

into a methodological corner. On the one hand, the author expertly explores a complex and largely unstudied form of monastic literature. On the other hand, however, the reader hovers so far above the provenance and general hermeneutic situation of the author's primary sources that it is often difficult to profit from Jansen's indisputable erudition. In this sense, the book would benefit enormously from a case study or short series of case studies, which would give the reader an understanding of the general aspects of a *chayik's* style, structure, and content, as well as place these texts in a more holistic context relative to the author's use of oral history.

In conclusion, Berthe Jansen's *The Monastery Rules* offers an excellent specialist study of Tibetan Buddhist monasticism, which emphasizes indigenous voices and emic perceptions of monastic guidelines over the broader historical and cultural context in which monastic institutions thrived. While this approach is exemplary and often rewarding to read, aspects of the author's treatment of primary data and certain atypical authorial choices detract from the publication's heuristic value. Nevertheless, *The Monastery Rules* constitutes a monumental achievement that breaks new ground on an understudied but vitally important topic.

Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida. By John C. Maraldo. Nagoya: Chisokudō Publications, 2017. 488 pages. Paperback: ISBN 978-1-9739-2956-7.

TANAKA JUN'ICHI

A RECONSIDERATION OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

It is a great honor for me to write a review of John Maraldo's *Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida*. Maraldo is well known both as a scholar of Japanese philosophy, especially of the thought of Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), and as a distinguished philosopher in his own right. It is indeed significant that a non-Japanese philosopher has published such a fine work on Japanese philosophy as for a long time Nishida's philosophy has been primarily studied by Japanese philosophers. The study of philosophy, though, should not be so geographically restricted

as it is fundamentally a universal pursuit and should be accessible to all people. Of course, Nishida's philosophy was constructed by a Japanese philosopher, but his thought should be understood as universal, and studied from an international perspective. However, Nishida's philosophy has often been misunderstood by philosophers in other parts of the world because he wrote only in Japanese. In addition, Nishida created new words that are difficult for even Japanese philosophers to understand. This partially explains why it has taken such a long time for good translations of Nishida's work to appear in English and other languages.

Only when Nishida's philosophy becomes recognized by philosophers throughout the world will his thought become "philosophy" in the original sense of the term. Philosophy should be accessible to anyone, not just to the people of a particular region. I am deeply grateful for, and greatly respect, the efforts of American and European philosophers to do research into Nishida's philosophy. I believe that such research into Japanese philosophy from a global standpoint will also help to enhance the quality of philosophy within Japan.

A CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

The volume comprises thirteen unnumbered chapters, each of which is an original philosophical reflection stemming from Maraldo's encounter with Nishida's thought, and each is well worth reading. I will briefly explain the contents of each chapter.

Maraldo presents his fundamental standpoint in the opening chapter entitled "Japanese Philosophy as a Lens on Greco-European Thought." As the Western philosophical tradition first developed in Greece, some philosophers think that the origin of philosophy is to be found only in Greco-European Thought. Maraldo, however, argues that non-Western thought has made significant contributions to European philosophy. Maraldo redefines philosophy as "a way of life" instead of "an argumentative discourse." He then demonstrates that the thought of Japanese Buddhism and Confucianism is embodied in such "ways of life." In particular, he examines the teachings of Kūkai 空海 (774–835), Saichō 最澄 (767–822), Pure Land Buddhism, and Zen Buddhism. Maraldo then concludes that Japanese philosophy can provide a lens on Greco-European thought precisely because each is fundamentally "a way of life."

In "How Meiji-Era Japan Appropriated Philosophy from Europe," Maraldo examines the history of Japanese philosophy in the Meiji era.

First, he considers the roles and thought of enlightenment proponents such as Nishi Amane 西周 (1829–1897), the Meiroku 明六 (Meiji Six) group, and Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1835–1901). He pays especially close attention to Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 (1836–1916) and his ideas concerning individual and human rights. He then discusses the thought of Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856–1944) and Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919). Inoue Tetsujirō refashioned Confucian thought based upon Hegelian philosophy and tried to define Eastern thought as “philosophy” (*tetsugaku*). Inoue Enryō promoted the notion of “pure philosophy” and stressed the import role of Buddhism, especially Huayan Buddhism, in this regard. Inoue Enryō’s thinking later influenced such important thinkers as Kuwaki Gen’yoku 桑木巖翼 (1874–1946), Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903), and Nishida Kitarō.

“Framing the Place and Significance of Nishida’s Philosophy in Europe and North America” examines Nishida’s philosophical influence on Europe and North America. The translation of Nishida’s works is admittedly difficult. Nevertheless, some European and American researchers believe that Nishida’s philosophy needs to be released from its original Japanese language in order to be properly examined. Five perspectives on Nishida are considered: (1) Nishida as Japan’s first philosopher, (2) Nishida as philosopher of the East, (3) Nishida as Zen philosopher, (4) Nishida as founder of the Kyoto school, and (5) Nishida as national ideologue. Maraldo argues that European and North American philosophers may realize that they share much common interest with Nishida.

In “How Nishida Individualized Religion” Maraldo enumerates the various influences upon Nishida’s religious philosophy, such as Zen Buddhism, Pure Land Buddhism, and Christianity. Although Nishida is generally thought to have been influenced by Zen, he did not directly identify religion with Zen. Nishida always disavowed mysticism and insisted on constructing a philosophical system. Maraldo here examines Nishida’s life in some detail. Though Nishida successfully passed his Zen *kōan* 公案 training, he was not satisfied with this result. While he certainly regarded “immediate experience” as most important, his own realization of “immediate experience” did not occur from this koan practice, but rather when he was a high school student in Kanazawa. Maraldo then examines Nishida’s approach to religion, focusing upon two problems in particular: the socio-historical aspect of religion and the relationship between the individual and the nation.

“The Problem of World Culture: Appropriating Nishida’s Philosophy of Nation and Culture” is a chapter of particular interest that contains a great

deal of original thinking. Maraldo tries to read Nishida's philosophy as a philosophy of culture, and argues that the latter's philosophy has the potential to contribute to multicultural society. The nationalistic elements of his thinking, such as Japan-centrism, should of course be abandoned. According to Maraldo's interpretation, Nishida foresaw our multicultural world, which consists of an array of ethnic groups. A true "world culture" may be formed from these various cultures. Nishida's ideas are similar in this regard to those of Charles Taylor. Nishida's notion of "world culture" may be seen to some extent in contemporary multicultural nations.

In the essay "Self, World, and the Nothingness Underlying Distinctions," the relationship between "self" and "world" is considered from the standpoint of absolute nothingness. This problem is normally examined from the standpoint of externalism and internalism. Maraldo explains, however, that the self-aware, judging mind should not be abstracted from one's concrete situation. Individuals create, and are created by, the historical world. This is then discussed from the standpoint of nothingness. In nothingness as the fundamental place, individual things and persons emerge as the "self-determinations of nothingness" (p. 191). The making of distinctions occurs from the self-determination of nothingness. Making distinctions manifest is rooted in nothingness. Maraldo then makes a highly original argument demonstrating a relationship between Nishida's notion of "nothingness" and Zhuangzi's notion of "obscurity."

Maraldo discusses two main issues in his essay "Enaction in Cognitive Science and Nishida's Turn of Intuition into Action." The first concerns the problem of the translation of the term *kōi-teki chokkan* 行為的直観. He presents various terms as possible translations, and then suggests the use of the term "enaction." Second, he applies the notion of "enaction" to a new approach to understanding human cognition—that of Francisco Varela (1946–2001). For Nishida, knowing is not conceptual knowing but practical knowing. Thus, we do not know something in our consciousness, but in our actions. The relationship between the world and us is interactive. The historical world determines our action. It is for this reason that he adopts the term "enaction." He then goes on to examine new aspects of cognitive science in light of this idea.

There are two key phrases in Nishida's philosophy of time. One is "eternal now," and the other is "absolute present." In his chapter entitled "Nishida's Ontology of History," Maraldo examines the decisive difference between these terms. In this context, he discusses the influence that Nishida's student, Tosaka Jun 戸坂潤 (1900–1945), had upon Nishida's own thinking.

Nishida considered “eternal now” to be part of consciousness, existing in the flow of linear time. Tosaka criticized this idea, though, as being bourgeois and not based on daily life. In response to this criticism, Nishida reconstructed his philosophy of time by presenting the notion of “absolute present,” which is contained in historical time. Here, time is not conceived of as a straight line, but rather as a round circle. In each temporal moment, the “absolute present” determines itself, and the present is not determined by the past but by the future.

In “Self-Mirroring and Self-Awareness: Dedekind, Royce and Nishida” Maraldo analyzes Nishida’s concept of self-awareness, comparing it to those of Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) and Josiah Royce (1855–1916). Maraldo first considers what Nishida thought about Dedekind’s definition of infinity, and then moves on to explore how Nishida attempted to address the problems he found therein by employing ideas from Royce. This effort prompted Nishida to devise his self-mirroring structure, which Maraldo probes at considerable depth. This notion became the basis for Nishida’s concept of “place” (*basho* 場所). The relationship between judgment, intentional consciousness, and pure act is fundamental for understanding Nishida. This chapter deftly reveals how this structure of knowing is constructed and functions in Nishida’s philosophy.

“What Phenomenologists Can Learn from Nishida about Self-Awareness” lays out the commonalities and differences between Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology, comparing in particular the thought of Nishida and Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Whereas Husserl conceived of the whole as transcendental subjectivity, Nishida thought all experience is in “consciousness” or “pure experience.” Where Husserl’s “I” is the stream of experience, Nishida’s “self” is self-reflecting and conceived of as mirroring. Nishida’s consciousness does not imply a first-person perspective. Maraldo goes on to discuss the merits and defects of self-mirroring awareness in Nishida, and in so doing, produces engaging and original philosophical analysis.

Heidegger and Nishida were famous philosophers who discussed the meaning of “nothingness” and emphasized its importance. Moreover, Heidegger defined the history of philosophy as comprised of onto-theology, and Nishida regarded “the West” itself as “being.” But, as Maraldo points out, we must be aware of the differences between these philosophers, and it is precisely such differences that he examines in depth in “Heidegger and Nishida: Nothingness, God, and Onto-theology.” Nishida distinguishes being and nothingness, and regards nothingness as the ultimate place. The character of Nishida’s nothingness is “absolute” and includes both being

and “relative nothingness.” Heidegger, however, did not turn to nothingness as a means to solve philosophical problems. Rather, Heidegger found a variation of “God” in the history of metaphysics, one in which God is transformed to “Be-ing.”

“Nothing Gives: Marion and Nishida on Gift-giving and God” comprises an original comparison between the thought of Nishida and that of the French philosopher and Roman Catholic theologian, Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946). Marion’s definition of “God” is highly original. It differs from Heidegger’s in that it does not consider God in the context of onto-theology. Rather, Marion thinks of God as a “gift.” In particular, Maraldo examines at great length Marion’s understanding of God’s “love,” which is considered a “gift” that does not need any recipients. He then compares Nishida’s understanding of love—derived from the traditions of Buddhist thought—with that of Marion.

Maraldo examines the notion of “world” in the thought of Nishida and Heidegger in his essay “The Many Senses of the One World: Nishida’s and Heidegger’s Thought in the 1930s and the Environmental Crisis of Today.” Today, the world is often thought of as “one world” because of the interdependent relationship between nations. Normally, the “world” is understood as the “natural world,” understood as being governed by the causal laws of physical nature. But Maraldo contrasts this naturalism with both Nishida’s “creative, historical world” and Heidegger’s understanding of “world.” Nishida explained the dynamic interaction between individuals and the world; Heidegger considered the creativity of the world from the perspective that it is the world itself that forms history. Maraldo thinks that “world” can be considered not only from the perspective of naturalism, but also from cultural and historical perspectives. In doing so, he emphasizes the continuing relevance of the thought of both Nishida and Heidegger to our present historical conditions.

PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THIS VOLUME

I will focus on three aspects of Maraldo’s volume that are particularly noteworthy, though there are indeed numerous other significant points that could be elaborated upon.

The Cultural and Political Significance of Nishida’s Philosophy

First, Maraldo has clearly demonstrated that the theoretical framework of Nishida’s philosophy influenced not only the development of his epis-

temology and ontology but the development of his cultural and political philosophy as well. His explanation of Nishida's transition from the concept of "eternal now" to that of "absolute present" is particularly satisfying and illuminating, especially as this transition is so central to Nishida's late cultural and political philosophy. Maraldo also lucidly demonstrates how Nishida's cultural and political philosophy developed vis-à-vis his interaction with his students. As is well known, Nishida turned his interest from transcendental problems to concrete problems because many of his students were fascinated with Marx. As mentioned above, Tosaka Jun especially impressed Nishida and had a profound influence upon him. Tosaka constructed his own philosophy of time on the basis of "everydayness." According to Tosaka, everydayness is the universal structure of history. Tosaka criticized his teacher's philosophy of time as being overly transcendental and not based on daily life. The result, according to Tosaka, was a philosophy that is "bourgeois."

Interestingly, Nishida did not reject Tosaka's criticism. Instead, he deepened his own philosophy by accepting and integrating Tosaka's criticism within it. Nishida initiated radical developments to his philosophy in the first half of the 1930s. Maraldo nicely explains the connection between Nishida's theoretical philosophy and cultural philosophy in his account of the concept of "absolute present." In doing so he reveals the decisive difference between the concepts of "eternal now" and "absolute present." In the "eternal now," time is conceived as circular. Past and future vanish in the present. The present is eternal. This is the point of Tosaka's criticism. Such an idea does not contain an historical standpoint. Based on this criticism, Nishida changed his fundamental framework.

In the "absolute present," each present is determined by, and in, its context. The absolute present is indexical and determines itself in each moment. It is similar to a linguistic expression whose reference shifts according to context. The meaning of the absolute present is determined by its situation. So "present" encompasses pasts and futures and has historical meaning. The absolute present is similar to Tosaka's everydayness. According to Nishida, the image of time is a circle without a center. Furthermore, the concept of "absolute present" is relevant to cultural and political philosophy, especially to the problems of Japanese culture and the nation-state. Nishida's discourse leads to the admission that there is no nation as center in this world, but rather that each nation tries to identify its function as central in its nation. Maraldo has convincingly demonstrated these connections between Nishida's theoretical and cultural philosophy.

Applying Nishida's Philosophy to Modern Science and Current Problems

Second, Maraldo makes compelling connections between Nishida's philosophy and problems facing the contemporary world. Two of the essays in this volume do so in particularly explicit ways: "The Problem of World Culture: Appropriating Nishida's Philosophy of Nation and Culture," and "Enaction in Cognitive Science and Nishida's Turn of Intuition into Action." In the former essay, Nishida's philosophy of culture is applied to multicultural society. The commonplace understanding of Nishida's philosophy is that it is overly Japan-centric. Maraldo, however, does not reduce Nishida's discourse in this simplistic manner. Rather, he points to the possibilities for global culture that it contains. This does not mean, of course, that Maraldo ignores certain problematic elements in Nishida's writings, such as his overly simplistic contrast between the "West" and the "East," which ignores the complexities underlying each of these terms. In the same way, Nishida also reduced "Japan" to a homogenous unity, ignoring the multiplicity found within Japanese culture. Such criticisms should not be overlooked, and Maraldo does not do so. Nevertheless, Maraldo does point out that Nishida not only predicted the rise of our multicultural, multiethnic world, but believed that a true world culture would arise from the interaction of a variety of cultures. Maraldo extrapolates from this idea and applies it to multicultural nations, substituting Nishida's notion of "world culture" for the multicultural nation-state. In so doing, Maraldo proposes a way to think with Nishida in our present situation.

In the latter essay, Maraldo comes up with a highly original term to render *kōi-teki chokkan*—a phrase that is central to Nishida's philosophy, yet notoriously difficult to translate. Maraldo's choice, "enaction," is not only consistent with Nishida's views, but also opens up rich possibilities for the application of Nishida's philosophy to contemporary cognitive science. Maraldo cites the new cognitive science of Francisco Varela, which describes the human body as historical, and the cognitive self as instrumental. In traditional science, scientists strived to ascertain truth capable of verification from a third-person perspective. However, new approaches in cognitive science such as Varela's discuss truth from a first-person, phenomenological perspective. In this view, all cognition is seen as grounded in action. The relationship between the knower and the world is thus expressed as "enacted." This idea is extremely close to Nishida's thoughts on epistemology in his later years, which likewise see knowing as being based on action (*kōi*), with all knowledge arising from the interdependence of self

and world. It is this relation between self and world that is called “action.” Maraldo’s choice of the term “enaction” thus successfully captures this resonance between Nishida’s later thinking and new developments in cognitive science.

The Comparison of Nishida with Other Philosophers

Lastly, Maraldo’s method of explaining Nishida’s philosophy by means of comparisons with an array of other philosophers is highly effective. He compares Nishida’s thought not only with Western philosophers such as Heidegger and Marion, but also with Japanese thinkers like Inoue Enryō, Tosaka Jun, and Tanabe Hajime 田辺元 (1889–1962), among others. His comparison of Nishida and Heidegger, discussed above, illustrates the rigorosity of Maraldo’s approach. He avoids easy identifications due to the use of similar terms—such as both Nishida and Heidegger’s use of “nothingness”—and illuminates the nuanced differences in the ways terms such as these are employed. Likewise, his three-way comparison of Dedekind, Royce, and Nishida, also discussed above, not only sheds new light on the understanding of Nishida, but on that of the other thinkers as well.

Maraldo’s comparisons of Nishida with other Japanese philosophers is likewise instructive, as in the case of Tosaka Jun’s influence on Nishida mentioned above. “How Meiji-Japan Appropriated Philosophy from Europe” treats a number of significant thinkers from that period and enables us to better understand the overall flow of the history of philosophy in Japan. In particular, he examines in detail the roles of Inoue Tetsujirō and Inoue Enryō, two philosophers with a deep understanding of Western philosophy who tried to construct original, modern philosophies that integrated aspects of Confucian and Buddhist thought. Maraldo’s sophisticated contextualization of the efforts of these two thinkers helps us better understand Nishida’s place in the history of philosophy in Japan.

Philosophy in its origin was conceived of as a universal endeavor. Nishida’s profound and extensive philosophical writings are not merely “Japanese” or for Japanese people alone. John Maraldo has done the philosophical community a great service by situating Nishida’s thought within the broad global sweep of modern philosophy. His volume will aid contemporary philosophers worldwide—Japanese and otherwise—to build upon some of Nishida’s insights to create new ways of thinking that are relevant

to our contemporary age. Such endeavors no longer belong to a field known as “Japanese philosophy,” but rather, to the universal discipline of “philosophy.”

A Soga Ryōjin Reader. By Jan Van Bragt. Edited by Wamae Muriuki. Introduction by Michael Conway. Nagoya: Chisokudō Publications, 2017. 566 pages. Paperback: ISBN 978-1-9738-1208-1.

TSUNODA YUICHI

Soga Ryōjin 曾我量深 (1875–1971) is “arguably the most innovative thinker in the history of modern Shin Buddhism,”¹ yet his works are still unknown to non-Japanese readers interested in modern Japanese Shin Buddhist thought. *A Soga Ryōjin Reader* by Jan Van Bragt (1928–2007) is the first collection of English translations of Soga’s theses, essays, and lectures. This work finally gives English-language readers access to the creative nature of Soga’s thought.

The translator, Jan Van Bragt, was the first acting director of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan. Moreover, he was a Catholic priest, who belonged to the Society of the Divine Word. He had dedicated himself to interreligious dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity for many years before he passed away in 2007. According to the foreword by James W. Heisig, Van Bragt had a deep affection for Soga, and worked on translating *Soga Ryōjin senshū* 曾我量深選集 (*The Selected Works of Soga Ryōjin*)² into English between 1989 and 2003. When Van Bragt passed away, he left behind “a trove of translations” (p. 1). Subsequently, Wamae Muriuki edited Van Bragt’s notes into publishable form (p. 3), and the present volume is the result of these efforts.

Van Bragt’s translations have several features that are different from ordinary academic translations. In the introduction to the book, Michael Conway notes that the content of the book is “a collection of partial translations and

¹ Robert F. Rhodes, “Soga Ryōjin: Life and Thought,” in *Cultivating Spirituality: A Modern Shin Buddhist Anthology*, eds. Mark L. Blum and Robert F. Rhodes (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), p. 101.

² Soga Ryōjin, *Soga Ryōjin senshū*, 12 vols., ed. Soga Ryōjin Senshū Kankōkai 曾我量深選集刊行会 (Tokyo: Yayoi Shobō, 1970–72).