

# THE EASTERN BUDDHIST

## THE LANKAVATARA SUTRA, AS A MAHAYANA TEXT IN ESPECIAL RELATION TO THE TEACHING OF ZEN BUDDHISM

The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*<sup>1</sup> is one of the nine principal Mahayana sutras in Nepalese Buddhism; in China and Japan it also occupies an important position in the philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism as containing the doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha or Ālaya-vijñāna,<sup>2</sup> and also in the literature of Zen Buddhism. The study of the sutra, however, owing to various reasons,<sup>3</sup> has not been so vigorously prosecuted as that of other sutras such as the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, *Vimalakīrti*, or *Avataṃsaka*. This neglect has especially been the case on the part of the followers of Zen, whose traditional indifference to philosophy and the cognate subjects is notorious. One of the reasons is that its Chinese translations are somewhat difficult to understand, which is no doubt partly due to the same quality in the original.

There are three Chinese translations now extant; the earliest one which is recorded to have been made in 412 A.D. was lost so early as 700 when the fourth and last one was produced by Śikshānanda and others. Of these three, the most difficult is that of Guṇabhadra which in all likelihood represents an earlier text, and it has been this too that has been studied most by Zen scholars and commented upon also chiefly by them. Since the publication of the Sanskrit text in 1923 by the late Dr Bunyu Nanjo, scholarly interest in the sutra has been revived to a certain extent in this country. It may not therefore be inopportune to discuss the significance of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* generally as a Mahayana text, but especially as relating to the teaching of Zen Buddhism.

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<sup>1</sup> To be linguistically exact, this is to be romanised *Lāṅkāvatāra*, but for practical reasons ṅ is throughout printed n in this article.

<sup>2</sup> These two terms are explained below.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the author's *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, p. 74 et seq.

## PART I

*Breadth of Mahayana Buddhism*

Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism so called, is like a vast ocean where all kinds of living beings are allowed to thrive in a most generous manner, almost verging on a chaos. Students who lightly step into it generally find it too complicated and overwhelming for their logical comprehension. But the fact is that Mahayanism is the outcome of long years of development of a religious system among a people furnished with the most fertile imagination. The student has to be patient. The best method of study may probably be found by taking up one principal Mahayana sutra at a time, and by examining its contents historically, philosophically, and psychologically. The Chinese scholars of Buddhism encountered the same difficulties centuries ago, and as in those days there was no higher or lower criticism of the sacred texts, every tradition was respected on its face value. The scholars exhausted their ingenuity to make a logical, humanly plausible arrangement among the literature brought over from India and claimed to have been delivered by the Buddha himself. Now this untenable position is abandoned, and each sutra has come to be studied historically, critically, and analytically. Each principal sutra may now be regarded as marking a certain stage or phase of development in the history of Mahayana Buddhism, which is indeed too huge and unwieldy to be handled as one solid piece of work completed within a few decades.

What does then the *Lankāvatāra* signify in the composite system of Mahayanism? What phase does it represent in the history of Buddhism? What in short is the message of the *Lankāvatāra* as we have it now? What function does it or did it perform in the conservation of Buddhist thought and experience?

Each principal sutra has had its special work to accomplish in the unfoldment of the religious consciousness. For instance, the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* marks the epoch in the history of

Buddhism when Śākyamuni ceased to be conceived of as historical personage subject to the fates of all transient beings; for he is no more a human Buddha but one who lives through eternity for the benefit of all creatures. The *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*, at least in part, also belongs to the same period. The *Sukhāvativyūha* represents a stage in the history of Buddhist experience which ceased to be wholly satisfied with the intellectual presentation of the doctrine of enlightenment, when Buddhists began to be oppressed with the idea of sin hanging on them too heavily and too acutely. The *Prajñāpāramitā*, on the other hand, dwelling on the conception of relativity seeks deliverance from the bondage of existence, or rather interprets the Buddhist realisation purely from the metaphysical point of view. The doctrine of Śūnyatā constituting the keynote of the *Prajñāpāramitā* is really the foundation of all the Mahayana schools of Buddhism including even the Yogācāra. What is known as primitive Buddhism denied the existence of a substantial ego (*ātman*), but its conception of the external world was that of the naïve realist. The *Prajñāpāramitā* philosopher insists on the non-existence of a particular body as such, that is, as an entity whose identity is absolute. Every being or every object, as he sees it, is relative, impermanent, and not worth getting attached to. This *Prajñāpāramitā* idea of relativity, or emptiness as the literal sense of the term *śūnyatā* is, is the foundation of the Buddhist theory of nature. As to the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*, it is really the consummation of Buddhist thought, Buddhist sentiment, and Buddhist experience. To my mind, no religious literature in the world can ever approach the grandeur of conception, the depths of feeling, and the gigantic scale of composition as attained by this sutra. It is the eternal foundation of life from which no religious minds can turn back athirst or only partially satisfied. It is a great pity that this magnificent literature still remains concealed in a language not so universally accessible. Not only deeply speculative minds find satisfaction here but humble spirits and heavily-oppressed hearts too will have their burdens lightened. Abstract truths are so concretely, so symbolically represented here, and one will finally come to the

realisation of the truth that even in a particle of dust the whole universe is seen reflected—not this visible universe only but a vast system of universes, conceivable by the highest mind only.

*The Teaching of the Lankavatāra*

Where does the *Lankāvatāra* stand then?

The *Lankāvatāra* may be classed in a way with the *Avatamsaka* inasmuch as it teaches the absolute idealism of the latter and is the disclosure of the inner mind of the Buddha, but it has a special message to give to the Buddhist world in a manner characteristic of the sutra. It is devoid of all symbolism—quite different in this respect from the *Avatamsaka*. It is instead straightforward in expression and notes down in a somewhat sketchy style almost all the important ideas belonging to the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. It is partly for this reason that the sutra requires a great deal of learning as well as insight to understand all the details thoroughly. The principal thesis of the *Lankāvatāra* may however be regarded as summarised in the following passage<sup>1</sup>:

“Again, O Mahāmati, there may be other Śrāmanas and Brahmans who hold the following views: that all things have no self-substance (*niḥsvabhāva*).<sup>2</sup> they are like a cloud, like a circle traced out by a revolving fire-brand, or like the air-castle of the Gandharvas; that they are unborn (*anutpāda*), they are like māyā, or mirage, or the moon in water, or a dream; that external objects are manifestations of the mind erroneously perceived due to false discrimination (*vikalpa*)<sup>2</sup> since time immemorial; that by thus viewing the world one ceases from being conditioned by the false discrimination worked out in one’s own mind, one does away with the terminology belonging to such false discrimination and with the signification of words

<sup>1</sup> This is done mainly from the T’ang version, the Kōkyōshoin edition of the Buddhist Tripitaka, 黃 VI, 87b f. Cf. the Sanskrit text (p. 42 ff.). Throughout this paper, wherever pages are mentioned, unless no specification is given, they refer to the Sanskrit text edited by B. Nanjo.

<sup>2</sup> As to the meaning of these terms, see below.

such as predicating and predicated; that when one understands that the body, property, and abiding place are the particularisations of the Ālaya-vijñāna (or *citta*=mind), one is freed from [ideas such as] perceived and perceiving, attains to a state of no-image, and has no thought of birth, abiding, and disappearance; and that all things start from the evolution of one's own mind (*svacitta*). O Mahāmati, such Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas will before long realise the sameness of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa.

“O Mahāmati, by deeds of great love, skilful means (*upāya*), and effortlessness (*anābhogacārya*), a Bodhisattva reviews all beings and knows that they are like *māyā*, they resemble shadows, they are not produced by causes; and further knowing that the world exists not outside the mind, he would lead a life of formlessness (*nirābhāsa*). As he gradually goes up the higher stages, he will realise a state of Samadhi where he comes to the understanding that the triple world is mind-only (*citta-mātra*). The Samadhi he has attained is called *Māyā*-like (*māyopama*). He will further free himself from all images, perfect his knowledge, and realise that things are unborn, and, entering upon the Samadhi called Vajravimbopama, will obtain the Buddha-body. He will, always abiding in the suchness of things, manifest himself in transformed bodies, he will be endowed with the ten powers, the six psychic faculties, and the tenfold self-mastery. O Mahāmati, adorned with *Upāya* (means), he will visit all the Buddha-lands; and disengaged from the philosophical doctrines as well as from the *Citta*, *Manas*, and *Vijñāna*, he will experience a turning within himself and by degrees attain the Tathagata-body.

“Therefore, O Mahāmati, if a Bodhisattva wishes to attain the Tathagata-body, he should keep himself away from the Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas, *Cittam*, causation, works, discipline, birth, staying, and passing, and cease from discriminating, philosophising, and only abide in the thought of ‘mind-only’ (*citta-mātra*).

“When the triple world is surveyed [by the Bodhisattva], he perceives that this existence is due to memory (*vāsanā*)

accumulated since the beginningless past, but wrongly interpreted. He recognises that Buddhahood is a state imageless, unborn, and to be inwardly experienced by oneself, when the mind gets fully controlled and purposeless deeds are accomplished. Like the cintamani (wish-gem), he will now manifest himself in a variety of forms according to the needs of sentient beings and lead them to the view that the mind-only is, and gradually have them go up the stages. Therefore, O Mahāmātī, let the Bodhisattva discipline himself well in the work of self-realisation (*svasiddhānta*).”<sup>1</sup>

*The All-importance of an Inner Realisation*

The ideas that things are devoid of self-substance (*svabhāva*), that is, they are empty in nature (*śūnya*), that the world is nothing but mind, that in order to reach the ultimate end of Buddhahood one must transcend all the limitations of particularity, and finally that the perfect state of enlightenment must be realised within oneself,—these are the common property of Mahayana Buddhism; but in the *Lankāvatāra* these ideas are developed in a way peculiar to this sutra, as it lays its emphasis especially on the importance of self-realisation, without which the Buddhist life remains a mere philosophical exercise. The reason why Bodhi-Dharma handed this sutra over to Hui-k’ê (慧可) as containing the essence of Zen Buddhism must be sought in this that the constant refrain of the *Lankāvatāra* is the all-importance of an inner perception (*pratyātmagatī*) or self-realisation (*svasiddhānta*). Therefore, the purpose of the sutra is highly practical in spite of its abstract speculations.

In the first chapter which is added to in the two later translations of the *Lankāvatāra*, we have this from the Buddha, who gently smiled looking at the palace of Lankā at Mount Malaya: “All the Buddhas of the past have discoursed on the truth of an inner realisation which can be attained only by the

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<sup>1</sup> Being full of technical terms, the reader will find it difficult to understand, but as we go on the import of the passage here quoted will I hope grow fully intelligible.

superior wisdom of the Buddha and never by the speculation of the philosopher<sup>1</sup> or by the discipline of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha. This truth I will now disclose for the benefit of Rāvana, king of Lanka."<sup>2</sup>

And when the Bodhisattva Mahāmati finished praising the virtues of the Buddha in the beginning of Chapter II, (which is Chapter I of the Sung translation), the Buddha surveying the assembly made this remark: "O ye, sons of the victor, and O thou, Mahāmati, ask and I will talk to you concerning the attainment of the inmost realisation."

These statements are conclusive to show that the *Lankāvātāra*'s special importance in the literature of Mahayana Buddhism lies in its perpetual reference to this intuitive element in all religion. While the sutra has been made use of to support the claims of a particular school such as the Yogācāra or the Avatamsaka, in its connection with the doctrine of the Ālaya-vijñāna or Tathāgata-garbha, this connection is accidental; the thesis of the sutra must be regarded as centered on the idea of an inner perception of the deepest truth, which goes beyond language and reasoning. The Buddhist discipline or exercise (*yoga*) as is told by the Buddha<sup>3</sup> consists of two parts, philosophical and practical. The philosophical discipline is to train the mind in absolute idealism and see that the world is mind, that there is in reality no becoming such as birth and death, and that no external things really exist; while the practical side is to attain an inner perception by means of superior knowledge (*svapratyātmāryajñānādhigama*). Putting the practical side of the Buddhist discipline first, we can say that when it is accomplished, the philosophical side follows by itself; that is to say, the world as seen in the light of self-realisation is to be interpreted in terms of absolute idealism. Whatever this be, the *Lankāvātāra* is decidedly rich in deep mystical speculations.

One thing I wish to notice in the *Lankāvātāra* before I

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<sup>1</sup> *Tīrtha*, or *tīrthakara* in Sanskrit, and 外道 in Chinese.

<sup>2</sup> P. 2.

<sup>3</sup> P. 79 f.

proceed to describe the nature of the inner self-realisation, is that this sutra does not make one reference to the awakening of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhi-cittotpāda*) made so much of, especially in the sutras of the Prajñāpāramitā group. The awakening of the thought of enlightenment means to take interest in the teaching of Mahayana Buddhism and to wish sincerely for the realisation of its truth. This is really the first step in the career of a Bodhisattva, for without this awakening no further progress in spiritual discipline will be possible. Therefore, in almost all the Mahayana sutras one is told to direct one's thought first towards enlightenment. When this is accomplished, one can come some day to the final attainment, however remote the day may be. In the *Lankāvatāra* no word is said about the awakening, but it goes directly to the heart of the matter, that is, it asks the Bodhisattva to come to the realisation at once, instead of making gradual advance towards the goal. In this respect, this sutra may be said to be an appeal to those Bodhisattvas who are already deeply steeped in the Mahayana teaching of the supreme enlightenment.

Another thing the student of the *Lankāvatāra* notices is that the Buddha here tells to attain to a state of inner realisation (*pratyātmagocara*) and not of enlightenment (*sambodhi*). These two are psychologically the same process; when one has Pratyātmajñāna one is enlightened. But in the *Lankāvatāra* the ultimate goal of the Buddhist life is generally stated in terms of experience (*gocara*) and not intellectually as illumining. I am inclined to think that the *Lankāvatāra* is unique in this respect explaining perhaps the reason why Bodhi-Dharma, the father of Zen Buddhism in China, recommended it to his mystic followers

#### *The Inner Experience and Language*

This inner perception or self-realisation is made possible by the presence of the Tathāgata-garbha within the heart of every sentient being.<sup>1</sup> The Garbha, literally meaning "womb," or,

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<sup>1</sup> P. 77, p. 222.



better, "something interiorly hidden," is the seed of Tathagatahood from which a fully enlightened being grows up. This is however generally found covered up with the defiled wrappings of false judgment (*parikalpa* or *vikalpa*) and irrational attachment (*abhiniveśa*). False judgment comes from not perceiving things as they are, *yathābhūtam*, that is, as not subject to the principle of individuation, which is imposed by the mind upon things considered external; as to the irrational attachment which causes in us all kinds of vexation, it is the inevitable result of false judgment. The Garbha, therefore, originally pure and immaculate, must be restored to its natural state free from attachments. It is thus generally likened to a priceless gem concealed under a soiled garment. Take the garment off and the shining stone will begin to shed its natural light over things as they are. The illumination thus obtained is a state of self-realisation, and one can then see the Garbha as if held in one's own hand, even as plainly as the āmalaka fruit.<sup>1</sup> As the Garbha thus cleansed off its defilement is beyond speculations of the philosopher and the attainment of the Hinayanists, the author of the *Daśabhūmika*<sup>2</sup> as well as the *Lankāvatāra* calls it *avikalpa*, or *nīrvikalpa* (*-jñāna*),<sup>3</sup> meaning knowledge of non-judgment or non-discrimination, a kind of direct perception, or again knowledge of thatness or suchness (*tathatājñāna*).<sup>4</sup>

In spite of the practical end it has in view the *Lankāvatāra* is filled with abstract nomenclature, which sometimes turns away those unfamiliar with Buddhist literature from further pursuing their study of it. But this is unavoidable seeing that the experience on which the *Lankāvatāra* discourses is not within the reach of a consciousness ordinarily suffocated with contrary notions. The sutra is quite explicit in this respect as it declares that those who are tied (*saṃsakti*) to words do not understand

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<sup>1</sup> P. 222.

<sup>2</sup> Edited by J. Rahder. P. 64.

<sup>3</sup> P. 158, etc.

<sup>4</sup> See also Sthiramati's commentary on the *Trisūlikā* by Vasubandhu, edited by Sylvain Lévi, pp. 40-41.

the truth (*tattvan*),<sup>1</sup> or that "the superior state of self-realisation is beyond speech and analysis."<sup>2</sup> In fact, the Buddha is never tired in this sutra of repeatedly reminding us of the fact that language falls far too short of adequately representing the true state of self-realisation. This is in the nature of language. Language is always discriminative; when we make any reference to anything, this is to be distinguished from other things, thus limiting it to that extent and to that degree. But the supreme moment of self-realisation is not subject to any form of limitation and discrimination; perhaps the only way of describing it will be to say "that," or, abstractly, "thatness" (*tathatā*), but even this is discriminating, *parikalpita*, and distorts the perception. As long as we are what we are, tied up to the exigencies of material existence, language is inevitable, and if we do not use words we have to resort to gestures or movements of some parts of the body in one way or another. The *Lankāvatāra* remarks:<sup>3</sup> Words are not necessarily used all over the world for the communication of ideas or feelings; for in some other Buddha-lands the Buddha-teaching is carried out by mere gazing, or by the contraction of the facial muscles, or by the raising of the eye-brows, by frowning or smiling, by clearing the throat, by the twinkling of an eye, by merely thinking, or by motion of some kind. Articulated speech is not an absolute necessity for human intercourse. Mere gazing is said to be sufficient in the world of Samantabhadra to make one realise the highest state of enlightenment known as "Anutpattikadharma-kshānti."<sup>4</sup> Even in this world, says the sutra, the ordinary business of life is carried on most successfully among the bees or ants that never use words. If so, we need not wonder at those Zen masters who merely raise a finger or utters an unintelligible cry in order to demonstrate the profoundest experience ever attainable by human consciousness. When there is

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<sup>1</sup> P. 224.

<sup>2</sup> P. 148.

<sup>3</sup> P. 105.

<sup>4</sup> This is explained below.

nothing in my mind which can readily respond to or which is already awakened to take in what is flashed out from another mind, the latter may use the finest expression possible in our language, and yet my mind may remain perfectly blind to its truth. If on the other hand there is a chord of harmony between the two, a touch on either side will create a reverberation in the other. There is no power in a language as such, though we cannot dispense with it by any means.

The *Lankāvatāra* here makes a distinction between words (*rutam*) and meaning (*artha*),<sup>1</sup> and advise us not to understand meaning by merely depending upon words, to do which is quite ruinous to the comprehension of reality. *Ruta* (word) is the combination of sound and syllable, subject to our logical or intellectual understanding. (*Vāg-akshara-samyoga-vikalpa*.) It issues from the cavity of the mouth between the teeth, jaws, palates, tongue, and lips, when one is engaged in conversation; inflections, conjugations, and other grammatical and rhetorical modifications are effected according to the ideas (*vikalpa*) and innate desires (*vāsanā*)<sup>2</sup> of the speaker. As to *artha* (meaning), it is an inner perception itself gained in self-realisation when one entering upon the path of Nirvana causes a turning (*parāvṛitti*)<sup>3</sup> in the deepest recesses of consciousness known as Ālaya-vijñāna. To gain this inner perception, a man retires into a

<sup>1</sup> P. 154, p. 193 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Vikalpa*, literally means "to distinguish," "to determine," or "to discriminate," and is rendered in Chinese by 分別 *fen-pieh*, which is the characteristic function of thinking. *Vāsanā* is a more difficult term implying the whole philosophy or psychology of Mahayana idealism. No English equivalent is found. In this article, "memory," "habit-energy," or "impression" is rather loosely used for it. For fuller explanation however see below.

<sup>3</sup> According to the T'ang translation, "They [the Hinayanists] do not understand that great Nirvana is obtained when through an inner perception there takes place a turning in the Ālaya upon which depends the existence of an external world." Vasubandhu's *Trisūtikāvijñāptikārikā*, XXIX, also makes reference to this turning. The *Lankāvatāra*, pp. 62, 102, 238, etc. More about this "turning" later.

solitary spot all by himself, and, by applying himself assiduously to abstract meditations and deep reflections, his inner sense (*prajñā*) or self-knowledge (*svabuddhi*) begins to shine out from underneath the residual accumulation (*vāsanā*) of the past thoughts, affections, and deeds since time immemorial. The meaning, *artha*, thus realised in one's inmost consciousness is something no combination of the physical organs is capable of expressing in any way adequate to the experience. But as when searching for an object in the dark one is to rely on a lantern, meaning is after all to be gathered by means of words, at least it is to be thus oriented. The understanding of the relation thus existing between *śūtra* (words) and *artha* (meaning) will be necessary when we wish to know the nature of the inner perception (*svapratyātmajñāna*).

This relation between words and meaning, or between syllables (*akshara*) and reality (*tattvam* or *tathātva*),<sup>1</sup> or between teaching (*deśanā*) and truth (*siddhānta*)<sup>2</sup> is like that between the finger and the moon.<sup>3</sup> The finger is needed to point out the moon, but it ought not to be taken for the latter. The same disastrous result follows from regarding *akshara*, or *śūtra*, or *deśanā* as the reality itself. Those who are not able to take their eyes away from the finger-tip will never realise the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) of things. It is again like feeding the baby with uncooked food,<sup>4</sup> it will be too late to resuscitate it when it has succumbed to the mother's unwise treatment. Those trained in the Buddhist doctrine ought to be quite discriminating in this respect. Naturally, we do not know what the teaching of the Buddha is if we have no communication in words, words are very much needed, but when there is no correspondence between words and meaning the teaching itself will lose its sense. The *Lankāvatāra* thus reiterates throughout the text that the Tathagata never teaches the Dharma fallen into mere talk (*akshara-patita*), and it was for this reason that it was preached by the

<sup>1</sup> P. 48, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup> P. 172.

<sup>3</sup> P. 223, p. 196.

<sup>4</sup> P. 196.

Buddha and other teachers of the Dharma that "the Tathagata had not uttered a word in answer or in discourse" during his life-time between the Enlightenment and the Nirvana.<sup>1</sup> The idea is, "Do not cling to words!" (*Na deśanā-ruta-pāṭhe 'bhini-viśatām.*)<sup>2</sup>

Words are to be treated like the lunar reflection in water as far as they are related to meaning. The reflection is there, though the moon itself has not entered (*apraaviṣṭham*) into the water; nor is it to be considered standing in no relation (*nir-gatam*) to the water, because the latter has something in it to reflect the moon.<sup>3</sup> Only let us not fall into the habit of superficially taking mere words for real meaning. This is the warning of the *Lankāvatāra*: *Yathā-ruta-artha-abhiniveśa-saṁdhau na prapateyuḥ.*<sup>4</sup>

#### *Disastrous Complications Arising from Discrimination*

This habit of regarding words as completely and adequately expressing all that is to be found there comes from another habit of ours, which is, in the terminology of the *Lankāvatāra*, our wrong discrimination or interpretation (*vikalpa*) of the aspect of existence, which may be designated as individuation (*prabhedanaya-lakṣhaṇa*,<sup>5</sup> or *vishaya-pariccheda-lakṣhaṇa*<sup>6</sup>). When this aspect is well understood so that we shall no more be misled by wrong interpretation, we are able to get into a state of self-realisation. Individuation means to separate one object from another, and taking these separated, particular objects for final substances (*svabhāva*, or *dharmā-ātmya-lakṣhaṇa*), to cling to this notion, and to keep up one's evil desires and passions burning all the time. According to the sutra, this wrong interpreta-

<sup>1</sup> P. 144, p. 194, p. 240. The same idea is expressed in the *Tathāgata-guḥya-sūtra*, which is quoted in Candrakīrti's Commentary on the Madhyamika, B. T. Society edition, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> P. 193.

<sup>3</sup> P. 158, p. 193.

<sup>4</sup> P. 160.

<sup>5</sup> P. 127.

<sup>6</sup> P. 44.

tion takes place in regard to several categories of thought and being such as (1) sounds, (2) describable objects of thought, (3) appearances, (3) material wealth, (5) substance, (6) causal relations, (7) definite philosophical views, (8) reasoning as to the existence of the ego, (9) coming into existence, (10) not coming into existence, (11) dependence, and (12) bondage and release.<sup>1</sup> Logically considered, this kind of classification is baffling; but when we survey the Indian background which stimulated the Buddhist philosopher to speculate on such conglomerate subjects, we can readily enter into his spirit. For Buddhists, in fact all Indian philosophers, there are no abstract problems of philosophy to be solved from the purely intellectual point of view. They are always tinged with religious sentiment, they have always some bearings on the most important practical question of life, which is how to get spiritual freedom. All the thinking carried on in this sutra, therefore, has always this question in view, and naturally those statements above referred to are to be explained according to the general trend of Buddhist thought.

The wrong consideration about sounds (1) creates an attachment to musical or literary productions which are not always spiritually enhancing, and this is to be avoided. Objects of thought are describable and therefore determinable (2), but the content of the inner perception forming the central theme of the *Lankāvatāra* is not subject to this limitation, and if one gets a wrong idea here, there will be no salvation for him, as he takes a thing indescribable and inexpressible for a thing altogether contrary. Things describable have no permanency and consequently no spiritual value, but we are liable to judge them wrongly and get firmly attached to them. (3) We are in this respect like those who fancy mere watery appearance in the desert for real one. This faulty judgment may extend indefinitely over all appearances, and that the result is ruinous goes without saying. Hence this warning. Attachment to material wealth or property (*artha*) is another case of false judgment as to appearance (4).

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<sup>1</sup> P. 128 et seq.

Substance (*svabhāva*) means in the *Lankāvatāra* a concrete individual object, a residue after the last analysis; and the adherents of the substance-theory maintain that there are really such things outside the mind (5). Owing to this misjudgment, the way to self-realisation is blocked. Errors of causal relation refer to the ideas of *sat* (to be) and *asat* (not to be), which are considered real as they make it possible to establish causal relationship between things about us (6). But this idea of causality ought not to lead us to a first cause or primary being from which all things derive their reality. As we know, Buddhist philosophy denies the first cause as really existing as such. The ideas of *sat* and *asat* are only relative and have no substantial existence besides being so named.

We next come to such philosophical views as entertained by different schools of thought at the time of the *Lankāvatāra* (9); according to which such categories as "to be" (*asti*) and "not to be" (*nāsti*), as oneness (*ekatva*) and otherness (*anyatva*), or as bothness (*ubhaya*) and not-bothness (*anubhaya*), are actualities and for that reason adhered to. This is, however, wrong and sure to lead one away from the inner realisation of the truth. (8) Reasoning (*yukti*) is concerned with the notion of the ego; when this is thought to be reality, one's spiritual development stops short. The *Lankāvatāra*, loyal to the traditional view of Buddhist philosophy, refuses to countenance the theory of ego-substance, which may be regarded as a corollary to general substance-theory. (9) The notion of *utpāda* (coming into existence) is related to that of causality. When such and such causes and conditions are matured, people think something comes into actual existence and continues to exist until the causes and conditions cease to operate; for coming into existence and vanishing from it are both real facts as much as is the law of causation. (10) The *anutpāda* view of things, on the other hand, argues that nothing has ever been brought into existence through causal relations, but that things are what they are even prior to the operation of the law of causation.

Dependence (*sambandha*) and bondage (*bandha*) are similar ideas. The relation between metal and wire is dependence, while

a man tied with a chord is in bondage, from which he can later be released when the chord is broken. All such relations when adhered to as real and permanent become dangerous to the spiritual growth of a true Buddhist, that is, of a Bodhisattva, (11) and (12).

Words (*rūpa*) and meaning (*artha*), therefore, are to be separated, as the former generally fail to give us an exact idea of the object described with them. They are of course indicative suggesting where to look for the meaning. Numerous indeed are close attachments (*abhiniveśasaṃdhi*) one makes to things and relations on account of a wrong understanding of their true nature and value, and, due to these close attachments, one wraps oneself up in a cocoon like the silkworm, binding tight not only oneself but others.<sup>1</sup> Imaging things where they are not, or not perceiving them where they are, men are addicted to evil desires and passions. Let them only know how truthfully (*yathābhūtam*) to look into the reality of things whereby to break through the nets of wrong judgments and false imaginations, and they would have an inward perception leading to emancipation.

*The Meaning of Yathābhūtam, Māyā, Śūnya*

To understand the world or oneself, *yathābhūtam*, as it is in itself, is one of the great watchwords ringing through both Hinayana and Mahayana literature. But to know exactly what *yathābhūtam* means is the problem, for it does not allow any definite description. The problem is to be settled only by appealing to direct perception when one knows what it is, as when one sees a flower or a stone. In this respect, Buddhist terminology is often graphic and full of power; think of such terms as *tathatā* (如如, or 眞如, suchness), *tattvam* (如實, thatness), or *satya* (眞諦, being-so), which is used to designate the content of inner perception (*pratyātma-jñāna*). This seeing *yathābhūtam* constitutes the mystical element in all religion, and if one is affectively inclined, *tat* (that) will have to be taken in faith; but when the intellectual claim predominates, "that" will have to be perceived with "a noble eye of wisdom" (*āryapra-*

<sup>1</sup> P. 161.



*jñācakshus*) and not by a divine (*divya*) or human (*māṃsa*) eye.<sup>1</sup>

The world seen through the divine or human eye is a world of *māyā*, but one disclosed to the Prajñā is the real one. Therefore, logically speaking, *māyā* is not a quality objectively attached to the world, it is not inherent in it, it rather belongs to the subject. As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not admit the existence of an external world, whatever qualities we ordinarily think as belonging to the latter are creations or constructions of our own mind. But if we allow ourselves to be guided by the discriminating imagination (*parikalpa*), the world must be said to have in itself something of *māyā* nature; for its impermanency is patent to us all, it appears and disappears like lightning, having no self-substance in it. To say that this is an evanescent world is to say that it is always becoming, never in a state of being, that is, in constant flux as an ancient philosopher aptly describes it. We must, however, be most careful not to be carried away by the ordinary method of interpreting the world and designate its transiency or constant becoming in the Mahayanistic terminology. This is highly coloured with idealistic tinge, and to apply it in an objective realistic sense will be quite misleading. When the world is said to be like *māyā*, it is to be understood subjectively, and not objectively. Such objective terms as transiency or a flux of becoming presuppose realism, and are not, strictly speaking, in harmony with the absolutely idealistic standpoint adopted by Mahayanists.

So with the conception of Śūnyatā (emptiness), we must bear in mind the fact that the term is not to be found in a logician's dictionary, nor in one containing realistic terms only. For it is the word coined by the possessor of the Prajñācakshus (wisdom-eye) when he has reviewed the world as I look at a sheet of paper before me this very moment. By him the world is perceived *yathābhūtam* stripped off all its logical predicates and also its so-called objective trappings; the world thus appearing in its nakedness has been designated Śūnya, empty, by the

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<sup>1</sup> P. 164.

Mahayanists. It is in this sense, therefore, when they say that there is nothing substantial in the world, which is endowed with an ego (*ātman*), and, therefore, which can be taken hold of; or that it slips off one's hands so readily, one predicate falling off after another, as it cannot be designated as being (*sat*), nor by its opposite, not-being (*asat*). No term or notion that admits an antithesis can be applied to the world, as it is beyond the logic of opposites. To mention some of such terms used in the *Lankāvatāra*, they are: *asti* and *nāsti*, or *sat* and *asat*, *svalakṣhaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣhaṇa*, *lakṣhya* and *lakṣhaṇa*, *grāhya* and *grāhāna*, *sāmsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, *bāhya* and *adhyātma*, *anya* and *ananya*, *anekatā* and *ekatā*, *abhaya* and *nobhaya*, *nitya* and *anitya*, etc. Before one term definitely fixes its quality, it runs over to the other alternative.

The *Lankāvatāra*, therefore, declares that the world as it is does not fall within the four propositions or points (*catuṣkoṭīka*)<sup>1</sup>, and in the first chapter even one hundred and eight negations are enumerated. The most truthful description of the state of things as we experience in this world of particulars, will be, from the Buddhist way of thinking, to compare it to *māyā* as created by the magician.<sup>2</sup> Making use of whatever objects he may take hold of, he would make out a variety of phantom creatures which appear to the spectators real. But in this neither the magician nor the objects fancifully created are at fault; the fault lies with the spectators who make erroneous judgments permitting things where they are not. The sutra gives further analogical proofs<sup>3</sup> to impress upon us the truth of *māyā*-conception or that of *Śūnyatā*. That a picture is seen as really having the three dimensions, that a bedimmed eye imagines a hair-net (*keṣoṇḍukam*), that a circle traced out by a fire-brand in quick motion is considered real, that a bubble is taken for a crystal-ball, and, further, that the reflection of a tree in the lake, an image in the mirror, an echo reverberating

<sup>1</sup> They are: affirmation, negation, double affirmation, and double negation.

<sup>2</sup> P. 56, p. 109, pp. 129-130, p. 199, etc.

<sup>3</sup> P. 90, ff, etc.

through the valley, a mirage in the spring-field, and the wooden man operated by a piśāca—that each of these phenomena is regarded as an actuality, is due to the error of judgment on the part of an unenlightened mind, which, being placed under the permeating influence (*vāsanā*) of the past thoughts and desires, is incapacitated to look *yathābhūtam* into the truth of the matter. However, we must not take them for absolute illusions, for they are there and yet they are not there, so that the category of existence fails to be applied here. From the dualistic point of view, we feel inclined to interpret these terms objectively as denoting the idea of mere transiency or unreality, but when the whole trend of Buddhist thought is understood, we know that these similes are meant to describe a state of things, to which such logical conceptions as *sat* and *asat*, etc., are inapplicable, but which must be directly experienced *yathābhūtam* in one's inmost consciousness.

The *Lankāvatāra* says (p. 105) :

“The sky [or space], the hare's horns, and a barren woman's child—

They are not, only talked of; so are things discriminated.

In the totality of causes and conditions, the ignorant discriminate birth;

Not knowing this reason, they go astray in the triple world.”

This may seem to mean: All things are mere names, their existence is not more than a matter of subjective discrimination; to think that things are really born, stay, and disappear in the system of causes and effects, is an illusion; all these realities so called have no objective validity; and, therefore, the world is altogether empty, void, unreal, and a mass of nothingness. To think this way, however, is not the position of the Mahayanist. What he wants us to do is that we should have a turning-over of the whole system of mentality and get a new point of view where we may survey the world *yathābhūtam*. The sutra, therefore, states a little further down (p. 106 ff.) that the difference between the wise and the ignorant is that the former are free from Viparyāsa while the latter are not. *Vipar-*

*yāsa* means imagining things where they are not, taking error for truth. The wise not hampered by this imagination see that the world is like *māyā* and has no reality, but at the same time they know that it is there, it is not pure nothingness. Why? Because they have gone beyond the relativism of being and non-being. The waters of the Ganga are not visible to the Preta, but they cannot be said to be non-existent, because other beings see them. In a similar way, the wise have a correct view of things as they are free from errors in their perception of an objective world, which exists only in relation to one's own mind. An objective world is really an error (*bhrānta*) in so far as it is discriminated as existing externally and individually. Or we may say that an external particularised world is an illusion as long as the ignorant are unable to break through the fetters of *Vikalpa*, wrong discrimination; whereas the same world is to the wise true, such as it is (*tathatā*). What is, therefore, an error to the one is truth to the other, because the latter is entirely free from all forms of discrimination (*sarvakalpināvirahitam*).

All these statements are designed to adjust our thought *yathābhūtam* to the actuality of existence, to which no logical predicates are applicable. To say "it is," is eternalism (*śāśvata*), to say "it is not," is nihilism (*uccheda*); and the object of Buddhist reasoning is to avoid these dualistic views, though not necessarily going to monism but to the way of experiencing it in its inwardness as well as in its totality.

"O Lord of Lankā," reads the sutra, "to see thus is called 'rightly seeing'; if seen otherwise it is called 'carrying on discrimination' (*vikalpa*), because here is discrimination which leads to dualism. It is like seeing one's own face in water, or like seeing one's own shadow in the moonlight or by the lantern, or listening to an echo of one's own voice in the valley, wherein discrimination takes place leading to attachment. In like manner, to separate *dharma* from *adharmā* [or *a* from not-*a*] is only due to discrimination, and on account of this one finds it impossible to do away with the distinction, thereby creating all forms of falsehood. One is thus unable to realise tranquillity (*śānti*). By tranquillity is meant oneness of objects, and oneness of

objects is the highest Samadhi, from which grows an inner perception by the Noble Understanding. The Tathagata-garbha is its objective.”<sup>1</sup>

As we see here, any thought that permits of opposition or antithesis such as *sat* and *asat*, *dharmā* and *adharma*, is considered the outcome of Vikalpa; and as long as Vikalpa is cherished, one can never realise the standpoint of pure idealism (*cittamātra*) and the *yathābhūtam* understanding of absolute oneness will never take place.

#### *What is Meant by Being Unborn?*

When *māyā* is understood in the sense elucidated above, we shall find light shed over the statement that all things are uncreated, or, more literally, unborn (*anutpannaḥ sarvabhāvaḥ*). This is one of the phrases quite frequently met with in all Mahayana literature, and those who are not familiar with it will certainly find the phrase devoid of sense, regarding as having no connection with the self-realisation. But this again is a part of viewing things *yathābhūtam*. For if existence is not to be annotated by any one of the four propositions (*catuḥkoṭīka*) and is above the alternation of *sat* and *asat*, and not controlled by the law of causation (*hetupratyaya*), it cannot be described in no other way than calling it unborn, *anutpanna*,—unborn not in the sense of eternity, nor in that of uncreatedness. Things are unborn simply because no categories admitting contradiction or alternation or antithesis are applicable here. Eternity contrasts with non-eternity or impermanence; uncreatedness if it has any relative meaning stands in opposition to creation; and if being unborn is taken in a similar way it limits itself and our perception of things will be no more *yathābhūtam* but affected by Parikalpa. For this reason, the Buddha in the *Lankāvatāra* repeatedly warns us not to get confused here, but to understand *anutpāda sarvadharmāṇām* in its absolute, unconditioned sense.

“Why is existence regarded as unborn or unoriginated? Because there is neither creating nor created, and therefore no

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<sup>1</sup> From the T'aug version. The end of the first chapter.

causer, (i.e., creator)."<sup>1</sup> Again,<sup>2</sup> things are unborn because they are to be regarded as *māyā*, and because the Buddha wishes to have the philosophers take their eyes away from logic and its necessary limitations. As long as the antithesis of *sat* and *asat* is considered objectively real, as held by some philosophers, there will be the real coming into existence and the real passing away from it. Those who are taken to the passing-away aspect of existence are nihilists, while those who look for the eternal aspect are eternalists; and neither of them has the right view of it. They are attached to one thing or another, they are far from attaining the point where all things are perceived in their true bearings, that is, as manifestations of mind-only (*cittamātradrīśya*). The *Lankāvatāra* calls this view-point "*Yathābhūta-avasthāna-darśana*."<sup>3</sup> The *gāthā* reads:

"Because there is no causing, there is no birth;  
Where existence is admitted, there is the holding of birth  
and death.  
When it is seen as being like *māyā*, etc.,  
No *Vikalpa* takes place as regards appearances."

This Buddhist idea of being unborn is liable to be confused with eternalism as is suggested by *Mahāmāti*.<sup>4</sup> But when we know that *anutpāda* (to be unborn) is not an idea constricted

<sup>1</sup> P. 115.

<sup>2</sup> P. 111.

<sup>3</sup> P. 112.

<sup>4</sup> P. 111, p. 166, etc. Eternalism may not be an appropriate term for that school of philosophy which holds that all things have been what they are and remain for ever as such. This is the *śāśvata* (eternal or persistent) view of existence and stands opposed to the other view known as the *uccheda* (destruction or extirpation). According to the latter, there is nothing in the world that is real, eternally abiding, and will retain its identity for ever. The doctrine of *Śūnyatā* is sometimes taken for this. Buddhism goes the middle way between the two extremes; for, according to it, existence is neither temporal and forever vanishing, nor eternal and forever abiding. Objectively stated, it is in a state of constant becoming, which in terms of Mahayana philosophy is called like *māyā*, or it is *śūnya* (empty, another difficult word to translate properly), it is unborn, it is not dualistic, it has no self-substance. This is the Buddhist teaching known as "*śūnyatā, anutpāda, advaya, niḥsvabhāva-lakṣaṇam sarvadharmāṇām*." p. 73.

to *utpāda* (to be born) or subject to the principle of causation, but an idea absolutely going beyond opposites, we come nearer to the truth. We need an inner perception to see into the true nature of existence; otherwise, like the ignorant and confused we see things where there is really nothing, and imagine them to be actualities though they are like the hare's horns or the tortoise's hair.<sup>1</sup> *Vikalpa* takes place here, and all looks distorted. So we read in the sutra:

“According to my doctrine, there is neither being nor non-being, for existence is not to be characterised as being born, nor as disappearing. Why is there no non-being? For it is like seeking various objects created by the magician or in a dream. [As long as there are things actually seen they cannot be said non-existent.] Why is there no being? For the self-nature of all things that appear to be here, is really non-existent, they are seen and yet not seen, they are taken hold of and yet not taken hold of. Therefore, I say that things are neither existent nor non-existent. If one, realising that there is nothing but what is seen of mind, abides in the suchness of things where no individuation [or discrimination, *vikalpa*] takes place, one will see that all doings in the world cease. To discriminate is the business of the ignorant, and not of the wise. O Mahāmati, it is due to the mind that discriminates that there appears a world destitute of reality, such as the palace of the Gandharvas or phantom creations of the magician. To distinguish between the born and the not-born, between the created and the uncreated, is like talking about the works of the magician, that have never been in existence and therefore that will never disappear. The ignorant fail to see the self-nature of existence (*bhāvasvabhāva*) because their views are perverted. When they are thus perverted, they are unable to realise a state of aloofness, and as they are unable to do so, they cannot disengage themselves from false discrimination. As long as one sees things particularised in forms, there is a perception of the born and the unborn, and as the result discrimination goes on. Nirvana

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<sup>1</sup> P. 62.

is where there is no birth, no extinction; it is seeing into a state of suchness [or thatness] which transcends all the categories constructed by mind; for it is the Tathagata's own inner consciousness."<sup>1</sup>

In connection with this *anutpāda* (not being born) idea, it may not be out of place to say a few words about the Mahayana conception of what is known as "Anutpattikadharmakshānti." One meets with this phrase quite frequently in all the Mahayana sutras though not so much in the *Lankāvatāra*. Literally rendered, it is "not-born-object-patience" and 無生法忍 in Chinese. This evidently baffled some of the European translators of the Mahayana texts. But we shall be able to understand it much better now than they as we have already explained what the Mahayanists mean by all things not being born (*sarvadharmāṇām anutpāda*). The idea is simply this that the reality or substance of things is beyond all predicate which always implies its opposite, and, therefore, the phrase, "Anutpattikadharmakshānti," is a statement concerning the nature of *dharma* which may abstractly be translated here as existence.

But the last term of the compound, *kshānti*, may be somewhat puzzling. What has patience to do with this existence to be designated unborn? *Kshānti*, of course, means "patience" here as when it is one of the six Pāramitās, or resignation, or acquiescence, but not in its ordinary sense. For *kshānti* here does not mean "to endure" or "suffer patiently"; endurance or suffering implies unwillingness and resistance to a certain extent. The sense of Buddhist *kshānti*, however, is a willing

<sup>1</sup> Abridged, pp. 199-200.

<sup>2</sup> M. E. Burnouf has in his French translation of the *Sādharmapūṇḍarīkā* (p. 85), "Une patience miraculeuse dans la loi"; Max Müller in his *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (S.B.E. XLIX, pp. 39-40, and p. 51), "Resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen"; Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse in their English translation of Śāntideva's *Śikshā-samuccaya* (p. 297), "Resignation to the idea of not being reborn"; and H. Kern in his English *Sādharmapūṇḍarīkā* (S.B.E. XXI, p. 134), "Acquiescence in the eternal law." These show how these great Sanskrit scholars struggled to get at the exact meaning of *anutpattikadharmakshānti*.



compliance or acceptance. When the *anutpanna* view of existence is truthfully recognised and accepted, it becomes the principle of one's conduct, determining the whole attitude of the mind. The Chinese scholars generally take 忍 (patience) for 認 (recognition) as they are both pronounced *jen*; but, strictly speaking, the term is not an intellectual one, it belongs to the will, it is a whole-hearted acceptance of the ultimate fact (*tattvam*) as perceived by a mind free from errors or wrong judgments (*vikalpa*).

In the *Avatamsaka Sutra*, a chapter (Śikshānanda, Chapter XXIX, On Kshānti) is devoted to the explanation of ten kinds of Kshānti.<sup>1</sup> (1) Kshānti in sounds means to listen to the oral teaching of the Buddha, to accept it without fear or hesitation, and to abide in it whole-heartedly. (2) Kshānti of obedience is to reflect upon the nature of things, and truthfully penetrating into it, to keep the mind pure and serene. (3) Kshānti in the unborn nature of existence has already been explained. The rest of the ten are realised when one attains to the knowledge of things as like māyā(4), mirage(5), dream(6), echo(7), shadow(8), phenomenal(9), and empty(10). That this way of looking at existence is generally Mahayanistic and that it is not the same as regarding existence as altogether unsubstantial from the relative point of view, has been already made clear as I hope in the preceding section.<sup>2</sup>

### *How is Nirvana Explained?*

Nirvana has been the central object of Buddhist life ever since the Buddha's own time, though in the Mahayana we do not come across the term perhaps so much as in the Hinayana. The idea has been replaced to a certain extent by the conceptions of Prajñā, Sambodhi, Dharmakāya, Tathatā, Pratyātmañāna, etc., when Buddhist thought drifted towards intellectual intuitionism. The *Lankāvatāra*, however, has not forgotten to make reference to Nirvana and to interpret it in its own characteristic

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, (S.B.E. XLIX), p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> For further definition of "Anutpattikadharmakshānti," see below.

manner. According to its author whoever he may be, Nirvana is realised when one can see into the abode of suchness (*yathābhūtārtha-sthāna-darśanam*).<sup>1</sup> Here is the point the intellect (*vikalpa*) cannot enter; for it dissects and establishes somewhat to take hold of (*grahaṇa*), and it will then see that something coming into existence (*utpāda*) and disappearing (*nirodha* or *apraṇvṛitti*). But Nirvana has no tangible form (*nimitta*), and it neither comes into existence nor ceases from working. To attain Nirvana, therefore, is to see into the truth of things *yathābhūtam*, that is, as unborn, as not affected by categories of intellectual construction.

To attain Nirvana which is a state of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) inherent in the nature of things and which is again a state of self-realisation obtained by means of a higher wisdom (*āryajñāna*), there must be a turning over (*parāvṛitti*) at the deepest seat of consciousness known as the *Ālaya-vijñāna*.<sup>2</sup> The latter is a kind of mental receptacle where all the memory of one's past deeds and psychical activities is deposited and preserved in a form of energy called *Vāsanā* (習氣 *hsi-chi*, in Chinese, habit-energy). But as this energy is so contaminated with ignorance and wrong judgment and all sorts of attachment (*abhiniveśata*), it reacts upon an external world in a way detrimental to the realisation of Nirvana, and, therefore, to the perception, *yathābhūtam*, of the truth. The old conditions must now be overhauled in order to create a new situation in our consciousness. To do this, we must free ourselves from the views nihilistic (*uccheda*) and eternalistic (*śāśvata*) and also from the notions of being (*bhāva*) and non-being (*abhāva*).

When this turning is effected, Nirvana is found to be devoid of all predicates. In it nothing is gained, nothing is cast aside, no extermination, no eternity, no unity, no diversity, one finds here. Nirvana is the mind of all holy ones and the goal of Buddhist discipline.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 200.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 62, 98, etc.

<sup>3</sup> P. 99.

The Hinayanists do not know this; when they realise that Nirvana is something above particular conditions and tranquil in nature, they feel they have it in its completeness in their Nirvana so called. But in fact they distinguish it from birth-and-death (*samsāra*), and seek it for the fear of being caught up in the net of transmigration. They cherish dualism, and so long as they do so, there is no true Nirvana for them. Nirvana, according to the *Lankāvatāra*, is not to be found in contradiction to birth-and-death, or Samsāra; for to thus distinguish one from the other is the result of wrong judgment (*vikalpa*), which imagines a future when the world of the senses is altogether annihilated, which is their Nirvana. The Mahayanistic Nirvana goes, however, beyond the dualism of Nirvana and Samsāra. It is to be found where there is the identity of Nirvana and Samsāra.

So long as dualism is adhered to, there is no Nirvana, no self-realisation. Light and shadow, long and short, black and white—they are mutually related; when they stand alone each by itself, they have no meaning. So with Nirvana. When it is sought after in relation to Samsāra, we may have a sort of Nirvana. But this kind vanishes when separated from the condition of mutuality in which it exists. True Nirvana is that which is realised in the oneness of Nirvana and Samsāra, absolute or *śūnya* in its nature, and above the relativity of eternalism and nihilism. Mahayana followers strive to realise this kind of Nirvana.<sup>1</sup>

The following passages<sup>2</sup> from the *Lankāvatāra* will give us some ideas of Nirvana prevalent at the time when this sutra was compiled:

“The Buddha said, O Mahāmati, what is regarded as Nirvana by the philosophers is not in accordance with the true features of Nirvana. Listen, O Mahāmati, I will tell you what it is.

“Some philosophers, seeing how impermanent things are, do not cling to the individual conditions; to them no external

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<sup>1</sup> P. 76, 126.

<sup>2</sup> P. 182 ff.

world exists, nor does the subjective mind; they do not think of the past, present, and future. Like the light that shines no more, like the seed that has no life, like the fire that no more burns, all attachments are gone with them, no individualising reflections take place, and this they consider to be Nirvana. But inasmuch as they see something destroyed, their Nirvana is not a true one, O Mahāmati.

“Again, there are some who think the departing to another realm is Nirvana; there is no external world of particulars for them; it is like wind ceasing to blow.<sup>1</sup>

“Again some think, not to see the distinction between the knowing subject and the known object is Nirvana.

“Again, there are some who holding to the view that all individual appearances are real, cherish the feeling of pain; for they are ignorant of the truth that all is the manifestation of mind-only. And just because of this ignorance they are frightened with appearances and seek for a state where there are no-appearances. An intense longing for this is regarded by them to be Nirvana.

“Again, there are some who, reviewing things inner as well as external in their individual and universal aspects and as existing in time, think that they have self-substance, which is not subject to destruction, and in this they find Nirvana.

“Again, there are some who believe in the indestructibility of all things such as ego, being, life, growth, and personality, and think this to be Nirvana.

“Again, some philosophers, not being intelligent enough, imagine the reality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa and think that the Guṇas in various transformations constitute all objects; and in this they see Nirvana.

“Again, some philosophers see Nirvana in the extinction of both merit and demerit, others in the extinction of evil passions by means of knowledge, and still others in the thought that Iśvara is really the creator.

“Again, there are some who think beings come into ex-

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<sup>1</sup> This last sentence does not properly belong here. There must have been some transposition in the text.

istence mutually conditioning and not through any other cause. As they are without wisdom, they are unable to understand rightly, and because of their not understanding rightly, they imagine Nirvana in their own way.

“Again, there are some who, wrongly imagining what they have perceived to be the true path, find Nirvana here.

“Again, some philosophers, holding to the view that quality and substance are one and yet two, and mutually related and yet not related, think Nirvana to be in this relationship.

“Again, there are some naturalists who believe in spontaneous creation, saying that the peacock’s variegated beauty, the thorn’s pointedness, and the production of various kinds of precious stones from the mine,—who is the maker of all these things? Nobody but nature, and this is Nirvana.

“Again, some find Nirvana in the understanding of the twenty-five principles.

“Again, some cherish the opinion that the looking after the welfare of the subjects by the observance of the six virtues is Nirvana.

“Again, some think time is Nirvana, from which issues the world.

“Again, there are some who see Nirvana in that the world (*bhāva*) exists, or that the world (*bhāva*) exists not, or that the world exists and exists not, or that the world and Nirvana are not two different things.

“Again, there are some<sup>1</sup> who, differing from all these philosophers, and in possession of all knowledge, declare like a roaring lion to the following effect that to understand thoroughly what is meant by the manifestation of mind-only, not to get attached to the external world, to be disengaged from the four propositions, to abide in the *yathābhūtam* view of things, not to fall into the errors of dualism, to be free from the ideas of subject and object, to stand above all forms of knowledge, not to get attached to any one form of truth, to abide in the realisation

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<sup>1</sup> This is evidently the Mahayanist view of Nirvana, though it is treated as if it were one held by the philosophers also not belonging to Buddhism.

of the truth revealed in the noble understanding, to perceive the twofold truth of egolessness, to be devoid of the two kinds of evil passions, to be cleansed of the two kinds of hindrance, to discipline oneself in all the stages [of Bodhisattvahood] one after another, whereby, entering upon the state of Buddhahood, to realise all the great Samadhis such as Māyā and for ever to go beyond the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna:—this is to attain Nirvana.

“O Mahāmati, all these philosophers’ views [except the last mentioned] are based on imagination and not in accordance with the truth; they are forsaken by the wise, for they are dualistic and Nirvana is imagined where it is not. There is really no such Nirvana where one may enter or come out. The philosophers, each adhering to his own thesis, fall into erroneous views contrary to reason, thereby achieving nothing but the wanderings and tribulations of the mind and will. O Mahāmati, therefore, you and other Bodhisattvas should avoid them.”

#### *The Essence of Buddhahood*

The self-realisation to be attained by the Bodhisattva is none other than the Buddha’s own inner consciousness, self-illuminating as well as world-illuminating. Therefore, when we know what is the nature of this enlightenment attained by the Buddha (*svabuddhabuddhatā*), we shall also have some glimpse of the content of the Pratyātmāryajñānagocara, the subject-matter of the *Lankāvatāra*. According to the sutra,<sup>1</sup> what constitutes the essence of Buddhahood (*buddhatā*) is neither a thing made nor a thing not-made, it is neither cause nor effect, it is neither predicable nor unpredicable, it is neither describable nor indescribable, neither subject to perception nor beyond perception. Why? Because by applying any one of these terminological explanations (*nirukta*) to this case, we commit a logical offence. If *Buddhatā*, the essence of Tathagatahood, is something made, it is impermanent; and if it is impermanent, all things made will be Tathagatas—which is impossible. If, on

<sup>1</sup> P. 187 ff.

the other hand, it is a thing not-made, it will be without a substance (*ātmakatva*), and all efforts to realise it will be to no purpose, as it is like the hare's horns or a barren woman's child. For are they not all not-made, unreal, merely imagined?

“Again, if the essence of Tathagatahood is neither cause nor effect, it is then neither being (*sat*) nor not-being (*asat*). And this being the case it lies outside the four propositions (*catuṣkoṭika*). The latter belong to the worldly way of talk and what lies outside them is no more than a talk, it is like speaking of a barren woman's child. This exists only in talk and does not come under the four propositions. As it does not come under them, it is to the wise beyond their logical survey (*pramāṇa*). The meaning of all the Tathagatas' words is to be thus understood by the wise.” (P. 188.)

This passage is taken from the Sanskrit text, which coincides with one of the Chinese versions, the T'ang; but when we weigh the meaning of the passage, we grow somewhat confused about it because it is in apparent contradiction to the general drift of thought that has been explained above as characteristic of the *Lankāvatāra* teaching. For if the essence of Buddhahood is something like the barren woman's child existing only in name and placed beyond the survey of the wise in the sense that it has no truth in it, the object of all Buddhist discipline will be set at naught. If, however, it could be understood in the sense that the truth is beyond the logical survey even of the wise, and, therefore, that it is an object of direct intuition, altogether beyond the reach of popular parlance which is made up with the four propositions, the quoted passage would be consistent with the rest of the text. The sentence referring to the barren woman's child as mere talk and beyond the four propositions will have to be altered. In fact, the Wei translation reads quite differently: “The four propositions belong to the worldly way of talk. O Mahāmati, if the truth does not go beyond the four propositions, it is no more than a word like when speaking of a barren woman's child. O Mahāmati, this belongs to mere speech, coming under the four propositions, and if the truth thus should come under them, the wise would

not take it up." Evidently, there is some discrepancy in the text. The earliest Chinese version extant, that is, the Sung, reads simply and is quite intelligible, showing perhaps that this is a more original text not mixed with gloss and other addenda. "O Mahāmati, if it is neither an object (*vastu?*) nor a cause, then it is neither being nor non-being; and if it is neither being nor non-being, it lies outside the four propositions. The latter belong to worldly talk. When it [or the essence of Buddhahood] lies outside the four propositions it does not come under them, and as it does not come under them, the wise take to it. The meaning of all the Tathagata's propositions is to be understood by the wise thus [that is, as beyond the four propositions]."

When Buddhism speaks of the egolessness (*nirātmana*) of all things (*sarvadharmā*), this must be understood in the same way as suggested above, that is, in the sense that while all things have their characteristic marks (*svalakṣhaṇa*), they are without self-substance (*ātman*). Inasmuch as the cow is not a horse and the horse is not a cow, they are quite distinct one from the other. Their individuality is to be reckoned with, but as to each having its self-substance or something that remains eternally so besides its appearances (*lakṣhaṇa*), there is no substance in it. Therefore, things are in one sense as they are, but in another sense they are not. This is what is meant by Buddhist phenomenalism, but we are not to be carried away by its doctrine of emptiness as was explained before, as Buddhism has after all something to affirm. Its superficially paradoxical way of presenting the truth is often baffling to logicians. The *Lankāvatāra* proceeds to say that the ignorant and confused use their own way of discrimination (*vikalpa*) to grasp the theory of non-ego, but as existence is really beyond any system of categories, the Tathagata's wisdom alone is capable of penetrating into reality. It is, therefore, declared by him that he is not distinct from the Skandhas, nor is he identical with them.<sup>1</sup>

The two horns of the cow are distinguished one from the

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<sup>1</sup> P. 188.



other, for the one is longer or shorter than the other, and in colour too they may differ. But they are of one nature as they are both horns. In a similar way, the Tathagata is different from what constitutes matter, and yet he is not different. Again, he is designated as one who is emancipated (*moksha*), but he is not one with the emancipation, nor is he different from it. Therefore, the essence of Buddhahood is neither eternal nor transeient, neither made nor not-made, neither composite nor un-composite, neither knowledge nor the known, neither predicable nor un-predicable, neither of the Skandhas nor not of them, neither describable nor indescribable. It is beyond all measurement, it is not to be brought under any form of category. We may talk of it as talk we must, but we can never reach it through words. For it is unborn, and consequently not subject to destruction. It is like unto the sky beyond logical constructions, and no amount of intellectual tricks (*prapañca*) will bring it within one's grasp. The essence, *buddhatā*, transcends measurement (*pramāṇa*) and the senses (*indriya*).<sup>1</sup>

The *Lankāvatāra* is quite anxious to let us realise that the theory of non-ego does not conflict with that of the Tathagata's Womb (*tathāgata-garbha*), of which mention was made elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> When the Tathāgata-garbha is spoken of as a kind of storage where all the seeds (*bīja*) of the past deeds and psychical activities are preserved, philosophers are apt to take it for an ego-soul. But, says the *Lankāvatāra*, the Tathāgata-garbha is empty in its nature yet real, it is Nirvana itself, unborn, without predicates, without affections (*aprañhita*), and, further, it is attained where no false discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) takes place, where no shadow (*nirābhāsa*) of particularisation falls. There is nothing here for the Buddhas or Bodhisattvas to take hold of as an ego-soul. They have gone beyond the sphere of false discrimination and wrongful judgment, and it is due to their wisdom and skilful device (*upāya*) that they set up all kinds of names and phrases in order to save their followers from mis-

<sup>1</sup> P. 189 f.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 206, 207, 259, 260, etc., of the present magazine.

taken views of reality. Pudgala (soul), Samtati (continuity), Skandha (aggregate), Pratyaya (causation), Aṇu (atom), Pradhāna (supreme soul), Īśvara (god), Kartṛi (creator):—some such ideas are entertained by the philosophers, but they are mere constructions of mind.<sup>1</sup>

*The World-transcending Knowledge.*

The inner consciousness of the Buddha, which constitutes the essence of Buddhahood (*svabuddhabuddhatā*), is the highest form of knowledge (*jñāna*). Of knowledge the *Lankāvatāra* distinguishes three forms: (1) worldly knowledge (*jñānam laukikam*), (2) supra-worldly knowledge (*lokottaram*), and (3) supreme supra-worldly knowledge (*lokottaratamam*). The first is relative as cherished by ordinary minds whose thinking is determined by ideas of being and non-being; the second is one possessed by the Hinayanists who cannot go beyond the categories of particularity and universality (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*); while the third and the highest is the knowledge attained by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who view the world from an absolute standpoint, for they know that the world is above all characteristics, that is, has never been brought into existence and will never be annihilated, that it is designable neither as being nor as non-being. It is by means of this highest knowledge that the Bodhisattvas finally come to the realisation of the egolessness (*nairātmya*) of all things, thus entering upon the path of Tathagatahood.<sup>2</sup>

This supreme supra-worldly knowledge is no other than the Noble Knowledge (*āryajñāna*) of the Bodhisattva, which enables him to enter into the innermost nature (*svapratyātma*) of all the Buddhas, and which constitutes the central theme of the *Lankāvatāra sūtra*. Its three aspects are now distinguished.<sup>3</sup> The first is its not being mere appearance (*nirābhāsa*), that it is reality, as distinguished from the way it is regarded generally

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 78-79.

<sup>2</sup> P. 156 f.

<sup>3</sup> P. 49.

by the Hinayanists and the philosophers. Secondly, it is awakened by the will (*pranidhāna*) and power (*adhishṭhāna*) of all the Buddhas. That is to say, the Noble Knowledge is made possible to rise in the mind of the Bodhisattva by the virtue of the Buddhas' earnest desire for universal enlightenment and salvation; their earnest desire or will sends out strong waves of vibration throughout the universe, and all sentient beings there feel its effect according to their capacities. Thirdly, sustained by this and going beyond the relative knowledge of the Hinayanists, the Bodhisattva's mind is freed from all predicable forms and ready for realising in himself a psychic state termed *Māyopamasamādhikāya*. He is now fairly on the way to the final stage of Buddhahood.

In Buddhism no distinction is made between knowledge and knower. The Noble Knowledge (*āryajñāna*) is at once the inner perception and the mental power that brings about this perception. This is quite in accordance with the general mode of thinking in Buddhism; for if there is something at the back of the knowledge, or if this is the function of a certain higher faculty in the mind, there will be a dualism which is so strongly combated by the Mahayanists. The knowledge after all must be absolute; so *Prajñā*, which is the same thing as *Āryajñāna*, is described as one of the six *Pāramitās* (virtues of perfection) in the following manner.<sup>1</sup> As the Hinayanists cling to the idea of Nirvana for their own spiritual enjoyment (*ātmasukha*), they are unable to think of the welfare of their fellow-beings. With the Mahayanists it is different, they are ever bent upon practising all the six *Pāramitās* in their highest possible form; and, therefore, in *Prajñā*, their minds are free from false discrimination (*vikalpa*); they do not fall into either of any opposing predicates as they are awake to the suchness of reality; they are thus able to cause a turning (*parāvṛtti*) in the whole field of their consciousness, though this does not mean that they destroy the work of their own past karma. *Prajñā* thus leads them finally to the realisation of the inmost truth deeply con-

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<sup>1</sup> P. 238.

cealed under the wrappings of attachment and intellectualism.

*Doctrine of the Triple Body*

When the *Lankāvatāra* was compiled, the doctrine of the Triple Body (*trikāya*) was not apparently yet formulated in the shape we have it today. We have thus terms corresponding to the Three Bodies and the indications of the underlying idea, but no specified relationship is established between them. Only the absolute state of self-realisation is considered belonging to the Dharmatā-Buddha,<sup>1</sup> who is evidently the Dharmakāya of the later periods.

There are other forms of Buddhahood known as Nishyanda-Buddha and Nirmāṇa-Buddha. *Nishyanda* literally means "flowing down", or "flowing into", and the Nishyanda-Buddha is a Buddha into whom Dharmatā flows and who shines in splendour. The two later Chinese translators have rendered it by 報佛 *pao-fo*, and 報 means "to requite", "to compensate"; while the Sung by Gunabhadra has 依佛 *i-fo*, 依 meaning "to depend", or "to rely upon." The latter is nearer to the sense of the Sanskrit *nishyanda*, and it is hard to know how the later translators came to have 報 for it instead of 依. Did they try to read their own thought into it? For they were doubtless acquainted in their own day with the doctrine of Trikāya, one of which is generally known as Sambhogakāya, and to which the *Lankāvatāra* has the corresponding Vipākāja<sup>2</sup> 報生佛 or Vipā-kasthā<sup>3</sup> 報住(?)佛.

The other form of Buddhahood mentioned in the *Lankāvatāra* is Nirmāṇaika or Nairmāṇika or Nirmāṇa.<sup>4</sup> This is generally done into Chinese by 化佛 or 變化佛, i.e., Transformation-Buddha, corresponding to the Nirmāṇa-kāya of the Triple Body. As to what is this Transformation-Buddha, the sutra does not offer any explanation. But when the distinction is made between the Nirmāṇa-Buddha and the Dharmatā-Buddha as to

<sup>1</sup> P. 56.

<sup>2</sup> P. 28.

<sup>3</sup> P. 34.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 28, 34, 56, 93, etc.

their method and material of preaching, we can have a glimpse into the specific features of the Nirmāṇa-Buddha. The *Lankāvatāra*<sup>2</sup> makes the latter the teacher of the ordinary people generally known as “bāla and pṛithagjana” in Buddhist literature, while the Dharmatā-Buddha discusses about an inner perception penetrating into the suchness of truth, or about the self-absorbing contemplation by Noble Knowledge (*āryajñāna*) on the ultimate condition of things which cannot be reached by logical categories. The class of beings designated as “bāla and pṛithagjana”, which includes almost all of us as drifting over the ocean of contrary ideas, is not able to see behind the veil of ignorance and wrong judgment (*vikalpa*), and to lead this unfortunate group of sentient beings to salvation or enlightenment, the Nirmāṇa-Buddha would discuss about the aspects of particularity (*svetaḥkṣhaṇa*) and universality (*sāmānyalakṣhaṇa*) as objects of the intellect. His preaching is thus concerned with the individualising side of existence (*prabheda-pracāra*), which is dealt with in Buddhist philosophy under such categories as the six Pāramitās, five Skandhas, twelve Āyatanas, eighteen Dhātus, methods of emancipation (*vimokṣha*), modes of consciousness, and other subjects.<sup>2</sup> The object of these discourses is naturally to go beyond the teachings of the various philosophical schools of the day. The Dharmatā-Buddha, on the other hand, is meant for the Bodhisattvas whose aim is to come to the highest realisation of truth, which is, Pratyātmāryajñāna-gatigocara.

The distinction, however, between the Nirmāṇa-Buddha and the Nishyanda-Buddha is not clear as far as the *Lankāvatāra* is concerned. For it describes the latter as performing almost the same function as the Nirmāṇa-Buddha.<sup>3</sup> His teaching is said to consist of such topics as particularity, universality, Habit-energy (*vāsanā*) conserved in the deep recesses of consciousness, wrong judgments about it, and their interrelations causing multitudinousness of objects to appear, and then our inordinate

<sup>1</sup> P. 93.

<sup>2</sup> P. 57.

<sup>3</sup> P. 56 f.

attachment to them, but in reality the non-existence of all these phenomena. Of these topics, the Dharmatā-nishyanda Buddha will speak thus: the conception of an individual ego-substance arises from our wrong judgment concerning the nature of existence and the law of causation, both of which fail to apply beyond the world of relativity which is *śūnya* (empty); it is like the creations of the magician, he knows how to produce variety of unrealities depending upon some objects of the senses such as plants, bricks, etc.; the spectators are induced to take them for real objects, though in fact there are none such. To the ordinary mind, the law of causation is made to extend beyond the world of relativity, which is also the world of wrong judgments and attachments; whereas the world which supplies a subject-matter for the Dharmatā-Buddha is altogether unsupported (*nirālamba*), disengaged from dependence (*ālambavigata*), that is to say, it is not to be subsumed under such notions as creation, sense-perception, inference, and others, as it is not to be found among the contents of thought cherished by the ordinary ego-bound minds, in which the Hinayanists and philosophers are included. The Dharmatā-Buddha points directly to the truth of immediate perception in which the Bodhisattva stands all by himself detached from the hypothetical creations of the mind.

From this we can see what the Dharmatā-Buddha teaches in contradistinction to the other two Buddhas, the *Nirmāṇa* and the *Nishyanda*; but as to the distinguishing marks between the latter two we fail to get any definite and specific ideas. When the universe is divided into two aspects, absolute and relative, the absolute one belongs to the Dharmatā while the relative one is the common province of the *Nirmāṇa* and *Nishyanda*. One may ask, Why this distinction then? As far as the *Lankāvatāra* goes, this question is unanswered. We can say only this, that the doctrine of *Trikāya* must have already been in progress at the time of the *Lankāvatāra* and the compiler of the sutra took it for granted that his readers were acquainted with the idea. It was evidently sometime later that the doctrine came to be dogmatised. The term "Dharmakāya" occurs at several

places<sup>1</sup> in this sutra, but no "Sambhogakāya", nor "Nirmāṇakāya," perhaps except once in p. 241.<sup>2</sup> However, that the Buddha is able as he wills to manifest himself as a Nirmāṇakāya in response to the earnest desires of his followers or in order to execute his own purposes, is foreshadowed in the conception of Manomayakāya, "mind-made-body," or "will-body."<sup>3</sup> This is a kind of Nirmāṇakāya assumed by the Bodhisattva as well as by the Tathagata.

One thing I wished to emphasise in this statement concerning the three forms of Buddhahood was that the story of the inmost perception to be gained by the Bodhisattvas, forming the central theme of the *Lankāvatāra*, is told only by the Mūla-tathāgata,<sup>4</sup> or true Tathagata (眞實如來) as in the T'ang version, because he is above all senses, all logical measurements (*sarvaprāmāṇa*), and cannot be perceived by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas as well as by the philosophers; because he abides absorbed in the bliss of realisation and in the perfection of the highest knowledge.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 51, 70, 192, 212, etc.; as Tathāgatakāya, pp. 42, 43, 51.

<sup>2</sup> One difference between the Transformation-Buddha and the Dharmatā-Buddha is described to be as follows:

"The Tathagata of transformation (*nirmīta-nairmāṇika*) is attended by Vajrapāni, but not the original Tathagata (*maula-tathāgata*). The original Tathagata is beyond all senses and reasonings, cannot be known by the simple-minded, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers. He abides in a state of bliss which follows from the perception of the truth as he has perfected himself in the doctrine of wisdom and patience. He requires no attendance of Vajrapāni. No Buddhas of transformation (*nirmītabuddha*) are born of karma (*na karma-prabhava*), yet they are neither the same nor different with the Tathagata. Like the potter who produces articles by bringing various conditions together, the transformation-Buddhas preach the Dharma when circumstances are provided for them, but they are incapable of discoursing on the state of consciousness realised by the noble understanding which leads to an inner perception of truth." (P. 242).

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 81, 136, 192.

<sup>4</sup> P. 242.

<sup>5</sup> This sketchy and incidental reference to the doctrine of the Triple Body as foreshadowed in the *Lankāvatāra*, is far from being satisfactory. When an article exclusively devoted to the treatment of the Tathagata is written, a fuller exposition of the subject will be presented.

*The Highest Knowledge and a First Cause*

We know now that the Noble Knowledge realised in one's inmost depths of consciousness (*pratyātmajñāna*) is something absolutely defying all description and altogether unpredicable, and that it is thus the topic to be properly dealt with by Dharmatā-Buddha himself and not by any other beings subject somehow to the principle of relativity. This knowledge is thus eternal, unconditioned, beyond the reach of all thinkability, and belongs to the highest principle of cognition from which all relative knowledge is derivable. Now the question is, In what respect does this differ from the first cause (*kāraṇa*) considered by the philosophers to be also eternal (*nitya*) and beyond thought (*acintya*)? This is answered by the author of the *Lankāvatāra* in the following manner:<sup>1</sup>

What is claimed to be the first cause by the philosophers cannot really be so, because a cause always presupposes something beyond and cannot be its own cause. The idea of causation belongs to a world of relativity, and what is relative cannot be eternal and is always within the sphere of thought. If we take a thing belonging to the relative world and therefore to a realm of action, as a first cause from which everything else has its beginning, this will be a wrong form of inference; for we jump from relativity to transcendentality, from impermanence to eternity, from a thing that is to a thing that is on the other side of being and non-being. Therefore, what is regarded by the philosophers as the first cause eternal and beyond thinkability is not to be identified with the Noble Knowledge attainable by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

That the Noble Knowledge is eternal and cannot be made a subject of thought, comes from its intrinsic nature. For it is a state of mind realised personally by the Buddhas when they deeply delve into the ultimate principle itself which is not conditioned by any category of thought. It is not to be designated as a cause which is bound up with its antecedents and con-

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<sup>1</sup> P. 59 ff.



sequents, it stands all by itself as absolute knowledge flashed through one's consciousness, it is a fact of experience which does not allow of any arguments. It is Tathatā (suchness), Tattva (thatness), perceived in the inmost consciousness of the Tathagata. As it is not an object external to him, it is a self-sufficient cause not depending on anything. We may say that this is a state of pure perception (*pratyātmagati*).

And it is for this reason that the *Lankāvatāra* is ever persistent in making this pure perception not an object of discursive understanding for the ordinary minds, for the philosophers, for the Hinayanists. It is not only too exalted a subject for them to comprehend, but quite beyond logic and liable to be wrongly and disastrously interpreted by them. It is meant for those only who are not at all surprised, or alarmed, or frightened at hearing that there is a thing beyond one's power of thinking, for such belong to the family of Tathāgatayāna.<sup>1</sup> The Mahayanist does not deny the reality of the objective world as regards its relativity, where all conditions obtain, it only refuses to extend these to a realm where they do not apply, and as to the existence and reality of such a realm he is firmly convinced because his inner perception testifies to it. What stronger and more intimate and more convincing proof could one ever expect to offer for a truth? Therefore, *Lankāvatāra* boldly declares:<sup>2</sup>

“Śrotapatti-phala (預流果), Skṛīdagami-phala (—來果), Anāgāmi-phala (不還果), and Arhattva (羅漢果)<sup>3</sup>—they are all perturbed states of mind. Sometimes I speak of the Triple Vehicle, sometimes of the One Vehicle, and sometimes of No-vehicle; all these distinctions are meant for the ignorant, for men of inferior wisdom, and even for the noble-minded. As to the entering into the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*), it goes beyond dualism. When one is abiding where there are no images (*nirābhāsa*), how could the Triple Vehicle be established? All

<sup>1</sup> P. 64.

<sup>2</sup> P. 65.

<sup>3</sup> These are the spiritual attainments of the Hinayanists, arhatship being the highest of the four.

kinds of Dhyāna, Apramāṇa, Ārūpa, Samādhi, and the Extinction of Thoughts<sup>1</sup>—they do not exist except as purely psychical (*cittamātra*).<sup>2</sup>

*The Parable of the Sands of the Ganga*

From the absolute point of view, no use is apparently to be found for anything in the world; no talk is needed, no sermonising avails, and, therefore, let the world go as it pleases and work out its own solution if it ever wants; for what are the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas after all? This is then the question awaiting the absolutist's solution. The following passages concerning the parable of the sands of the Ganga will be edifying in this respect.<sup>3</sup>

“At that time Mahāmati asked the Blessed One, Thou teachest in the scriptural text (*deśanāpāṭa*) that the Tathagatas of the past, future, and present are like the sands of the Ganga; is this to be understood literally? Or is there another meaning to it? Explain it to me, O Blessed one!

“To this the Blessed One answered: O Mahāmati, do not understand it literally. The Buddhas of the past, future, and present are not to be measured according to the measure of the sands of the Ganga. Why? Because the comparison goes beyond this world, it is no fair comparison, there is something resembling in it but not quite exact. And, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas do not hold up a comparison going beyond this world and not of complete resemblance. What has been told by myself and the Tathagatas is no more than a small portion of real resemblance. When I say that there are Tathagatas equal to the sands of the Ganga, it is meant to make those stupid and vulgar people tremble, who, following the modes of feeling and the erroneous views which are cherished by some philosophers, get attached to them, thinking that there is an eternal being or that there is not, go on revolving around the

<sup>1</sup> Summarily stated, these are all different forms of meditation.

<sup>2</sup> P. 65.

<sup>3</sup> P. 229 ff.

wheel of existence, of birth and death. How are they to be kept away from the strait pass of the wheel of existence so that they come to long for a superior object and lay hold of a superior object? Thus it is shown that Buddhahood is easy to attain. If it is told that the appearance of a Tathagata is like the blooming of the udumbara, they may not exert themselves. [Therefore, I preach that the Tathagatas are like the sands of the Ganga. But again,] considering what people are to be led. I hold out in the scriptural text that the appearance of the Tathagata is a matter of utmost rarity as the blooming of the udumbara plant. O Mahāmati, the udumbara flower has never been seen by anybody, while the Tathagatas have already appeared in the world and are here even now. To say that the appearance of the Tathagata is as rare an event as the blooming of udumbara plant is not a statement put forward in accordance with my inner knowledge. When a statement is shown in accordance with my inner knowledge, it goes beyond, it oversteps any comparison that may be made in the world, because of its unbelievableness, and it will not be believed by stupid and vulgar people. No comparisons hold good in the realm of the Noble Understanding which is attained by an inner realisation, because the truth (*tattvam*) goes beyond those marks visible to the Cittam, Manas, and Manovijñāna. The truth is the Tathagata, therefore no comparisons are adequate here.

“Nevertheless, O Mahāmati, just a little of comparison is given, that is, Tathagatas are said to be equal to the sands of the Ganga, they are equal, they are not different, yet the comparison is not proper, nor erroneous. O Mahāmati, for instance, the sands of the river Ganga are violently trampled on by fishes, tortoises, porpoises, crocodiles, buffaloes, lions, elephants, etc., but the sands are not troubled, have no ill feelings, nor are they unconscious of being trampled on; they are without imagination, beautifully clear and devoid of impurities. Even so with the Tathagatas, O Mahāmati, their Noble Understanding attained by an inner perception is the great river of Ganga, and their powers, psychic faculties, self-mastery are the sands; and they are trampled by the philosophers, stupid people, and

antagonists, who are the fishes, but they are not troubled, they have no ill feelings. The Tathagatas, because of their original vows, fulfilling all the bliss that accrues from perfect mental concordance (*samāpatti*) for the sake of all beings, are not troubled, have no ill feelings. Therefore, the Tathagatas, like the sands of the river of Ganga, do not particularise, as they are above likes and dislikes.

“O Mahāmati, the sands of the river of Ganga do not lose their earthly quality even when fire breaks out on earth at the end of the kalpa, because the sands are of the nature of the earth itself. And, O Mahāmati, as the earth is bound up with the fiery element, it will never burn up, only it is imagined by stupid and vulgar people who are fallen into the way of untruthfulness that the earth will burn up because of continuity. But it will not burn up because it is the element on which fire subsists. Even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagata’s Dharma-body, like the sands of the Ganga, is not destructible.

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga are immeasurable, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagata’s rays of light are immeasurable, which are shed by the Tathagatas over the assemblies and circles of all the Buddhas in order to effect the ripening and inspiring of all beings.

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga, retaining their quality of being themselves, do not change into anything else, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, because of their severance from the cause of conditional existence, have gone beyond the realm of birth-and-death.<sup>1</sup>

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga are unconcerned whether some of them are taken away or whether more are thrown in, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas’ wisdom (*jñāna*) which is engaged in the ripening of all beings knows neither decrease nor increase, for the Dharma is without corporeality. Beings endowed with the body, O Mahāmati, are destructible, not so with beings without the body; and the Dharma is without the body.

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<sup>1</sup> Literally, “are neither produced nor vanishing in Samsāra.”

“O Mahāmati, as a man cannot obtain ghee or oil or things like that from the sands of the river Ganga, however hard he may squeeze them to get it, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, however painfully hard they may be oppressed for the sake of all beings, never neglect the fulfilling of their original vows which they cherish in the depths of their hearts in the Dharma-dhātu [i.e., realm of the Dharma], so long as all beings are not led into Nirvana by the Tathagatas, and this is due to the latter’s being endowed with great compassion.

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga flow along the banks of its water and not where there is no water, even so, O Mahāmati, all the discourses by the Tathagatas on the Buddha-dharma take place in accordance with the stream of Nirvana. For this reason the Tathagatas are said to be like the sands of the river Ganga. O Mahāmati, the sense of transmigration here does not apply to the Tathagatas. O Mahāmati, decay is the sense of transmigration. And, O Mahāmati, the ultimate end of birth-and-death is not to be known. Not being known, how am I to disclose the Dharma in the sense of transmigration? Annihilation is the sense of transmigration. O Mahāmati, this is not known to stupid and vulgar people.

“Mahāmati asked, If, O the Blessed One, the ultimate end is not knowable, how is it possible for all sentient beings to obtain deliverance as they are living in the midst of birth-and-death?

“Said the Blessed One, O Mahāmati, when the cause is removed which is the memory [i.e., habit-energy or *vāsanā*] of erroneous reasoning and faulty discrimination since beginning-less time, and when there takes place a turning at the seat of discrimination by realising that external objects are appearances or manifestations of one’s own mind, then there is deliverance, which is not annihilation. Therefore, O Mahāmati, there is no occasion for speaking of endlessness. An endless end is a synonym of discrimination, O Mahāmati; and apart from discrimination, there is no other being whatever here. When the inner world or the outer one is surveyed by wisdom (*buddhi*), we find indeed, O Mahāmati, all objects transcending the dualism

of knowing and being known. Only because of not knowing one's own discriminating mind, discrimination takes place; when this is realised, it disappears.

“On this occasion this was uttered :

“Those who see the Buddhas as not related to destruction, nor to transmigration, like the sands of Ganga, see the Tathagatas :

“Like the sands of Ganga which are free from all defects always flowing along the current, so is the substance of Buddhahood.”

## PART II

### *The Intellectual Content of the Buddhist Experience*

Having elucidated to a certain extent though not so exhaustively as a thorough survey of the *Lankāvatāra* may require, as regards the nature of the inmost consciousness of the Tathagata known as Pratyātmāryajñāgocara, let us now proceed to see what intellectual equipment is needed for a Bodhisattva before he can attain to this inner realisation so emphatically acclaimed in the sutra. This intellectual equipment consisting of two parts, logical and psychological, is in a way the philosophical content of the intuitive experience attained by the Bodhisattva. It may be regarded either as the intellectual attitude to be acquired by him before he enters upon the path of Buddhist discipline, or as the philosophy of what he has realised, which as a rational being he is to elaborate later on. In either case, the *Lankāvatāra* offers us a thorough going idealism along with the message of self-realisation, and this has been the point of discussion as referred to before among the Buddhist exegetists who wished to decide which was the more important topic of the sutra. Whatever this may be, we are now prepared to see what is the philosophical background of the Buddhist experience.

Historically, the *Lankāvatāra* has been considered as exposition of the following subjects: the five Dharmas, three

Svabhāvas, eight Vijñānas and two Nairātmyas. Buddhist scholars, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese, were always quite partial to what may be termed a numerical method of analysis. The whole text was first analysed into so many parts, and each part again into so many sections, and so on; and then the important ideas developed in them were picked up, and gathered up numerically in order one, two, three and so on. They thus often failed to see one central thought running through the text, like the mountaineer whose attention is constantly arrested by details in his way and fails to take in the mountain as a whole. Now, the *Lankāvatāra's* philosophy is absolute idealism, and all these numerical headings are details used to establish the main theme. But I will here first discuss each subject separately and then arrange it so as to bring out the whole system in a more centralised shape.

#### *The Five Dharmas*

The five categories (*dharma*) are Name (*nāma*), Appearance (*nimitta*), Discrimination (*vikalpa*), Right Knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), and Suchness (*tathatā*).<sup>1</sup> Those who are desirous of attaining to the spirituality of the Tathagata are requested to know what these five categories are; for they are unknown to the ordinary-minded, and, as they are unknown, the latter judge wrongly and get attached to appearances. Now Names are not real things, they are merely symbolical (*saṃketa*), they are not worth getting attached to as realities. The ignorant minds flow along the stream of unreal constructions, thinking all the time that there are really such things as "me" and "mine." They get a tenacious hold on these imaginary objects, over which they learn to cherish greed, anger, and infatuation, altogether veiling the light of wisdom. These passions lead to actions, which, being repeated, go on to weave a cocoon for the agent. He is now securely imprisoned in it and unable to see himself free from the encumbering threads of wrong judgments. He now drifts along in the ocean of transmigra-

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<sup>1</sup> P. 224 ff, p. 228.

tion, and, like the wheel turning around the same axle, he never gets out of the rut. He never grows or develops, he is the same old sin-committing, blindly-groping fellow. Due to this infatuation, he is unable to see that all things are like *māyā*, mirage, or a lunar reflection in water; he is unable to disengage himself from the false idea of self-substance (*svabhāva*), of "me and mine," of subject and object, of birth, staying, and death, he does not realise that all these are creations of mind and wrongly interpreted. For this reason they finally come to cherish such notions as *Iśvara*, Time, Atom, and Pradhāna, and so inextricably involved in appearances they forever turn on the wheel of ignorance.

By Appearances (*nimitta*) are meant qualities belonging to sense-objects such as visual, olfactory, etc.: and by discrimination (*vikalpa*) is meant the naming of all these objects and qualities, distinguishing one from another.<sup>1</sup>

Right Knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) consists in rightly comprehending the nature of Names and Appearances as predicating or determining each other. It consists in seeing mind as not agitated by external objects, in not being carried away by dualism such as nihilism and eternalism, and in not falling into the state of Śrāvakahood and Pratyekabuddhahood as well as into the position of the philosopher.

When one surveys by the aid of this Right Knowledge over a world of Names and Appearances, one realises that they are to be known as neither non-existent nor existent, that they are in themselves above the dualism of assertion (*samāropa*) and refutation (*apavāda*), and that the mind abides in a state of absolute tranquillity not disturbed by Names and Appearances. When this is attained one gets into a state of Suchness (*tathatā*), and as it is where no images are reflected the Bodhisattva will experience joy.

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<sup>1</sup> More literally: "Then, again, O Mahāmāti, discrimination is that by which names are set up. Expressions are given to appearances, saying 'This is such, and not otherwise'; and we have names such as elephant, horse, wheel, footman, woman, or man, wherein discrimination takes place."



*The Three Forms of Knowledge*

The three forms of knowledge known as three Svabhāvalakṣhaṇa<sup>1</sup> are more or less a recapitulation or re-classification of the five Dharmas. *Svabhāva* literally means "self-nature," and *lakṣhaṇa* "a characteristic mark"; and, therefore, the combination may apply to the nature of knowledge itself and also to its object. But the motive underlying the classification is to see what knowledge is required for the attainment of the truth that will release one from the pain and bondage of existence, and the three characteristic marks so called will more properly apply to knowledge than to its object. In this case the term "svabhāvalakṣhaṇatraya" may be understood as meaning three characteristic signs by which the nature of a knowledge may be distinguished.

The first is known as Parikalpita, wrong discrimination or judgment, and comes from not rightly comprehending the nature of objects, internal as well as external, and also the relationship existing between objects as independent individuals or as belonging to a genus. The second is Paratantra, literally, "depending on another," is a knowledge based on some fact, which is not however in correspondence with the real nature of the object. The characteristic of this knowledge is that it is not altogether a subjective creation produced out of pure nothingness, but it is a construction of some objective reality on which it depends for material. Therefore, its definition is "that which arises depending upon a support or basis (*āshraya*)." And it is due to this knowledge that all kinds of objects, external and internal, are recognised, and in these, individuality and universality are distinguished.<sup>2</sup> Paratantra is thus equivalent to what we nowadays call relative knowledge, while Parikalpita is the fabrication of one's own imagination or mind. In the dark a man steps on something, and imagining it to be a snake he is frightened. This is Parikalpita, his wrong judgment attended with unwarranted excitement. He now bends down and examines

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 67, 227.

<sup>2</sup> P. 67.

it closely when he finds it to be a piece of rope. This is Paratantra, his relative knowledge. He does not yet know what really the rope is and thinks it to be a reality, individual and ultimate.<sup>1</sup>

While it may be difficult to distinguish sharply Parikalpita from Paratantra from these brief statements or definitions, the latter seems to have at least a certain degree of truth as regards objects themselves, but the former implies not only an intellectual mistake but some affective functions set in motion along with the wrong judgment. When an object is perceived as an object existing externally or internally and determinable under the categories of particularity and universality, the Paratantra form of cognition takes place. Accepting this as real, the mind elaborates on it further both intellectually and affectively, and this is the Parikalpita form of knowledge. It may be after all more confusing to apply our modern ways of thinking to the older ones especially when these were actuated purely by religious requirements and not at all by any disinterested philosophical ones.

The third form of knowledge is Parinishpanna, perfected one, and corresponds to the Right Knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) and Suchness (*tathatā*) of the five Dharmas. It is the knowledge available when we reach the state of self-realisation by going beyond names and appearances and all forms of discrimination or judgment (*vikalpa*). It is Suchness itself, it is the Tathāgata-garbha-hṛdaya, it is something indestructible (*avināśah*).<sup>2</sup> The rope is now perceived in its true perspective. It is not an object constructed out of causes and conditions and now lying before us as something external. From the absolutist's point of view which is assumed by the *Lankāvatāra*, the rope is a reflection of our own mind, it has no objectivity apart from the latter, it is in this respect non-existent. But the mind out of which the whole world evolves is the object of Parishpanna, perfectly-attained-knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> See also p. 130 ff. The *gūṭhā*, however, is very difficult to understand.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 67, 227.

The relation between the five Dharmas and the three Svabhāvas may be tabulated as follows:

Five Dharmas	{	Nāma,	}	.....	Parikalpita,	}	} Three Svabhāvas.
		Nimitta,			Paratantra,		
		Vikalpa,			.. Parinishpanna.		
		Samyagjñāna,					
		Tathatā.					

In going over this tabulation as in the study of other parts of Buddhist philosophy, we must have one thing always before our minds, as I stated elsewhere, which is that Buddhist thought is the outcome of Buddhist life, that its logic or psychology or metaphysics cannot be understood adequately unless we realise that facts of Buddhist experience are at its basis and therefore that pure logic is not the key to the understanding of Buddhist philosophy.

#### *The Two Kinds of Knowledge*

The division of knowledge or truth (*satya*) into two forms, Samvṛitti and Paramārtha, is also known to the author of the *Lankāvatāra*, but it was due to the Madhyamika school of Nāgārjuna that the distinction was thoroughly formulated into a system and made most of it to account for the dual aspect of experience in their treatises on the doctrine of the Middle Path. In the *Lankāvatārā* we may say that the idea is foreshadowed when it makes reference to Vyavahāra,<sup>1</sup> according to which the Buddha concedes to the possibility of such concepts as being and non-being, birth and death, caused and causing, etc. Vyavahāra belongs to our ordinary life where rules the principle of individuation, and as long as the relative and provisional existence of māyā is permitted, common parlance too has to be given authority for practical purposes. When the sutra, however, goes on further down explaining the characteristic features of the Paratantra form of knowledge, the terms, Samvṛitti and Paramārtha, occur—the former as leading to particularity and the latter as a psychical state when this is transcended. The

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<sup>1</sup> Meaning "usage," or "worldly way." P. 85.

gāthā on page 130 ff. seems to throw some light on what is meant by the Parikalpita and the Paratantra form of knowledge and also on their relationship to the Madhyamika conception of Samvṛitti-satya. But the stanzas<sup>1</sup> are very complicated in meaning and difficult to get at, exactly and in full. But the main idea seems to be this: Mind is set in motion when it allows itself to be conditioned by the principle of individuation. Parikalpita and Paratantra follow from this stirring up of mentation. Paratantra is intellectual, for it operates depending upon something outside itself. It is a kind of representation. It may not be always correct, but it does not create anything out of itself. Parikalpita, on the other hand, weaves out its own imaginative world regardless of its objective value. It is always in the wrong not only in the logical sense but psychologically. The main point about it is that it discriminates "me and mine" from what is not "me and mine," and holding this distinction to be real and final, gets itself attached to it, which culminates in moral egotism. When this is once asserted, all the evils follow that are to be found in connection with life. Paratantra which may be innocent in itself becomes the most efficient hand-maid to Parikalpita, and what is created by it is also intellectually confirmed with all its practical consequences. Paratantra and Parikalpita are mutually dependent. Parinishpanna is to go beyond both these forms of knowledge. This is Paramārtha, the highest transcendental wisdom, while the Samvṛitti form of truth prevails in the world of Parikalpita and Paratantra.

The two kinds of Buddhi (knowledge)<sup>2</sup> which are elsewhere distinguished in the sutra may be considered to correspond to Samvṛitti and Paramārtha. Buddhi is a higher power of reasoning, but it also denotes any form of intelligence. The first is called *Pravicaya-buddhi*, which is a kind of absolute knowledge corresponding to the Parinishpanna. *Pravicaya* means "to search through," "to examine thoroughly," and the Buddhi so

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<sup>1</sup> P. 130 ff.

<sup>2</sup> P. 122.

qualified penetrates into the fundamental nature of all things which is above logical analysis and cannot be described with any of the four propositions (*catushkoṭīka*). The second Buddhi is called *Pratishṭhāpika*, that is, intelligence that sets up all kinds of distinction over a world of appearances, making one's mind attached to them as real. Thus it may establish rules of reasoning whereby to give judgments to a world of particulars. It is logical knowledge, it is what regulates our ordinary life. But as soon as something is established (*pratishṭhāpita*) in order to prove it, that is, as soon as a proposition is made, it sets up something else at the same time and goes on to prove itself against that something else. There is nothing absolute in this.

This setting-up or establishing is elsewhere designated as *Samāropa*.<sup>1</sup> The *Lankāvatāra* distinguishes four of such establishments: (1) to establish characteristic marks (*lakṣhaṇa*) where there are none, (2) to establish definite views (*dṛishṭa*) where there are none, (3) to establish a cause (*hetu*) where there is none, and (4) to establish a substance (*bhāva*) where there is none. Owing to these propositions definitely held up as true, opposite ones will surely rise and there will take place a wrangling or controversy (*apavāda*) between the opposing parties. The sutra thus advises the Bodhisattva to avoid these one-sided views in order to come to a state of enlightenment which is beyond the positive as well as the negative way of viewing the world.

#### *The Twofold Non-ātman Theory*

We now come to a third distinctive feature of the philosophy of the *Lankāvatāra*, which is known as the twofold non-Atman theory. i.e., *Nairātmyadvaya*.<sup>2</sup> The non-Atman or non-ego theory is known among all Buddhist students as the most differentiating mark of Buddhism, but the denial of an Atman or self-substance in external objects is the specific property of the Mahāyāna and may require some explanation. To translate

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<sup>1</sup> P. 70.

<sup>2</sup> P. 68.

*ātman* always by "ego," or "self," or "soul" may not be right; especially when its denial is applied to an objective world, egolessness has no meaning, it is merely the source of misapprehension. An Atman means something substantial in possession of a number of qualities, and a free agent not bound by the principle of relativity. When its existence, therefore, is denied in us, it means that we have no such free agent within ourselves, enjoying a substantial existence even above the concatenation of cause and effect. When we deny its reality in the world external to us, it means that there is no self-substance (*svabhāva*) in individual objects which come into existence, abide for a while, and finally disappear according to certain laws. In this case, *nairātmya* is *niḥsvabhāva*, and when it is understood in this way, the idea falls in harmoniously with the other views maintained by Mahayanists. Though not yet formulated numerically by Buddhist scholars, there are four distinguishing marks in Mahayana ontology which constitute its very kernel. They are: (1) that all things are empty (*śūnyatā*), (2) unborn (*anutpāda*), (3) not dual (*advaita*), and (4) without self-substance (*niḥsvabhāva*).<sup>1</sup> This sums up the metaphysical aspect of Mahayanism, and the dual non-Atman theory is merely a partial recapitulation of it.

The *Lankāvatāra* explains the theory in the following manner:<sup>2</sup> The Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas have nothing personal in them, there is no "me and mine" in them, they are created by the ignorant affirmation of the desire to have, and attachment takes place when they are comprehended by the senses. The material world as well as the physical body are manifestations of the mind known as Ālaya-vijñāna, and when they are discriminated as particular existences, we are discriminating our own mind-made. They are in constant transmigration, they never remain even for a moment as they are, they flow like a stream, they change like a seed, they flicker like a candle-light, they move like a wind or a cloud. And when affections are stirred up, they are pursued by us, we behave like the monkey

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 73, 188, etc.

<sup>2</sup> P. 68 ff.

or the fly that runs after filthy food, not knowing when to get satiated, and evidently to no good purpose, we burn like fire. Due to the habit-energy (*vāsanā*) accumulated since time immemorial through wrong reasoning and attachment, we now transmigrate from one state to another revolving like a wheel, like a machine, like a phantom creation, or like a walking ghost. When we realise this, we are said to have the knowledge of the non-existence of an individual ego-soul (*pudgalanairātmya-jñānam*).

Dharmanairātmya-jñānam, as I said before, is gained by extending the knowledge of the non-existence of an individual ego-soul to the external world. The two ideas are inter-related, and when the one is asserted the other follows inevitably. To say that all objects are devoid of self-substance is to recognise a most complicated system of relationship running through existence. This was noticed by the Buddha himself when he discoursed on the Chain of Origination, but as his immediate interest was to free his disciples from ignorance and attachment, his statement stopped short at the psychology of non-ego. With the growth of Buddhist experience and thought, the psychology developed into metaphysics, and the doctrine of Śūnyatā (emptiness) came to occupy the minds of the Mahayanists. And this doctrine is another way of saying that all objects are without self-substance. When the theory of relativity is once established, all these stock ideas of Manayana Buddhism are necessary inferences: Śūnyatā, Dharmanātmya, Niḥsvabhāva, Anutpāda, Anābhāsa, Nirvāṇa, Māyopama, etc.

The denial of self-substance means that just as the Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas are devoid of ego-soul and have no other creator than the desire to have which expresses itself in deeds, thereby subjecting itself to an endless concatenation of cause and effect, so all things that are in nature above such categories as particularity and universality are distinguished as concrete individuals only through the wrong discrimination which is so intensely cherished by the ordinary mind. The wise are not confused, however, they are free from unwarranted inferences and attachments, as they know, by rightly reviewing the world

of particulars (*sarvadharmā*), that the latter is devoid of mind (*citta*), will (*manas*), intelligence (*manovijñāna*), the five Dharmas, and Self-substance (*svabhāva*).<sup>1</sup> When this is attained, the knowledge concerning the absence of Atman in all things is attained. "To be devoid of mind, etc.," means that the real nature of existence cannot be designated by any category of thought, for to be predicated means to be determined, to be limited. The truth, if it is really something that gives complete satisfaction to the yearnings of our religious consciousness, must be absolute, and to be absolute and thoroughly convincing such truth must be innerly experienced. When an appeal is made to logic, a statement or proposition is to be proved according to rules of thought, and these rules are sure to be conditional, and, therefore, more or less one-sided and prejudicial. Yet when the Mahayanists have to say somewhat either to assert or to deny, they run the risk of being judged by rules of thought, and perhaps all that they can establish in the circumstances is to say that all things are "devoid of mind, will, etc." as above referred to. This is where Mahayana philosophers are always in a quandary.

To apply the term, "Atman," ego or soul, not only to a person (*puṅgava*) but to all inanimate objects may sound strange at first sight as was stated above, but when it is realised that Buddhist philosophy has no special intellectual interest in the discussion itself except from the most pragmatistical point of view, i.e., as concerned with life, with this person, with its salvation and enlightenment, the extension of the term "self" or "soul" over to all existence seems justified and appropriate. At any rate the dual non-ego theory is one of the features of the Mahayana as differentiated from the Hinayana.

#### THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDHIST EXPERIENCE

##### *The Doctrine of Mind-only*

Having finished that phase of equipment which may be called logical, for the upward career of the Bodhisattva, let

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<sup>1</sup> P. 69.



us now pass on to the psychological phase, that is, the doctrine of consciousness, technically known as the theory of the Eight Vijñānas. As I wish to repeat, Buddhism being a religion has no abstract interest in logic, or psychology, or metaphysics *per se*, and especially in the case of the *Lankāvatāra* the chief problem is to reach a state of self-realisation which is the *sine qua non* of Buddhahood, and of Bodhisattvahood as well. All efforts are to be directed towards this goal, and it would be against the spirit of the sutra to be discussing about the psychology of the *Lankāvatāra*. I am doing this simply for the benefit of the modern reader who wants to get a better perspective of the text than in its original confusion.

Psychology is, however, the most difficult part of the *Lankāvatāra*, and it is not an easy matter to get a clear insight into the meaning of it. What I have done here may not be quite correct as far as the reading of the text is concerned, and I am open to conviction from the hand of a more competent interpreter.

Most Buddhist scholars are often too ready to make a too sharp distinction between the Madhyamika and the Yogācāra school, taking the one as exclusively advocating the theory of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) while the other is bent single-mindedly on an idealistic interpretation of the universe. They thus further assume that the idea of emptiness is not at all traceable in the Yogācāra and that idealism is absent in the Madhyamika. This is not exact as a matter of historical fact. Though it is impossible just at present to fix the date of the *Lankāvatāra* definitely, we find in it the tendencies that might have developed into the Yogācāra as well as into the Madhyamika; and these tendencies must be regarded as prior to the development of these two schools each distinctly claiming its special province of interest. The differentiation must have taken place after the sutra and not before; for it is natural to infer that composite tendencies appear first and their decomposition into separate ideas and further development each along its specified line.

Whatever this may be, the main point we must never forget in the study of the *Lankāvatāra* is that it is not written as a

philosophical treatise to establish a definite system of thought, but to discourse on a certain religious experience. What philosophy or speculation it offers is only incidental as an introduction or as an intellectual interpretation necessitated by the rational nature of humanity. This latter phase of religious experience may be more predominant in Buddhism than in some other religions, but it is not for us to miss the essence of the matter for the sake of its more or less unimportant accessories, however inevitable they may be.

As was definitely stated, the principal theme of the *Lankāvatāra* is Pratyātma-āryajñāna-gocara, a state of consciousness in which the inmost truth is directly presented to one's mind. This being an immediate perception of the truth cannot be imparted to others by means of logic, but without it the perception itself ceases to be operative, which is the same thing as not existing at all or being unreal. The experience in itself is without content, and must be given to it by the intellect to make it workable in our social living. The psychology of the *Lankāvatāra* is also to be treated thus, that is to say, its doctrine of mind-only (*cittamātra*) with all its accompaniments is meant to explain the mental experience of the Bodhisattva. We have always to bear this subordinate position of psychology, or logic, or metaphysics in the teaching of the *Lankāvatāra*.

The doctrine of mind-only is explained in this wise.<sup>1</sup>

“As the waves of the ocean depending on the wind are stirred up and roll on dancing without interruption;

“So the Ālaya-flood constantly stirred up by the wind of Vishaya [principle of individuation] rolls on dancing with the waves of various Vijñānas.

“Dark blue and red, and salt, conch-shell, milk, and honey; fragrance, fruits, and flowers; rays of light and the sun—they are neither different nor not-different one from another; so the seven Vijñānas which are the waves of the ocean rise in conjunction with mind (*citta*).

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<sup>1</sup> P. 46 ff. These gāthās are not sometimes quite clear as to their meaning. Perhaps the text is to be more thoroughly re-arranged, which to a certain extent the author hopes to do later.

“Manifold are the waves evolved in the ocean; likewise indeed the Ālaya sets in motion a variety of Vijñānas.

“Citta, Manas, and [Mano-] vijñāna are spoken of [as different] because of appearances; in fact the eight [Vijñānas] have no specifically qualifying marks: there is neither that which qualifies nor that which is qualified.

“As there is no differentiation in the waves of the ocean, so no modification obtains in Citta as regards the Vijñānas.

“Citta gathers up karma, Manas inspects, the Vijñāna distinguishes, and the five Vijñānas discriminate the visible [world].

“Dark blue, and red, and such-like are known to be due to the Vijñāna of mankind, and tell me, O Mahāmuni, how a likeness obtains between waves and mind (*citta*).

“Dark blue and red and such-like are indeed not in the waves, and it is for the sake of the ignorant that mind is described as evolving due to appearances.

“There is no evolving in mind, mind in itself is free from that which is perceived; where there is that which is perceived there is that which perceives; the case is the same with the waves.

“The body, property, and abode are known to be due to the Vijñāna of mankind, in which an evolution is observed: the analogy holds good with the waves.

“The ocean with the dancing waves is discernible, and likewise why is not the evolution of the Ālaya perceived by intelligence?

“In accordance with the intelligence and discrimination of the ignorant, the Ālaya is compared to the ocean, and the likeness of waves and the evolution [of mind] are pointed out by a simile.

“Thou who illuminest the world like the sun that shines equally above and below, announce the truth for the sake of the ignorant!

“Thyself the master of all kinds of teaching, why dost thou not announce the truth? If thou dost not announce the truth, the truth may disappear from the mind.

“As the waves are stirred on the ocean, as images are seen

in the mirror, in a dream, simultaneously, so is the mind in its own field.

“To discriminate objects, an evolution takes place in succession: the Vijñāna distinguishes, and Manas reflects upon.

“The visible world manifests itself to the five Vijñānas; there is no successive evolution when mind is in a state of collectedness.

“As a painter or his disciple arrays his colours in order to produce a painting, so do I preach: the picture is not in the colour, nor in the canvas, nor in the vessel.

“In order to attract all beings, the picture is produced in colours; preaching may err, and the truth is indeed beyond words.

“Being the master of all kinds of teaching, I preach the truth to my followers, and the truth is to be attained by an inner perception, as it goes beyond both the distinguished [object] and the distinguishing [subject].

“I preach for the sake of sons of the Buddha, this preaching is not for the ignorant; the manifoldness of things is seen as like Māyā, and exists not.

“Preaching is thus done in various ways, subject to errors; when the preaching is not in good accord [with the mentality of the hearer], it is then for him no preaching.

“A good physician administers medicine according to his patients; so indeed do Buddhas discourse in accordance with the mentality of beings.

“The masters thus preach the state of consciousness attained by their inner perception, which does not belong to the realm of philosophers and Śrāvakas.”

According to the *Lankāvatāra*, the mind, inclusive of Citta, Manas, and other six Vijñānas, is in its original nature (*svabhāva*) quiet, pure, and above the dualism of subject and object. But here appears the principle of particularisation known as Vishaya, which comes from *vish*, meaning “to act,” “to work”; and, stirred by this wind of action, the waves are seen over the tranquil surface of the mind. It is now differentiated or evolves (*vr̥itti*) into eight Vijñānas: Ālaya, Manas, Manovijñāna, and

the five senses; and simultaneously with this evolution the whole universe comes into existence with its multitudinous forms and with its endless entanglements. The following is indeed the constant echo reverberating in the sutra:

“The visible [world] which is mind does not exist [as such]; mind is set in motion by being seen [i.e., objectified]; the body, property and the abode are the manifestations of the Ālaya which belongs to mankind.

“Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, Self-nature, the five Dharmas, the two forms of Nairātmya (egolessness), purity—these are elucidated by the Buddhas.

“Long and short and such-like come to exist mutually conditioned; not-to-be grows effective by to-be and to-be by not-to-be.

“When things are analysed into atoms, there remains nothing to be discriminated as objects. Those who hold wrong views do not believe in the ever-abiding ground where the mind-only [doctrine is established].

“The masters point out the state of consciousness attainable by their inner perception, which goes indeed beyond the mental calibre of the philosophers and Śrāvakas.”<sup>1</sup>

### *The Important Terms Explained*

Before going further, it may be desirable to explain the more important technical terms constantly used in Buddhist psychology.

As is seen here, the conception of the Ālaya-vijñāna plays a chief, though silent, rôle in the evolution of the idealistic philosophy of the *Lankāvatāra*. It is often called simply “Citta,” or “Tathāgata-garbha.” *Ālaya* means a storage-house (*tsang*, 藏識, in Chinese) where all kinds of goods are kept in storage, and it is the Ālaya-vijñāna’s function to store up all the memory (*vāsanā*) of one’s thoughts, affections, desires, and deeds. *Citta* which is used as a synonym of the Ālaya may be translated “mind” as distinguished from Manas, that is, in its more specific sense. *Citta* comes from *ci*, which has two senses,

<sup>1</sup> P. 54.

(1) "to gather," "to pile," "to acquire," and (2) "to perceive," "to look for." *Citta*, therefore, may mean either "collection" or "thought," and in the present case, that is, when it is identified with the *Ālaya*, Buddhist scholars take it in the sense of accumulation. So we read in the *Lankāvatāra*, "Citta gathers up karma."<sup>1</sup> Ordinarily, it may correctly be rendered "thought," or "mind." The great source of confusion, however, comes from *Citta* being used frequently for the whole system of *Vijñānas* as well as for the *Ālaya*.

*Vijñāna* is one of the significant terms in Buddhism, and it is difficult to have one English word for it. *Jñā* means "to know," "to perceive," but *Vijñāna* in Buddhism has a technical sense; it is not mere understanding, it is a sort of principle of conscious life as distinguished from the body, and it is also the power or faculty of discrimination. It has however essentially an intellectual connotation, faithfully retaining its original sense. In the case of *Ālaya-vijñāna*, there is no discrimination in it, no intellection; for it simply accumulates all the impressions, all the memory-seeds (*bīja*) that are produced and left behind by the activities of the other *Vijñānas*.

*Tathāgata-garbha*, which is another name for the *Ālaya*, is also a sort of store-room or receptacle where the seeds of Tathagatahood are retained and matured. It has a religious shade of meaning in contradistinction to *Ālaya-vijñāna* which is a more philosophical term. *Garbha* is generally done into *tsang* in Chinese, same as *ālaya*, but literally it means "womb" (*tai* 胎). It is strange that the Chinese translators never, as far as I know, rendered *tathāgata-garbha* by 如來胎, but always 如來藏, except when in the Shingon sect the *Garbha-kosa-dhātu* (胎藏界) is spoken of as contrasting to the *Vajradhātu* (金剛界). But the meaning is clear because the *Tathāgata-garbha* is the womb where Tathagatas are conceived and matured, and as we are all possible Tathagatas except that we sit generally so tightly wrapped up under the heavy intellectual and affective coverings known as *Jñeyāvaraṇa*, and *Kleśāvaraṇa*, the intellectual and the affective obstruction.

<sup>1</sup>Pp. 47, 158.

*Manas* (from *man*), meaning "to think," "to imagine," "to intend," is that seat of intellection and conation, corresponding to the Western conception of mind. It is the one term in Buddhist psychology that has no *viññāna* attached at its end. It is often confused, and justifiably with Manovijñāna which is one of the six Vijñānas recognised by all the schools of Buddhism. In the *Lankāvatāra* *Manas* occupies a definite position and performs a specific function in the hierarchy of psychical activities, which will be described later. Manovijñāna like the other five Vijñānas has a field of its own as the perceiving of the rationality of things internal as well as external. The Cakshurviññāna is meant for the visibility of things, the Śrotra-viññāna for their audibility, and so on. The Manovijñāna functions sometimes independently of the five Vijñānas and sometimes simultaneously and conjointly with them. To a certain extent, it may be considered equivalent to the intellect, while *Manas* is conative and affective besides being intellectual. Therefore, it is sometimes called *Klišṭamanas*, meaning "Manas in defilement." The spiritual defilement starts nowhere else but in this *Manas*, the root of intellection and conation.

When the sutra says that all things are mind-only, *cittamātram*, what is meant by it? Does *Citta* refer to the *Ālaya*, or to the whole system of Vijñānas, or to the interaction of the *Ālaya* and the *Manas*?

When it is said that *Citta* is under the bondage of *Vishaya*, *cittam vishaya-sambandham*,<sup>1</sup> or that bondage is mind-made, *bandhanam citta-sambhavam*,<sup>1</sup> what is meant by this *Citta*?

What does the phrase, *svacittadṛśyamātra*, (the-seen-only-by-one's-own-mind), or *cittavikalpalakṣhaṇa* (appearances-discriminated-by-mind), really refer to, which occurs so frequently throughout the *Lankāvatāra*?

When mention is made of "purifying the outflow of the visible world from one's own mind" (*svacittadṛśyadhārāviśuddhi*),<sup>2</sup> what is this mind?

<sup>1</sup> For instance, p. 130.

<sup>2</sup> P. 55

In my view, Citta or mind refers in some cases to the Ālaya alone, in other cases to Manas, or even to the whole system of Vijñānas. When the sutra says that if there is no turning (*parāvṛtti*) of the Ālaya-vijñāna called by the name of Tathāgata-garbha, there will be no extinction of the seven functioning Vijñānas,<sup>1</sup> or that the Tathāgata-garbha is united with the seven Vijñānas, from attachment arises a dualism, and when thoroughly perceived this is removed,<sup>2</sup> we realise that the Ālaya is the most important conception on which the whole mechanism of the psychic life hangs. Mind-only (*cittamātram*) must then mean *ālayavijñānamātram*. In fact the Ālaya is a depository of all kinds of karma-seeds, good as well as bad,<sup>3</sup> and so long as it is not stirred up by Vishaya, the principle of individuation, it will stay quiet, retaining its original purity<sup>4</sup> or neutrality, inefficiency, aloofness, and the primary quality of not being contaminated by defilements. However, the Ālaya is always found in company with the seventh Vijñāna, or Manas,<sup>5</sup> and when it is found at all working, all the other Vijñānas are found in action.<sup>6</sup> This being the case, "mind-only" may also involve the whole mental apparatus, especially with the Ālaya strongly in alliance with Manas.

It may be more appropriate to consider Citta designating the whole system of Vijñānas as a unit, instead of looking at each Vijñāna as an independent yet interrelating element. The whole mind is then conceived as operating or functioning in eight different modes, while each mode also shares in the general activity of the mind either as Citta or Vijñāna. Unless Citta is especially referred to as distinguished from Manas and the Vijñānas, we can safely state that Citta, when mentioned independently in such phrases as *cittamātram*, *svacittadrīṣyam*, or

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<sup>1</sup> P. 221.

<sup>2</sup> P. 223.

<sup>3</sup> Tathāgata-garbha mahāmāte kuśala-akuśala-hetukah. P. 220; see also p. 242.

<sup>4</sup> Anyanta-prakṛiti-pariśuddhi. P. 222.

<sup>5</sup> P. 220.

<sup>6</sup> P. 221.



*cittamātravinīrmuktam nopalabhyate*, means the whole system of conscious life which is generally designated as mind by Western philosophers. For instance, we have in the T'ang version the following verse corresponding to the gāthā in the Sanskrit text, p. 70 :

“The body, property, and the abode—  
 These are no other than the shadow of the mind ;  
 The ignorant, unable to understand it,  
 Are engaged in theory-making and in controversy.  
 But what they establish is merely mind-made,  
 And outside mind nothing is obtainable.”

In this quotation Citta (mind) no doubt stands for the totality of the Vijñāna system. Indeed when the Ālaya is separated from its company, it ceases to work, that is, to exist, and we have nothing left here except the name.

The doctrine expounded in the *Lankāvatāra* and also in the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* is known as “Citta-mātra” and never as “Vijñānamātra” or “Vijñāptimātra” as in the Yogācāra school of Asanga and Vasubandhu. As far as the idealistic way of looking at the world is concerned, both systems have something in common; especially the *Lankāvatāra* may be interpreted more or less consistently by means of the Yogācāra psychology, and indeed this has been frequently attempted by scholars. But as is the case with Aśvaghosha's *Awakening of Faith* the *Lankāvatāra* differs from the Yogācāra in one important point, that is, while the latter maintains that the Ālaya is absolutely pure and has nothing to do with defilements and evil passions, the *Lankāvatāra* and Aśvaghosha maintain the view that the Tathāgata-garbha or the Ālaya is the storage of the impure as well as the pure, that it is both immanent and transcendental, both relative and absolute.

#### *The Evolution of the Vijñāna System*

The whole Vijñāna system is explained in the *Lankāvatāra* from various points of view which are very difficult to present adequately in another language in which there is no tradition of thought corresponding to the Indian or Buddhist way of think-

ing. I hope the following interpretation of mine has not altogether misrepresented the original conceptions of the *Lankāvatāra*.

The Vijñāna system is describable from three points of reference: its evolution, its modes of being, and its function.

By evolution is meant the rise (*utpāda*), abiding (*sthiti*), and disappearance (*nirodha*) of the Vijñāna.<sup>1</sup> Of this there are two forms, Prabandha and Lakshana. Prabandha, meaning incessant continuation, is concerned with an uninterrupted activity of the Vijñāna, while Lakshana (or external mark) means its manifested aspect. When the habit-energy (*vāsanā*) stored up in the Ālaya by the imprints left behind by thinking, feeling, willing, and acting, either good or bad, is destroyed, there will be no visible signs of them left. This is called the destruction or disappearance of the Vijñāna as to their Lakshana. When not only the cause of the subject (*āśraya*) in dependence of which the Vijñānas can function, but that which supports them (*ālambana*), or that which provides them with material, are removed, there will be no more continuation of activity in the Vijñānas. This is the case of disappearance both with the Prabandha and with the Lakshana of the Vijñānas, and the same conditions will also hold good with their rise and abiding-on. But as the sutra does not give any further explanation concerning the difference between, for instance, the disappearance of the Prabandha and that of the Lakshana, the above statement is not enough to show why this distinction between the two is necessary, not only logically but psychologically; for the difference specified above does not seem to be sufficiently warranted. All that we can gather from this is that there is Vāsanā amassed in the Ālaya, which acts as cause to the other Vijñānas, and that there is another thing which serves as object to the latter, and, finally, that by the interaction that goes on between subject and object all the Vijñānas grow either active or dormant according to the case.

The one most important conception in the system of Vij-

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<sup>1</sup> P. 37 ff.

ñānas is Vāsanā. What is this? Psychologically, Vāsanā is memory, for it is something left after a deed is done, mental or physical, and it is retained and stored up in the Ālaya as a sort of latent energy ready to get in motion. This memory or habit-energy (習氣), or habitual perfuming (薰習) is not necessarily individual; the Ālaya being super-individual holds in it not only individual memory but all that has been experienced by sentient beings. When the sutra says that in the Ālaya is found all that has been going on since beginningless time systematically stored up as a kind of seed, this does not refer to individual experiences, but to something general, beyond the individual, making up in a way the background on which all individual psychic activities are reflected. Therefore, the Ālaya is originally pure, it is the abode of Tathagatahood, where no defilements of the particularising intellect and affection can reach; purity in terms of logic means universality and defilement or sin means individuation, from which attachments of various forms are derived. In short, that the world starts from memory, that memory in itself as retained in the Ālaya universal is no evil, and that when we are removed from the influence of false discrimination the whole Vijñāna system woven around the Ālaya as centre experiences a turning (*parāvṛitti*),—this is the gist of the teaching of the *Lankāvatāra*.

This turning marks the culmination of the practical psychology of the *Lankāvatāra*, for it is through this fact that the realisation of Pratyātma-āryajñāna-gocara is possible, and this realisation is the central theme of the discourse. As this event takes place in the Ālaya, or what is the same thing, in the Tathāgata-garbha, which is the basis of all things, it is known as *āśraya-parāvṛitti*, a turning at the basis. *Āśraya* means that on which anything is dependent, and in this case the Ālaya is the *āśraya* on which hangs the working of the Vijñānas and consequently the birth (*utpāda*) of the whole universe. The turning takes place when the ego-centric and evil-creating discrimination based upon the dualism of subject and object ceases by realising that there is no external world besides what is perceived within oneself, and this realisation is effected by the cultivation

of the intellect known as non-discriminative and transcendental (*nirvikalpa-lokottara-jñānam*). As long as our ordinary understanding which works dualistically conditioned prevails, we cannot go beyond the realm controlled by the seven Vijñānas, and if we cannot go beyond this, we have no chance to penetrate into the reality of things (*dharma-tā*), which means an everlasting transmigration in the world of birth and death. We must look now in the opposite direction, towards the quarter where no Vikalpa takes place, and where no evolution (*vr̥itti*) of the Vijñānas has set in. An opening must be made to the non-discriminative and transcendental intellect. The opening is the turning. The eye that used to open to the external world thinking it was reality and egotistically attached to it, now turns within to see what lies here. It is in this inner world that so many things we have been looking after are accessible now: the Inner Perception (p. 62), Nirvana (pp. 62, 98, 238, etc.), Tathatā (p. 108), Emancipation (*moksha*, p. 233), Prajñāpāramitā (p. 238), the cessation of the seven Vijñānas (p. 221), etc.

This turning is in a sense re-turning as the Ālaya or Tathāgata-garbha returns by this to its original purity (*śuddha*), happiness (*sukha*), and eternal nature which is above *pravṛitti* and *nivṛitti* (rise and disappearance).<sup>1</sup> The Ālaya gets contaminated by external impurities (*āgantukleśa*) amassed by all kinds of philosophising (*vitarkadarśana*) which is based on the discrimination of subject and object. When the discrimination is in the right direction, it is all right, for it points towards the returning; but when it goes astray as is the case with every one of us, the unenlightened, it stirs up all sorts of trouble, not only intellectually but affectively, the latter being the worst of all trouble-makers. As Buddhism like other Indian systems of thought puts the first emphasis on intellectual integrity, the right seeing into the situation performs the most important office in the whole programme of Buddhist experience. When the intellectual outlook gets distorted, the affective and conative disturbances follow, which in turn react upon the essential purity

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<sup>1</sup> P. 222.

of the Ālaya and contaminates it thoroughly. Incorrectness in every form is described by Buddhists in terms of chromatics. Hence the Ālaya is dyed (*upakliṣṭa*) by external impurities. *Kleśa* is generally translated in Buddhism 煩惱, "tormenting and afflicting," "causing vexations of spirit," but here in the *Lankāvatāra* it is done by 塵, "dust" or "impurity" as it spoils the immaculate Ālaya. And since this dust is not native to the Ālaya, it is called *āgatu*, the "guest" who is uninvited.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Three Modes of the Vijñāna*

The Vijñānas may be described from their modes of being, that is, from the *lakṣhaṇa* point of view: there are three signs from which their being may be approached. The first is the Vijñāna as evolving (*pravṛitti*), the second the Vijñāna as producing definite effects (*karma*), and the third the Vijñāna as remaining in its original nature (*jāti*).<sup>1</sup> The Pravṛitti-vijñāna is a collective name for all the particular Vijñānas that evolve out of the Ālaya, when they are considered from the point of view of evolution, while the Ālaya is the Vijñāna or Citta that remains undisturbed in its native abode. The Karma-vijñāna describes the Vijñāna in its functioning capacity. The Vijñāna in itself does not show any signs of becoming; but these three aspects belong to one Citta; thus they are, as the sutra says, "neither different nor not-different."

The following extracts may give us some ideas as to what is meant by the Pravṛitti-vijñāna and its relations to the other aspects of the Vijñāna.

"As atoms of clay and a lump of clay are neither different nor not-different from each other, so are gold and ornament made of it. If, O Mahāmati, a lump of clay is different from its atoms, nothing will be produced out of them, but as something is produced out of them, they are not different. But if they are identical, not different, no distinction is possible between atoms of clay and the lump. Likewise, O Mahāmati, if the

<sup>1</sup> P. 222.

<sup>2</sup> P. 37 ff.

evolved Vijñānas are different from the Ālaya each in its original nature, the Ālaya will not be their primary cause. If they are identical, the disappearance of the Vijñānas will be the disappearance of the Ālaya, but there is no disappearance of their own original nature. Thus, O Mahāmāti, there is no disappearance of the original nature of the Vijñānas, but only the disappearance of the karma-aspect of the Vijñānas. If, however, their own original nature should disappear, the Ālaya itself would disappear. With the disappearance of the Ālaya, the distinction will cease to exist between the Buddhist doctrine and the nihilism of some philosophers. According to the latter, when the comprehension of an external world ceases, the Vijñānas cease to continue, their uninterrupted activity since beginningless time will be broken. O Mahāmāti, the philosophers may explain an uninterrupted evolution [of the Vijñānas] by a cause, and do not say that the evolution is produced by the united action of the eye-sense with form and light. They assume another cause; the cause is Pradhāna (unevolved nature), Puruṣa (supreme spirit), Īśvara (supreme lord), time, or atom.”<sup>1</sup>

“O Mahāmāti, the eye-sense (*vijñāna*) is awakened by four causes (*kāraṇa*). What are the four? Getting attached to the visible world not knowing that it is mind-made(1); tenaciously clinging to form due to the habit-energy of unwarranted speculations and erroneous views since beginningless time(2); the self-nature of the Vijñāna itself(3); and eagerness for the multitudinousness of forms and appearances(4). O Mahāmāti, owing to these four causes, the waves of the evolving Vijñānas are set in motion in the Ālaya which flows like the waters in the midst of the ocean. O Mahāmāti, as the eye-sense, so [with the other senses, the perception of]the objective world takes place simultaneously and regularly [i.e., constantly] in all the sense-organs, atoms, and pores; it is like the mirror’s reflecting images, and, O Mahāmāti, like the wind-tossed ocean, the ocean of mind is blown over by the wind of objectivity (*vishaya*)

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 38-39.

and the [*viñāna*-] waves are raging without interruption. The cause and the manifestations of its action are not separated the one from the other; and on account of the karma-aspect of the *Vijñāna* being tightly united with the original-aspect, the self-nature of form [or objective world, *rūpasvabhāva*] is not accurately ascertained, and, O Mahāmati, thus evolves the system of the five *Vijñānas*. When together, O Mahāmati, with these five *Vijñānas*, the objective world is regarded as the reason of differentiation (*paricheḍa*) and its appearances are defined, we have *Manovijñāna*. Caused by this, there takes place the birth of the body. They do not, however, think within themselves that 'we, mutually dependent, come to get attached to the visible world which grows out of one's own mind and is discriminated by it.'''<sup>1</sup>

#### *The Functions of the Eight Vijñānas*

From the functional point of view, there are eight *Vijñānas*: *Ālaya*, *Manas*, *Manovijñāna*, and the five; but they may be grouped under two headings: *Khyāti-vijñāna* and *Vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna*. *Khyāti*, from *khyā*, means "to perceive," "to manifest," and this function of the *Vijñāna* is to perceive or to reflect things that appear in front of it just as the mirror reflects all forms before it.<sup>2</sup> This is the office of the *Ālaya*. It looks into itself where all the memory (*vāsanā*) of the beginningless part is preserved in a way beyond thought (*acintya*) and ready for further evolution (*pariṇāma*); but it has no active energy in itself, it never acts, it simply perceives, it is in this respect exactly like a mirror; it is again like the ocean perfectly smooth with no waves disturbing its tranquillity; and it is pure and undefiled, which means that it is free from the dualism of subject and object. For it is the pure act of perceiving, with no differentiation yet of the knowing one and the known. The waves, however, will be seen ruffling the surface of the ocean of *Ālaya-vijñāna* when the principle of individuation known as

<sup>1</sup> P. 44.

<sup>2</sup> P. 37.

Vishaya (境界) blows over it like the wind. The waves thus started are this world of particulars where the intellect discriminates, the affection clings, and passions and desires struggle for existence and supremacy.

This particularising agency sits within the system of Vijñānas and is known as Manas; in fact it is when Manas begins to operate that a system of the Vijñānas manifests itself. They are thus called "object-discriminating-vijñāna" (*vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna*). Manas' function is essentially to reflect upon the Ālaya and to create and to discriminate subject and object from the pure oneness of the Ālaya. The memory accumulated (*cīyate*) in the latter is now divided (*vicīyate*) into dualities of all forms and all kinds. This is compared to the manifoldness of waves that are now stirring up the ocean. Manas is an evil spirit in one sense and a good one in another, for discrimination in itself is not evil, is not necessarily always false judgment (*abhūta-parikalpa*) or wrong reasoning (*prapañca-daushṭhilya*). It grows to be the source of great calamity when it creates desires based upon its wrong judgments, such as when it believes in the reality of an ego-substance and gets attached to it as the ultimate truth. For Manas is not only discriminating intelligence, but willing agency, and consequently actor.

In these activities Manas is always found in company with the Manovijñāna. In fact, it may be more proper to say that Manas and Manovijñāna conjointly working produce the world of particulars, and when reference is made to Vastuprativikalpavijñāna it includes both Manas and Manovijñāna. The function of Manovijñāna is by hypothesis to reflect on Manas, as the eye-vijñāna reflects on the world of forms and the ear-vijñāna on that of sounds; but in fact as soon as Manas evolves the dualism of subject and object out of the absolute unity of the Ālaya, Manovijñāna and indeed all the other Vijñānas as well, begin to operate.<sup>1</sup> It is like a complicated machine now, the whole system of the Vijñānas, each singly and also conjointly with others, is set in motion. When the system is thus

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<sup>1</sup> P. 44.



of salvation, or upon whom any kind of benefit may be bestowed. From the absolutely idealistic point of view, we may even ask if life is at all worth living. Is it not really much ado for nothing that the Bodhisattva should try to save the world when the latter is no more than mere illusion of his own mind? This is what is called by the Mahayanists *uccheda-darśanam* (nihilism) and does not understand *yathābhūtam* the truth of things. That the world is like a mirage, thus that it is empty, does not mean that it is unreal in the sense that it has no reality in whatever way. But it means that its real nature cannot be understood by a mind that cannot rise above the dualism of "to be" and "not to be." Therefore, the Sung translation of the *Lankāvataṛa* opens with this stanza recited by Mahāmati:

"The world transcends [the dualism of] birth and death, it is like the flower in air; the wise are free from [the ideas of] being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"All things are like mirage, they are beyond the reach of mind and understanding; the wise are free from [ideas of] being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"The world is beyond nihilism as well as eternalism, and it is always like a dream; the wise are free from [ideas of] being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"The wise know that there is no self-substance in a person, nor in an object, and that both passions and their objectives are always pure [in their nature] and have no individual marks; and yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"There is no Nirvana anywhere, there is no Buddha abiding in Nirvana, there is no Nirvana abiding in the Buddha; both the enlightened and the enlightening are transcended; 'to be' and 'not to be,' these two are altogether put aside.

"Those who look up to the Buddha thus tranquil and detachment-attained, are known as 'not-seizing,' they are pure now and after."

*The Bodhisattva Never Enters into Nirvana*

According to the *Lankāvatāra* there are five orders of beings from the religious point of view: (1) Those who belong to the Śrāvaka order, (2) Those of the Pratyekabuddha order, (3) Those of the Tathagata order, (4) Those who belong to no definite order, and (5) Those who are altogether outside these orders.<sup>1</sup> Those belong to the Śrāvaka order who are delighted at listening to such doctrines as concern the Skandhas, Dhātus, or Āyatanas, but take no special interest in the theory of causation, who have cut themselves loose from the bondage of evil passions but have not yet destroyed their habit-energy. They have attained to the realisation of Nirvana, abiding in which state they would declare that they have put an end to existence, their life of morality is now attained, all that is to be done is done, they would not be reborn. These have gained an insight into the non-existence of an ego-substance in a person but not yet into that in objects. Those philosophical leaders who believe in a creator or in the ego-soul may also be classed under this order.

The Pratyekabuddha order comprises those who are intensely interested in anything that leads them to the realisation of Pratyekabuddhahood. They would retire into solitude and have no attachment to things worldly. When they hear that the Buddha manifests himself in a variety of forms, sometimes in group, sometimes singly, exhibiting miraculous powers, they think these are meant for their own order, and immensely delighted in them they would follow and accept them.

The Tathagata order may be again divided into three: those who gain an insight into the truth that there is no individual reality behind what one perceives, those who know that there is an immediate perception of the truth in one's inmost consciousness, and those who perceive that besides this world there are a great number of Buddha-lands wide and far-extending. They may listen to discourses on such subjects as manifestations of mind, or transcendental realm of the Ālaya, from which

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<sup>1</sup> P. 62 et seq.

starts this world of particulars, and yet they may not at all feel astonished or frightened. These belong to the order of Tathagatas.

The fourth one is of indeterminate nature, for those who belong to it may take to either one of the above three orders according to their opportunities.

There is still another class of beings which cannot be comprised under any of the four already mentioned; for they do not have any desire for emancipation, and without this desire no religious teaching can enter into any heart. Two sub-classes, however, may be distinguished here, those who have forsaken all roots of merit, and those who have vowed at the beginning to save all beings. They both belong to the *Icchantika*<sup>1</sup> order so called. Into the former fall all those who vilify the doctrines meant for the Bodhisattvas, saying that they are not in accordance with the sacred texts, rules of morality, and the doctrine of emancipation. Because of this vilification they forsake

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<sup>1</sup> This is generally understood to have been derived from *icchā* "desire." According to Dr. Unrai Wogiwara, however, it comes originally from *itthamvika* or *aitthamvika*, meaning "being worldly" or "belonging to this world." (The *Mahavyutpatti*, ed. by himself, notes, p. 23.) Linguistically, he may be all right, but psychologically there is no harm in deriving *icchantika* from *icchā*, wish or desire; for the *Icchantika* are those devoted followers of hedonism either in its bad or good sense. The Bodhisattva is a hedonist in the good sense, his not entering into Nirvana is his own desire or pleasure, he simply desires to remain in this world in order to save his fellow-beings from misery, and he does this not from any sense of duty or moral desirability; he does this merely from his altruistic impulse as it were, that is, he is following the bent of his own mind, which is pleasure to him. But in the case of a sensuous hedonist "he does not believe in the law of causality, he has no feeling of shame, he has no faith in the working of karma, he is unconcerned with the present, with the future, he never befriends good people, he does not follow the teaching of the Buddha." (Quoted by Dr. Wogiwara as the definition of the *Icchantika* given in the *Nirvana sūtra* (the Kyōbunkwan edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, 卷 VII, 96a, 1.9.) As far as the pursuit of pleasure is concerned, the hedonist-Bodhisattva and the worldly sensuous hedonist belong to the same order as are classified in the *Laṅkāvatāra*.

into a world of particulars. His vows are to be fulfilled, and in this he is said truly to be a Bodhisattva.

*The Bodhisattva and Social Life.*

The central theme of the *Lankāvatāra* has been explained as being the attainment of an insight into one's inmost consciousness, and to do this we have seen that the sutra approaches the subject in two ways, logical and psychological. But as Buddhism is a religion and as every religion has its practical and social side, without which it will lose its reason of existence, the *Lankāvatāra* also prepares the Bodhisattva for his mission as one of the members of a cooperative life. In fact, this is what distinguishes the Mahayana from the Hinayana, for the latter's object of spiritual discipline does not extend beyond his own interest, however exalted it may be in itself.—the object being the attainment of Arhatship, a solitary saintly life. This is all well as far as it goes, but as we are all living within a most complicatedly organised communal body, not excepting even a Buddha or a Bodhisattva, we have to think of this side of life. The conception of a Bodhisattva was thus inevitable. If he attained to a state of self-realisation which he finds so full of peace, bliss, and strength, his natural desire is to impart them to his fellow-beings. Technically, when he has finished benefitting himself (*ātmahitam*), his next step is to go out into the world and benefit others (*parahitam*). In reality, he cannot do good to himself without letting others share in it. The sutra, therefore, now proceeds to tell the reader what is the practical, i.e., social life of the Bodhisattva. It may be said that the object of gaining an insight into the inner truth of things is really to qualify oneself for social work.

Before proceeding, a question may be raised as to the value of doing anything for others inasmuch as, according to the doctrine of *Svacittamātram* (self-mind-only), or to that of *Sarvadharmānām śūnyatā-anatpāda-advaya-niḥsvabhāva-lakṣaṇa*,<sup>1</sup> there is nothing or nobody in the world that will be the object

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<sup>1</sup> P. 73.

in full swing, we cannot distinguish one Vijñāna from another, they so intimately interact, and the mirroring Ālaya is not distinguishable from the discriminating Manas and from the other Vijñānas, reflecting, reasoning, desiring, and acting. The Khyāti and the Vastuprativikalpa have now no differentiating marks (*abhinnalakṣaṇa*),<sup>1</sup> they re-act upon each other, the one acting in turn as the cause to the other (*anyonyahetuka*).

In the beginning there was the memory amassed in the Ālaya since the beginningless past as a latent cause, in which the whole universe of individual objects lies with its eyes closed; here comes in Manas with its discriminating intelligence, and subject is distinguished from object; Manovijñāna reflects on the duality, and from it issues a whole train of judgments with their consequent prejudices and attachments, while the five other Vijñānas help them to grow more and more complicated not only intellectually but affectively and conatively.<sup>2</sup> All the results of these activities in turn perfume the Ālaya stimulating the old memory to wake up while the new one finds its affinities among the old. In the meantime, however, the Ālaya itself remains unmoved retaining its identity.

The following extracts from the *Lankāvatāra* elucidate for us the relation between the Ālaya and the other Vijñānas and also that between Manovijñāna, including Manas, and the remaining part of the Vijñāna system.

When the Buddha said that Buddhist Nirvana consisted in one's turning away from the wrongfully discriminating Manovijñāna, Mahāmati asked, "O Blessed One, dost thou not establish eight Vijñānas?" Being assured of this, Mahāmati proceeded, "If this be the case, why dost thou not speak of one's turning away from the seven Vijñānas instead of Manovijñāna?" The Buddha answered as follows: "Depending upon Manovijñāna as the cause, there takes place the evolution of seven Vijñānas. Further, O Mahāmati, when Manovijñāna clings to an external world of particulars, habit-energy (*vāsanā*)

<sup>1</sup> P. 37.

<sup>2</sup> P. 235.

is generated therefrom and by this the Ālaya is nurtured. Together with the thought of 'me and mine,' taking hold of it and clinging to it, and reflecting upon it, Manas thereby takes shape and is evolved. The nature of the substance [however] shows no change. Depending upon the Ālaya as the cause, an external world is tenaciously held as real while it is the manifestation of one's own mind, and thereby the mentation-system, mutually related, is evolved in its totality. Just like the ocean-waves, O Mahāmati, [the vijñānas], set in motion by the wind of an external world which is the manifestation of one's own mind, rise and cease. Therefore, O Mahāmati, the seven Vijñānas cease with the cessation of Manovijñāna. Thus it is said :

“My Nirvana has nothing to do with Substance (*bhāva*), nor with Action (*kriyā*), nor with Appearance (*lakṣaṇa*) :

“With the cessation of the Vijñāna which is caused by discrimination, there is my cessation [i.e., Nirvana].

“Depending upon it as the cause, the whole system of mentation finds its refuge here.

“The Vijñāna gives the cause to the mind (*citta*) and is its dependant :

“As when the great flood runs its course there are no more waves,

“So with the extinction [of Manovijñāna] all the Vijñānas cease to rise.”<sup>1</sup>

The above shows the importance of Manovijñāna in the body of Vijñānas including the Ālaya; let us now proceed to see what rôle the Ālaya, besides supplying material to the activity of Manovijñāna, plays, or rather how it stands by itself especially in connection with the idea of Tathāgata-garbha. The following will be of great help to our understanding the significance of the Ālaya, which is needed in the bringing about of all inner experience known as Pratyātmagati :

“O Mahāmati, the Tathāgata-garbha contains in itself causes both good and not-good, and from which are generated all paths

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 126-127.

of existence. It is like an actor playing different characters without harbouring any thought of 'me and mine.' From not comprehending this, there arises the union and interaction of three causes producing results. The philosophers not understanding this get attached to the fixed idea of a creator. Infused with the habit-energy of various kinds of speculations and errors which have been carried on since beginningless time, the name of Ālaya-vijñāna obtains, [as *ālaya* means all-conserving]. It is in company with the seven Vijñānas which are generated in the dwelling abode of ignorance. The body [of the Vijñānas] is stirred uninterruptedly and all the time like the waves of the great ocean, but [the Ālaya itself] is free from the fault of impermanence and devoid of the thought of ego, it is in its ultimate substance perfectly immaculate. As to the other seven Vijñānas beginning with Manas and Manovijñāna, they originate and come to an end and are characterised with momentariness; this birth is due to our erroneously discriminating things that are not; they are intimately related to and dependent upon an external world of forms and images; tenaciously attached to names and appearances, they fail to comprehend that forms and appearances are manifestations of one's own mind; they do not realise what is pain and what pleasure, they are no producer of emancipation; firmly standing on names and appearances [as realities], they are begotten of the desire to have (*rāga*) and further beget the same desire; [the desire and the Vijñānas are thus mutually conditioning]. When what are known as the perceiving senses are destroyed and disappear, others [Vijñānas], immediately following this, cease to function. There is [still] a self-discriminating knowledge; and seeing that no pain, no pleasure is felt, that there is the extinction of thought and sensation, and the attainment of mental tranquillity and the four Dhyānas, and a skilfulness in [the understanding of] truth and emancipation, the devotees (*yogin*) think that they have [really] attained emancipation. But as long as the Ālayavijñāna known by the name of Tathāgata-garbha is not set in motion and turned round, the cessation of the seven evolving Vijñānas will never take

place. Why? Because, depending on the Ālaya as the cause, the Vijñānas are evolved; because this is not within the reach of all Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, philosophers, and Yoga-devotees; because [while] they understand that there is no ego-substance in a person, they are [still] attached to ideas of singleness and generality as really existing in the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas; the Tathāgata-garbha is awakened and grows quiescent as one sees into what is meant by the five Dharmas, the [three] Natures, and the non-existence of the ego-substance in particular objects; and when there takes place the turning [in the Ālaya] by gradually going up along the scales [of perfection, i.e., Daśabhūmika], one will never be led astray by the methods and views held by the philosophers. . . . .

“The Tathāgata-garbha is found united with the seven Vijñānas:

“From attachment a duality sets in, from knowledge it disappears:

“The Mind is to be regarded as mirror-like, perfumed by speculation [-habit] since beginningless [past]:

“When things are truly observed, they are not as they appear.

“As the ignorant see the finger-tip and not the moon,

“So those who are addicted to letters understand not the thatness of things I teach.

“The Mind dances like the dancer, Manas resembles the jester [or companion actor],

“The Vijñāna, in company with the five, imagines the visible [world] as the stage.”<sup>1</sup>

#### *The Function of Manas*

The question may rise now, What is the significance of Manas? Cannot the other Vijñānas do without this one acting, as it were, between the Ālaya and the other particularising six Vijñānas? This seems to be quite a natural question, seeing that the Manovijñāna can directly deal with the Ālaya without

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<sup>1</sup> P. 220 ff.



the interference of Manas. According to my way of interpreting the *Lankāvatāra*, which may not be correct, the Ālaya is a sort of universal consciousness, and Manas individual, empirical consciousness. In the Ālaya everything is stored, good and bad, in a state of quiescence and potentiality, but no discrimination, which latter, however, appears with the initiation of Manas. Manas is the active source of all the mental activities we ordinarily experience in this world of particulars. The possibility of consciousness lies in its dualistic nature, for without that which grasps (*grāhaka*) and that which is grasped (*grāhya*), there will be no conscious life. The duality of subject and object is fundamental, but this dualism is impossible without assuming behind it something which is not dual. Therefore, at the back of the six Vijñānas there must be Manas, the principle of individuation, and also the Ālaya, which goes even beyond the foundation of consciousness. When we admit that the six Vijñānas are fundamentally conditioned by the principle of individuation, we admit the existence of Manas. And when Manas is admitted, we inevitably go on to the Ālaya which allows itself to be reflected by Manas as its condition and yet at the same time transcends it because the Ālaya is not an individual object of experience but universal in its nature. And it is due to this universal nature of the Ālaya that all the individual Manas are capable of reflecting one and the same universe and of engaging in discussion. The Ālaya is thus most appropriately compared to the ocean.

This ocean of the Ālaya is disturbed by the wind of the particularising principle, psychologically known as Manas and epistemologically as Vishaya. While Manas is conceptually separable from the other six Vijñānas, it is practically involved in them. In our psychological life itself the whole Vijñāna system is engaged and we cannot very well talk individually of its components. So the *Lankāvatāra* is always careful to guard us from getting confused about this point: the Ālaya and the Vijñānas are different and yet not-different, i.e., one; without the Ālaya, the cause is lost and the whole mental apparatus collapses; and when that which makes the cause operative

ceases to get stirred up, the cause itself grows quiet though this does not mean its disappearance or destruction.

The Manas is the discriminating agency, but as this is possible only in the Ālaya, on which Manas with all its retinæ of Vijñānas is dependent, the Manas and the Ālaya are in the closest possible relationship. For this reason, the Ālaya is dependent upon Manas to grow conscious of itself and of its unity. On the other hand, the six Vijñānas cannot function in harmony with one another unless Manas comes in between them and the Ālaya. Manas is the connecting link. The position occupied by Manas in the system of Vijñānas is thus peculiarly complicated and apt to get confused sometimes with the Ālaya and sometimes with Manovijñāna. In the *Lankāvatāra*, the Ālaya is the reservoir of things good and bad, but it is perfectly neutral and not conscious of itself as there is yet no differentiation in it. This differentiation is caused by Manas, the defiling Vijñāna as it is sometimes called. The differentiation or defilement itself is neither good nor bad, but when this is adhered to as final, irreducible reality, there ensues the idea of an ego-substance internally and externally, and from this all evils are generated. As the result the mind loses its native tranquillity. What is now most needed is to cause a revolution (*parāvṛtti*) in the whole system of Vijñānas, especially in the Ālaya itself, which, contaminated by Manas and Manovijñāna, has had its neutrality, purity, and innocence all departed from itself. To look into the matter squarely and clearly is called to see *yathābhūtam*, which leads to emancipation and serenity.

#### *The Awakening of Prajñā.*

How do we get now Prajñā awakened in order to see into the true state of things, *yathābhūtam*? Where does this Prajñā come, and how do we attain self-realisation by directly experiencing the truth? And what is the truth? The sutra refers all the time to Prapañca (戲論), Parikalpa (妄計), Vikalpita (分別), Abhiniveśa (執着), Bhrānti (迷惑), Daushṭhulya (過惡), Vāsanā (習氣), etc., which are tossing up the roaring waves over the Ālaya-ocean; but when does Pratyātmāyājñāna get

its start so that the stormy sea will grow pacified and the world perceived without discrimination or disturbance of any kind? Says the sutra: "The Bodhisattva who aims to be great in his spiritual discipline is required to be perfect in the following four things: (1) He must have a penetrating comprehension (*vibhāvāna*) as regards the nature of the manifestation of mind; (2) He must be free (*vivarjana*) from such notions as birth, abiding, and destruction; (3) He must observe (*upalakṣhaṇa*) that external objects do not exist; and (4) He must get into (*abhilakṣhaṇa*) a state of realisation by directly seeing into the inmost self."<sup>1</sup> How could this be achieved?

If it were due to the coming in of the principle of particularisation or discrimination (*vikalpa*) that the Ālaya ceases to be the seat of Tathagatahood, and if without this principle no sentient beings could ever come to the perception of the Ālaya even in its disturbed, distorted, and altogether false reflections, it must be again this principle that will set us aright in the position in order to have a correct view of Ālaya. In other words, if it were the work of Manas and Manovijñāna that an external world came to be recognised as external, it must be their work again, properly executed this time, that we come to look at the world as having evolved out of our own being. Formerly, the Vijñāna got wrongly attached to the principle of particularisation and thus to the undesirable part of the Vāsanā, memory, in the Ālaya. There must be a turning of the waves, the course of Manas and Manovijñāna must be altered towards the other direction than that which has been pursued hitherto. If they thought of the Ālaya as external and subject to changes, they must now retrace their steps and look within themselves and see if there is anything that transcends the principle of particularisation. To transcend this principle, that is, for Manas and Manovijñāna to transcend themselves, means the obliteration of themselves, their disappearance from the field of operation, the going beyond the dualism of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, of *sat* and *asat*, one and many, particularity and

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 79-80.

universality. When this is accomplished, where do we find ourselves? Where is the ultimate abiding place for us? This is the abode of Tathagatahood, and belongs to the realm of Ālaya-vijñāna to be known as Tathāgata-garbha, and realisable only through immediate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*).<sup>1</sup> For this no more belongs to the sphere of logic and analysis, but an experience immediately attained within oneself (*pratyātma-gatigocara*). A knowledge that is not of particularisation and discrimination, must be one of direct experience in which the Ālaya reveals itself in its original purity and not in its distorted forms as it ordinarily does to the Vijñānas.

When we thus come to have an immediate knowledge of transcendental nature, the Vijñāna system ceases to be treated psychologically. We have now to go back to the chapter preceding this, where the so-called logical aspect of the inner experience is treated. The awakening of Prajñā which is non-discriminative knowledge (*nirvikalpa-jñā*) beyond the realm of mentation (*acīntya* or *acitta*), is a practical question in the *Lankāvatāra*, and this will be treated in what follows.

### PART III

#### *Discipline in Dhyāna*

The logical and psychological equipment must be followed up by practical discipline without which the Bodhisattva could not be more than an idealistic philosopher. "As all the sacred doctrines leave no room from option and doubt, let the Bodhisattva retire into a solitude and reflect within himself by means of intelligence (*buddhi*) which lies in his inmost mind, and not be led by anybody else, when he will free himself from views based upon discrimination and by degrees advance towards the state of Tathagatahood."<sup>2</sup> This not depending on another is emphasised not only in Mahayana literature but in the Āgamas

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<sup>1</sup> P. 222.

<sup>2</sup> P. 133; see also p. 155.

Nikāyas; for Buddhism is emphatically the doctrine of enlightenment which is to be realised within oneself. So, it is urged for the Bodhisattva who wishes to penetrate behind the screen of contrasts and dialectics that he should rid himself of all the hindrances (*nivāraṇa*) that may arise from noisy confusion, from heaviness of mind, and from sleepiness, and also that he should assiduously engage in disciplining himself throughout the night, not at all unindful of the philosophies of other schools,<sup>1</sup> including the Hinayanist.

Can the Bodhisattva, however, reach his goal by his own effort and without any outside assistance? Is there no "other power" that will come to his help? Here we come to one of the features of Mahayana Buddhism distinguishing itself from the Hinayana. The *Lankāvātāra* calls it the "Adhishṭhāna of all the Buddhas which issues from their Praṇidhāna."<sup>2</sup> Without this Adhishṭhāna on the part of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva with all his assiduity and penetrating insight may be incapable of realising the highest truth in himself and may not finally be taken up among the community of the Buddhas of the past, present, and future. *Adhishṭhāna* (*adhi+sthā*) means "basis," "position," "power," etc., translated into Chinese by 加持力 "the power that is added to and sustaining." It is the power emanating from the will of the Buddha whose loving heart embraces the whole universe, and is added to that of a Bodhisattva to sustain him, to encourage him, and finally to carry him over to a state of self-realisation. Not only in the present sutra but in other Mahayana sutras we frequently come across the sentence, "Through the Anubhāva or Prabhāva (that is, power) of the Buddha, a Bodhisattva rose from his seat and asked thus of the Buddha, or preached thus." This is a form of authorisation, but in the case of Adhishṭhāna, it is more than that, for here the Buddha's power sustains the Bodhisattva throughout his long laborious career of discipleship. Read the following:<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 49, 99.

<sup>2</sup> P. 49 f.

<sup>3</sup> P. 100 ff.

“And again, O Mahāmati, sustained in two ways by the power (*adhishṭtāna*) of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattva falls down at their feet and asks them to settle controversial points for him. What are the two ways? The one is the power by which the Bodhisattva is made to attain states of mental tranquillisation, and the other is that by which the Buddha personally appears before the Bodhisattva and anoints him with his own hands.

“It is thus due to the power of the Buddha that the Bodhisattva at the first stage attains the Samadhi known as the Light of the Mahāyāna, and that having attained this Samadhi the Bodhisattva finds himself now blessed by the personal presence of all the Buddhas from the ten quarters who will with their own body and speech add their power upon him. It is like the case with the Bodhisattva Vajragarbha and others who are furnished with all these meritorious attributes.

“O Mahāmati, in this wise the Bodhisattva at the first stage gets sustained by the power of the Buddhas in his attainment of the states of tranquillisation. In virtue of a stock of merit accumulated for hundreds of thousands of kalpas, he will in succession go up the stages, and qualifying himself with the virtues of perfect control, reach the stage of Bodhisattvahood called Dharmamegha (Cloud of the Law). Seating himself on a throne in the Palace of the Great Lotus, he is surrounded by Bodhisattvas like himself and wears a tiara adorned and embellished with all kinds of jewels. The Buddhas will now come from all the ten quarters of the universe, who are shining like the brilliant full-moon with yellowish, golden, champaka-like rays, and with their lotus-like hands anoint the forehead of the Bodhisattva seated on the throne in the lotus palace. He is like the crown-prince of a great sovereign, who, being thus anointed by the Buddhas personally with their own hands, assume full power. This Bodhisattva and such others are said to be sustained, thus hand-anointed, by the power of the Buddhas. These are the two ways in which the Bodhisattva is sustained by the power of the Buddha; and when he is thus sustained he will see all the Buddhas face to face. In no other way, the Tathagatas, Arhats, the Fully-Enlightened Ones are to be seen.

“And again, O Mahāmati, whatever the Bodhisattva accomplishes in the way of Samadhi, psychic attainments, or preaching, is thus done by being sustained in two ways by the power of the Buddhas. If the Bodhisattva could at all preach intelligently without being sustained by the power of the Buddhas, the ignorant would also preach intelligently. Why? The question hangs on whether or not one is sustained by the Buddhas’ power. Being sustained by the entrance of the Tathagata into them, [the whole universe with its] grasses, shrubs, trees, and even mountains, and also [with its] musical instruments of all kinds, utensils, towns, dwellings, palaces, and seats,—all will play music. How much more so with conscious beings! The deaf, blind, and mute will be emancipated from their defects. Suchwise is the power of the Tathagata, so distinctive, and so full of great virtues.

“Mahāmati asked, Why do the Tathagatas sustain the Bodhisattva by their power when he abides in his states of tranquillisation as well as when he is at the superior stage? Said the Blessed One: It is to keep him away from the evil one and from evil passions, it is to let him not fall into the Dhyana and stage of the Śrāvakas, but to make him attain to the self-realisation of the Tathagata-stage and grow in the virtues already acquired by him. For this reason, the Bodhisattva is sustained by the power of all the Tathagatas. O Mahāmati, if he is not thus sustained he may fall into the way of thinking as cherished by bad philosophers, Śrāvakas, and the evil one, and will not be enlightened in the Supreme Enlightenment. For this reason, the Bodhisattva is favoured by the Tathagatas who are Arhats and Fully-Enlightened Ones.”<sup>1</sup>

The conception of Prāṇidhāna which is usually translated 誓願 or simply 願, “vow,” is again peculiar to the Mahayana. A Bodhisattva generally makes a number of vows before he begins his career as a world-teacher; for his desire to realise the final stage of Buddhahood is not for his own benefit but for the whole world. The forty-eight vows of Dharmākara are one

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 100-103, abstract.

of such cases, who became Amitābha Buddha the world-saviour when his vows were all fulfilled. But, generally speaking, the Bodhisattva's universal vow or prayer is that all his fellow-beings, inclusive even of non-sentient beings, sooner or later, attain to the supreme enlightenment of the Buddha, and his work towards this end never ceases. The *Lankāvatāra* does not tell us so much about awakening the thought of enlightenment, (*bodhi-citta-utpāda*),—in fact I think there is not one reference to this idea; when Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi is mentioned, it refers to its attainment and not to the awakening of thought towards it. But in the *Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras* and others this awakening is constantly spoken of as the first step towards gaining access to the final truth of Tathagatahood. The *Lankāvatāra*, however, describes the Buddha's part in the purification of the hearts or minds of all beings by raising a question as to the time needed for the work. Mahāmāti asks, "Is the cleansing effected by the Buddha instantaneous or gradual—the cleansing of all beings from the out-flowings (or disturbances) of the Mind (*svacitta-dṛṣṭya-dhārā*)?" To this the Buddha gives the following answer, according to which his cleansing takes effect sometimes instantaneously, sometimes gradually.<sup>1</sup> The word "sometimes" is missing in the passage quoted, but we have I think to supply it in order to make the sense not too glaringly contradictory. In fact, the reading of the *Lankāvatāra* is no easy task as I remarked in the beginning of this paper, and in many cases varied interpretations are possible.<sup>2</sup>

Mahāmāti asked, "When the mind is cleaned of its own flow of external manifestations, is it done all at once or by degrees?" Said the Buddha: "The cleansing is done by degrees, not all at once. It is like the ripening of the amra fruit which takes place gradually and not at once. It is again like the potter's making pots, it is done gradually and not at once. The Tathagata's cleansing of all beings of their minds from which external manifestations flow, is carried out by

<sup>1</sup> Mainly after the T'ang version. Cf. pp. 55–56, Nanjio edition.

<sup>2</sup> There is no doubt that the sutra makes no pretensions to a system.



degrees and not all at once. It is again like the shooting of grass, shrub, herb, or a thicket on earth, it is gradual and not at once; so does the Tathagata cleanse all beings of their mental outflows. It is again like one's learning the arts of dancing, singing, writing, playing the lute, etc.; it is mastered by degrees and not all at once: so does the Tathagata his cleansing work.

“[But sometimes the cleansing is done at once and not by degrees] as in the case of the mirror's reflecting all forms simultaneously and without discrimination. In a similar way, the Tathagata cleanses the minds of all beings from their outflowing manifestations, making them at once pure and free from discrimination and leading them to a state of no-images. Again, as the sun or the moon illumines all forms and appearances at once with its beams of light, so does the Tathagata reveal at once the spiritual state of Buddhahood which is the object of intuitive knowledge (*acintyajñāna*) by befreeing all beings of their self-imagined manifestations, errors, and habit-energy (*vāsanaā*). Again, as the Ālaya-vijñāna reveals simultaneously an external world of individual objects as manifestations of one's own mind, so the Nishyanda-Buddha,<sup>1</sup> at once maturing all beings, enables them to discipline themselves as religious devotees at their abodes in the celestial palace of Akanishṭha. Again, as the Dharmatā-Buddha shines instantly with the light of the Nishyanda-Buddha and the Nirmāṇa-Buddha, so does the inner realisation of the ultimate truth shine forth all at once, going beyond the wrong views based upon ideas of being and not-being.”

*The Will-body (manomayakāya)*

No definite statement of the Triple Body dogma is found in the *Lankāvatāra*, but all the component ideas seem to be present as is recognisable here: Dharmatā-Buddha, Nishyanda-Buddha, and Nirmāṇa-Buddha, which apparently correspond to the later trinity of Dharma-kāya, Sambhoga-kāya, and Nirmāna-kāya. It may be interesting to discuss here the development

<sup>1</sup> For the explanation of this see *supra*.

of the dogma if the author was not going to restrict himself to such topics in the *Lankāvatāra* as are more or less directly connected with the absolute idealism developed in the sutra and with the intuitive knowledge of the truth which is its principal theme—these being the foundation of Zen Buddhism. He wishes, however, to touch upon the idea of Nirmāṇa-Buddha as it is closely related to that of Prapīdhāna, the Bodhisattva's vow. Being thoroughly idealistic, whatever is most vehemently desired by the Buddha or Bodhisattva whose interest extends over the whole field of beings, must take effect in one way or another in this world even of our ordinary life. To have, however, a wish carried out successfully, one may have frequently to step over the limitations of this physical body, which is tied to space-time relations. A body not so limited will be needed in this case,—a body that can be manifested anywhere and at any time as is wished. The Buddha or Bodhisattva has this body known as Manomayakāya, which means “mind-made-body,” or simply “will-body.”

The definition of Manomayakāya (意生身 or 意成身), according to the *Lankāvatāra*, is this: “By *manomaya* [‘as willed’] it is meant to move about so speedily and unobstructedly as one wills. Like the mind that moves unobstructedly over mountains, walls, rivers, trees, and other objects, even beyond many hundreds of thousands of *yojanas*, by merely thinking of objects seen and perceived previously, with its own thought continuously and uninterruptedly working regardless of the limitations of the body; so when the Manomayakāya is obtained in the realisation of the Samadhi known as Māyopama [Māyā-like], he acquires the ten powers (*bala*) the tenfold self-mastery (*vaśīta*), and the six psychic faculties (*abhijñāna*), is adorned with the distinguishing marks, and born among the family of Holy Path, and, thinking of the objects of his original vow which is to bring all beings to full maturity, moves about as unobstructedly as the mind moves on.”<sup>1</sup>

The three kinds of Manomayakāya (“will-body”) is dis-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 81.

tinguished in the *Lankāvatāra* somewhat foreshadowing the later systematisation of the Triple Body dogma: The three are (1) the will-body attainable in the bliss of Samadhi, (2) the will-body that has the knowledge of the self-nature of the Dharma, and (3) the will-body whose deeds are not calculative, being born among the order of holy ones. The first kind is the product of a perfect mental control which takes place as the Bodhisattva goes up through the third, the fourth, and the fifth stage of spiritual discipline, and realises that the mind in its true nature is above its evolved Vijñānas and seeing into the phenomenality of objects is tranquil like the ocean undisturbed by the waves. The second form comes from a deep penetration into the truth of all things, which is enjoyed by the Bodhisattva above the eighth stage; for as he perceives that all things being mere appearances are like māyā and non-entities, there takes place a turning in the recesses of his consciousness, and he enters into the Samadhi called Māyopama and then into other Samadhis; he is now adorned with flowers, with various attributes such as the tenfold self-mastery and the six psychic faculties, moves as quickly as thought itself, and the body attained now is like lunar reflection in water or an image in the mirror or a vision in a dream, it is not made of the four elements and yet resembles one so made, it is furnished with all the parts of the material body; he will now enter into all the Buddha-lands, their circles and assemblies. As he has thus perfectly penetrated into the nature of the Dharma, he has the second form of the will-body. The third will-body comes from deeply experiencing the bliss and character of the inner realisation enjoyed by all Buddhas.”<sup>1</sup>

The inner realisation (*pratyātmadharmā*) here referred to is a common property of all the Buddhas, and when a Bodhisattva obtains this insight into his inmost being, he has thereby obtained the passport into the spiritual community of all the Buddhas, past, present and future. If a critic insists that this subjectivism ought to be verified objectively, i.e., must have some

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<sup>1</sup> Pp. 136-137, abstract.

objective ground on which the experience is to be set up, the *Lankāvatāra* says that there is what is to be called Paurāṇasthiti-dharmatā, something that has been in existence from the timeless past, or thingness that abides eternally in things, or an absolute reality that exists regardless of the appearance or non-appearance of the Buddhas. This reality exists in the world as gold exists concealed in the ore, for it is this that makes things abide, makes them arrange themselves in order and establish a realm among themselves, and constitutes their essence. It is eternally there. It is the suchness of things.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, when the Bodhisattvas or Buddhas attain to the realisation, the experience is not something altogether new to them. It is an old story, as it were. It is like walking in an old city which one happens to discover in the midst of the desert. The streets are smoothly paved as ever. One enters into it, and quietly enjoys a peaceful life. The Buddha did not create these things, they have been there from the beginning. The Dharma he has an insight into is something enduring (*dharmasthititā*), a regulative principle (*dharmaniyāmatā*), and suchness of things (*tathatā*), reality (*bhūtata*), truth (*satyatā*). And it was for this reason that the Buddha declared that ever since his enlightenment night he had not uttered a word.<sup>2</sup> This is indeed, according to the *Lankāvatāra*, the esoteric teaching (*saṃdhāya*) or Buddhism.<sup>3</sup>

The conception of Paurāṇasthiti-dharmatā, or Pūrvadharmasthititā<sup>4</sup> is the doctrine of universal Ālaya-vijñāna, ontologically stated. The Pratyātmagati consists in realising this originally-abiding Dharma, which is variously described as Tathāgata-garbha, the Ālaya, suchness of things, which is beyond the signs of speech, analysis, and description, and in which all the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and sentient beings get united, have an ever-enduring community—Nirvana. But the function of the Bodhisattva is not to stay forever in this happy society but to come

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<sup>1</sup> P. 143.

<sup>2</sup> See also above.

<sup>3</sup> P. 144.

<sup>4</sup> P. 241.

all the roots of merit and do not enter into Nirvana. The second group is that of the Bodhisattva, who wishing to lead all beings to Nirvana denies himself this bliss. He vowed in the beginning of his religious career that until every one of his fellow-beings is led to enjoy the eternal happiness of Nirvana he himself would not leave this world of pain and suffering, but must strenuously and with every possible means (*upāya*) work towards the completion of his mission. But as there will be no termination of life as long as the universe continues to exist, the Bodhisattva may have no chance for ever to rest himself quietly with his work finished in the serenity of Nirvana. The time will come even to those evil speakers of the Bodhisattvayāna when through the power (*adhishṭhāna*) of the Buddhas they finally embrace the Mahayana and by amassing stock of merit enter into Nirvana, for the Buddhas are always working for the benefit of all beings no matter what they are. But as for the Bodhisattva he never enters into Nirvana as he has a deep insight into the nature of things which are already in Nirvana even as they are. (*Bodhisattvecchantiko 'tra mahāmate ādīparinirvṛitān-sarva-dharmān-viditva-atyantato na parinirvāti*).<sup>1</sup>

Thus we know where the Bodhisattva stands in his never-ending task of leading all beings into the final abode of rest. So, says the sutra: "He will through his ten never-ending vows bring all beings to maturity, and, manifesting himself in various forms in response to the needs of all beings, will never know where to rest from his task; and yet his mind is always abiding in the state of self-realisation and in the enjoyment of perfect meditation."<sup>2</sup>

#### *The Bodhisattva's Vows and His Effortless Works*

According to his transcendental insight into the truth of things, the Bodhisattva knows that it is beyond all predicates and altogether not subject to any form of description, but his heart full of Karuṇā (love) for all beings who are unable to

<sup>1</sup> P. 66.

<sup>2</sup> P. 123; see also p. 214.

step out of the dualistic whirlpools of *sat* and *asat*, he directs his intense vows towards their salvation and emancipation. His own heart is free from such attachments as are ordinarily cherished by the unemancipated, but that which feels is here after all, his insight has not destroyed this, and hence his Pūrvapraṇidhāna, his Upāyakaushalya, his Nirmāṇa-kāya. Yet all that he does for the maturity (*paripācana*) of all beings in response to their needs, is like the lunar reflection in water (*jalacandrat*),<sup>1</sup> showing himself in all forms and appearances he preaches to them on the Dharma. His activity is what is in Mahayana phraseology called Anabhogacarya, deeds that are effortless, effectless, and purposeless, which correspond to the Christian love of God.

When the Bodhisattva enters upon the first stage called Joy, Pramuditā, in the career of his spiritual discipline, he makes the following solemn vows, Praṇidhāna, ten in number, which, flowing out of his most earnest determined will, are as all-inclusive as the whole universe, extending to the extremity of space itself, reaching the end of time, exhausting all the number of kalpas (ages), and functioning uninterruptedly as long as there is the appearance of a Buddha. The first is to honour and serve all the Buddhas, one and all, without a single exception; the second is to work for the preservation and perpetuation of the teaching of all the Buddhas; the third is to be present at the appearance of each Buddha, wherever and whenever it may be; the fourth is to practise the proper conduct of Bodhisattvahood which is wide and measureless, imperishable and free from impurities, and to extend the virtues of perfection towards all beings; the fifth is to induce all beings in the most comprehensive sense of the term to the teaching of the Buddhas so that they will find their final abode of peace in the wisdom of the all-wise ones; the sixth is to have an inner perception of the universe, wide and inexhaustible, in all its possible multitudinousness; the seventh is to realise the most closely interpenetrating relationship of each and all, of all and each, and to make

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<sup>1</sup> P. 227, p. 193, etc.

every land of beings as immaculate as a Buddha-land; the eighth is to be united with all the Bodhisattvas in oneness of intention, to get intimately acquainted with the dignity, understanding, and psychic condition of the Tathagatas, so that he can enter any society of beings and accomplish the Mahāyāna which is beyond thought; the ninth is to evolve the never-receding wheel whereby to carry out his work of universal salvation, by making himself like unto the great lord of medicine or the wish-fulfilling gem; and lastly, the tenth is to realise the great supreme enlightenment in all the worlds, by going through the stages of Buddhahood, and to gratify the wishes of all beings with one voice, and while showing himself to be in Nirvana, not to cease from practising objects of Bodhisattvahood.<sup>1</sup>

These ten vows or prayers made by the Bodhisattva at the beginning of his spiritual career, that is, when he has entered upon the first stage of Bodhisattvahood or rather Buddhist life, called Pramuditā, do not quite describe the inner consciousness of the Bodhisattva in its deepest signification; for he has not yet entered a stage of Anabhoga-carya where all his conscious efforts are dropped and he moves about as the sun shines on the unjust as well as on the just, or as the moon in water. While a great compassionate heart (*mahākaruṇā*) is always the most powerful driving force throughout his spiritual progress, he may not attain to a higher stage unless his heart transcends dualism and his behaviour leaves no taint of discrimination (*vikalpa*). Up to the seventh stage (called Dūramgama) of Buddhist life, the Bodhisattva has not been free from the sense of making effort for the attainment of a certain definite object, he has so far always been conscious of strain and strenuousness, he has been making a definite attempt at accomplishing something, at bringing forth some tangible result as the outcome of

<sup>1</sup> This is a mere abstract. For details see the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, edited by J. Rahder, pp. 14-16. Also cf. the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, translated into English by E. Bendall and H. W. D. Rouse, pp. 265-268. Quite interesting it is to compare the English version with the various Chinese translations of the *Daśabhūmika sūtra* as an independent text and also as one of the chapters in the *Avatamsaka sūtra*.

his labour. But he has now completed this part of his work, he has now graduated, so to speak, from an effortful life (*prayogicarya*), he is now on the way to a life of Anabhogacarya, where no efforts are made, no consciousness of strain is left though he is far from being a sleepy lithargic good-for-nothing fellow now.<sup>1</sup>

So we read in the *Avatamsaka sūtra*, or in the *Daśabhūmika sūtra*,<sup>1</sup> that up to the seventh stage the Bodhisattva has been trying not to be affected or contaminated by a life of evil passions (*kleśa*), but has not yet been able to go beyond it (*samatikram*). He is like a great king who goes around riding on a fine elephant. He knows thus that there are many poverty-stricken people in his country, but he himself has no fear of getting mixed among these unhappy creatures. He is quite free indeed from such contamination, but he cannot be said to be a super-man who has passed beyond the frailty of a mortal being. He can attain to this transcendental state only by abandoning his kingly position and being born in the Brahman world, where, enveloped in the celestial light, he looks down at thousands of worlds and freely walks through them. The Bodhisattva, up to the seventh stage, has gone through the world riding in the carriage of the Pāramitās, virtues of perfection, and due to these virtues he has been kept away from the contamination of this world though he knows well that there are defiled lives enough here. But he cannot be called yet to be one who has gone altogether beyond evil passions and deeds following them. If, however, he abandons all his conscious strivings or purposeful efforts, that is, if he finally passes from the seventh to the eighth stage, and, riding in the Bodhisattva's carriage of immaculacy, walks through the world, free from contaminations, he is really the one who has altogether gone beyond.

When thus the Bodhisattva, discarding all effortful works (*sarvabhogavigata*), attains to the effortless state of consciousness, he enters upon the eighth stage known as Acala, the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rahder, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Rahder, p. 58.



Immovable. But we must remember that effortlessness is the outcome of intense efforts, and that when the former is not preceded by the latter, it will never be realised. Says the *Daśabhūmika*:<sup>1</sup> It is like a man who in a dream finds himself drowning in a river; he musters all his courage and is determined at all costs to get out of it. And because of these very efforts and desperate contrivances he is awakened from the dream, and when thus awakened he at once perceives that no further doings are needed now. So with the Bodhisattva: just because of the great determination and the great strivings that he has put forward in order to save all beings from getting drowned in the river of ignorance and confusion, he has at last reached the eighth stage, and once here all his conscious efforts are set aside, his perception is not obstructed by dualistic considerations, nor by appearances.

This effortlessness is again compared in the *Daśabhūmika*<sup>2</sup> to a great seafaring boat. When the boat is not yet at sea, much labour is needed to make it move forward. But as soon as it gets out in the ocean, no human power is required; just let alone and the wind will take care of it. One day's navigation thus left to itself at high sea will surely be more than equal to one hundred years' human belabouring while still on the shallows. When the Bodhisattva accumulating the great stock of good deeds sails out in the great ocean of Bodhisattvahood, one moment of his effortless activity infinitely surpasses deeds of conscious striving.

By these analogies, the reader will be able to form some idea as to the significance in Buddhism of a life of effortlessness. When the Bodhisattva reaches this stage of Buddhist life he is said to be standing on the stage of immovability (*acala*), for he has now realised Anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. This is defined in the following terms in the *Daśabhūmika*<sup>3</sup> showing where is the spiritual background of Anabhoga-carya, which is really the quintessence of Bodhisattvahood:

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<sup>1</sup> Rahder, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> Rahder, p. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Rahder, p. 63 f.

“The Bodhisattva Vajragarbha said, O venerable sir, son of the Buddha, when the Bodhisattva, while at the seventh stage, has thoroughly finished examining what is meant by the knowledge of the means (*upāyajñāna*), has well cleansed the paths, has accumulated all the preparatory material, has well equipped himself with the vows, and is sustained by the power of the Tathagatas, procuring in himself the power produced from the stock of merit, attentively thinking of and in conformity with the powers, convictions, and unique characteristics of the Tathagata, thoroughly purified, sincere in heart, and thoughtful, elevated in virtue, knowledge, and power, great in pity and compassion which leaves no sentient beings unnoticed, and in pursuit of the path of wisdom that is beyond measurement; and, further, when he enters, truly, as it is, upon the knowledge that all things are, in their nature, from the first, unborn (*anutpanna*), unproduced (*ajāta*), devoid of individualising marks (*alākṣhaṇa*), have never been combined (*asambhūta*), are never dissolved (*avināśita*), nor extinguished (*anishṭhita*), nor changing (*aprayṛitti*), nor ceasing (*anābhiniṣṛitti*), and are lacking in self-substance (*abhāvasvabhāva*); the knowledge that they remain the same in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, are of suchness, non-discriminative, and entering into the knowledge of the all-knowing one, [and finally] when he thus enters upon the knowledge of all things as they really are, he gets himself completely free from such individualising ideas as are created by the mind (*citta*) and its agent (*manovijñāna*); he is as detached as the sky, and descends upon all objects as if upon an empty space; he is then said to have attained to the acceptance of all things as unborn (*anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*).”

This may seem from the point of view of ordinary terminology almost too abstract, too metaphysical, but to those who are well acquainted with the Mahayanistic way of thinking and feeling, the definition of Anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti here quoted from the *Daśabhūmika* is exact and adequately describes the highest object of Buddhist life as far as this kind of phraseology allows. In the *Lankāvatāra*, the same ideas are more concretely expressed from another angle by means of an analogy,

though the sutra says that such analogies do not do justice to the true state of affairs. The truth as intuitively seen by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas surpasses all symbolism and beyond the understanding of the ordinary mind, but when some indications are not given, the truth may forever be kept away from us, perhaps worse than that, will be vilified and denounced to our own spiritual ruination. The analogy has already<sup>1</sup> been quoted when Tathagatahood was compared to the sands of the Ganga.

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There are some other important points in the *Lankāvatāra* to which I wish to refer if this paper were intended to exhaust the sutra even as one of the principal Mahayana texts, but my object has been from the start to treat it as most intimately connected with Zen Buddhism, and, therefore, as containing some of the most salient ideas of Zen. Therefore, I opened this article with an account of Pratyātmagatigocara which forms the central thesis of the *Lankāvatāra* and also the object of Zen discipline. No doubt, all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism (and for that matter the Hinayana too) aim at gaining an immediate personal insight into the essence of Buddhahood, but this aspect of Buddhist life I find more clearly and emphatically and straightforwardly brought out in the *Lankāvatāra* than any other sutras. But as all religion requires a philosophical background without which it limps, I have tried to show how the *Lankāvatāra* gives a logical and a psychological account of the inmost experience called throughout the sutra Pratyātmāryaj-ñānagocara. With this the theoretical side of Zen Buddhism finishes while its active side is to be developed if it has to bear fruit in this practical life. Hence towards the end of this paper I have tried to describe the disciplinary life of the Buddhist as presented in the sutra.

Buddhist nomenclature is frequently too intellectual and the Indians have their own peculiar way of presenting their ideas; and for this reason one is apt to regard the Mahayana as

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<sup>1</sup> See page 241 et seq. of this magazine.

a philosophy too abstract and too high-flying and not at all religious; but the fact is that the Mahayana stands on two legs. Prajñā and Karuṇā, transcendental idealism and all-embracing affection for all kinds of beings, animate as well as inanimate. The former sees into the unity of things, and the latter the diversity. The Bodhisattva weeps with suffering beings and at the same time realises that there is one that never weeps, being above sufferings, tribulations, and contaminations. Buddhist life finds its perfect realisation in a harmonious blending of the two terms: philosophically, the one and the many, *sat* and *asat*; religiously the pure and the defiled. And this balancing is found in the Bodhisattva's Prañidhāna or vow. "There are two worlds, the defiled and the immaculate, and between the two there is no way to cross from the one to the other, except by means of the Bodhisattva's great vow, knowledge of means (*upāya-prajñā*), and the power of psychic penetration."<sup>1</sup>

DIASETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

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<sup>1</sup> *The Daśabhāṃika Sūtra*. Cf. Rahder, p. 58.