relationship of religion to ethics and morality. Written in 1903, the last year of his short life, it is widely regarded as his most mature statement on how he viewed the ethical imperative of religion. The reader should bear in mind the political climate in Japan at this time when the Buddhist community was struggling to regain its social legitimacy after decades of attenuation at the hands of the Meiji political oligarchy. The turn of the century saw the first incursions of Japanese militarism abroad and the political climate imposed a social mission on religious organizations, both Buddhist and Christian, in which their spiritual goals were expected to demonstratively serve the modernization efforts of the nation-state. Titled "The Relationship between Religious Morality and Common Morality," Kiyozawa here, as elsewhere, does not appear to be concerned with distinguishing morality from ethics; indeed both words appear to be used interchangeably in this text. In the title, the term, "Religious Morality" is followed by the phrase *zokutai* 俗諦 in brackets. *Zokutai* is a technical Buddhist term representing the concept known in Sanskrit as *samvṛti-satya*: religious truth that can be known by ordinary beings such as you and me; it is commonly translated as "worldly truth". Coupled with it, Mahāyāna texts also discuss the "highest" or "absolute" truth, *shintai* 真諦, which derives from the Sanskrit *paramārtha-satya*. It is unlikely that even a figure such as Kiyozawa Manshi was aware of the Sanskrit equivalents of these traditional Chinese Buddhist terms at the time this essay was published, however, for the study of Sanskrit Buddhist texts in

Japan was still in its infancy. I have therefore tried to consider these crucial terms within the semantic context of the Sino-Japanese terminology of the entire essay, rather than translate them back into Sanskrit.

Translation

ALTHOUGH IT IS often said that morality is the most important issue in the world of man, we do not respect this [judgement]. In fact, it is not uncommon for people to wonder what sort of factors are at play that have induced a trend in which we now have people who appear determined to eradicate morality entirely. Some look at the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths, absolute and worldly, as found in Shinshū¹ and say the worldly truth is none other than the teachings of ethics and morality. There are others, however, who would criticize this position, saying that not only does this reflect the error of partiality in advocating only the absolute truth, but it also leads to the loss of the benefits Shinshū affords to the nation and society. In the following pages I would like to present my feelings about the issue of morality and the Buddhist concept of worldly truth.

In general, the teaching of the two truths is extremely deep and subtle, but it also reflects a common, everyday attitude. One result of this is the existence of people who have somehow only heard about the popular side of the issue and thus understand little of its profound implications. Although it is difficult to treat exhaustively the details of this matter in this space, I will attempt to outline it briefly. Buddhism may be said to begin from considerations of an ethical life and proceeds to doctrines classified as Hinayāna, Mahāyāna, Exoteric, or Esoteric. Furthermore, for those who are spiritually unable to enter into any of these systems, there is a way of salvation that, in the end, saves all sentient beings without exception by means of a single Dharma teaching: namely, the teaching of the two truths, worldly and absolute, which exhausts the full extent of the Buddha's great compas-

¹ This is a reference to the particular doctrines of the Jōdo Shinshū Buddhist sect in Japan. For more of Kiyozawa Manshi's personal opinions on traditional Shinshū doctrine, see the translator's article, "Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning of Buddhist Ethics" in *The Eastern Buddhist*, Spring 1988.

sion. For this reason, the teaching of the two truths naturally transcends the so-called ethics and morality of this world. And [relevant to our present discussion,] the sublime message inherent in the gate of worldly truth is truly astonishing.

Anything which could be termed a religious doctrine or ethical teaching is based on thoughts of good and bad that exist in our minds. All teachings endeavor to encourage the good and control the bad; by doing so the goal is to bring us to the attainment of peace of mind. Spoken of from another point of view, we attempt to release ourselves from dissatisfaction and achieve contentment. But within this suffering and joy,² it is the suffering and joy as it relates to the issue of good and bad that is indeed the predominant concern. The doctrines or teachings we see in the world are attempts therefore to enable the individual to reach a pre-determined space where he can rest assured he has found a solution to this problem.

Now with regard to the issue of precisely what is good and what is bad, [we can say that] although all ordinary people feel this is perfectly obvious, looking at the research of scholars we find that things are in fact not at all clear. What is considered good in country *A* may be considered bad in country *B*, and the reverse may also be true. Moreover, what was [considered] good during a former age may be seen as bad in a later time [within the same country]. The converse also occurs. This being the situation, there are inevitable doubts about what is truly good and what is truly bad. When people speak of a relevant, practical morality or religion, however, they have little interest in debating such doubts. When practical morality or religion is the basis of one's concern, prevailing conceptions in other countries or in previous times are simply not considered. The crucial point is now, directly before us—deciding what action we should take. At such moments nothing else matters. [For most people,] their approach is simple: in their heart of hearts what they feel is good *is* good, what they feel is bad *is* bad. Were it possible to always do what one thinks is good and never do what one thinks is bad, all systems of morality and religion would affirm this position.

² What I have translated as suffering and joy are standard Buddhist terms for the two poles of how we process sensation: we are repulsed by what we perceive as leading to suffering or anxiety (S. *dukkha*) and attracted to what we think will bring us joy or happiness (S. *sukha*).

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Nevertheless, if we address ourselves to the question of why morality and religion are so difficult [to practice], we must first recognize the fact that when each individual by himself tries to honestly base his actions on what he feels is good and bad, things just do not happen as he thought they would. The harder he strives the more he realizes how problematic his situation is. And as his understanding of the difficulty progresses, the more it occupies his thoughts. From this corresponding growth in concern comes a variety of arguments on the subject of good and evil. The present situation in Japan is exactly at this stage. From the desire to advance the practice of morality, we have today a blossoming of academic discussions on the subject of ethics and indeed the [various] positions are interesting. Some say that if one's motivation is good, then as a result one's behavior must accordingly be good. Another position states that regardless of one's motivation, if an individual's actions are evil, then this is [unambiguously] evil. For the purposes of research, these [opinions] are all attractive. But in the end, this is only debate or research. When we come to the practice of morality, debate or research makes little difference. Individually, everyone feels they should simply do exactly what they think is right and not do what they think is wrong. But even if one were certain about what constitutes good and bad behavior in a particular situation, in fact it is difficult to carry out exactly what you think is good and completely refrain from what you think is bad. This kind of "difficulty" is completely different from the "difficulty" that arises in debate or research [on morality or ethics].

If the situation were such that we could not get to the level of practice until these troublesome investigations into the nature of ethics were resolved, then we would have to say that today we are not yet at a time when [ethical] praxis can take place. The actual practice of morality, however, is not at all dependent on this. It has been going on since ancient times [while the debate over what is good and evil continues to the present day]. And there is nothing to prevent one from beginning its [practice] today as well. If we do not begin [our ethical behavior] today, moreover, when could we hope to? [If we waited for the resolution of this academic debate] that time would never come. Hence the practice of morality is not something to be seen as linked to moral debate or research. They are totally separate.

On the other hand, for those who focus directly on praxis and en-

counter the problems inherent thereof, movement into the arena of debate and research on morality is natural. But one thereupon discovers all the problems that lie here as well and it becomes clear that this latter path will not provide any easy solutions [either]. One thereupon feels a tremendous stimulus toward [greater diligence in] practice and, with an even deeper zeal than before, one may return to the path of single-minded cultivation of practice. It is interesting that within this process many people either well-grounded in scholarship or with strong intellectual leanings will spend a long period of time, even decades, in intellectual debate. Among those with no academic achievement and weak intellectual inclinations, however, there are many who easily succeed in breaking away from this labyrinth of argument and investigation. There are also many who, from the outset, have never engaged in debate or research. In any case, everyone finds their concerns will ultimately be focused only on praxis, and no one can avoid experiencing problems in this area. Those people who, having heard the teaching of the two truths according to *tariki* Shinshū, feel they are easily capable of putting into practice the worldly truth teaching, have simply not yet reached this point. They are of a like mind to those researching and debating the meaning of morality.

There is one point to be made concerning this dilemma wherein it is not easy to do what is right (i.e. good) and abstain from what is wrong (i.e. evil). These [notions of good and evil] are basic ideas expressed in all teachings; but if we look into this one step further, we can say that, in fact, rather than calling these "teachings", they should be seen as natural inclinations. Before we are ever taught such things, we are naturally endowed with desires motivating us to behave well rather than badly. Therefore, if it were truly possible to act on [these inclinations] without difficulty, then even if we were not formally concerned with this issue, we should be able to do what is morally correct. But things do not really work in this way and, in fact, even when [ethics] are taught with extreme care, still no one can fully behave [in a morally proper way]. To the practice of morality applies the saying: a three-year old child can speak of it but even an eighty-year old man cannot do it. Accordingly, if there are those who think the practice of Shinshū worldly truth is easily accomplished, we must call this a misapprehension of the situation.

Some people will say the worldly truth according to Shinshū is

different in its intent than that of ordinary ethics or morality. They will say that since the usual sense of ethics or morality is separated from religion, it cannot be practiced. But because Shinshū worldly truth is a morality which flows from absolute truth, so long as the attainment of *shinjin*³ is definite, moral practice will be natural and inevitable. Though it seems there is an element of truth in this, there is also one aspect which requires some care. We are referring to the distinction between things that occur naturally and inevitably and things which are carried out intentionally and deliberately. Something which occurs naturally and inevitably need not be taught. The necessity of “teachings” lies in the attempt to enlighten our intentions and deliberations by means of those teachings. Therefore, if the practice of worldly truth in Shinshū terms were accomplished naturally and inevitably, so long as the ultimate truth exists, there should be no need for worldly truth teachings. From the fact that the worldly truth is taught nearly shoulder to shoulder with the absolute truth, it should be clear that the practice of worldly truth is in fact not something which manifests naturally and inevitably from the *shinjin* of absolute truth. [Rather] what is gained naturally and inevitably from the *shinjin* of absolute truth is the so-called “ten kinds of worldly benefits.”⁴ Because it is grasped in this way, there is no teaching stemming from it which says on any particular issue: “do this and do not do that,” or “one must do this and must not do that”. There is no hint of any teaching [in this tradition] which advocates praying to the gods for protection or for blessings of the highest regard. This is because even without such prayer, one naturally and inevitably has already obtained the benefits of protection from the gods and blessings of the highest merit. Among the ten benefits [attained when *shinjin* is realized], one is transforming evil into good and another is realizing gratitude and thus repaying

³ *Shinjin* 信心 may be translated as the “enlightenment of faith.” This religious experience is the quintessential religious event in the life of a Shinshū believer. Here Kiyozawa appears to be referring to an assumption that those who have attained this awakening are *de facto* capable of proper moral discernment and successful praxis in moral terms, or as he puts it, “perfect praxis.”

⁴ *Genshō jisshu no yaku* 現生十種の益. This is a reference to the ten kinds of benefits said to accrue to the nembutsu practitioner during this lifetime as mentioned by Shinran at the end of the chapter on Faith in his *Kyōgyōshinshō*. For a full discussion on this topic, see the *Bukkyō Daiji-i* II: 1099-1101.

merit [to the Buddha]. In these particular doctrines we have evidence of concern for good and evil as well as esteeming a sense of obligation. But these are benefits that accrue naturally and inevitably; there is no [accompanying] teaching which says, "For this reason, do this and do that".

[As stated above,] since the Shinshū worldly truth is expounded as a teaching equally majestic with the absolute truth, it should be understood that it does not express something which naturally and inevitably manifests from the experience of *shinjin*; rather it exists in order to enlighten our intentional activity. Seen in this way, there is no problem in affirming that the difficulties in implementing the worldly truth of Shinshū are not particularly different from the difficulties in implementing common morality or ethics; in the final analysis, the perfect practice of Shinshū worldly truth is [also] something not easily accomplished.

Although the perfect praxis of either the worldly truth of Shinshū or common ethics and morality may be difficult, some degree of successful practice is possible. If one gradually cultivates oneself, in fact, one can increasingly draw closer to perfection [in praxis]. The teachings [of any moral system], though they may be vexing, are therefore most important in this respect. It is a frequently presented argument, moreover, that [moral] practice is an urgent imperative. This position also has some truth to it. But strictly speaking, on this point we must draw a distinction between worldly truth in Shinshū and common, ordinary morality. The general attitude toward common morality is that one really has no other way to proceed: somehow each individual must maintain a practice of moral [standards]. For, regardless of whether or not it is actually possible, we have no choice but to commit ourselves to carry out [these ideals] one at a time. Even if one's resolve is firm, however, when it comes to the point of the actual implementation [of the morally ideal act], one gradually falls into a state of anxiety. In the end, the individual will turn to religion or become hopelessly despondent about the future of mankind. The worldly truth as expounded in Shinshū stands side by side with the absolute truth, [and we must bear in mind that] future events will all be realized by absolute truth. From the outset, therefore, the teachings imply no imperative to seek one's own progress in terms of worldly truth. Especially in its praxis, one will encounter troubles as we have mentioned above. No matter how hard we strive, there is no means by which we

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can do something laudable. Moreover, [on the personal level], the ability or inability to [successfully] carry out these ideals depends upon the content of one's karmic fruition or inherent make-up; if one's karmic or natural design is inferior, no matter how much effort he may make, he is simply at a stage where he is unable to produce anything superior. In any case, [we can say] for Shinshū, worldly truth does not aim at the usual goal of competency in the implementation [of the teachings] such that we perform praiseworthy deeds; its efficacy lies elsewhere. Accordingly there is a great difference in the thrust of the Shinshū worldly truth and common morality which itself aims at performing commendable acts. Put another way, it does not really matter whether one intends to do something splendid or something wretched: the goal of the worldly truth teaching in Shinshū is not concerned with such notions.

One may wonder, then, what the purpose of Shinshū worldly truth actually is. The answer is simply that it aims to lead the individual to the [above-stated] perception that one cannot, in fact, perform these moral tasks. Although there may be differences between those who have attained *shinjin* as it relates to absolute truth and those who have not, it should be noted that the perception of the impossibility of moral praxis is identical in both cases.

[By way of explanation,] let us first turn to those who have not yet attained *shinjin*. Having experienced the difficulty of [common] moral practice, such people often become religious and thereby proceed down the road to the attainment of *shinjin*. At first glance, this may not seem terribly significant but in fact it is not a simple matter. For the single basic impediment blocking the entrance to *tariki* faith is the conviction that one is capable of practicing *jiriki* discipline. Although there are many kinds of *jiriki* disciplined praxis, the most common and universal is behavior considered ethical or moral. As long as one thinks proper moral action is indeed possible, the entrance to *tariki* religion is ultimately blocked. It is an indispensable condition for becoming religious that one experiences [the disappointment incurred when] honestly seeking to mould one's behavior to conform to ethics or morality, one realizes that ultimately things will not turn out as expected. In the case of those who have not attained *shinjin*, since the primary objective is ultimately the surrender of the deluded *jiriki* mind, this experience may occur in reference to an assortment of different moral schemes: the teachings of Shinshū worldly truth, the teachings

of contemporary social ethics or [current norms of] morality, the five precepts,⁵ the ten wholesome aspects of behavior,⁶ an attempt to do good in all actions., etc. But the teachings of Shinshū worldly truth are the most favorable because they are part of a system that opens the door to absolute truth.

Next we will consider someone after he has obtained *shinjin*. Although we attain “the great pacified mind”⁷ as a result of our experience of *tariki shinjin*, the habitual deluded mind of *jiriki* continues to arise nonetheless. Thereafter, when we hear teachings on worldly truth, they seem directed precisely at this deluded mind. Our reaction is to immediately attempt to put these ideals into practice. When we then engage in such practice, however, we eventually perceive how truly difficult this is. It is then we turn around and rejoice [once again] in our *tariki* faith, returning to the attitude embodied in the phrase, “In the joy of faith of the truly sincere mind, the self is forgotten; one returns to the non-doing and non-becoming ocean of faith.” In other words, in the situation [of one who has attained *shinjin*], because one’s praxis is so difficult, the worldly truth teaching exists to deepen one’s thoughts of gratitude toward the infinite compassion [of the Buddha].

Of these two approaches to the worldly truth teachings, the first is an example of “choosing the appropriate teachings and making use of them”. When people hear that in Shinshū there is the idea of a worldly/absolute theory of two truths or a mutually dependent two-truth theory, they may think this reflects a religion which has not forgotten about society and the nation—revealing they are unable [at this point] to grasp the *shinjin* of absolute truth. When such people diligently attempt to practice the Shinshū worldly truth in the form of ethics or morals, in the end this [experience] becomes a guide which brings them to a grasp of the *shinjin* of absolute truth. Yet the true meaning of the traditional theory of mutually dependent two truths is

⁵ S. *Pañca-sīla*. These are prescribed for all Buddhist laymen: no killing, stealing, illicit sex, lying, or drinking of intoxicants.

⁶ S. *Daśa-kuśala*. These are the *pañca-sīla* mentioned above plus no immoral language, slander, equivocation, covetousness, anger, or false views.

⁷ *Dai-anjin* 大安心. *Anjin* is a traditional term in Pure Land Buddhism referring to the attainment whereby one’s anxieties are relieved about Birth in the Pure Land and all that this implies. In Shinshū terminology, it is generally used as a synonym for *shinjin*.

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expressed in the second example given above [i.e. after one has attained *shinjin*]. It is precisely because one has reached absolute truth *shinjin* that he is not surprised by his inability to actuate [the morality of] worldly truth. And because he fails at this his sense of graciousness toward his *shinjin* in the absolute truth deepens. It is here that the individual truly grasps the implications of this relationship of mutual dependence and mutual support.

The essential message of the worldly truth lies, as we have just stated, in the case of those who have experienced *shinjin*, but there is one more point to be made regarding the subsequent development of this understanding. Although it is true that the issue of praxis in regard to worldly truth is first relevant because it is problematic, with the passage of time the true nature of worldly truth becomes apparent even without sensing the difficulties involved in its application. Finally, one reaches the point where, upon hearing words such as "worldly truth" or "morality," he can savor the true implications of the mutually dependent two truths. Thus, while it may be impossible for me to implement this truth, [I know] such an impossibility is a matter of course. At the same time [I am perplexed about my practice], this self that is stymied is encompassed by an infinite compassion that will never yield. Truly the only emotion here is gratitude—a surge of humility and joy. This state of mind may not arise readily in the beginning, but in the end it appears instantly whenever one hears about "worldly truth" and other such notions.⁸

There is also a contrary proof of this. Someone involved with the Shinshū teaching of worldly truth may see the anguish another person goes through regarding common moral issues like "Should I abide by this or not?" or "Can I do without this or not?" On the one hand while pitying the misleading prejudices of that person who is still committed to models of moral behavior, on the other he delights in the peaceful acceptance of his own spiritual situation. Indeed, questions of respon-

⁸ Note Kiyozawa's use of the passive action of hearing here. Since all praxis directed toward personal liberation, not only that of morality or worldly truth, is considered futile in Shinshū doctrine, Shinran's emphasis on hearing the Dharma (*J. mon* 聞) has long since taken the role of religious praxis in Shinshū. The technical term *mon* in Shinshū specifically refers to encountering the Truth through hearing the preaching of the Dharma. Though Kiyozawa's use of hearing is somewhat different here as it includes ordinary social morality, it does lead to the same religious affirmation.

sibility or obligation as in "should I . . .," or "can I . . ." occupy a predominant share of the anxiety in our lives; their influence is simply enormous. Though worldly truth as seen in Shinshū may contain elements of a command idiom expressed in terms of "Do this. . . . Do not do that," generally speaking, in its core it does not approve of such exterior pressures as "You should do this" and "You must not do that." Even in cases where some anxiety is created from the use of such [enjoining language], it is not comparable to the anguish experienced under the deluded thinking of common morality. In other words, when arbitrary notions of "You must do this" and "You must not do that" are added to the delusory abstractions of common morality wherein one is merely ordered to "Do this. . . . Do not do that," the situation [may escalate to where] it seems a solemn command has come down from God or the Buddha saying, "You absolutely must do this," or "It is strictly forbidden for you to do that." People accordingly come to think that the crucial matter of their salvation will depend on their ability or inability to implement so-called proper moral behavior, consequently feeling "If I do not do this, I will not be saved," or "If I do that I will not be saved." It is a matter of course that an extreme anxiety thus develops in regards to one's capacity of behave appropriately. Whether or not one is able to actuate the worldly truth teaching in Shinshū, however, has not the slightest relation to the most important fact of one's salvation. Though there may be some anxiety over one's ability to implement [Buddhist ethics as called for in scripture], not only is this incomparable to the unease arising from the arbitrary abstractions of ordinary morality, but the nature of [Buddhist and non-Buddhist] concerns in this area is completely different. One contains an anxiety over being tormented by a devil, the other effects deep shame toward the great compassion of the Buddha. In one there are tears cried in fear and the expression of an intense anger at never being forgiven, while in the other there are tears which come from being touched by the depth of compassion and mercy [in the Buddha] which encompasses us anywhere, anytime.⁹

Because of this situation the Shinshū worldly truth teaching is not

⁹ Here Kiyozawa seems to be making a veiled attack on Christianity and its doctrine of final judgement. The Buddhist world in Japan (and throughout Asia, for that matter) underwent unceasing attack from Christian missionaries and their newfound converts at this time. These attacks often focused on moral themes, chiding Japan's Bud-

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something which sets out to impose prescriptions on human behavior. If it were offering regulations for our actions, we would expect its principles to be definite and precise. In fact, whether it be simple "rules," a general notion of duty to the state, or the five [Confucian] cardinal virtues of benevolence, justice, politeness, wisdom and fidelity, the forms [Shinshū statements take regarding such obligations] are decidedly vague. Even in the basic formula of the "five good acts and five bad acts"¹⁰ or the phrase, "only excluding those who have committed the five grave offenses and those who have slandered the Dharma . . . ,"¹¹ the intent is, again, somewhat different. Of course if one were seeking to reconcile these with each other, he could say that they all may be implying the same thing. But it is better not to force such an accommodation. Why? Because just as we have stated above, the worldly truth teaching of Shinshū is not aimed at its actualization; if anything, it emphasizes arousing the perception that its actualization is in fact impossible. There is no need to enumerate every instance of this in detail, just as there is no need to fix its meaning. It applies to whatever approach one takes: it is therefore acceptable to see this as either imploring one to practice what is said to be good, or urging one not to do what said to be bad. In either case the individual will reach the point where he awakens to the fact that the perfect practice of neither is possible. Grasping this is nothing less than the elation of *shinjin* in absolute truth. The worldly truth teaching is thus nothing less than the means to perceive absolute truth from its back side by means of *shinjin*. That is to say, as opposed to the positivity of absolute truth, worldly truth is appealing for its negativity. For that reason it is a great misperception to think the worldly truth teaching exists in order to compel people to

dhist legacy for allowing such things as prostitution, sexually mixed communal bathing, unbridled alcoholic consumption, etc. For more details, cf. the translator's "Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning of Buddhist Ethics," cited above.

¹⁰ This phrasing comes from the standard translation of the so-called *Larger Sukhavati-vyūha* by Saṃghavarman, the *Wu-liang shou ching* 無量壽經 (T³⁶⁰), an early work where the Sanskrit term *pañca-śīla* (cf. n. 3 above) is rendered as "good acts" 五善, as opposed to its more common translation as 五戒. Not observing these five precepts was then termed the five "bad acts" 五惡.

¹¹ This phrase is added as a sort of disclaimer in the famous eighteenth vow of the *Wu-liang shou ching* wherein these transgressors are excluded from this promise to all sentient beings by Amitābha Buddha to guarantee Birth in his Pure Land by means of their sincere reciting of his name.

uphold standards of human behavior or by extension to benefit society and the nation. If the worldly truth teaching were expounded in connection with the laws of the king or the precepts of benevolence and humanity, as a matter of course it would be conducive to the performance of [these duties] to some degree. In fact [such concerns] are an appendant phenomenon. Since there is a degree of efficacy in these secondary aspects, however, their esteem in society has resulted in the main point [of the teaching] being overlooked entirely. Despite the fact that the essential thrust of the doctrine is religious, it is its appended moral elements that seem to be valued most highly; a strange set of circumstances indeed!

In general, when one speaks in the same breath of Buddhist worldly truth and morality or the nation-state (*kokka* 國家), one should take care to explicate the qualities of each. Looking first at worldly truth and morality, the primary need is to know what is meant by worldly truth. Upon trying to explain this, one immediately notices that worldly truth stands alongside absolute truth in the doctrine of *tariki* Shinshū. In other words, [Buddhist worldly truth] is not a teaching of morality but a teaching of religion; it is not a teaching about the way of men but about the way of Buddhas. Seeing it in this way, it goes without saying that worldly truth is something to be explained by a religious person and that its goal must be to produce religious results. Morality, on the other hand, is morality—it is not religion. It is a teaching about the way of men, not the way of Buddhas. Hence it should be expounded by a moralist with the goal of producing moral accomplishments. Although politicians do not avoid speaking about business matters, politicians are not merchants. Although the world of business is not unrelated to [the growing of] grain, merchants are farmers. In that religion and morality have been separated, there is no need to confuse their domains. If one does not recognize the distinction between religion and morality, thereby taking the stance that religion is none other than morality and morality is none other than religion, then any discussion of the relationship between Buddhist worldly truth and morality is pointless. Furthermore, in such a context one would not be discussing morality in relation to worldly truth wherein worldly truth is contradistinguished from absolute truth, for this position implies both truths are teachings of morality.

Let us now consider the relationship between worldly truth and soci-

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ety and/or the nation-state. Since in general the notion of worldly truth is a religious teaching, it goes without saying that its contribution to society and the nation-state is, at the same time, a contribution of religious merit. It is one thing to recognize someone's religious contribution [to society] in his energies toward expounding the absolute truth teaching. It is quite another to then turn around and criticize the same person because he has not devoted equal effort to propagating the worldly truth teachings [conceived to be of more direct social significance]. If absolute and worldly truth were distinct, then it would be acceptable to say there is an insufficiency if we teach one and not the other. But as they reflect only the front and back of the same thing, there should be nothing lacking if we teach only one. In any case, there should be no argument that the contribution to state and society of preaching even worldly truth lies in its religious impact, so when we expound the absolute truth teaching, this is already in effect.

There is also an argument which states that while it may be acceptable to draw a distinction between religion and morality such that religious people preach religion and moralists preach morality, it would be improper [if this distinction means] destroying morality in order to expound religion. If such a result were before us it would not be a trifling matter. But there is really nothing that can be done about it. If morality is that weak, then its dissolution may not be such a bad thing. It is, after all, the duty of a religious person to teach religion. And he fulfills that duty for purposes of religious efficacy, certainly not because he intends to do away with morality. For this reason, if morality were destroyed, morality would be destroyed by itself. One wonders, however, if such vague arguments are really appropriate to this discussion. Just what is the religious person supposed to preach [about morality]? He cannot choose between someone who has killed another and someone who has not. Frankly, it is irrelevant to the religious point of view whether the person before him is a thief or not, or whether or not someone who wants to commit adultery should be allowed to do so. [The preacher of religion] has no choice but to stress that infinite compassion does not base its salvific intent on discriminations among individuals who have committed murders, thefts, etc.

How does the moralist respond to this? Is this something which he feels will destroy morality, something which will vitiate humanity? Anyone who immediately affirms such statements does so rashly. [They

would be assuming] that he who consciously distinguishes religion from morality would be obligated for religious reasons to withhold condemnation for murder, theft, licentiousness or falsehood. From a humanistic, moral point of view, murder and theft are heinous crimes; licentiousness and falsehood must not be permitted. The people who commit these offenses are all transgressors against humanity and, in a moral sense, depraved individuals. [It is thus without denigrating morality that we advocate] the religious expounding the Dharma from a religious standpoint and moralists preaching from their own moral concern. Standing separately, there is no hint of a conflict of interest. Consider the mind of someone who has committed one of the offenses mentioned above. If he were concerned with morality before feeling disturbed about religion, he would repent and thereafter devote himself to a moral path. If he gives precedence to religion, he would rush at once to a portal of religion. If he needs religion and morality combined, then, repenting his sin, he will commit himself to the paths of both. If he is someone who does not reflect upon either religion or morality, he will probably wander in the dark night of his crime just as he is. From this perspective one can also understand those moments when [they] have refrained from such transgressions.

In conclusion, we must recognize that vague arguments about religion being harmful to morality, or the establishment of Buddhism meaning the destruction of humanistic values, only invite misunderstanding. Issues such as these demand precision. The distinction between religion and morality should now be clear: [we expect] religious individuals to uphold the religious dimension of life and moralists to maintain [standards of] morality. If each works to his full capacity, then each will contribute his own meritorious services to the society and the nation.

Above I have expressed my understanding just as it is on the issue of the relationship between the worldly truth of Shinshū and the so-called ethics and morality of society by letting my brush run freely. This being a work written after I have become ill, I would like to express my apologies for it being at a stage where a certain carelessness has been unavoidable.

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