

Mind and Metaphysics in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism

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Heidegger's Ursprüngliches Denken

ONE OF THE salient difficulties Heidegger associates with the metaphysical tradition is a rigid dependency on the subject-object scheme of knowing. Philosophy, from Plato, envisions man as the knower over against the known and engages in "subjectivism" (*Subjektivität*) and "representational thinking" (*vorstellendes Denken*), tendencies which Heidegger traces throughout the metaphysical tradition. This opposition to subjectivism—a collective and intensified "subjectivity" (*Subjektivität*)—is a rejection of the idealist tradition, of the reduction of Being to a configuration of consciousness. In Descartes' philosophy, for example, truth is grounded in a subject (in the human *cogito*) which functions autonomously. Even in Kant, despite an opposition to the acquisition of metaphysical knowledge, the dichotomy of the thinking subject over against the known is preserved.¹ Heidegger recognized this difficulty as early as *Sein und Zeit*, which is precisely the motive for his innovative notion, "Being-in-the-world" (*In-der-Welt-sein*). In contrast to Kant, who postulates the impossibility of knowing things-in-themselves, Heidegger insists that no subject-object demarcation exists between knower and known, that the knower is already "in" the world before reflective thinking takes place, and that the knower already has an awareness of the known. This knowing cannot be equated with conceptualization or with pre-conceptualization, however. The

¹ For Heidegger, Kant's thinking was necessarily enmeshed in the subject-object duality of the knower over against the known because his thinking *initiated* from the subject, from the *a priori* constructs of reflective thought, without investigating the ground of subjectivity which allows subjectivity (and reflective thought) to be possible, without investigating by way of a "preliminary ontological analytic" (*vorgängigen ontologischen Analytik*) the subject in its subjectivity.

knowing which is characteristic of metaphysics (and which is basically reflective) presupposes a more fundamental knowing, a knowing which does not view the world merely as an object but as an integral relation to oneself.

Thought, for Heidegger, is not a matter of the correctness or incorrectness of logical propositions—the kind of thinking in which metaphysics traditionally indulged—but a matter of what is prior to logical thinking. Reason is but a mode of thinking, not its essence—“reason and its conceptions are only *one* kind of thinking and are in no way determined by themselves”² and when reason “pushes everything into the presumable swamp of the irrational,”³ Heidegger claims that reason conceals the illumination on which its own illuminative mode is based. Correctness is insufficient for “original thinking” (*ursprüngliches Denken*) and is possible only *by virtue* of original thinking. Metaphysics, accordingly, is sundered from the truth of Being and must deal in what Heidegger calls the “derivative form of the truth of knowledge” (*abkünftige Gestalt der Wahrheit der Erkenntnis*) and the “truth of propositions” (*Wahrheit der Aussage*). Because metaphysics’ vision is necessarily confined to derivative forms of truth and to propositions of truth, it is incapable of penetrating truth in its primordially and of investigating the illumination process which is “prior to all truth in the sense of *veritas*.”⁴ Although the subject-object split which characterizes the *veritas* of reflective thinking is displayed in the perceptions of metaphysics, Heidegger recognizes a more original truth prior to these reflective modes.

Original thinking, however, is not thinking of Being in the sense that Being is a subject added to knowledge, as one of the possibilities of knowledge, but is rather Being’s own manifestation: “Being is not a product of thinking. It is more the case that original thinking is an occurrence of

² “*Zur Seinsfrage*,” reprinted in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), p. 216.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Was ist Metaphysik?* (5th ed., containing “*Einleitung*” and “*Nachwort*”; Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1959), p. 10. This primordially is evident even in his early discussions of *logos* in *Sein und Zeit*, in which he argues that our understanding of “truth” depends on “our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of ‘agreement’ [*Übereinstimmung*]” (*Sein und Zeit* [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1963; 10th ed.], p. 33) and on our ability to discern “untruth” in terms of “hiddenness” (*Verborgenheit*).

Being."⁵ And just as metaphysics is dependent on Being, it is dependent on the "light" which allows its vision to be possible, a light which has ironically been concealed from it: "The light itself, which is to say, that which metaphysical thinking experiences as light, does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking."⁶ In order to arrive at Being's origin, prior to accumulated metaphysical conceptions, a light is imperative. Rather than being concerned with the "what" of human existence, Heidegger is concerned with the foundations—the illuminative foundations—which permit knowledge of a "what" to be possible: the metaphysical thinker must consider "*from where* he has taken *the light* to enable him to see more clearly."⁷

Though it could be argued that Plato was also concerned with illumination, Heidegger's thought is more primordial in that he is concerned with illumination *as* illumination, with the illumination process itself, with illumination prior to that which is illuminated. Though Plato's Idea is the "source" (*Ursprung*) of "visibility" (*Sichtbarkeit*), it is itself visible and perceivable in the way that beings are perceivable. Plato's truth, therefore, in its visibility and perceivability, has the quality of beings, and is oblivious of what Heidegger deems to be a more genuine "ontological difference."⁸ Although metaphysics has variously distinguished between beings and Being, the initial distinction arising with Plato's equation of the Being of beings in terms of the absolute Idea, it has not treated the illuminative power (Being) which allows beings to be revealed as beings. Plato's notion of truth as visibility is "representational" in that truth is re-presented (visualized) as an object over against a subject. And though metaphysics, from the time of Plato, envisions truth as something that can be seen, as something visible, it is precisely this sense of truth as visibly representa-

⁵ *Was ist Metaphysik?*, p. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷ "Zur Seinsfrage," reprinted in *Wegmarken*, p. 244 (italics mine).

⁸ In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* Heidegger employs the term "ontological Difference" (*ontologische Differenz*) to illustrate the dilemma of metaphysics and to clarify his primordial enterprise. Since metaphysics has not treated the process which allows beings to be illuminated and which sanctions its own metaphysical insights, since it has not come to terms with Being-as-illumination, the distinctions it makes between beings and Being is not genuine. Metaphysics, moreover, is a "forgottenness" [*Vergessenheit*] of the difference between Being and beings" (*Holzwege* [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963; 4th ed.], p. 336; my italics). This is a serious charge, one that underlies Heidegger's radicalization of thought.

tional, coupled with the dichotomy of knower and known, that Heidegger attempts to overcome.

Zen's Original Mind

Zen is also concerned with original thinking and with primordial illumination. Hui-hai, accordingly, speaks of an "original mind" which "shines forth brightly"⁹ and which "can be attained only through sudden illumination."¹⁰ Zen's original thinking, which is likened to a "bright mirror,"¹¹ moreover, is akin to Heidegger's primordial illumination which surpasses representational thought, which surpasses the Platonic and generally metaphysical tendency of equating truth with visibility, of identifying truth with that which can be seen and re-presented. "So long as the seeing is something to see," Suzuki cautions, "it is not the real one."¹² It is because Zen Illumination cannot be equated with visibility as ordinarily understood that Zen speaks of a "third eye"¹³—what Hui-hai appropriately terms "the Buddha-eye."¹⁴ It must also be said that Zen would applaud Heidegger's attempt to overcome subject-object duality, the duality of the knower over against the known. In his discussion of "original Mind," Suzuki maintains that "there is no separation between knower and known" and adds that Zen is "the unfolding of a new world hitherto unperceived in the confusion of a dualistically-trained mind."¹⁵ As Ha Tai Kim expresses it, Zen masters are concerned with "the attainment of a state in which all distinctions are superceded."¹⁶ And finally, it must be said that Zen would embrace Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysics' exclusive concern with the intellect, the intellect which in fact sanctions subject-object duality. Suzuki defines *satori*, thus, as "an intuitive looking into the nature of things in contradistinction to the analytical or logical

⁹ *The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai* (New York: 1972), p. 59.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹² *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind* (London: 1949), p. 28.

¹³ *Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series* (London: 1927), p. 13.

¹⁴ *The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai*, p. 51.

¹⁵ *Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series*, pp. 125, 230.

¹⁶ "The Logic of the Illogical: Zen and Hegel," *Philosophy East and West*, v (January 1955), 21.

understanding of it,"¹⁷ and more sweepingly asserts that "the spirit of Zen abhors all forms of intellectualism."¹⁸

Despite these similarities, there are more fundamental dissimilarities that need to be elucidated. Although Heidegger indeed radicalizes reflective thought in his concern with a "primordial" or "original" (*ursprüngliche*) thought, it is doubtful that he would be willing to embrace what Zen refers to as "no-thought" (*wu-nien*) or "no-mind" (*wu-hsin*). One could argue, of course, that Heidegger doesn't have to refer to his primordial endeavor as "no-mind," that this dimension is already implicit in his radical dissociation with reflective thought. Still, what Zen means by no-mind is even more radical than Heidegger's sense of original thought being primordial to reflective thought. Zen's thinking is so original, so radically original, that it empties itself or un-thinks itself to the extent that it does not even have itself, does not even have itself as original thought, as original thought being opposed to any other kind of thought. Zen's no-mind is so radically paradoxical that, despite what is preliminarily an effort to surpass ordinary dualistic thought, the ultimate realization is such that original thought does not exist in contradistinction to ordinary thought. By transcending the dualistic matrix of reflective thought, Zen does not deny that matrix but maintains that Mind is absolutely and paradoxically dualistic and non-dualistic at the same time. This is the thrust of Richard DeMartino's term, "non-dualistic duality."¹⁹ Any kind of discrimination is rejected in Zen. If one clings to dualism at the expense of non-dualism, one is "dualistically" entrapped; if one clings to non-dualism at the expense of dualism, one is dualistically entrapped. It is in this light that Tai-hai, a twelfth century master, held a stick before an assembly of monks and gave them the following koan: "If you call this a stick, you affirm; if you call it not a stick, you negate. Beyond affirmation and negation what would you call it?"²⁰ One could take Tai-hai's question regarding a stick and apply it to Heidegger's original thinking: beyond the affirmation or negation of ordinary thought itself, what would you call it?

¹⁷ *Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series*, p. 230.

¹⁸ *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind*, p. 14.

¹⁹ "The Human Situation and Zen Buddhism," in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis* (New York: 1960), p. 169.

²⁰ Quoted in D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series* (London: 1933), p. 100.

Heidegger's concern with illumination is more akin to the teaching of Shen-hsiu, the famous Buddhist leader of the Northern School of China, who was the rival of Hui-neng of the Southern School. Shen-hsiu's *gāthā*, which he presented to the Fifth Patriarch of Zen, with the hope that this *gāthā* would earn him the title of Sixth Patriarch, reads:

This body is the Bodhi-tree.
The Mind is like a mirror bright;
Take heed to keep it always clean
And let not dust collect upon it.²¹

Heidegger's original thinking is similar to Shen-hsiu's in that he seems to want to keep original thinking cleansed of the dust-like film of metaphysical thinking and reflective thinking generally. With reference to Shen-hsiu's *gāthā*, Suzuki notes that Shen-hsiu's position does not adequately reflect the Zen position of original thinking not existing bifurcationally with ordinary thinking, and queries, "Is not this dust-wiping, which is the same thing as 'keeping one's guard,' an unwarranted process on the part of the Zen Yogin?"²² Heidegger, interestingly, especially in his later writings, maintains that one should keep a "guard" on Being, referring to man as the "guardian" (*Wächterschaft*) of the truth of Being, and very famously proclaiming man as the "shepherd of Being."²³

In contrast to Shen-hsiu's *gāthā*, Hui-neng's *gāthā*, which was accepted by the Fifth Patriarch and merited Hui-neng the distinction of Sixth Patriarch, reads:

There is no Bodhi-tree,
Nor stand of mirror bright.
Since all is void,
Where can the dust alight?²⁴

Rephrasing the third line of this *gāthā*—"from the first not a thing is"²⁵—Suzuki recognizes it as "a bomb thrown into the camp of Shen-hsiu and his predecessors."²⁶ Despite Heidegger's radicality with regard to tradi-

²¹ Quoted in *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind*, p. 17.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²³ *Holzwege*, p. 23.

²⁴ Quoted in *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind*, p. 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

tional metaphysics, this notion of Hui-neng's would similarly have to be thought of as a bomb with regard to the entire Heideggerian enterprise. Heidegger, like Shen-hsiu, is concerned with dust-cleaning, not with no-mind, not with mind so empty that dust-cleaning must be considered obsolete. In Zen, not only does the distinction between knower and known become obsolete, the distinction between the various *kinds* of knowing themselves (ordinary and original) must also be rendered obsolete.

Although Heidegger believes that thinking must undergo a radical unlearning, an upheaval of the inwrought ideas of "everydayness" (*Alltäglichkeit*)—"we can learn thinking only if we unlearn what has hitherto been the essence of thinking"²⁷—Zen Mind is so paradoxically unlearned and so paradoxically empty that it does not even have itself, and just as it cannot be thought of in contradistinction to ordinary thinking, it cannot be thought of in contradistinction to everydayness. In order to fully appreciate this, one must understand that Zen's transformation is threefold. The first phase is an ordinary mode of apprehending reality, a dualistic, representational perception comparable with Heidegger's everydayness, an everydayness in which "mountains are mountains" and "waters are waters."²⁸ The second phase is a phase in which "mountains are no longer mountains, nor waters waters,"²⁹ in which all forms (mountains and waters) are emptied of their form-structure or radically de-formalized. In the third phase, however, "mountains are again mountains, and waters waters."³⁰ In this final phase, in this Great Awakening, reality is no longer merely form (as in the first phase) nor formless (as in the second phase) but has been transformed into formless-form. In the *Heart Sūtra* it is written: "Form (*rūpa*) does not differ from the void, nor the void from form. Form is identical with void [and] void is identical with form."³¹ Because of this transformation of the Great Awakening, by virtue of its formlessness which is paradoxically all forms, Zen cannot be thought of as different from the everyday.

From the Zen point of view, there is no ultimacy "apart" from the everyday, and to think that the essence of Zen is "contained" in such no-

²⁷ *Was Heisst Denken?* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954), p. 5.

²⁸ *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, First Series, p. 24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Quoted in Charles Luk, *Ch'an and Zen Teaching*, First Series (Berkeley: 1970), p. 213.

tions as Being and Nothingness is fallacious. In fact, if one pursues Zen strictly along the lines of abstractions such as Being or Nothingness *at the expense* of the everyday, one will surely miss Zen, for Zen is none other than everyday existence, none other than walking, chopping wood, cooking, or having a cup of tea. Zen must never be viewed as purely conceptual or contemplative in the sense of being deracinated from activity or life. On the contrary, Zen is most active and vital. Discussing Josetsu's famous fifteenth century painting, *Hyōnen*, in which a man is depicted attempting to catch a slippery fish with a gourd, Furuta Shōkin reminds us of the necessary alertness and liveliness of the fisherman. There is no time for errors in judgement or for ponderous reflection. The fisherman must act suddenly, directly, without hesitation, with what Furuta calls "lively means."³² Nothing can be more "down to earth" or more concrete than this painting by Josetsu, for the very means of subsistence are at stake. Furuta explains, "One mistake and the path to understanding slips away like the catfish from the gourd."³³ That Zen is not abstract contemplativeness divorced from the concrete is most dramatically disclosed in the famous story about the Zen monk who, upon strolling across a bridge and upon being asked about the depths of the Zen river, seized one of the inquirers and would have hurled him into the river had not the inquirer's friends interceded in his behalf.³⁴ The only way to fathom the depths of the Zen river is not to hypothesize its depths but to actually plunge into its depths. The Zen monk, accordingly, would have cast the inquirer bodily into the river to illustrate this imperative, to convey that the river is not an abstract mental configuration but is none other than the actual river beneath them. Although the task of Zen is to realize the river with a different mode of Being, to realize it as Formless Form which is ultimately no different than oneself, it must be said that the river *as river* is Zen, and to think that it points to something else, to an abstract configuration, is surely to miss the reality of the river and surely to miss the reality of Zen. Finally, that Zen is not a transcendentalism divorced from the concrete of everyday life is evident in the living conditions in a Zen monastery. Describing life in a Zen monastery, Suzuki notes that work is "considered a vital

³² "Question and Answer in Zen," trans. by N. A. Waddell in *Philosophical Studies of Japan*, x (1970), p. 115.

³³ *Ibid.*, 116.

³⁴ Cf. D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in Zen* (London, New York: 1955), p. 56.

element in the life of a monk. It is altogether a practical one, and chiefly consists in manual labour, such as sweeping, cleaning, cooking, fuel-gathering, tilling the farm, or going about begging in the villages far and near."³⁵ This practical activity is more than the obvious necessity of maintaining the monastery, it is a salient reminder to the inhabitants that their meditation is not directed at a reality divorced from their mundane concerns but has everything to do with such concerns. The master not only *informs* his students that having a cup of tea and just sweeping is Zen, he demands that they *participate* in having tea and sweeping in order to demonstrate that these activities are none other than Zen. In fact, it is precisely when a student believes that having tea and sweeping impede his Zen progress that the master may insist that he spend *more* time having tea and sweeping.

In his *Earth and Gods*, Vincent Vycinas, reflecting on the integralness of earth and gods in Heidegger's thought and arguing that Heidegger has not forsaken concrete reality in his ontological quest, contends that Heidegger "turns more radically to the things of everyday life with a highly respectful attitude towards them and with a genuine and profound disclosure of their essences."³⁶ This radical turning, however, must be deemed less radical than Zen's in that in Zen's radicalization of the concrete, concrete reality is nothing "other" than original Mind. In Zen it is not even the case that one has to "turn" to concrete reality. From Zen's most paradoxical standpoint one has never "left" the concrete. There can be nothing to turn to because ultimately there is nothing remote from original Mind toward which one can be said to turn. And the "highly respectful attitude towards" the things of everyday life that Vycinas sees in Heidegger's thinking is also more fully radicalized in Zen because of Zen's dissolution of this "towards." In Zen one does not have a respectful attitude "towards" things. One is respectful in the sense that one's respect is not "towards" anything but is the all-inclusive respectfulness of things themselves as they respect themselves, the all-inclusive respectfulness of one's original Mind as it expresses itself as all things.

Continuing his discussion, Vycinas notes that "through the ontological symbol of the country road, Heidegger visualizes this belonging together

³⁵ *Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series*, p. 315.

³⁶ *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 20.

of Being and man."³⁷ Vycinas notes that Heidegger's symbol of a way or road is not a public street road but a "country road or forest-trail," explaining that "on a public highway Being can never be experienced" and that "the only place where Being is accessible are country roads or forest-trails."³⁸ For Zen, however, ultimate realization cannot be confined to the country, cannot be confined anywhere. Zen, rather, as E. Ecker Steger puts it, "must be the pearl found in the market place."³⁹

Heidegger's Überwindung der Metaphysik

Because metaphysics has restricted its horizon to conceptual formulations but has been oblivious of the illuminative process prior to these formulations, Heidegger excludes metaphysics as an adequate means for his task. Heidegger, however, does not deem metaphysics as superfluous. On the contrary, he is cognizant of the significance of metaphysics but believes that, before an adequate metaphysics can be possible, the very illumination of which it partakes and on which it depends must be investigated, a condition valid not only for metaphysics but for all those disciplines which restrict their insights to metaphysical horizons—biology, psychology, philosophical anthropology, theology, logic, and onto-theology in general. Heidegger's destruction of metaphysical constructions is not an obliteration of metaphysics or a "denial" (*Verleugnung*) of metaphysics but a rethinking which may provide an adequate ground for metaphysics.

That the overcoming of metaphysics is not a metaphysical requiem, an utter renunciation of metaphysics, is evident in Heidegger's contention that "overcoming is worthy of thought only to the extent that one thinks about incorporation [*Verwindung*],"⁴⁰ which intimates not only the re-establishment of a ground but the "delivering-over" (*Überlieferung*) to a ground on which metaphysics may rest. Incorporation is essential to Heidegger's overcoming because he firmly believes that "metaphysics cannot be abolished like an opinion";⁴¹ moreover, metaphysics' abolish-

³⁷ *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 164.

³⁸ *Earth and Gods*, p. 20.

³⁹ "The No-Philosophy of Zen," *The Personalist*, LV (Summer 1974), 285.

⁴⁰ "Überwindung der Metaphysik," *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 3 vols. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961; 3rd ed.), I, 71.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

ment is impossible because of its occurrence by *virtue* of the Being-process, its occurrence being a manifestation of the Being-process. Alluding to Descartes' analogy of the philosophical tree, Heidegger contends that foundational thinking "does not tear up the root of philosophy. It tills the ground and plows the soil for this root."⁴² Heidegger is not promoting a dispensement of metaphysics, because it is and probably will always be the "root of philosophy" (*Wurzel der Philosophie*). Still, though the root of philosophy, metaphysics by no means is the root of thinking: "The basis of thinking," he insists, "it does not reach."⁴³ Laying the foundation for metaphysics, therefore, is not arbitrary and certainly not an "empty systematic fabrication" (*leeres Herstellen eines Systems*). It is a process that is ever conscious of the intrinsic limits and possibilities of metaphysics, a process which is determinative of the very essence of metaphysics, a process which can be ascertained, in fact, only by means of a "laying bare" (*Freilegung*) of metaphysics' "hidden ground" (*verborgener Grund*).

Zen's Dissolution of Metaphysics

The nature of Western metaphysics is such that it invariably attempts to prove something, to wrest some truth out of the universe, out of mind or out of Being, and to systematize it comprehensively. Despite his opposition to traditional metaphysics, despite his rejection of traditional notions of truth, Heidegger too has this speculative bent. Although Heidegger is not concerned with the traditional enigma of correctness and incorrectness, he is most speculative with regard to that which allows correctness and incorrectness to be possible—Being. Although this concern is undeniably a radicalization of metaphysics, from the Zen point of view this radical undertaking must itself be radicalized. According to Harold E. McCarthy, "Zen is the elimination of metaphysics in the sense that Zen is not metaphysical at all."⁴⁴ Rather than solving metaphysical questions, Zen prefers to dissolve them. Although William Richardson aptly concludes that "the 'critical' (*erkenntnistheoretische*) problem, so gravely posed by the Neo-

⁴² *Was ist Metaphysik?*, p. 9.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ "Zen and Some Comments on a Mondo," *Philosophy East and West*, xvii (October 1967), 91 (McCarthy italicizes "is").

Kantians, dissolves,"⁴⁵ it cannot be said that Heidegger's Being, as a problem, dissolves. Although Heidegger surpasses the traditional problem of how the knower knows the known, he is nonetheless interested in illumination *per se*, and proceeds to delineate illumination ontologically in terms of Being's revealment and concealment. Being as a theoretical problem is not dissolved in his thinking, it is generated and regenerated primordially, presumably by the Being-process itself.

Zen would respond to Heidegger's Being-question by submitting that the question itself must be questioned—questioned to the point wherein questioning itself is dissolved. Questioning, for Heidegger, is the fertile ground of his thought, and questions are the seeds for thought. Without questions, thought would be impossible. Thought is only worthy of thought to the extent that it is "worthy of questioning," a questioning which is "the fidelity [*Frömmigkeit*] of thought."⁴⁶ As William Richardson explains, "The question of man, sc. about the process of There-being, inseparable from the Being-question itself can never be answered. It is and remains essentially a question."⁴⁷ Richardson also notes that Heidegger's Being-question is posed "indefatigably," an indefatigability which he calls a "passion for knowing."⁴⁸ Pursuing Heidegger's thought along this line, Herbert Spiegelberg surmises, "At times one might feel that he himself does not want an answer, but prefers to leave the question open with all its tantalizing mystery, and that a 'genuine shipwreck' (*echtes Scheitern*) on the rocks of the question would satisfy him very well."⁴⁹ There is a difference, however, between leaving the question open, as Heidegger does, and this sense of shipwreck. Heidegger does not question to the point of shipwreck, to the point of the dissolution of questioning itself, and in this he differs fundamentally from Zen. Charles Fu clarifies this important distinction between Heidegger and Zen in his contention that "it never occurs (*Es nie ereignet*) to Heidegger that, in order to leave behind the question of Being transmetaphysically, he must make another—and final—radical attempt at transforming what he calls 'thinking' (*Denken*)

⁴⁵ *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 102.

⁴⁶ *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, I, 44.

⁴⁷ *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 291.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), I, 317.

into what Zen Buddhists call 'awakening' (*wu* or *satori*), wherein lies man's ultimate emancipation from all the onto-theo-logical fixations of language, thought, and reality."⁵⁰ Zen would be willing to embrace Heidegger's remark that we have not learned how to question, but would radicalize this notion by submitting that one must question questioning itself—not to provide a philosophy or ontology of questioning, but to break through the metaphysics of questioning in such a way that questioning and the metaphysics of questioning are dissolved.

In response to the notion of oneness being a solution to the problem of duality, a Zen master asks, "After all things are reduced to oneness, where would that One be reduced?"⁵¹ One could substitute Heidegger's Being in place of oneness in this context. Accordingly, in a dialogue with Heidegger, Zen would probably ask, now that you have reduced everything to this Being-question, where would *this* be reduced? Heidegger, evidently, never pushed his questioning to the limit, to its own limit as questioning. He never arrived at what Zen calls the "great doubt,"⁵² a doubt in which all questions, answers, and thoughts are radically doubted, so radically doubted that they are emptied of themselves. It is precisely this sense of radical doubt that must accompany every *koan*. According to Suzuki, the koan is "neither a riddle nor a witty remark. It has a most definite objective, the arousing of doubt and pushing it to its furthest limits."⁵³ With regard to the last word that might be said about Being in Heidegger's thought, William Richardson maintains that "it becomes increasingly clear that for him a last word probably cannot be said, insofar as the sense of Being lies in the fact that it is eminently questionable."⁵⁴ Although Zen would not say that it has the last word—Zen is well aware of the endless creative

⁵⁰ "Heidegger and Zen on Being and Nothingness: A Critical Essay in Trans-metaphysical Dialectics" (a paper presented in the Conference on "Being and Nothingness in Chinese and Western Thought" at Fairfield University, May 30–June 4, 1978), p. 19.

⁵¹ *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 41. That Oneness would be unacceptable to Zen is a salient point of Richard DeMartino's. Zen cannot be thought of in the sense of "any alleged absolute monism," he insists, in which "one component is reduced to or absorbed by the other component." This is precisely the thrust of his most paradoxical term, "nondualistic dualism" ("The Zen Understanding of Man," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Temple University, 1969, p. 121).

⁵² "The Human Situation in Zen Buddhism," p. 164.

⁵³ *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism*, p. 108.

⁵⁴ *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 15.

possibilities that can be engendered in speculative thinking—⁵⁵ it reaches a point in its radical doubt wherein questioning becomes obsolete, wherein one's questioning reaches "a limit of stability and the whole edifice" comes "tumbling to the ground."⁵⁶

According to Heidegger, every great thinker "thinks only one single thought,"⁵⁷ a statement which is certainly indicative of his own thinking and which does seem to coincide with the orientations of great Western thinkers, despite their labyrinthine categories, whether it be Buber's "interhuman," Nietzsche's "will to power," Kierkegaard's "individual," or Freud's "desire." Indeed, "in spite of the great variety of Heidegger's philosophical themes," Vincent Vycinas appropriately notes that "he basically holds to one and the same thought, the thought of Being."⁵⁸ In contrast to Heidegger, however, Zen would say that its great thinkers have thought no-thought, that no-thought exists in contradistinction to other thoughts, and that by thinking no-thought one paradoxically thinks all thoughts. Interestingly, Suzuki claims that Shen-hsiu's dust-wiping is a "means of concentration" which dwells "on one thought."⁵⁹ Again, Heidegger's thinking is akin to Shen-hsiu's, not Zen's. Rather than Heidegger's original mind which constantly dwells on the question of Being, Zen proposes a more radical mind, what Hui-hai refers to as a "non-dwelling mind."⁶⁰ And whereas Heidegger's thinking may be regarded as a mode of concentration in the sense that it concentrates on one thought, Zen's concentration, by virtue of its concern with no-thought, must be regarded as an un-concentration, for there is nothing which is con-centric to it. Moreover, the demands and stresses of ordinary concentration are nullified. Zen's concentrationless concentration is effortless. It is effortless because there is nothing to overcome (*überwinden*), nothing any longer which needs to be broken through, no gaps or dichotomies, nothing apart from concentration unconcentrating transcendentally, nothing but transcendent concentration.

⁵⁵ As Hui-neng puts it, "he who understands the idea of no-thought-ness has a perfect thoroughfare in the world of multiplicities" (quoted in *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind*, p. 126).

⁵⁶ *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism*, p. 95.

⁵⁷ *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 20.

⁵⁸ *Earth and Gods*, p. 58.

⁵⁹ *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind*, p. 18.

⁶⁰ *The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai*, p. 56.