

Emptiness and Time

Part II

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V

I USED the terms "ontological order" and "logos" above to characterize the "law" or "dharma" which manifests itself, for example, in the phenomenon of a cock crowing at daybreak.¹ Ordinarily this logos is conceived of as the essential rational law inherent in the being of "things" itself and is regarded in philosophy as the object of cognition of "reason" or the speculative intellect. In modern times it has also come to acquire a character of scientific law as the object of cognition through the faculty of discursive "understanding" in science.

I have reiterated that, on the field of this logos, the intrinsic "selfness" of a thing, whatever it may be, can never be grasped. This would seem to contradict what I have stated above about true existence (i.e., ec-sistence) as "dropped off body-and-mind," that this ec-sistence means the holding in grasp of all things or phenomena in their home-ground, that is, in their being-in-themselves and in their *dharmic* character of being—what we can also describe by saying that it is in grasp of all things in their logos.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the logos of beingness comes to have a qualitatively different significance according to whether it is seen from the standpoint of reason or from the standpoint of ec-sistence.

Logos has also the meaning of "word" or "speech." On the standpoint of ec-sistence, it takes on the meaning of *koto* (a Japanese word signifying

¹ *Eastern Buddhist* ix, 1, pp. 65, 68 ff.

both "affair" and "word").² Here, the rational law of being is, as such, word or speech. Just as the promulgated law is a kind of voiceless speech that shows men the orbit their social lives should follow, so the rational law of being is, under the grasp of the King Samadhi, the voiceless speech of one who "makes himself Master wherever he is." It is his preaching of the law (dharma), his *seppō*.

Of course, although we speak of "*seppō*" (the preaching of dharmas with words), that is not to suggest that words exist apart from dharma, because here the dharma itself is, as such, the word uttered in preaching: the dharma is always preaching itself in and through phenomena, of which it is the dharma. So, in this case, preaching may be called a preaching without words, or a preaching of non-preaching. Further, as there is no dharma existing apart from phenomena or "things" of which it is the dharma, we can say that in the preaching of dharma it is things that preach. Through their being such as they are, things themselves are manifesting their own dharma. And while they are preaching about their own dharmas, we can say that things preach about themselves. Of course, we can also say that the dharma preaches about things whose own intrinsic "nature" it shapes. These four aspects—that the dharma is preaching itself in phenomena; that the dharma is preaching about phenomena; that phenomena are preaching about the dharma; and that they are preaching about themselves—come to one and the same affair (*koto*). And the whole makes up the meaning of the *seppō* (the dharma preaching).

But then, there is a "lord" who without preaching himself makes things preach the dharma. He makes them manifest their own dharma, letting, at the same time, things manifest themselves, and also makes the dharma preach itself as well as about things. After all, the dharma is no other than this lord's preaching of non-preaching.

Now, in the mode of being of "things" themselves in Emptiness, "being as they are" and "being as they ought to be" are, as I have said, entirely one. And on the field of this "oneness," logos as *koto* (signifying affair and word) appears, and the dharmic nature of the being of "things" there becomes discernible. "Being" on that field is, as such, "being as it ought to

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

be," which means that in this being, the character of compliance with an order is manifesting itself. It signifies a presence of some word of directive command (*Gebiss* in Heidegger's terms). In the dharma-like nature of "things" which are as they ought to be, is a character of hearing and obeying. This dharma-like nature denotes the law-command of the "lord" with his "body and mind dropped off." It is even his "categorical imperative."

Here, *logos* or *koto* as rational law—"ratio" and "law" in their ontological sense—indicates the fundamental mode of being of things on the very field where they *are* presenting themselves in their being at their roots, so to speak, and at the same time implies that this is the mode of being they originally ought to exist in. That things *are* fundamentally means, first, that they are expressing themselves, and second, that in expressing themselves they at the same time give expression to that which makes them be. They also indicate, give evidence of, and bear witness to it. This is the same as saying that things are in a dharmic mode. In reference to the first side of this, we have stated that things are preaching the dharma, and to the other side, that things hear and obey the dharmic order. Both are one in the dharmic nature of being.

It might sound strange to say that things are preaching the dharma, or that they are speaking of the *logos*. But it is always from things that we know the rational law. It is from things that we hear. All our knowledge springs from and returns to the place where, in Bashō's words, we should

Learn from the pine tree
 The *koto* of the pine tree,
 Learn from the bamboo
 The *koto* of the bamboo.

The pine is telling the *koto* of the pine tree, the bamboo the *koto* of the bamboo. Our "knowing about rational law or *logos* always begins from and ends in the place where things are speaking of themselves, of their own *koto*; in other words, where things are on their own home-ground and in their suchness, revealing themselves as they really are. For, that things "are" as they really are and that they are speaking of their own "*koto*" is one and the same thing.

Now I said that, in their dharmic nature, "things" give expression

and bear evidence or witness to³ that by virtue of which they are. What they give evidence and bear witness to is none other than the ec-sistence of "body-mind dropped off" and "dropped-off body-mind" that opens itself up as the field of "emptiness" which makes things be in their "origin" (that is, as they are and ought to be). It is none other than the "self in *satori*" indicated in Dōgen's saying: "That the self carries itself to all things (dharma) to practice and confirm them is illusion; that all things (dharma) come forward to practice and confirm the self is *satori* (enlightenment)." This self in *satori* is precisely that which makes itself "master" or "lord" wherever it may be.

Therefore, when I said above that the *dharma* of "things" (in their dharmic mode of being) has at once the character of preaching the dharma and of obeying the dharma, that which this dharma gives "evidence" and bears "witness" to, or, in other words, that which makes the dharma at once preach itself and obey itself, and hence, finally, that which preaches and commands within this dharma, is none other than the "self" in the sense I have just mentioned. It is the self as the selfless, or ego-less.

Just as a scene in which cars and pedestrians stop and go in accordance with the change of a traffic signal demonstrates traffic law and hence also the legislating "man" (juridical person), so in phenomena such as a leap year coming one year in four, or hearing a cock crow at day-break—the fact that all things are "lawfully natural"—there is to be seen the manifestation of "man" as legislator. It is "man," impersonal as "the selfless," yet personal as the "self."

In a word, there appears a storehouse holding all rational laws gathered up by virtue of the ec-sistence of "dropped-off body-and-mind." Here, all things, through being gathered and maintained in the hands of that ec-sistence, are made "things in the world"; just as Dōgen says, "Through my now exerting myself, every thing and every dharma comes to present itself" (*Shōbōgenzō Uji*).

Thus, in the standpoint of ec-sistence, logos as the rational law of being is not different from the law-like character in the primal mode of

³ The Japanese word "*akashi*" means at once to clarify or make clear, to reveal or make known, and to testify, or make proof of.

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being of all things, not different from everything's being itself, such as it is, and not different from things being manifest as themselves. Here, logos is, as such, the being-as-it-is-ness (*ascitas*) of every thing. It is, in other words, "like-ness" in its ontological sense as as-it-is-ness, suchness, or thusness (always with a connotation of "true-ness" of a thing truly presenting itself⁴). And again, logos is the "true thusness" which ultimately can be attributed to the "Thus Coming" (*Tathāgata*).

As is well-known, Heidegger interpreted "Truth" as *Alētheia* in its original meaning of unhiddenness (*Unverborgenheit*), in the sense of being manifest as it really is. The logos of things in "emptiness" can be said to be "truth" in this sense. And where all "things" are primally and originally manifesting themselves as they really are, the ec-sistence of "dropped-off body-mind" is directly revealing itself alone, as "the solitary One revealing itself in all phenomena." That is to say, the absolute "Truth" is there. This is the very place the absolute truth is to be found.

Logos is most originally logos on the home-ground of that ec-sistence. And the logos that belongs to the field of speculative reason or to that of discursive understanding is something developed from this origin to the levels of reason or understanding. Insofar as it is seen only from those levels, logos is no longer a real disclosure of things. In order to be a true disclosure, logos thus developed must always be brought back to its origin, to "empty" ec-sistence, to the ec-sistence which opens itself up as the field of "emptiness."

In this way, such an utterance as "We meet a leap year one in four, Cocks crow at four in the morning" refers to an ec-sistence which primarily comprehends, in their real suchness and in their lawfulness, all things that are in the world of incessant becoming and transition; to an ec-sistence which gathers to its own home-ground or to its own "selfless self" all things which themselves are each on their own home ground. Such an ec-sistence is none other than the ec-sistence of what Dōgen called the "dropped-off body-mind."

This ec-sistence also signifies to exist truly in Time, or rather, as Time. It is bottomlessly in Time or as Time which bottomlessly brings itself to

⁴ "The Standpoint of Sunyata," *Eastern Buddhist* vi, 1, p. 89, and vi, 2, p. 75.

its own fullness. In it, the arising ("birth") is non-arising ("non-birth"). It is as birth-*size*-nonbirth. It is as Time, of which it was said before: "time is not time, therefore it is time." In the ec-sistence we are now speaking of, "beingness" is one with the "truth" (unhiddenness) of such Time coming into its own. With this ec-sistence one is and lives in the world, wherein

Every morning the sun ascends in the east,
Every night the moon descends in the west.
Clouds retreat, the mountain bones are bared,
Rain passes, the surrounding hills are low.⁵

One is and lives in the world which is Time, in the World-time, while one's selfless-self, in its lordly ec-sistence, is bringing this Time into its own, that is to say, bringing one's own Self-being to its fullness. Because here in true existence (or ec-sistence), true beingness is the same with the "truth" of Time, and "to be" means to "be as Time." While living in the transience of time one's life is at every single step "birth-*size*-non-birth." It is life in which one whiles away one's time, accepting whatever may come.⁶

This existence, while always being in time, is always in the beginning of time. Though a life given birth through parents, it exists nevertheless before the parents were born. Of course, the "before" in this case is not prior in the sense of temporal emergence. Rather, it is "before" the emergence of time. It is the "beginning" of the emergence of Time itself.

Augustine, once asked what God had been doing during the boundless stretch of time before the world was created, answered that Time itself was created by Him together with the world. In a similar sense, the "before" in which the parents were not yet born is the "before" of Time itself, the beginning of the emergence of Time. And this "beginning" reveals itself right there where and when the falling away of body and mind takes place. It is before even all the temporal "befores" (all the beginnings immanent in Time). The beginning of Time itself is before all possible pasts. And, at the same time, it is after all possible futures.

Past events, no matter how far back, and future events, no matter how

⁵ *Eastern Buddhist* IX, 1, p. 64.

⁶ *Ibid.*

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remote, are all gathered up at this "beginning" of Time. They all come into being only as what is gathered at that place. All the possible events of past and future can be said to be originally held together in the Time which comes into its own as Time from this "beginning."

In connection with the idea of "transmigration," I once characterized the real nature of birth-death (samsara) as infinite finitude.⁷ Seen from the standpoint of so-called samsara-*śiva*-nirvana, this infinite finitude is not aloof from the home-ground of existence in the form of the falling away of body and mind. For this ec-sistence keeps itself aloof from samsara right in the midst of samsaric existence. It holds itself aloof from birth-death, because at any time it stands steadfast on the "beginning" whence that time comes into its own: on the beginning of Time itself.

In reference to the opening phrase of the *Heart Sutra*: "At the time when Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva engaged in the practice of the deep *Prajñāpāramitā*," I have said that this "practice" and this "time" are matters of this ec-sistence.⁸

This ec-sistence is the ec-sistence of the "self" in the sense that all things come forward and make one's self the way of their practice and confirmation; or, in other words, the ec-sistence of the self which lives in the world as Time from the very beginning where Time comes to a head and the world "worlds." Ec-sistence in this sense is not something different from its essential "time."

It is the same with "practice." I quoted Dōgen's saying about the dropping off body-mind being *sanzen*. The home-ground of the ec-sistence of body-mind dropping off is the place where the world worlds; that is, where all "things" are gathered together in their suchness or in their being as they really are, and realizing thus their dharmic nature. That is the place where the self is "confirmed by all dharmas" (i.e., all things), and also the place where, as Dōgen says,⁹ the Buddhas and patriarchs are holding together that practice based on proper sitting in self-joyous samadhi. Well-known also is Dōgen's "To learn the Buddha's Way is to learn oneself. To learn oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁹ *Shōbōgenzō Bando* (translation in *E.B.* vi, 1); see also *E.B.* ix, 1, p. 63 ff.

means to be confirmed by all dharmas. To be confirmed by all dharmas means to let the body-mind of oneself and the self of others drop off" (*Genjōkōan*).¹⁰ The "dropping off of body-mind" spoken of here and the "dropped-off body-mind" are none other than *sanzen*.

That one's self is given attestation by all dharmas and that in such a way the world "worlds," is precisely what was called "crosslegging the King Samadhi."¹¹ Here all things come forward to practice and affirm one's self. This being so, the practice of deep *prajñāpāramitā* spoken of in the *Heart Sutra* can only mean the ec-sistence of body-mind dropped off in the sense described above.

As stated in the previous section,¹² this ec-sistence of the fallen away body and mind is said to denote "the solitary One, alone and unbared in the myriad phenomena of the world." I also said that this is the "truth" (*Alētheia*) of that ec-sistence revealing itself absolutely unbared. In bearing witness to this "solitary One alone and unbared," each and every phenomenon is more intrinsically that "thing" itself than it is in itself. We can say that in the very Beginning in which the world worlds, the world is more truly itself than it is in the world itself. That all dharmas (i.e., all things) come forward, practice oneself, and bear witness to oneself means that all dharmas come back to the place they can be more intrinsically "true" than they are in and by themselves; to the absolute Truth, to That which in its unbared grandeur reveals itself solitary amidst the myriad things.

Seen from there, what is described as a process of all things coming forward and bearing witness to one's self is not a different matter from the idea that the dropping off of body-mind is *sanzen*. Or again, it was said that the dropping off of body-mind means one's original face coming to present itself (*Fukanzazengi*).¹³ This original countenance presents itself at the place where the world "worlds"; the place where one's treasure-house opens of itself and one uses it at will;¹⁴ the place of "the self-

¹⁰ Translation in *E.B.* v, 2, p. 129 ff.

¹¹ See *E.B.* ix, 1, p. 63.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁴ Dōgen, *Fukanzazengi* (translation in *E.B.* vi, 2).

joyous samādhi." This is none other than the place the Buddhas and patriarchs practice zazen. On the whole, this is the meaning contained in what is called "practice."

Hakuin (1685-1768) has a Zen comment (*jakugo*)¹³ on the occurrence of the word "practice" in the *Heart Sutra*. He says: what about the phenomena of man moving his hands and feet, eating or drinking, of the clouds moving, the rivers flowing, the leaves falling and the blossoms scattering? As soon as one tries to affix any kind of form, however slight, to them and give them some definite countenance, the same result is bound to follow as in Chuang-tzu's fable about Chaos: when someone gouged out Chaos and attached an eyeball to it, Chaos died. What Hakuin says is only natural, if one recalls that "practice" means the aforesaid samadhi of self-enjoyment which always manifests the character of perfect round wholeness and is always absolutely free. There is nothing here which is not in one's own treasure-house and which is not available to be used as one pleases. We should avoid inflicting a wound on this harmoniously blended whole by letting an act of discriminative thought intervene, putting an eyeball on it. As soon as the attitude of objective representation enters there with the "form" of what is outside oneself, a look or feature as the "other" will arise; something that is not one's own treasure and is not available for use at will, will arrive on the scene. "Chaos" will die. This already marks a deviation from the place of "practice."

The moment you see "practice" in a representative fashion, you have already attached to the form. On the field where practice is truly practice, phenomena such as man moving his limbs, clouds moving across the sky, water flowing, leaves falling, and blossoms scattering, are formless. Their form is a formless one. And to adopt this "formless form" as one's own form—is none other than the standpoint of "practice."

With regard to the term "deep-paramita," Hakuin again remarks that it is "Gouging out perfectly good flesh to make a wound." And regarding the word "time," he likewise says, "There again the good flesh is gouged out." His meaning is the same as before. He wants to say that when one

¹³ Pithy comments "attached" (*jaku*) to the utterances of Zen masters or passages from sutras which express in a free manner one's own appreciative interpretation.

deliberately speaks of *prajñā*" and "time," imagining such things actually exist somewhere one is only damaging perfectly good flesh. In the ec-sistence of the fallen-away body-mind, *prajñā* and time must both be formless. They are the formless form of that ec-sistence.

In the foregoing, I dealt with birth-death (*samsara*) on the field of *samsara-size-nirvana* as the problem of "time." My interpretation was concentrated on the temporality of ec-sistence as *sunyata* or "emptiness" in the true sense, and a term of Dōgen's, "dropped-off body and mind," was chosen as an instance of the same ec-static existence as *sunyata*. This ec-sistence is a position where all things in the world are gathered together: all things which come to appear in this world of incessant becoming and transition without fail in their dharmic nature and always in their real suchness. This being so, when one's self as body-mind is born, "the birth is, as such, no-birth," and when it perishes, "the perishing is, as such, no-perishing." Ec-sistence as *sunyata* in the King Samadhi holds all "things" or "phenomena" through its own Law or Dharma and uses them in self-enjoyment. Its standpoint is always absolute freedom in the midst of this world of incessant becoming and transition. It is not different from Time coming to a head from all possible times before, not different from the "Beginning" of time itself.

It may be said, however, that a question still remains unsolved. It is the question of how on the basis of this "time" could what we usually call "history" ever be explained. The problem concerns the historicity of "time." No matter how the standpoint of the dropped-off body-mind may be evaluated, human history is a world of men whose body-mind has not fallen away and who are wandering all the time in illusion, ignorant of the right way. Though man may be saved through religion, is that not only a concern of the individual? We must conclude that human societies in history go their own way regardless of whether individuals are saved or not. Especially the Buddhist idea of "emptiness," is it not super-historical and hence non-historical? We know indeed the general conception of Buddhism tends to affirm this question. It is an incontrovertible fact that a consciousness of history in the sense it now seems to have taken has scarcely developed from within Buddhism. It would be quite natural to expect during the long development of Mahayana Buddhism that the

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problem of history would have been called in question from the standpoint of *samsara-sam-nirvana*, especially in the discussion about Bodhisattvahood. But this expectation was not to be fulfilled. What was the reason for that? It is surely an issue of importance for us today to return to the past to study the causes for this. But here I cannot embark upon such a task. I will instead take up another problem; namely, the question of whether the several basic viewpoints of history which have to the present appeared on the scene in the West do, in fact, exhaust all possible ways of viewing history, or whether the aforesaid standpoint of "emptiness" can contribute anything new.

VI

In *An Historian's Approach to Religion* (1956), Arnold Toynbee argues that in the present age, the greatest cultural gulf is not between liberalism and communism, for although the opposition between them is highly conspicuous today, we cannot see it as a factor that will fundamentally determine the future course of mankind. When we examine their origins, we find both of them to belong to the same group of ideologies and religions of Western Judaic origin. (Here the Western Judaic group of ideologies and religions is used in a broad sense that includes Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.) On the contrary, the confrontation which is deep enough to determine the problems of the whole of mankind consists, according to Toynbee, in the chasm between the Buddhaic group of philosophies and religions and the Western Judaic group. (Here "Buddhaic" thought is understood to contain also the pre-Buddhaic Indian philosophy and post-Buddhaic Hinduism, not to mention the Mahayana and the Hinayana.) The chasm between these two ways of thought forms the basis of all economic and cultural opposition. Although it is not so immediately conspicuous as the opposition between communism and liberalism, Toynbee asserts that as a problem concerning the future of all mankind, it is more serious and important, the authentic problem of the future history of the world.

In Toynbee's opinion, the Buddhaic philosophies have the following characteristic features. First, the motions of nature and the cosmos are

thought to be cyclic. Second, that which governs the cosmos and the human world is conceived as an impersonal law (dharma). These viewpoints, he says, determine the views of Nature and History of the Buddhist philosophies. On the other hand, according to the view of history of Western Judaic thought historical time flows as a non-recurring process, and the whole process is governed by a personal Being. History is basically characterized as something that can be controlled and determined by the power of intellect and will and can be imputed a meaning through that power.

Now, to that way of "Buddhaic" thinking can be ascribed one advantage over the Western way of thinking: it contains the possibility of transcending the self-centeredness which is innate not only in man but generally in all living creatures. To think that the rhythmic movement of the cosmos is cyclic or that the cosmos and the human world are under the rule of impersonal law is to place emphasis upon the universal rather than on the particular of everything and to see things from their aspect of universality. Toynbee interprets this as a view in which the individual in one way or another is dissolved into the universal; a view which has a significance of its own so far as the self-centeredness is thus transcended, but through which History is instead completely deprived of its significance. For, in a world where everything is reduced to the idea of the universal, nothing essentially new can take place. Seen fundamentally, there remains only a mere repetition of the same, a sort of circular movement in which same universal entities obtain.

On the contrary, in the Western Judaic way of thinking, the history of the world of man is considered to be similar to the rhythmic procession of an individual human life. Just like a drama, it has a beginning, and, developing along a definite plot, it reaches an end. While various vicissitudes and dramatic crises appear on the scene between the beginning and the end, somewhere the plot comes to an eventual close.

When history is conceived of as such a drama or individual life-career, the controlling factor is the will. When God is thought of in this connection, it is the will of a personal God that holds sway over the entire history. And every individual person acting in the world-drama is performing also with his human faculties which again is motivated basically

by the will of his personal self. Here, History is set up as something that involves "meaning" within itself.

But on the other hand, in this standpoint, man's self-centeredness never ceases to project its shadow, however far one may succeed in leaving it behind. A remarkable example of this can be found in the fact that the religion of Israel is connected with a consciousness of the Jewish people as God's chosen people. It is true that, in the religion of Israel, the ego-centred attitude of man, his self-centredness before God, is something that must be denied as sin. But those who, before God, throw away this self-centeredness, obey Him wholeheartedly and follow His will obediently, come to regain their consciousness of being the chosen people in relation to others. Self-centeredness appears once more on a higher level: the will of the self backed up by the will of God. Even though such a position of the will made it possible for the first time to furnish world-history with meaning, it left the self-centeredness intact to the very end.

This, roughly represented, is Toynbee's thesis. It also seems to contain a ready sign-post pointing to where the final problematic lies in regard to the way of viewing history.

"History" is essentially connected with the fact that a self which is here described as self-centered comes to operate from within itself in the form of personality (whatever explanation may be given to this concept) in contrast to the world of "nature," about which this cannot be said. If that be true, what kind of significance does history come to possess when seen in its connection with religion?

We have just said that man's self-centeredness always remains in the Western religions; even when it is once negated, it appears again, as in the guise of a chosen people. One may suspect there lies hidden in the background of that concept a sort of direct projection onto God of the Jewish people's desire that He should be wrathful for passing judgment on other peoples. Perhaps an unconscious desire to punish others was projected onto their righteous God. Roughly speaking, an emotional attitude of this kind (the so-called *ressentiment*) can reappear in a higher form of self-centredness by passing through God to the level of religion. The consummate self-abandonment or whole-hearted humility (the so-called *Demut*) towards God turns out to become the basis of the superiority complex of

the self over and against others; and that only prereflectively and purposelessly, as a depth-psychological move, so to speak. Be that as it may, we cannot but feel that, in spite of the religious self-negation of one's own self-centeredness, the deep roots of the latter still remain firmly entrenched, and from there an unconscious reaction arises, with the result that this self-negation reverses of itself into an unconsciously disguised self-centeredness. And this is just the point that has been disclosed and attacked by modern critics of Christianity, most radically perhaps by philosophers such as Feuerbach and Nietzsche.

For the state in which the possibility of such a reaction or reversal to be left unchallenged, with the root of self-centeredness intact as an "unconscious" force, means that here the self-reflection which belongs to the quintessence of man's self is still not yet pushed to its extreme. It stands short of full achievement, incapable of penetrating down to the self's own marrow. To use Buddhist terminology, the self still leaves the basic *avidyā* (ignorance) intact in itself as its own root. If, therefore, it be true that history can be endowed with meaning only on the basis of man's being a self or so-called "subjectivity" which even when equipped with the high-sounding name of "personality" cannot fail to imply the character of self-centeredness, then it will also mean that history is in essence the world of beings involving the basic *avidyā* and hence involved in the field of karma and hereditary former karma (*pūroa-karman*). It is also clear that history is invariably showing us such an aspect.

On the other hand, however, it is generally held that historicity tends to weaken in the direction of a radicalized negation of self-centeredness, through the process of the dissolution of the individual and personal into the universal and impersonal. This has been the conventional view for a long time in the West. As we have seen above, an eminent contemporary historian like Toynbee is of this opinion. If it is true, we are forced into admitting that a kind of dilemma lies hidden between religion and history. But is this really so?

First, I must point out that in the position of Toynbee expounded above his interpretation of Buddhism, and of Mahayana Buddhism in particular, seems to be questionable in some respects. He seems to assume that, in the Mahayanic conception also, "time" is simply circular and all things are

dominated by impersonal law, the result of this being an ambiguity of the meaning of history or a lack of historical consciousness. If we judge it from the Western idea of history, his opinion may seem to be valid; in fact, however, the question is not so simple as that. It is here rather that we discern the final problem to be solved.

As regards its so-called "circularity," all religions which can be characterized in terms of *mythos* share in common the view that time is recurrent and non-historical. Even in philosophy, that is, the philosophy whose essential feature lies in breaking free of the mythological way of living and viewing things—as we have already seen, the ancient Greek philosophies, for example, can be characterized in this way—there are many cases in which time is regarded as circular.

This concept of time is inevitable, when one sees the universe or all things in the universe from the point of view of nature. In the world of nature, the four seasons follow rotation and the various periods recur in the passage of years and months. The "time" of natural phenomena, including astronomical time, returns necessarily to its starting point and repeatedly follows the same orbit.

From the point of view of its content, human life is likewise molded by rotating time. To cite only one instance, in ancient Japan at the time of the rice crop new wine made from harvest rice would be offered in the royal palace to the gods and deities. Then the emperor and his subjects would drink it together in celebration. In ancient times this ceremony is said to have taken place every year. Probably it was performed on the strength of a belief that this wine was possessed of a manna-like vitality. When a man drank wine made from new rice, the "spiritual" power inherent in rice gave security to his life and certainty to his existence anew. Rice is connected also with the generative power contained in the soil of the country. Through the rice this power works as a force in support of man's existence. Through the ceremony in which the emperor and his subjects drink the same wine, their political connection and the relations constitutive of the state are renewed.

Moreover, these acts are performed on the basis of the relation between the *kami* and men. In other words, the relations between the gods and man, the gods and the land, man and the land, and man and man,

constitute as one totality a communal and politically unified relationship, and this whole connection is renewed once every year. For this purpose, a yearly festival is held at a definite time. Otherwise, life in the following year could not proceed on a firm basis. By its observance, a year of life, man's year-round existence, the existence of the state and the communal political relations, the rice production, economic life and so on, are guaranteed anew and regenerated until the same season arrives again. Since everything becomes antiquated after the elapse of a year, it must be regenerated anew at the end of each yearly cycle. That unified relationship must be reconstructed and re-established by equal participation in the same "spiritual" vitality offered in the festival. That is what is meant by saying life is cyclic.

Here, the chief characteristic of history in its authentic sense does not come out clearly. The natural world and the human world move *pari passu* in accordance with a definite "rule." The human life in its various phases has its own "usage" and runs according to its norms. The usage which has a religious basis and enters into everyday life has been operating this way from the beginning of history, that is, in this case, from the outset of the establishment of the state. In other words, history is accounted for only in the form of a repetition of something recurrent. Every deviation from this orbit is condemned as sin or defilement. Evil or sin in the ethico-religious sense consists in going astray from the norm of life, that is, from the modal pattern which has been observed repeatedly from the beginning of history. In short, all religions which are based upon myth reveal a standpoint like this. At the same time, I think it noteworthy that in the Japanese myth concerning the establishment of the nation, the origin of the country is conceived of as dating from the once-happened, non-recurring event of the descent to earth of the heavenly grandson of the Sun-goddess.

The fact that the historical consciousness originated in the Jewish people involves in many respects a problem. Historical consciousness since then underwent remarkable development in the West and, in the modern age in particular, it has gradually come to pass that the whole of human life itself is reconstituted through man's own historical consciousness about himself. What is included in such a development?

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No doubt, in Christianity too, as in ancient Japan, righteousness was regarded to consist only in living in obedience to the law ordained by God. But here, man in history is from the start conceived of as having rebelled against God's will and having broken the divine order, so that sin constitutes the most essential factor in the Christian view of man in history. In the concept of original sin, man's consciousness of sin, that is, of his separation from God, is intimately connected with the consciousness of his existence as an autonomous, independent being. And conversely, in man's subjective self-awareness of existence is always recognized the implication of his consciousness of sin.

And with this, it can be said, the consciousness of liberty which did not come into play in the standpoint of cyclic recurrence found in mythological religions has, in Christianity, come to arise at one with man's self-awareness as an individual being. We can also say that only here has "time" ceased to be recurrent, so that every step of man's life has become dramatic and every moment of time has become something creative out of which new things may emerge.

In short, man's awareness of his own being in terms of the "self" is here established in connection with three factors: the awareness of original sin, of liberty, and of the once-for-all nature (*Einmaligkeit*) of time. Here, the consciousness of history is connected with man's self-awareness that implies an essential tendency toward self-centeredness. And since salvation consists in the historic event in which this self-centered mode of being based upon original sin is overcome and a reconciliation with God is brought about, religion is constituted, here, of three basic factors: awareness of sin which forms its ground, man's freedom, and historicity. This kind of religion stands on a plane much higher than the mythological one.

Thus, when we pursue the problem of history, we inevitably strike against the emergence of such a standpoint of man's self-awareness with which, moreover, the problems of sin, freedom, and the historicity of "time" are connected. This standpoint can be said to have been maintained throughout Christianity and its forerunner, the religion of the Hebrew prophets.

The next question concerns the kind of problematic involved in the above-stated case of Christianity. Here I cannot enter into a detailed

consideration of this question. I can only touch upon it to the extent it has reference to the present concern: the problem of historicity versus "emptiness." In that context, I think that the problematic involved in Christianity is connected with the three factors I cited above as implied in the Christian self-awareness of man's existence: the awareness of sin, freedom, and the once-for-all nature of time.

The first question concerns the self-centered character which appears within the self-awareness of religious man. As we have seen above, in Christianity, where the origin of history is supposed to imply sin, the very beginning and development of history on the one hand and man's self-centered being on the other are conceived of as essentially united. (In this sense, Kant, for example, once said that evil was supposedly the origin of history.) Further, the conquest of man's self-centeredness, that is, his salvation accomplished through the atonement of original sin and reconciliation with God, is also assumed to be a historical event within history, prepared through the development of history after God's plan. The incarnation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ and the atonement by his death on the cross are regarded as having opened up in history the field of man's salvation, that is, to have revealed God's *agape* into history, special emphasis being here placed upon their historical facticity. God's *agape* is revealed into history. It comes from God's side toward the self-centred human being which exists in history, bearing the burden of original sin. Also, repentance and faith on the side of man are related to this historical revelation, that is, to Jesus Christ as an actual historical entity.

Now, the religious standpoint which is thus established has a character of exclusive absoluteness that leaves no room for any commensurability with other religions. For the facticity of history is, in general, absolutely incommensurable in that it is a factum or actual reality, and moreover, specifically in this case, the object of religious belief is a factum whose historicity is particularly emphasized. In such a circumstance, the requisition of the absoluteness a religious "truth" generally postulates combines with the once-ness of a historical fact. As a result, the standpoint of this faith has no other choice but to ask for itself exclusive absoluteness. Here intolerance inevitably raises its head. Like the consciousness of being a chosen people which appeared in the religion of Israel, this is self-

centeredness in the realm of religion. This is precisely what Toynbee dealt with in his book.

Intolerance here is essentially related to the fact that this belief is based upon a personal standpoint, the standpoint of a personal relationship with a personal God; for religious personality also involves within itself a sort of self-centeredness. Because of this self-centeredness, the faith of Christianity could not avoid giving rise to frequent struggles between this factor and the other ingredient of *agape*, that is, the love of one's fellow-men. The struggles against the pagan unbelievers at the end of ancient times, in the Middle Ages (the Crusades, for instance), and throughout the modern age, the persecution of heretics, the Inquisition, the religious wars within the Christian world—these and the intolerance they reveal, together with the similar phenomena in Islam, are negligible in the history of Buddhism.

The second problem in connection with the Christian view of history is its eschatology. Mythological religions not infrequently have an eschatology of cyclical world-time according to which, at the end of a periodical cycle, the world is destroyed in conflagration, and a new world arises from the ashes. We can also find in Buddhism the fourfold notion of the coming into being, existence, destruction, and emptiness of the world. There is no such cyclic character in Christian eschatology. But here, as is well-known, the coming of the *eschaton* which will appear suddenly from God at some least-expected time and bring world-history to a close, is considered in connection with the notions of the second coming of Christ and the final judgment.

Now, I think that this notion of the end of history is problematic insofar as it is, as Christianity demands, conceived of as historical fact which is expected to take place in the actual historical world. The emergence of the super-historical which brings all history to a close is represented here as an event that happens only once, that is, in the dimension of historical fact. This view, I think, is open to doubt. The history of Europe records many cases in which people who took the *eschaton* for a literally historical fact fell into panic thinking that the end of the world was at hand. Today, it is no longer possible to take seriously the notion that an end to history emerges historically in the dimension

of historical fact with historical meaning.

Contemporary theology attaches much importance to eschatology. It may be possible to give the *eschaton* idea a new meaning; for instance, through the so-called existential interpretation. But even in this case, it would still be difficult to imagine the *eschaton* in the world of historical fact.

In short, the awareness of the once-ness and historicity of "time" was established in Christianity, and the cyclical character of "time" inherent in the mythological religions was overcome. And at the same time, the eschatology of cyclical world-time in mythological religion was converted into a historical one. The *eschaton* now came to be considered as an end which cuts short the whole of the past history of mankind and brings it to a close even on the level of historical fact; as an end which is a one-time historical event. The whole past history, then, could be called the "pre-history" of mankind, even by modern figures like Marx or Nietzsche, or called "interim" time by Christian theologians.

Although I admit that the establishment of historical consciousness was an epoch-making event, I think this consciousness is still problematic in the respect that it came about only in correlation with such a form of eschatology, in such a conception of the end of history. This whole circumstance is also basically connected with the Christian viewpoint which sees the origin of history in original sin. Later on, I will deal with this in detail.

Since the modern consciousness of history was established and the study of history as a "science" came into existence, eschatology has almost ceased to figure in the view of history of those who make historical fact the object of their study. On the level of the immanent view of historical fact it is impossible indeed to consider an end coming from outside of history itself. On this level, it is of course quite natural to reckon with a direction oriented to some aim immanent in history. But such a direction has no final end in itself. One of the most naïve expressions of this can be found in the idea of "progress" characteristic of the 18th century school of "enlightenment."

The idealistic notion of mankind endlessly advancing in history stands diametrically opposed to the eschatological view of history. But even this

one-sided view of history contains in it an unquestionable component of historical consciousness. In history there is certainly an aspect of progress. The historical world shows us a face that refuses the notion of *eschaton* in which everything is subjected to divine judgment; an aspect of continuous progress through the unfolding of ever new developments. Even today, those who rely upon the notion of "progress" stand basically upon a view of history of this kind.

Notice must be made, however, that in its origin this view of history came into existence as a repulsion against the intolerance of the Christian type of faith. The basis of this view of history is trust in human reason. The first impulse toward this emphasis upon reason originated, in the midst of the bloody struggles within the Christian world, in the will to find a common standpoint apart from all dogmatic faith. Hence this rational standpoint was, in principle, born of the impulse of a spirit of tolerance.

It led, on the one hand, to the so-called deistic attempt to reinterpret the Christian doctrines on a standpoint of reasonableness and then developed later into the standpoints of "philosophy" of religion and "science" of religion, the latter with its ramification into various fields of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history ("history of religions") etc., in all of which an attitude of religious tolerance constitutes the dominant factor. On the other hand, the rational tendency developed into the scientific view of history and of society, where in the main an attitude of critical opposition to religion holds sway. The view of history as "progress" stands generally in the latter direction.

What I have mentioned on this point has a bearing on a third problematic; that in man's subjective self-awareness is involved another facet which cannot be exhausted merely by reference to original sin. In other words, in this self-awareness is involved essentially the standpoint of "reason" and the demand of rationality in the realms of knowledge and practice. Further, fundamentally seen, this rational standpoint can be reduced to man's freedom as a rational being. Man's freedom contains in its roots not only the aspect of sin in man's relation to God but also another aspect which can be regarded as reason in man's relation to himself. And here lurks inevitably the simultaneous conflict between *fides* and

ratio, and between intolerance and tolerance—conflicts which have never been absent throughout the whole history of Christianity.

Of course, it is impossible to view history only as “progress” made possible by bringing human reason to “enlightenment.” It is meaningful, for example, that a contemporary historian like Butterfield¹⁶ takes up the notion of “judgment” not as a dogma of faith but as a category through which to elucidate history. More than that, the emergence of a view such as Nietzsche’s nihilism which contends that “God is dead,” that the Christian notions of eschatology and God’s judgment have lost their power to impart direction to the human spirit, signifies at the same time a critique turned toward the “God-killer,” the superficially optimistic rationalism with its optimistic idea of progress. Nietzsche’s nihilism was a double-edged sword of radical skepticism against those two conflicting thoughts.

At any rate, the idea of progress today ceases to be the lone dominating category through which to investigate history. But even so, the problematic of the modern historic consciousness which is taking shape around the idea of progress can hardly be solved solely by returning to the old eschatological view of history.

In the foregoing, I have tried to trace the kind of problems involved in the circumstance that, in the “Judaic Western” group of religions (Toynbee’s phrase), especially in Christianity, man’s subjective consciousness of being a “self,” on the one hand, and the “historicity” of history in the double sense of historical consciousness as well as of history itself becoming conscious of its own, on the other, have simultaneously come into existence. The three problematics mentioned above are basically combined into one; and from this basis, if we go further back, we are led to the notion of God’s personality and, hence, man’s personality. I will not enter into a discussion of these here. I have already dealt with them once and will again later on.

I have discussed the problems dealt with here from a slightly different angle in an article entitled “Religion, History, and Culture” in my book (written in Japanese) “*The Philosophy of Fundamental Subjectivity*” (1940),

¹⁶ Hubert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (1949).

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and in "Religion and Culture" in my book (also in Japanese) entitled "*Religion and the Problems of Contemporary Society*" (1951).

VII

Although the views of history in Christianity and in the modern movement of rationalistic "enlightenment" stand diametrically opposed, they have something in common in that both of them recognize a meaning in history. The former recognizes God's providence or administration in history from the standpoint of its theocentric faith, and the latter sets up from the anthropocentric standpoint of man's reason the *telos* of history in the consummate rationalization of human life.

In opposition to them, the world-view of modern nihilism goes back to an abysmal *nihilum* in which not only history but also all other processes of the world are finally reduced to meaninglessness. I have said above that this abysmal situation means an ec-static transcendence of man's being-in-the-world and gives expression to the self-awareness of man's existence in its limit-situation. On the basis of this nihilism, Nietzsche made a turnabout to the idea of eternal return, under the disguise of which the "will to power" manifests itself. Now, the eternal return of the world propounded by him cannot simply be said to be non-historical, like the cyclic rotation of the natural world-process in mythological religions, for the eternal return here is reckoned as implying all the processes that can be regarded as new creations in history. As a matter of fact, the nihilistic world-view itself was born from the depths of the development of history in the West as a kind of uncompromising self-reflection. Its very emergence was a historical event. The philosophy of the "will to power," a turnabout from nihilism, is also essentially connected with the problem of history.

Be that as it may, insofar as the will to power consists, in the final analysis, in a world-view of eternal repetition, I think that on that eternal repetition which is the final ground of history and a sphere of ec-static transcendence, the meaning of history cannot find its foundation except in a negative fashion. We must not overlook, though, the positive side in Nietzsche's thought. In the perspective inherent in the position of

the will to power, all the meanings which hitherto had been attributed to history and turned into meaninglessness in *nihilum* could be again provisionally affirmed in their provisory values and be restored to their relative import when all the "world-interpretations" until now came to be affirmed from the position of the will of power as so many tentative attempts of that will to posit values.

The ideas of the will to power and eternal return, which represent a position of great affirmation, could only appear after a great nihilistic negation. All of the meanings which were imparted to history and are now rendered meaningless—inclusive even of the meanings which human reason gives to history in making itself the principle of meaningfulness—are restored once more by the position of the will to power in the sphere of its own ec-static transcendence and are transformed into the will's own perspective.

However, if the will to power as the ec-static basis on which all those meanings are restored only succeeds in opening up the field of eternal return of the same world-time, history is, after all, only restored in such a fashion that it cannot complete its true historicity. So long as the view that something absolutely new is created in "time" cannot be radically carried through, history is always deprived of its true meaning.

In this respect, Nietzsche's view of eternal return is pregnant with a problematic that is exactly the opposite of that of Christian eschatology.

As we have seen, Christianity broke down the cyclic character of mythological "time" and imparted historicity to "time." But at the same time, it also supplied the mythological end of time (*eschaton*) with historicity. As a result, the *eschaton* was expected to descend from a trans-historical dimension and appear in the level of history as the one-time historical event of the second advent of Christ and the last judgment: an historical event supposed to bring all history to a close. Thus, the historicity of history could be brought to its complete realization through and with the historicity of eschatology, in such a way, however, as puts a final stop to actual history itself. A stop of this sort cannot be found in Nietzsche's view of eternal return. Actual history here proceeds to an aim immanent in it, the aim of the "superman" in the present outlook, for "man" is something that shall be overcome. But, while history is exempt

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from being predestined to an abrupt end by possessing the eternal return as its ec-static (and, in this sense, "super-historical") ultimate base, the endlessness thus guaranteed is obtained only in such a way that history comes up short of full historicity.

Therefore, the final question to be solved here is: How is it possible for "history" to carry its historicity to the ultimate super-historical base without thereby being brought to a full stop through the super-historical? Or rather: Is there any possibility that "history" can become historical in the consummate sense of the word precisely by its historicity being carried unto its super-historical ground? I think this question inevitably leads to the relationship between history and "emptiness."

The problem of eschatology has nothing to do with the end of history in the sense, for example, that the earth might cool off and mankind thereby become extinct. It is rather concerned with the question of a super-historical level which is disclosed through man's self-awareness of his own existence in history. Ultimately, it is the problem of the end of history in a religious sense. Particularly in Christianity it is maintained that the way of man's salvation was bestowed as the historical event of Christ's incarnation; a way cut open from the super-historical level into history itself. The incarnation is the beginning of the *eschaton*, so to speak, which will be brought to completion through the future historical event of the second advent of Christ.

Now, the notion of the end of history corresponds with that of the beginning of history. The idea that history has a finish correlates to the idea that it has a start. This start is represented by the fall of Adam. The incarnation of Christ took place in order to bestow salvation upon man living within the original sin through Adam's fall, that is, in order to put an end to the history which had begun with Adam. History starts with Adam's sin and ends in the second advent of Christ. Or again, it begins with God's punishment and ends in the last judgment. As Adam's fall, the incarnation of Christ, and his second advent are one-time historical events, at least insofar as they are seen from the inside of history, religion here is essentially based upon history and history essentially based upon religion. The history of salvation or the history of judgment is, as such, the religion itself.

As we have seen, however, the historical consciousness in modern times became totally estranged from the view that history is predestined to a historical end. Consequently in the modern world, eschatology falls back into a level similar to the notion of the world-end of mythological religions. A retrogress is made to the level on which people conceive, for example, of the cooling off of the earth as a fate meted out by the "will" of Nature, or find Divine "punishment" in some catastrophic phenomena of nature such as a great deluge or violent earthquake. But an *eschaton* of this sort can no longer have any relevancy to the principle problem in the making of man's view of history. As we have already suggested, there is in history an intrinsic aspect that rejects it, the aspect of "reason" on which the modern historical consciousness, as is expressed in the establishment of the study of history as "science," unfolds itself.

The same thing can be said of the beginning of history no less than of its end. In the contemporary world, I think, hardly anyone believes literally that the history of mankind began with Adam's fall.

That history has a beginning and an end should be entirely denied from the immanent way of viewing history. And this immanent view, the view which developed into the science of history, is essential to history and indispensable for historical consciousness as well as for man's view of history, to the same degree as the super-historical view which develops into the religious understanding of history. The notions of the beginning of history and its end as they appear in the long tradition of Christianity must be said to be incompatible with this point of view and, so far, contain a problem still waiting for solution. The problem lies in the way of understanding the meaning of those notions, in the way of interpretation, which, in traditional Christianity, still remains confined within the frame of the old mythology.

If so, where can we find the root of the problem? In answer to this question, we cannot but say that it lies in the view of God, according to which God is conceived of as a "personal" being, a being provided with a self-conscious "will." History has a beginning and an end as God's punishment and judgment. History is interpreted as the history of judgment, or the history of salvation by God. Behind history, there is a God who governs the world with his will and intellect, or with his good will and wise provi-

dence. It is only through God's will that history took its departure and will be brought to a close, these events being sheer manifestations of the divine will. Here, the view that history has a beginning and an end is essentially connected with the fact that God is conceived of on a super-historical level as a personal, that is, self-centered ("theo-centric") willful being; in the final analysis, as some "being," as "something or some entity that is."

No one can deny that the notion of a personal God, a God of judgment (or of justice), or a God of love, by causing human beings to stand face to face with the "sacred" in the form of a living subject, face to face with a God who is probably beyond compare in the sacredness of his majesty and grace, has brought man's conscience and love to special depth and thus has elevated the human personality to a remarkable height. Because of this, and provided that the above analysis of the inherent problematic is right, it would be all the more desirable that the solution of these problems would arise from within Christianity itself in the future. I think we are in need of this solution not only for the purpose of constructing a true view of history for future mankind but also in order that Christianity itself may successfully confront the "secularized" view of history in the modern world.

With regard to Nietzsche's so-called eternal return, we can say that so far as the term "eternal" is concerned there is neither beginning nor end, and that so far as the term "return" is concerned the same beginning and the same end always repeat themselves. These two are here one and the same.

This boundless meaninglessness, watched over by a nihilistic air, is overcome by a turnabout in which the standpoint of the Will to power opens up through this meaninglessness and the world becomes a manifestation of this Will. In this standpoint, all the world-processes are penetrated by a "Will to will" which "plays" itself away on the field of the fresh purity of the "Innocence of Becoming" (*Unschuld des Werdens*) in perfect abandon and high spirits. This standpoint may perhaps be called a "voluntaristically" modernized version of Heraclitus. It can possibly be recognized also as one of the Western thoughts which have come nearest to the Buddhist standpoint of emptiness. We can here perceive an ethereal

air of a kind which makes us feel we are in the neighborhood of, for example, Dōgen's position which finds expression in his above cited: "We meet a leap-year one in four. Cocks crow at four in the morning"; and also, "I don't have a single strand of the Buddha's Dharma. I now while away my time, accepting whatever may come."

But, in spite of all this, Nietzsche's eternal return does not make Time be truly Time. He also speaks of the "instant" as a momentary eyeblink (*Augenblick*), but his idea of the instant, with its background of eternal return, does not imply the bottomlessness of the genuine moment. Hence, it cannot signify the place where something truly new can occur. As I have said before, the historicity of history cannot here break through to its full fruition.

What is, then, the reason for this all? It lies, in this case also, in the fact that some "entity" like the will-to-power is still conceived of on a suprahistorical plane. Of course, it is not conceived of as a "being" like the God of Christianity: it is not the absolute ground of being but the principle of absolute becoming. It is also not regarded as something objective. Rather, our own self is, as such, none other than a manifestation of that Will itself. We can possibly say that, seen fundamentally, will-to-power is a position similar to that of the mystical unity of *Brahman* and *atman*, to which the ancient Indians gave expression by saying, about *Brahman*, "That art thou" (*tat tvam asi*). If the similarity is valid, it is certainly an important step forward.

And yet, insofar as what is here at stake is a "will," that is, something conceived of in the third person as an "it," it still does not rid itself of the character of entity, something that is.

Although we can say there that our own self is, in fact, That, we cannot yet confirm and affirm that That is, in truth, our own *self*. In other words, although one can say it is one's "self which is not self," one cannot yet say it is one's "*self* which is not self". There is here a basic difference between Nietzsche's position and the position of Zen, in which it could be said, for example, that the ec-sistence of "body-and-mind dropped off; dropped off body-and-mind" is the King-of-samadhis Samadhi of one's self as such, with one's eyes lying horizontally and one's nose sitting vertically.

That the will-to-power involves within it something which is not yet

completely turned back into the "self" indicates that it remains in the state of being represented as something that *is*. If it would have been a standpoint completely turned about into the self, there would not remain, on the ec-static supra-historical plane of the existence in the King Samadhi, a single strand susceptible of being represented as what *is*. Then, Time would be disclosed in its authentic aspect of truly bottomlessly arising as time and History in its authentic aspect in which historicity thoroughly comes into its own.

The domain of this "self," this "time," and this "history" is the domain in which body-and-mind fallen away, fallen away body-and-mind, and *samsara-side-nirvana* obtains—the domain of emptiness. This *is*, at the same time, the standpoint of real and complete actuality.

In contradistinction, Nietzsche's position, insofar as it substituted a life-giving power of the Will for the God of Christianity, could not but display, together with a keen modernity, a regression to *mythos*. Such concepts as eternal return and Dionysos are proof of this regression. This step can be said to have deprived his conception of time of its historicity as well as its actuality.

Contrarily, Hakuin, for example, in his Zen comments on the term "time" in the *Heart Sutra*, after saying that "this also gouges out perfectly good flesh," adds three comments:

"Before all the *kalpas* (world times) past and after all the ones to come."

"A marvellous spiritual light glints with austere chill in the sheath of a hair-splitting blade."

"A round gem, shining in dark night, is brought out on its tray."

To these he adds a Zen verse:

Yesterday at dawn I swept the soot of the old year away,
Tonight I grind and knead flour for the New Year's goodies.
There's a pine-tree with its roots, an orange with leaves,
Then I don new clothes and await the coming guests.¹⁷

Hakuin's words are enough to give us a glimpse how utterly *actual*

¹⁷ *Dokugo Shingyō* (Hakuin's Zen commentary on the *Heart Sutra*).

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"time" is in Buddhism and on what position the possibility of this thoroughly realistic view of time is based.

I said before that the historical character of history can radically realize itself precisely in the standpoint of "emptiness." It is to this I should like to turn in the next chapter.

Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku
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