

# Dialogues, East and West

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN DR. PAUL TILLICH AND  
DR. HISAMATSU SHIN'ICHI

## PART TWO

Participants: Paul Tillich  
Hisamatsu Shin'ichi  
Interpreters: Richard DeMartino  
Fujiyoshi Jikai

*Tillich:* I am so sorry that I wasn't able to attend any further public lectures of yours. Mrs. Tillich, however, attended the art lecture. She was an art-historian in Germany.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu:* Did she offer any comment?

*Tillich:* Yes. She was very much grasped by the way in which you combined art and the experience of the ultimate—the transcendent formlessness.

*DeMartino:* The Formless Self.

*Tillich:* Yes, the Formless Self; how you coupled the artistic form with the Formless Self. I don't know whether you have a special subject to discuss today. If not, I would like to ask this question, because I have been asked myself about it: "How do you integrate them?" Mrs. Tillich simply said that you did, but she couldn't develop how. So I would like to ask you: "How did you bring together the Formless Self and the artistic form?"

*Fujiyoshi for Hisamatsu:* I also have many questions to ask you: I should like to learn from you; but we may start with this.

*Hisamatsu (in Japanese):* What I call the Formless Self includes, in so far as it is Self, Self-awareness. But by this Formless Self (or Self-awareness), I mean the 'Formless-Myself,' which 'Formless-Myself' has activities. In its activities, then, the Formless Self expresses—or presents—Itself.

\* For the Introductory Statement and Part One, see the *Eastern Buddhist*, Vol. IV, No. 2, October, 1971, pp. 89-107. *Ed.*

*Fujiyoshi* for *Hisamatsu*: He says that the Formless Self—as Self—means Self-consciousness, and since it is Self—or the Formless “Myself”—it has functions. So, when the Formless Self functions, it expresses Itself.

*DeMartino*: What is being underscored here is that the Zen Formless Self is not a dead ontological concept. It is rather a “living” Self-awakening—or Self-actualization—capable of creative Self-expression.

*Tillich*: With contents? Not beyond contents?

*DeMartino*: “With contents” and “beyond contents.” For, on the one hand, as a “living” Formlessness that is functioning, it can express Itself in—or through—any content. On the other hand, however, whatever the content or “form,” artistic or otherwise, through which it may express Itself, it always expresses Itself as a Formless—and in that sense as a “contentless”—Self.

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s question was whether the expression of the Formless Self is with contents or beyond contents.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): The Formless Self has boundless contents. In Zen it is said, “In ‘Not-a-Single-Thing’ there is an inexhaustible store of contents.”

*Fujiyoshi* for *Hisamatsu*: It has endless contents.

*Tillich*: Endless?

*DeMartino*: The forms or contents available to it are unlimited.

*Tillich*: So content would mean, for example, the sea, the mountain, or the landscape that is painted.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): No. Scenery, such as mountains and rivers or flowers and birds, constitutes the *Moment* for the Formless Self to express Itself. Zen art has nothing to do with a realistic copying of natural phenomena. When painted, the landscape may seem to be the content of the painting, but the true content is the Formless Self.

*Fujiyoshi* for *Hisamatsu*: He says that the mountain, river, bird, or flower that is painted is a kind of content....

*Tillich*: Of the Formless Self?

*DeMartino*: Or “Motif.” Actually, he used the German word, *Moment*. The bird or the landscape serves as the *Moment* of the Formless Self in its Self-expression.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): So the *Moment* is not the real content.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: The *Moment* or *Motif* is thus only the apparent content; the genuine content is the Formless Self—ever manifesting Itself, it might again be added, as a “formless-form” or a “contentless-content.”

*Tillich*: But it appears in the *Moment*. Now, does *Moment* here signify the moment of time?

*DeMartino*: It might be better to take it as *Motif*.

*Tillich*: Both words come from *moverem*, “moving” in English. *Moment* is a derivation of *movere*, to move. It is originally Latin, *movimentum*, the movement.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): For *Moment*, there is in Buddhism the expression “en” (縁).

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Akin to *Moment* is a Buddhist word that may be translated as “condition” or “relation.”

*Fujiyasbi*: “Condition” or “impulse.”

*Tillich*: You wouldn’t say “element”?

*Fujiyasbi* for *Hisamatsu*: No; it is not element.

*DeMartino*: I think that your term, *kairos*, the right time, would be closer. For in one of its meanings, the Buddhist concept that he mentioned, *en*, in Japanese, may be taken as connoting the right condition at the right time—so, perhaps, the right “occasion.” For instance, a Zen student totally absorbed in or grasped by his ultimate problem (or *koan*), suddenly hears a bird singing: the constellation—or “affinity”—of those conditions being just right, he awakens.

*Tillich*: He hears a bird sing?

*DeMartino*: Yes.

*Tillich*: Namely, in a way that makes it possible for him to make music also.

*DeMartino*: Yes; hearing the bird sing, as you would say, “opens him up” to his true Self. The conditions being exactly right at that time, through the *en*, *Moment*, or occasion of the bird singing, he hears the Song of Him-Self—or in more traditional Zen terminology, he hears the ‘Sound of One-Hand.’ This “relation”—if it can be called such—may then later be reversed. Thus, if the awakened Formless Self should paint the form of a bird singing, that would now be an expression—or “singing”—of the Formless Self through the *Moment* of the bird.

*Tillich*: Because he was opened up by the bird singing?

*DeMartino*: It needn't be solely because of that. He could also paint something else with form and express his True—or Formless—Self through that *Matif* or *Moment*.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Hence, things with form are really without form. Whatever has form has its authentic import in having no form.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Consequently, a form expresses its genuine nature in transcending or negating its form—in other words, as a “form-without-form,” or, again, as a “formless-form.”

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): The mark of Zen aesthetic appreciation, accordingly, is to see within form what is formless—which means to see in things with form the Self-Without-Form.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: The key to an appreciation of Zen art, therefore, is to appreciate in the artistic form the Self-Without-Form that is being expressed...(*Tillich*: In it?)...yes, or through it.

*Tillich*: That is quite similar to my own thinking. The “depth of being in it,” I would call it.

*DeMartino*: Instead of “Being,” Dr. Hisamatsu prefers the designation, “Formless Self.” He didn't say this, but I think that one point of difference between the two of you is that whereas for you “depth of being” eventually leads to God as the ultimate source of being, for him it would not be God but Self—man's true or “Formless” Self.

*Tillich*: Yes. Perhaps, then, we should now turn to what Dr. Hisamatsu wishes to ask. I am open for your question.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): The question I would like to ask is this: historically there have always been various religions; but can they all properly be called religions? Expressed otherwise, what is true or justifiable religion? I think that religion ought to have an objective validity in human nature that is different from that of science, art and morality. Yet, although different from—and transcending—all of the latter, it ought to be of significance for them also. But where in man's nature is there the basis for such a religion? In brief, my question is where in the nature of the human being would you find the valid, objective ground for religion?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu's focal question is, “What constitutes true or justifiable religion?” Put another way, he is asking, “What in human nature would be the point of ‘objective validity’ that makes religion—as

distinguished from science, art, or morality—both possible and necessary?” This is the problem he is discussing in his faculty seminar here at Harvard. To explain it a little further, science (or the cognitive enterprise generally), morals, and art all rest, in Dr. Hisamatsu’s view, on what is termed “autonomous reason,” but what is finally an inner contradiction. True religion, however, goes beyond science (or the cognitive-rational), beyond morals, and beyond art. The question that he is posing—and which he put to the faculty seminar—is: What is it in the make up of the human being that both constitutes the basis and accounts for the necessity of religion? In sum, if you wanted to establish the *raison d’être* for religion through an analysis of man’s nature, where in that nature would you locate the foundation and the need for religion?

*Tillich*: Perhaps I could say—not definitively, but as a preliminary answer—the experience of belonging to the Infinite and of being excluded from it at the same time. Man is by nature related to the Infinite. He is not infinite, but he is related to it. He is not without it, and he is at the same time excluded from it. This double relation seems to me to be the ground of all religion. That is a somewhat short answer to a long question; but, if you wish, I can elaborate it. By “excluded,” I mean “separated.” Also, I don’t use the word “God” here; I use “Infinite.”

*DeMartino*: Man “belongs to” yet is “separated from” and therefore “longs for” the Infinite.

*Tillich*: Yes. Good! Thank you. That is exactly what I mean.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): When you speak of the “Infinite,” of longing for the “Infinite,” what is the Infinite? Is it in contrast to the finite?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu asks if the infinite, as you intend it, stands opposed to finitude.

*Tillich*: The word infinite includes some opposition, but if it were a sheer opposition it wouldn’t be infinite.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Is it in some way without this antithesis?

*Tillich*: Not “without,” otherwise it would be a meaningless word.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Does it both include and go beyond all dualistic polarities?

*Tillich*: Perhaps I should give a few more of the relations. The first is that the Infinite is the ground of the finite, which does not mean “cause,” but which

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means "creative ground." The second is that the Infinite is the judge of the finite; there the real separation comes in. The third is that the Infinite is the reunion with the finite. I have now simplified my theological thinking, but these three relations should be mentioned.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Is this reunion the aim of religion?

*Tillich*: Yes.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Is it, then, that the divisiveness is on the side of the finite, while the "Grund" and the judging are on the side of the Infinite? In morals, for example, there is the redemption of good and evil. In the case of good and evil, how would you explain the relations of the Grund, the judging, and the final reunion?

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: He asks if you would illustrate the three aspects of the Infinite as they pertain to the problem of good and evil.

*Tillich*: The word "judging"—*kriainis*, in Greek—means separating between good and evil.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: When, in judging, the good is separated from the evil, what is the ground of that separation—or that "distinction"?

*Tillich*: The freedom of man to act against what he essentially is, is the evil—the possibility of evil.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu wishes to inquire now not about the source of evil, but about the basis for the discrimination between good and evil.

*Tillich*: That is the same; the acting against one's essential being.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: What would the "reunion" represent in this matter of good and evil?

*Tillich*: Overcoming evil by the good.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Is it actually possible for good to put an end to evil, or is this an interminable human quest? That is, is the reunion a real possibility, or is it just an ever-elusive goal that man pursues endlessly?

*Tillich*: This is not an alternative. In order to be in search of something, you must already have experienced it in some fragmentary way—otherwise you wouldn't even ask for it.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Is the fragmentary "having" a historical reality?

*Tillich*: Yes. I would say that in our conversation today, some split between religions and human beings is being overcome fragmentarily.

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*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: If that is a "fragmentary" reunion, what of the complete or total reunion?

*Tillich*: The total reunion is a transcendent symbol; it is not an empirical or experiential reality.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): I can see that such a way of thinking will lead to that conclusion. But doesn't this idea of reunion contain a contradiction? For what is sought as an historical actuality remains from beginning to end a symbol; that is, the reunion does not become actualized in history because it is in its very nature beyond man's reach.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Isn't there a contradiction involved in this idea of reunion in that although seeking it may indicate some fragmentary having of it, by its own nature it is unattainable?

*Tillich*: Why is that a contradiction?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: If the reconciliation sought cannot be attained, that for Dr. Hisamatsu is a contradiction in that man is striving for something that is not fully accessible to him.

*Fujiyoshi* for *Hisamatsu*: Is that not a contradiction as regards the reunion?

*DeMartino*: Man's having to seek it, wanting to seek it, trying to seek it, yet his being unable to actualize it because it is in fact unactualizable constitutes, in Dr. Hisamatsu's view, a contradiction.

*Tillich*: It is not a logical contradiction. It happens every day.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: The longing is not satisfied because it cannot be satisfied.

*Tillich*: No; I would say it is gratified, but only by anticipation. Perhaps besides fragmentary fulfillment, you can also introduce the term "anticipation." It surely comes nearer to what he wants. But anticipation of something is not having it. To anticipate it is a kind of having it, but is also a kind of not having it. Could you translate for him the German word, "Vorwegnahme"?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Then doesn't this constitute the problem?

*Tillich*: Where is the problem?

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): The problem is that it is impossible for evil to be thoroughly subdued by the good, even though it ought to be. Any unqualified suppression,<sup>1</sup> therefore, can be nothing other than a wish or

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unfulfillable expectation. Wouldn't this, however, leave man with a sense of hopelessness?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: The good cannot entirely eliminate the evil that ought to be radically eliminated. Any such eradication, accordingly, can be no more than a desire or unrealizable expectation. But can man rest with what amounts to this sort of a "hopeless-hope"?

*Tillich*: There is another element in it, a third element. There is hope; there is anticipation, which is more than hope; and the third element is the certainty that it has been overcome in Eternity.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: What is the basis of that certainty?

*Tillich*: This is a most relevant question. The anticipatory experience includes both the fulfillment and the not-yet-fulfillment. Out of the anticipatory experience we derive as an element—we have in it as an element—the eternal fulfillment: being Eternal in the midst of time. If we are Eternal in the midst of time, we are still in time; but there is an element in time—in the temporal moment—that is more than temporality. This is the answer to the question, "From where do you know?" For in the anticipatory act we have it by anticipation. It is wonderfully expressed in Paul; I cannot express it as well.

*Fujiyoshi* for *Hisamatsu*: Is this the same as Leibnitz's theory of the preestablished harmony of God?

*Tillich*: I don't think so. It is much more the paradox of St. Paul than it is Leibnitz's philosophy. Perhaps I should give this quotation from Paul: "Not that I have reached it or that I be perfect; but I hunt after it—to grasp it—as I am grasped by Christ." Now there you have both: "I hunt after it—to grasp it—as I am grasped." Here you have the two sides.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): If that is the case, does the anticipation take place in the form of faith?

*Fujiyoshi* for *Hisamatsu*: Is this anticipation or presupposition an expression of faith?

*Tillich*: It is not presupposition, but anticipation. Presupposition is a logical argument; anticipation is an experience.

*DeMartino*: Dr. Hisamatsu asked whether this is an anticipation of, by, or through faith.

*Tillich*: That depends on what is understood by faith. If faith is taken as belief



in something, then it has nothing to do with faith. But if faith is the state of being grasped or gripped by some ultimate concern—or by the ultimate, simply—then it is faith. Anticipation is not a logical argument, a presupposition, or an act of belief; rather, it is an experience: an experience of the presence of the Ultimate in the preliminary, of the Eternal in the temporal, or of the Perfect in the imperfect. It can be spoken of as faith if faith is defined as the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Then “anticipation” is not identical with “ultimate concern.”

(Here there is a break in the tape.)

*DeMartino* for *Tillich* (in Japanese): No; it is not the anticipation itself but what is anticipated that is the ultimate concern.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): To return to the matter of morals, I think the reason that it is not possible for good to uproot evil exhaustively is that good cannot be established as such except in contrast to evil. Even if some specific good should once conquer some specific evil, this moral triumph would be no more than relative. Sooner or later another clash would inevitably ensue—which means, consequently, an unceasing conflict. So is it not precisely the nature of morals that precludes there ever being an absolute “good”?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: He now asks for your comment concerning his own interpretation of morals: namely, that it is impossible for good to dislodge evil completely in so far as good can be discriminated as “good” solely in contradistinction to “not good”—or “evil.”

*Tillich*: I didn’t say that.

*DeMartino*: No, he is saying this. (*Tillich*: Yes.)

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: While there may be a relative or temporary containment of some aspect of evil by some aspect of good, there cannot be a pure good in which the positive unconditionally displaces the negative. This is because it is an innate characteristic of judgment that the positive or affirmative always entails—at least by logical implication—its negative opposite.

*Tillich*: Yes. In Eternity we anticipate a victory that does not abolish evil, but reduces it to mere potentiality. We can say that in God—or in the ground of being—evil is conquered not by being annihilated, but by not being actualized. It is actualized in finitude—in the finite world, but not in the infinite ground of being.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Evil will avoid total effacement perennially, inasmuch as moral judgment has as its basis the duality of good and evil. In short, is it not the very nature of judgment that accounts for the impossibility of the negative judgmental element ever being wholly obliterated? For would not any judgment necessarily require—even if only, in your terms, as a “potential”—the negative pole?

*Tillich*: Yes; but “potential” is different from “actual.” Of course, the evil must be potential in the divine ground; otherwise it never could become actual.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): But is that the way to solve the problem of evil historically?

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Not “historically.” Dr. Tillich’s position is that evil is overpowered in Eternity, by being reduced to mere potentiality—but it is not destroyed. This sort of subjugation is “anticipated” by man in history, but he cannot fully realize it historically.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): That the outright destruction of the negative element by the positive cannot be historical derives from the fact that judgment itself—whether moral, intellectual, or artistic—is based on the mutual discordance of the two elements.

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich would agree—in terms of “potentiality.” But for Dr. Tillich the difference is this: whereas in history the evil is actual—as is the good, in Eternity the evil does not become actualized; it is left as a sheer potentiality.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: When it is said that in Eternity evil is no more than a potentiality, is this to say that it disappears from actuality?

*Tillich*: Yes, and not just in the future, but also in the past and present.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu does not consider it possible for evil alone to be expunged from actuality.

*Tillich*: Yes, it is possible. Evil is never in God; therefore, in so far as we participate in Eternity, we are beyond evil.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Even if evil is reduced to potentiality in Eternity, would that remove it from actuality?

*Tillich*: In Eternity, but not in time. In time and history evil persists; the struggle in history is continuous.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: So that historically the confrontation remains.

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*Tillich*: Historically it remains. I do not believe in the progressive elimination of evil.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Doesn't this inability to do away with the conflict between good and evil in history present an ultimate problem for man?

*Tillich*: In what sense an ultimate problem?

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: In the sense that since the historical battle between good and evil will go on forever, this constitutes—as regards moral striving—an “*aporia*.”

*Tillich*: Yes, “*aporia*,” “there is no way out.”

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu maintains, moreover, that this “*aporia*” is not peculiar to the field of morals, but is also to be found within the regions of the cognitive and the aesthetic.

*Tillich*: Oh, yes.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: This is why he says that, finally, they all rest on an inner contradiction. For in whichever arena value-judgments are made, the “positive” value is inescapably antithetical to—and thereby indissolubly linked with—the contradictory or “negative” value.

(Here there is another break in the tape.)

*DeMartino for Tillich* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich says, “Pure being would be death.”

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Then the problem is this: value does not subsist in isolation; it is unavoidably related to being. So, conversely, with being; for man, no being is dissociated from value. In man, therefore, these two are interfused.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Value does not stand by itself; it is invariably connected with existence or being. One does not make value-judgments apart from existence; nor is one involved in existence without making value-judgments. For human beings these two go together. Dr. Hisamatsu's point is that the absonance between the positive and the negative exists not solely in the domain of value, but also in that of being. Within the area of value, he is contending, a purely positive valuation is impossible; that is, there can never be pure goodness or pure truth or pure beauty.

*Tillich*: No, of course not.

*DeMartino*: Similarly, neither can there be pure existence—or, to use your term, “pure being.”

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*Tillich*: No. That would be death.

*DeMartino*: Not that it would be death; but that the concept of being necessarily implies non-being.

*Tillich*: I agree very much. Therefore I deny that there is being without non-being even in God.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Oh, does Dr. Tillich also think so? Then, putting aside the case of God, with man, being and non-being—or as regards organic life, birth and death—are inseparable; they cannot but prevail dualistically. It is the same with value and dis-value. In man, consequently, the contradictions inhering in the dualities of being and non-being and of value and dis-value come to be one. This single, combined contradiction, which is different from the relative contradictions that emerge from the process of history, may, accordingly, be considered to be man's basic contradiction.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: For Dr. Hisamatsu the contradictory dichotomy between the positive and the negative indigenous to the singularly inter-related worlds of value and being, is not a relative contradiction that arises from history, but is a fundamental or "root" contradiction that underlies man's uniquely "human" existence.

*Tillich*: Yes; for man, so it is.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu would like to ask if this may be referred to—using Kant's term, "*Antinomie*"—as the "ultimate antinomy"?

*Tillich*: Yes, antinomy in man. Yes; I could probably accept that, if I would see the implications.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: His first question is whether this ultimate contradiction may be spoken of as an "ultimate antinomy"?

*Tillich*: No, I don't call it a contradiction. A contradiction is a logical mistake.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): What I consider to be the "ultimate antinomy" is neither exclusively of logic nor of will nor of feeling; it involves all three. It cannot be reduced, therefore, either to contradiction, dilemma, or agony; all three are there as one.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: He agrees that taken strictly, "contradiction" is a logical designation; that is why he prefers the word "antinomy," because he feels it is not restricted. His conception of the "ultimate antinomy"

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embraces at least three elements: in the logical or cognitive realm, it is that of contradiction; in the emotional or affective realm, of anguish; and in the volitional or conative realm—where will and decision are involved, of dilemma. In Dr. Hisamatsu's view, human nature is such that these several components coalesced as one delineate man's cardinal contradictory antagonism—or "dualistic opposition."

*Tillich*: Of essential goodness and...(*De Martino*: No.) He does not use the words potential and actual?

*De Martino*: No. For Dr. Hisamatsu it is the dualistic opposition between the positive and the negative: existentially (or, if the term is permissible, "onto-existentially"), between being and non-being; axiologically, between the good and the "not-good"—or "evil"—in the sphere of morals, the beautiful and the unbeautiful in aesthetics, and the true and the untrue in the dominion of the cognitive.

*Tillich*: But the relation is much more dialectical: because the good, the true, or the beautiful is always that which is positive, which is given; while the other is the distortion of it, and cannot live without it. The good can be without the evil.

*De Martino*: That is what he is denying.

*Tillich*: The evil cannot be without the good. Here the only way of reconciliation between us would be that he accept the distinction between potentiality and actuality. Then I could agree with him, that potentially there must be evil even in God—potentially, but not actually.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Whether a matter of distortion or not, the contradictory opposition of the two remains ineluctable.

*De Martino to Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): For Dr. Tillich, the good can be without the evil.

*Tillich*: But not without the potential evil. That is decisive. If he doesn't accept the concepts of potential and actual, then I cannot maintain my position. Perhaps you can give him an example. Hate is the distortion of love, but love is not the distortion of hate.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): I should say it is not that you cannot maintain your position, it is more that we are unable to accept your position. But let us put that aside for the moment. My concern at present is to emphasize that this ultimate antinomy—or "dualism"—permeates the very center of man's

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being; no attempt, consequently, to resolve it within this framework will ever be successful.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: What Dr. Hisamatsu wishes to stress at this juncture is that since human nature is innately beset by this core antinomy that includes as one all of the forms that it takes in the various dimensions mentioned, so long as man continues within his—or “its”—dualistic framework, the problem can never be resolved.

*Tillich*: Not resolved; but it is different whether it is simply going on or whether there is the fragmentary, anticipatory overcoming. This makes all the difference.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): What I would like to speak of, however, is not a fragmentary, anticipatory overcoming, but a fundamental resolution that goes down to the root. For the ultimate antinomy can be resolved only at its root; that is why it cannot be dealt with either by cognitive-learning, morality, or art. Still, to solve this problem that reason cannot solve, there must be a solution that will nevertheless satisfy reason. That is, although the problem cannot be solved by “rationality,” as it is an affliction of the “rational” or “human” being, every such being has the inevitable desire to solve it. Thus it is that the proper concern of religion is no other than to resolve this ultimate antinomy.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: I think that in effect Dr. Hisamatsu is now presenting his own answer to the question he originally asked you; namely, what is it in the nature of man that necessitates—and provides the ground for—religion? In Dr. Hisamatsu’s understanding, man is characterized by a central opposition or “ultimate antinomy” that cannot be resolved by autonomous reason in any of its several provinces—the cognitive-intellectual, the moral-volitional, or the aesthetic-emotional. Yet, it is precisely as a “rational” being that man is existentially ensnared in this all-pervading dualism. (*Tillich*: Yes.) Accordingly, man has to go beyond his autonomous reason in order to solve at its root this ultimate problem that his reason cannot solve with a solution that will nevertheless satisfy his reason. It is in this analysis that Dr. Hisamatsu finds not alone the necessity and the ground—or what he terms the “objective validity”—for religion, but also what he considers to be its true or justifiable *raison d’être*.

*Tillich*: How does this differ from what I said about creative ground, judgment

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involving separation or estrangement, and then reconciliation as the final aim? Is there any difference?

*Fujiyoshi to DeMartino* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich's resolution is historical—or relative; Dr. Hisamatsu's is not.

*DeMartino* (in Japanese): No, Dr. Tillich's final resolution is not historical; it is realized in Eternity.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Is this Eternity, for Dr. Tillich, separate from history or does it incorporate history?

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: When you say that there is a "reconciliation" or "reunion" in Eternity...(*Tillich*: Yes)...does that Eternity include history?

*Tillich*: "Include"? No, I wouldn't say so.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Not in any sense?

*Tillich*: As potentiality, yes; but not as actuality.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: What exactly is the relation between Eternity and history?

*Tillich*: Out of Eternity, history comes or goes; and to Eternity it returns.

*DeMartino*: Would you say that Eternity is expressed in history?

*Tillich*: Yes.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): When man strives for historical achievements in the worlds of morality, art, and learning, these achievements often come to be regarded as the objectives for which ordinary men live. Despite the fact that my standpoint is different from Dr. Tillich's, I, too, would say that Eternity creates history or expresses itself in history. But I should like to begin the consideration of Eternity with the problem of the basic antinomy that encompasses morality, art, and learning; for it is the problem of this antinomy that opens up the direction toward Eternity—that is, toward religion.

*DeMartino to Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): I think Dr. Tillich would agree. What Dr. Tillich does not yet see, however, is the difference between the reconciliation or reunion of which he spoke and the resolution of which you are speaking.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu*: Though Dr. Hisamatsu's understanding of what is meant by "reconciliation" or "reunion" is admittedly limited, his feeling is that it does not seem to offer a conclusive resolution of man's ultimate antinomy.

*Tillich*: "Resolution" comes from the Latin, *solvere* or *re-solvere*. "Resolution" means eliminating a complex that is disagreeable because it is full of tensions and conflicts; this is dissolved—the tensions are taken away. Now, isn't reunion the same as taking away the tensions? I don't see the difference.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): In the Zen way of removing or dissolving the antinomy, man's combined agony, dilemma, and contradiction provides the "*Moment*" for the resolution. That is why Zen makes so much of doubting. As Dr. Tillich likewise has written, ordinarily in religion—including Buddhism—people are exhorted to have faith without doubt. But in Zen, on the contrary, people are asked to doubt radically. This kind of doubt, however, is not that entertained in a scholarly or cognitive endeavor. The word may be intellectual, but it is far more fundamental than intellectual doubt; it is a "total" doubt. For this "Doubt" is oneself *as* the ultimate antinomy—that is, it is the "*antinomic existence*," so to speak, of oneself and the world. Expressed otherwise, this "Doubt" is not merely of an "objective" character, but may be described as being of a "fundamentally subjective" character.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: He is now trying to get at the difference by explaining the Zen way to attain this resolution. For Zen, unlike many other religions—even other schools of Buddhism, not only does not deny but indeed requires doubt. In Zen, the necessary precondition for the solution of man's ultimate antinomy is that radical "Doubt" in which man exhaustively actualizes himself and the world *as* the ultimate antinomy. Thus, in spite of its being a cognitive or intellectual term, this doubt is not narrowly intellectual. It is, rather, the consummate crystallization of the basic dualistic opposition that engulfs the individual and the world.

*Tillich*: Yes.

*DeMartino*: Hence, in Zen, oneself and the world becoming thoroughly what I like to call this "Great-Doubt-Block"—which is no other than the ultimate antinomy actualized-in-itself—is a prerequisite to its resolution.

*Tillich*: Is he acquainted with my *Dynamics of Faith*?

*DeMartino*: Yes, Dr. Hisamatsu is well aware of—and earlier specifically referred to—your own writing on the important role of doubt in religion.

*Tillich*: I sometimes have the feeling that his concept of Christian faith is the old-fashioned concept of believing in things.



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*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): For Dr. Tillich faith under no condition is ever a matter of sheer belief; it constantly entails doubt.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Yes; his is not ordinary faith.

*DeMartino*: He understands that your faith comprehends the element of doubt.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): In Zen, however, the dissolution of the Doubt is a matter not of faith, but of Awakening.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu is now getting to the critical difference. For in Zen, when one has become this consummately crystallized "Doubt" or 'antinomic-existence-in-itself,' the solution consists in the dissipation of that Doubt not through faith but through a new Awakening.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): So that with the dispelling of the ultimate antinomy, every agony, contradiction, and dilemma is resolved in one and the same instant. This is the nature of the Zen resolution.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: With the radical or "root" Awakening that is the breaking-up of the fully "existentialized" ultimate antinomy or "Great Doubt," all of its problematic constituents—intellectual contradiction, emotional anguish, and volitional dilemma—are "im-mediately" and totally resolved.

*Tillich*: Resolved, but by anticipation!

*DeMartino*: No; this is the crucial difference. The Zen solution is not one of anticipation; it is an actual resolution.

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich thought that the resolution of Zen is also by anticipation.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): No; it is actual, not by anticipation.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: He confirms that it is an actual solution—which accordingly eventuates, I might add, not in a "future," "transcendent," or "symbolic" Eternity, but in what may be characterized as an "actualized eschatology," Here-Now.

*Tillich*: In time and space?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: In this "opening-up"—or "break-through"—there is no "in time and space."

*Tillich*: But it can happen in time and space—here, yesterday, tomorrow?

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: If it were no more than temporal or spatial, then it could not be said to be conclusive.

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): I think the purport of Dr. Tillich's question is that if it is asserted that the Awakening is the actual resolution of man's underlying binary opposition—which can be attained by any man—then it would seem to have to take place in time and space.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Yes; but with the Awakening, being just an "ordinary man" comes to an end.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: With the actualization of the resolution, man, ceasing to be simply an "ordinary man," ceases to be simply in time and space. That is, since the dissolution of the ultimate antinomy comes about with the awakening of the "Self-Without-Form"—or the Self as "Formless-Form," it is inappropriate any further to speak solely in terms of the ordinary "self-with-form."

*Tillich*: What is the relationship between the man who is in doubt and the man in whom the awakening occurs? What is the relationship between these two men?

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): The distinction lies in the turning-over of the Self.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: The difference between the man who is the embodiment of the Great Doubt and the man of Awakening is that with the latter, the Self, turning upon Itself, has broken-through and dispelled that Doubt.

*Tillich*: All right. But this happens, for instance, to Dr. Hisamatsu one day. If it happens to him then it happens between the year 1889, in which he was born, and today.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): The Buddhist text entitled the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* does use the term "First-Awakening." But if this meant literally a "first-time-awakening," it would have not merely a beginning but also an ending. Such an awakening, obviously, could not be genuine. So from an ordinary time-space point of view, it may be said that the Awakening unfolds at a certain time and place. If, however, time and space were to belong to the awakening itself, then it would not be a true awakening.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Considered from the perspective of time-and-space, the Awakening may seem to take place in time-and-space. But considered from the perspective of the Awakening-in-Itself, it is neither conditioned nor restricted by either time or space. So if there is a temporal beginning or ending to the awakening—or if it is circumscribed by any sort of spatial limitation, then it is not a true awakening. The True Awakening—or

Formless Self—in-Itself has neither a beginning, an ending, a special place, or a special time.

*Tillich*: Then it cannot happen to a human being.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): It is not that it is beyond the capability of a human being. Rather, with this new Self-awakening the problem of the basic antinomy mentioned earlier is resolved, so that one is no longer an "ordinary" human being. Again, however, although we have said "new" Awakening, the Awakening-in-itself has no newness or oldness.

*Fujiyoshi* (in Japanese): The Awakening is a complete "conversion."

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Formless-Self-Awareness is different from the ordinary self-awareness of man. But even to speak of it as different—he referred to it as "new"—is to do so from the standpoint of the "old" or "ordinary" dualistic consciousness. For the "turning-over" that is this Awakening is the Self-actualization of what could perhaps be rendered in your terminology as the 'ground-of-being-itself.' Now, can it be said that the 'ground-of-being-itself' begins or ends—or is at a particular point—in time, or is at a particular place in space?

*Tillich*: No; but this happened to him, Dr. Hisamatsu, and not to Hitler.

*DeMartino*: Since, however, in happening "to him" his Self "turned over"—which means, if I may further interpret this, that it undergoes its fulfillment in a 'Great-Death' or "dying-to-itself" that is at once a 'Great-Birth' "beyond birth-and-death"—the "him" that it "happened to" in one sense ceases "to be."

*Tillich*: Yes; but "his" Self.

*DeMartino*: This is the same issue that arose during the first conversation. The Actualization is not of "his self" in dualistic contrast to "not his self." On the contrary, it is precisely the breaking-up of the simple duality of "himself" and "not himself."

*Tillich*: Then I don't understand why it occurred to him and not to his shoemaker or to Hitler.

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich says that it is *your* self-awakening, because it was not realized, for example, by Hitler.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: He says that it cannot alone be specified as "my" self-awakening or "my" break-through, because the "my" now is a Formless "My."

*Tillich*: Yes, I understand that. But this is a *façon de parler*, that is, a kind of talk. He must make clear why it has something to do with him and not with his shoemaker, otherwise further discussion becomes impossible.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): That this Awakening, while original and basic to all men, fails to come to pass in some is similar, for instance, to the case of children in whom reason has not yet evolved. As these children mature, reason develops and they become rational beings beyond their former state. I think it will be agreed that this being more rational is a truer way of life for man *qua* man. Likewise—and beyond that—there is the Formless Self, for which rationality is not the ultimate way of being, and to which the rational self awakens beyond itself. As this is the ultimately true way for human beings, every one ought to become awakened to this Self—which is to say that every one ought to resolve the antinomic bifurcation that plagues ordinary human existence.

*DeMartino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): But I think Dr. Tillich's question has to do with the fact that what relates to—and ought to be effected by—all, is not accomplished by all.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): This is because there can be no resolution to the religious problem unless it first becomes fully and exhaustively actualized in the person. Ordinarily, however, this consummation is not achieved, even though it ought to be.

*DeMartino* for *Hisamatsu*: Dr. Hisamatsu began his last response by comparing the transformation brought about by the Awakening of the Self-Without-Form to that brought about by the emergence in man of reason. The child, for example, after the development of its reason may be said to have advanced to a truer—but not as yet the consummately true—way of human existence. For beyond reason there is the more radical awakening to—or by—the Formless Self. That this latter Awakening comes to fruition in some but not in all is accounted for by the earlier explanation that the necessary prerequisite for a solution to the religious problem is that it become thoroughly exacerbated and exhaustively capture or “grasp” the individual. That is, notwithstanding that the problem can—and ought to—culminate in a total crystallization in everyone, actually it does not do so.

*Tillich*: Yes, I understand that. But then it happens to somebody and not to somebody else.

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*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Even granting that it occurs to someone, it does not occur to any specially chosen one.

*De Martino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich is not saying that it is gained by any specially chosen person. What he is saying is that when reached by a person, it is reached by—and is the solution of—that person and not some other person.

*Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): That does not make it a purely “individual” or “personal” solution. Just the opposite, it is a resolution that involves—and has to be made by—all mankind. Indeed, it is for this reason that it can be said to have an “objective” validity.

*De Martino* for *Hisamatsu*: Albeit from one viewpoint the resolution may be seen as occurring to “this” person and not to “that” person, it is not exclusively “this” person’s “private,” “personal,” or “individual” solution. For as a resolution of the fundamental antinomy intrinsic to human nature as such, it has a universal—or “objective”—validity.

*Tillich*: Yes; but it is realized here.

*Fujiyasbi*: While it issues forth here, it has a common basis.

*Tillich*: No, it is the principle—like the Holy Spirit in Christianity, which is a principle—that appears in one and does not appear in others.

*De Martino*: Therefore you say that it has its locus in time and space.

*Tillich*: Yes; that means it happens in time and space. If it is manifest in one individual and not in another individual, then time and space enter into the picture.

*De Martino* to *Hisamatsu* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s argument is that if the resolution can be said to come to fruition “in one” and not “in another,” then it must be said to come about in time and space.

*Fujiyasbi* (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s understanding is that the Awakening comes to pass in time and space.

*De Martino*: It seems to be difficult for us to convey your exact import to Dr. Hisamatsu sharply enough in Japanese. Could I, therefore, again say that considered objectively—or dualistically—the Awakening may be said to have occurred to “him” and not to someone else. But in occurring “to him,” he is no longer “him” in simple dualistic opposition to “not him”—or, consequently, to anyone or anything “other” to him. For as the ‘solution-through-dissolution’ of the crystallized polarity of “being-and-nonbeing,”

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the Awakening is precisely the Self-actualization of the non-duality of "himself" and "not himself." Thus, as was also discussed during the first conversation, with the attainment of the resolution, one is at once "oneself" and "not oneself," just as one both "is" and "is not." So it is an Awakening of, by, and to the "Formless" Self—or, in another characterization, the "Selfless" Self. Hence, though it would appear to have its locus in time and space, more correctly the Awakening must be said to have its locus in time-less-time and in spaceless-space—or, to return to an earlier part of this discussion, in Eternity-Infinity.

*Tillich:* Yes. Now this formulation is a little difficult. But as the hour is quite late, I think we should perhaps let the matter rest there for today. Good! Good! Thank you very much. This was really wonderful. I trust it was as enjoyable for you as it was for me.

*DeMartino for Hisamatsu:* Dr. Hisamatsu says the pleasure is all his, and wishes to thank you.

*Tillich:* I shall look forward to meeting you again after the forthcoming recess.